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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1995

Building a Successful Security Infrastructure: What You Want vs. What You Need vs. What You Can Afford

With the fast growing popularity of the Internet, many organizations are racing to get onto the on-ramp to the Information Superhighway. However, with frequent headlines such as 'Hackers' break in at General Electric raises questions about the Net's Security', 'Internet Security Imperiled - Hackers steal data that could threaten computers world-wide' and 'Stanford Computer system infiltrated; Security fears grow', organizations find themselves rethinking their approach to the on-ramp. Is the Internet safe? What do I need to do to protect my organization? Will hackers try to break into my systems? These are questions many organizations are asking themselves today. In order to safely travel along the Information Superhighway, organizations need a strong security framework. Developing such a framework for a computer site, whether it be just a few dozen hosts or several thousand hosts is not an easy task. The security infrastructure for a site is often developed piece-by-piece in response to security incidents which have affected that site over time. Or worse yet, no coordinated effort has been dedicated toward security. The end result is that many sites are still poorly prepared to handle the security dangers of the Internet. This paper presents guidelines for building a successful security infrastructure. The problem is addressed in a cookbook style method. First is a discussion on how to identify your assets and evaluate the threats to those assets; next are suggestions and tips for identifying the weak areas in your security armor. Armed with this information we can begin to think about what you really need for your site and what you can afford. In this stage of the process we examine the different categories of security tools and products that are available and then present some tips for deciding what is best for your site.

Crabb, Michele D.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
DOE OSTI2025

Women in Nuclear Security: The United Arab Emirates Story

Historically in the United Arab Emirates, security personnel stationed at nuclear sites were typically men with military or policing backgrounds. Although these groups bring important, transferrable skills and experience to the nuclear security mission, some Emirati stakeholders recognize the increased benefit of a greater diversity of voices and backgrounds within the nuclear security team hierarchy. By recruiting from a wider range of disciplines and encouraging gender diversity, the security team could develop broader insight into security challenges, and a greater variety of perspectives could bring forth more innovative solutions. When aligning a diverse, multinational workforce with a common mission, all members of a security organization must fundamentally change their individual approaches to the work; the entire staff must be on the same page. This can be particularly challenging for some people who find it difficult to transition from a framework of beliefs because of past experiences based on prescriptive, exclusionary, hierarchical thought. Also, national cultural values are learned early, held deeply, and change slowly over the course of generations, and inherent biases rooted in these values can create barriers to the collective progress of a team. Creating a more open, diverse, and transparent culture for the team by accepting a unique, egalitarian, professional nuclear security culture that all members adhere to can be a challenging task for some. In this article, I share my experiences related to professional roadblocks, personal challenges, and lessons learned, particularly those regarding the empowerment of women in science and engineering, while developing and establishing the United Arab Emirates nuclear security program. I also discuss the support (and underrepresentation) of women, including those currently in critical leadership positions, and their careers in nuclear security.

Barakah Nuclear Power Plant↗
NASA NTRS2013

IT Security Support for Spaceport Command and Control System

During the fall 2013 semester, I worked at the Kennedy Space Center as an IT Security Intern in support of the Spaceport Command and Control System under the guidance of the IT Security Lead Engineer. Some of my responsibilities included assisting with security plan documentation collection, system hardware and software inventory, and malicious code and malware scanning. Throughout the semester, I had the opportunity to work on a wide range of security related projects. However, there are three projects in particular that stand out. The first project I completed was updating a large interactive spreadsheet that details the SANS Institutes Top 20 Critical Security Controls. My task was to add in all of the new commercial of the shelf (COTS) software listed on the SANS website that can be used to meet their Top 20 controls. In total, there are 153 unique security tools listed by SANS that meet one or more of their 20 controls. My second project was the creation of a database that will allow my mentor to keep track of the work done by the contractors that report to him in a more efficient manner by recording events as they occur throughout the quarter. Lastly, I expanded upon a security assessment of the Linux machines being used on center that I began last semester. To do this, I used a vulnerability and configuration tool that scans hosts remotely through the network and presents the user with an abundance of information detailing each machines configuration. The experience I gained from working on each of these projects has been invaluable, and I look forward to returning in the spring semester to continue working with the IT Security team.

