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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2016

Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

Cotton, William B.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Space station crew safety: Human factors interaction model

A model of the various human factors issues and interactions that might affect crew safety is developed. The first step addressed systematically the central question: How is this space station different from all other spacecraft? A wide range of possible issue was identified and researched. Five major topics of human factors issues that interacted with crew safety resulted: Protocols, Critical Habitability, Work Related Issues, Crew Incapacitation and Personal Choice. Second, an interaction model was developed that would show some degree of cause and effect between objective environmental or operational conditions and the creation of potential safety hazards. The intermediary steps between these two extremes of causality were the effects on human performance and the results of degraded performance. The model contains three milestones: stressor, human performance (degraded) and safety hazard threshold. Between these milestones are two countermeasure intervention points. The first opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against stress. If this countermeasure fails, performance degrades. The second opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against error. If this second countermeasure fails, the threshold of a potential safety hazard may be crossed.

Cohen, M. M.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Space Station crew safety - Human factors model

A model of the various human factors issues and interactions that might affect crew safety is developed. The first step addressed systematically the central question: How is this Space Station different from all other spacecraft? A wide range of possible issue was identified and researched. Five major topics of human factors issues that interacted with crew safety resulted: Protocols, Critical Habitability, Work Related Issues, Crew Incapacitation and Personal Choice. Second, an interaction model was developed that would show some degree of cause and effect between objective environmental or operational conditions and the creation of potential safety hazards. The intermediary steps between these two extremes of causality were the effects on human performance and the results of degraded performance. The model contains three milestones: stressor, human performance (degraded) and safety hazard threshold. Between these milestones are two countermeasure intervention points. The first opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against stress. If this countermeasure fails, performance degrades. The second opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against error. If this second countermeasure fails, the threshold of a potential safety hazard may be crossed.

Cohen, M. M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Resilient Autonomy in the Face of Adversity

The NASA Resilient Autonomy Project developed a software framework that implemented a Run Time Assurance (RTA) architecture that leveraged ASTM International’s F3269 Industry Standard for safely bounding complex behavior in aircraft. This framework was called the Expandable Variable Autonomy Architecture, or EVAA. EVAA was developed during the height of the Covid-19 lockdown that caused the Resilient Autonomy team to pivot from flight test to distributed simulator testing. EVAA was developed to be platform and mission agnostic where platform specifics were behind a hardware abstraction layer that EVAA called a Coupler. EVAA was able to host multiple safety monitors that could resolve individual safety hazards. EVAA was able to resolve priority conflicts when multiple safety hazards needed to be resolved simultaneously and was able to resolve highly complex situations in a safe manner that could exceed human capabilities.

Ethan Williams↗
DOE OSTI2023

3D Virtual Simulation for Radiation Safety and Hazards Identification Training

This presentation will be presented at CAES codebreaker session on May 4th. The slides include two projects that demonstrate how virtual training can benefit from visualization technology. One is a collaboration project between the Applied Visualization Laboratory and College of Eastern Idaho for radiation safety and survey training. The other one is Idaho National Laboratory's hazards identification online training that utilized LiDAR technology.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1977

Rocket propulsion hazard summary: Safety classification, handling experience and application to space shuttle payload

The DOT classification for transportation, the military classification for quantity distance, and hazard compatibility grouping used to regulate the transportation and storage of explosives are presented along with a discussion of tests used in determining sensitivity of propellants to an impact/shock environment in the absence of a large explosive donor. The safety procedures and requirements of a Scout launch vehicle, Western and Eastern Test Range, and the Minuteman, Delta, and Poseidon programs are reviewed and summarized. Requirements of the space transportation system safety program include safety reviews from the subsystem level to the completed payload. The Scout safety procedures will satisfy a portion of these requirements but additional procedures need to be implemented to comply with the safety requirements for Shuttle operation from the Eastern Test Range.

Pennington, D. F.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Analysis of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR)

Safety analyses of the Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR) Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) application are provided to establish its Failure Effects Classification which affects certification and operational approval requirements. TASAR was developed by NASA Langley Research Center to offer flight path improvement opportunities to the pilot during flight for operational benefits (e.g., reduced fuel, flight time). TASAR, using own-ship and network-enabled information concerning the flight and its environment, including weather and Air Traffic Control (ATC) system constraints, provides recommended improvements to the flight trajectory that the pilot can choose to request via Change Requests to ATC for revised clearance. This study reviews the Change Request process of requesting updates to the current clearance, examines the intended function of TASAR, and utilizes two safety assessment methods to establish the Failure Effects Classification of TASAR. Considerable attention has been given in this report to the identification of operational hazards potentially associated with TASAR.

Koczo, Stefan, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1971

Orbiting propellent depot safety. Volume 2: Technical discussion

The results of a study assessing the gross requirements and concomitant safety hazards associated with the operation of several configurations of orbiting propellant depots (OPD) are presented. The major structural and operational aspects of the integral, semimodular, and modular concepts are described. The concepts are evaluated to determine their safety hazards, and emphasis is placed on propellant transfer to and from the OPD. The study indicates that a modular mode of depot resupply is desirable regardless of the OPD configuration. This resupply mode requires no flow transfer to resupply either the semimodular or modular OPD. Of the three concepts, the semimodular appears to provide the best operational advantage and lowest safety risk.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2012