computer security↗
NASA NTRS2016

Empirical Analysis and Automated Classification of Security Bug Reports

With the ever expanding amount of sensitive data being placed into computer systems, the need for effective cybersecurity is of utmost importance. However, there is a shortage of detailed empirical studies of security vulnerabilities from which cybersecurity metrics and best practices could be determined. This thesis has two main research goals: (1) to explore the distribution and characteristics of security vulnerabilities based on the information provided in bug tracking systems and (2) to develop data analytics approaches for automatic classification of bug reports as security or non-security related. This work is based on using three NASA datasets as case studies. The empirical analysis showed that the majority of software vulnerabilities belong only to a small number of types. Addressing these types of vulnerabilities will consequently lead to cost efficient improvement of software security. Since this analysis requires labeling of each bug report in the bug tracking system, we explored using machine learning to automate the classification of each bug report as a security or non-security related (two-class classification), as well as each security related bug report as specific security type (multiclass classification). In addition to using supervised machine learning algorithms, a novel unsupervised machine learning approach is proposed. An ac- curacy of 92%, recall of 96%, precision of 92%, probability of false alarm of 4%, F-Score of 81% and G-Score of 90% were the best results achieved during two-class classification. Furthermore, an accuracy of 80%, recall of 80%, precision of 94%, and F-score of 85% were the best results achieved during multiclass classification.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2025

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
NASA NTRS2016

Measuring Global Water Security Towards Sustainable Development Goals

Water plays an important role in underpinning equitable, stable and productive societies and ecosystems. Hence, United Nations recognized ensuring water security as one (Goal 6) of the seventeen sustainable development goals (SDGs). Many international river basins are likely to experience 'low water security' over the coming decades. Water security is rooted not only in the physical availability of freshwater resources relative to water demand, but also on social and economic factors (e.g. sound water planning and management approaches, institutional capacity to provide water services, sustainable economic policies). Until recently, advanced tools and methods are available for the assessment of water scarcity. However, quantitative and integrated-physical and socio-economic-approaches for spatial analysis of water security at global level are not available yet. In this study, we present a spatial multi-criteria analysis framework to provide a global assessment of water security. The selected indicators are based on Goal 6 of SDGs. The term 'security' is conceptualized as a function of 'availability', 'accessibility to services', 'safety and quality', and 'management'. The proposed global water security index (GWSI) is calculated by aggregating indicator values on a pixel-by-pixel basis, using the ordered weighted average method, which allows for the exploration of the sensitivity of final maps to different attitudes of hypothetical policy makers. Our assessment suggests that countries of Africa, South Asia and Middle East experience very low water security. Other areas of high water scarcity, such as some parts of United States, Australia and Southern Europe, show better GWSI values, due to good performance of management, safety and quality, and accessibility. The GWSI maps show the areas of the world in which integrated strategies are needed to achieve water related targets of the SDGs particularly in the African and Asian continents.

sustainable-development goals↗
NASA NTRS1990

Information Security and Integrity Systems

Viewgraphs from the Information Security and Integrity Systems seminar held at the University of Houston-Clear Lake on May 15-16, 1990 are presented. A tutorial on computer security is presented. The goals of this tutorial are the following: to review security requirements imposed by government and by common sense; to examine risk analysis methods to help keep sight of forest while in trees; to discuss the current hot topic of viruses (which will stay hot); to examine network security, now and in the next year to 30 years; to give a brief overview of encryption; to review protection methods in operating systems; to review database security problems; to review the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Orange Book); to comment on formal verification methods; to consider new approaches (like intrusion detection and biometrics); to review the old, low tech, and still good solutions; and to give pointers to the literature and to where to get help. Other topics covered include security in software applications and development; risk management; trust: formal methods and associated techniques; secure distributed operating system and verification; trusted Ada; a conceptual model for supporting a B3+ dynamic multilevel security and integrity in the Ada runtime environment; and information intelligence sciences.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1995