SURF IA Conflict Detection and Resolution Algorithm Evaluation

The Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF IA) algorithm was evaluated in a fast-time batch simulation study at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Langley Research Center. SURF IA is designed to increase flight crew situation awareness of the runway environment and facilitate an appropriate and timely response to potential conflict situations. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the performance of the SURF IA algorithm under various runway scenarios, multiple levels of conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) system equipage, and various levels of horizontal position accuracy. This paper gives an overview of the SURF IA concept, simulation study, and results. Runway incursions are a serious aviation safety hazard. As such, the FAA is committed to reducing the severity, number, and rate of runway incursions by implementing a combination of guidance, education, outreach, training, technology, infrastructure, and risk identification and mitigation initiatives [1]. Progress has been made in reducing the number of serious incursions - from a high of 67 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 to 6 in FY2010. However, the rate of all incursions has risen steadily over recent years - from a rate of 12.3 incursions per million operations in FY2005 to a rate of 18.9 incursions per million operations in FY2010 [1, 2]. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also considers runway incursions to be a serious aviation safety hazard, listing runway incursion prevention as one of their most wanted transportation safety improvements [3]. The NTSB recommends that immediate warning of probable collisions/incursions be given directly to flight crews in the cockpit [4].

Jones, Denise R.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Runtime Assurance of Aeronautical Products: Preliminary Recommendations

Runtime assurance (RTA) affords an operational layer of protection against safety hazards to aeronautical products that may include less trusted or untrusted functions. However, any RTA scheme must itself be trusted before it can be deployed into use: i.e., it must be fit for its intended purpose, and it must not itself introduce safety hazards. This report contains preliminary recommendations on the application and integration of RTA into aeronautical products intended for use in civil aviation. The main purpose of these recommendations is to inform regulatory guidance and consensus standards that may be used to meet the safety intent of the applicable regulations.

Runtime assurance↗
DOE OSTI2024

Titanium Wire Arc Additive Manufacturing Inert Enclosure and Material Handling Safety Considerations

Wire arc additive manufacturing (WAAM) via metal inert gas (MIG)/gas metal arc welding (GMAW) is a viable option for fabrication of large-scale titanium parts; however, it introduces new safety hazards associated with both the material and the additional system hardware required for the process. Localized gas shielding of the weld arc via standard GMAW torch is inadequate for titanium due to its affinity for oxygen; thereby requiring the use of an inert enclosure to protect the weld from entraining oxygen. The use of the inert enclosure presents potential safety hazards such as operator asphyxiation and brings up discussion of confined space considerations. In addition, the titanium welding process creates pyrophoric titanium soot residue around the deposit, which can undergo deflagration during part cleaning and part removal. This paper provides an overview of the titanium WAAM process along with safety considerations for the design and operation of the inert enclosure as well as functional solutions for the safe handling of the titanium soot by-product.

Walters, Alex↗
NASA NTRS2011

An Overview of NASA Engine Ice-Crystal Icing Research

Ice accretions that have formed inside gas turbine engines as a result of flight in clouds of high concentrations of ice crystals in the atmosphere have recently been identified as an aviation safety hazard. NASA s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) has made plans to conduct research in this area to address the hazard. This paper gives an overview of NASA s engine ice-crystal icing research project plans. Included are the rationale, approach, and details of various aspects of NASA s research.

Addy, Harold E., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Screening Li-Ion Batteries for Internal Shorts

The extremely high cost of aerospace battery failures due to internal shorts makes it essential that their occurrence be very rare, if not eliminated altogether. With Li-ion cells/batteries, the potentially catastrophic safety hazard that some internal shorts present adds additional incentive for prevention. Prevention can be achieved by design, manufacturing measures, and testing. Specifically for NASA s spacesuit application, a Li-ion polymer pouch cell battery design is in its final stages of production. One of the 20 flight batteries fabricated and tested developed a cell internal short, which did not present a safety hazard, but has required revisiting the entire manufacturing and testing process. Herein are the details of the failure investigation that followed to get to root cause of the internal short and the corrective actions that will be taken. The resulting lessons learned are applicable to most Li-ion battery applications.

Darcy, Eric↗
DOE OSTI2021

In situ observation of thermal-driven degradation and safety concerns of lithiated graphite anode

Abstract Graphite, a robust host for reversible lithium storage, enabled the first commercially viable lithium-ion batteries. However, the thermal degradation pathway and the safety hazards of lithiated graphite remain elusive. Here, solid-electrolyte interphase (SEI) decomposition, lithium leaching, and gas release of the lithiated graphite anode during heating were examined by in situ synchrotron X-ray techniques and in situ mass spectroscopy. The source of flammable gas such as H 2 was identified and quantitively analyzed. Also, the existence of highly reactive residual lithium on the graphite surface was identified at high temperatures. Our results emphasized the critical role of the SEI in anode thermal stability and uncovered the potential safety hazards of the flammable gases and leached lithium. The anode thermal degradation mechanism revealed in the present work will stimulate more efforts in the rational design of anodes to enable safe energy storage.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
NASA NTRS1974

Bibliography on aircraft fire hazards and safety. Volume 2: Safety. Part 1: Key numbers 1 to 524

Bibliographic citations are presented to describe and define aircraft safety methods, equipment, and criteria. Some of the subjects discussed are: (1) fire and explosion suppression using whiffle balls, (2) ultraviolet flame detecting sensors, (3) evaluation of flame arrestor materials for aircraft fuel systems, (4) crash fire prevention system for supersonic commercial aircraft, and (5) fire suppression for aerospace vehicles.

Pelouch, J. J., Jr.↗