Security for Multimedia Space Data Distribution over the Internet

Distribution of interactive multimedia to remote investigators will be required for high quality science on the International Space Station (ISS). The Internet with the World Wide Web (WWW) and the JAVA environment are a good match for distribution of data, video and voice to remote science centers. Utilizing the "open" Internet in a secure manner is the major hurdle in making use of this cost effective, off-the-shelf, universal resource. This paper examines the major security threats to an Internet distribution system for payload data and the mitigation of these threats. A proposed security environment for the Space Station Biological Research Facility (SSBRP) is presented with a short description of the tools that have been implemented or planned. Formulating and implementing a security policy, firewalls, host hardware and software security are also discussed in this paper. Security is a vast topic and this paper can only give an overview of important issues. This paper postulates that a structured approach is required and stresses that security must be built into a network from the start. Ignoring security issues or putting them off until late in the development cycle can be disastrous.

Stone, Thom↗
NASA NTRS2004

Security Management and Safeguards Office

The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are in a safe environment.

Bewley, Nathaniel M.↗
NASA NTRS2003

CORBASec Used to Secure Distributed Aerospace Propulsion Simulations

The NASA Glenn Research Center and its industry partners are developing a Common Object Request Broker (CORBA) Security (CORBASec) test bed to secure their distributed aerospace propulsion simulations. Glenn has been working with its aerospace propulsion industry partners to deploy the Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) object-based technology. NPSS is a program focused on reducing the cost and time in developing aerospace propulsion engines. It was developed by Glenn and is being managed by the NASA Ames Research Center as the lead center reporting directly to NASA Headquarters' Aerospace Technology Enterprise. Glenn is an active domain member of the Object Management Group: an open membership, not-for-profit consortium that produces and manages computer industry specifications (i.e., CORBA) for interoperable enterprise applications. When NPSS is deployed, it will assemble a distributed aerospace propulsion simulation scenario from proprietary analytical CORBA servers and execute them with security afforded by the CORBASec implementation. The NPSS CORBASec test bed was initially developed with the TPBroker Security Service product (Hitachi Computer Products (America), Inc., Waltham, MA) using the Object Request Broker (ORB), which is based on the TPBroker Basic Object Adaptor, and using NPSS software across different firewall products. The test bed has been migrated to the Portable Object Adaptor architecture using the Hitachi Security Service product based on the VisiBroker 4.x ORB (Borland, Scotts Valley, CA) and on the Orbix 2000 ORB (Dublin, Ireland, with U.S. headquarters in Waltham, MA). Glenn, GE Aircraft Engines, and Pratt & Whitney Aircraft are the initial industry partners contributing to the NPSS CORBASec test bed. The test bed uses Security SecurID (RSA Security Inc., Bedford, MA) two-factor token-based authentication together with Hitachi Security Service digital-certificate-based authentication to validate the various NPSS users. The test bed is expected to demonstrate NPSS CORBASec-specific policy functionality, confirm adequate performance, and validate the required Internet configuration in a distributed collaborative aerospace propulsion environment.

Blaser, Tammy M.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Secure ADS-B authentication system and method

A secure system for authenticating the identity of ADS-B systems, including: an authenticator, including a unique id generator and a transmitter transmitting the unique id to one or more ADS-B transmitters; one or more ADS-B transmitters, including a receiver receiving the unique id, one or more secure processing stages merging the unique id with the ADS-B transmitter's identification, data and secret key and generating a secure code identification and a transmitter transmitting a response containing the secure code and ADSB transmitter's data to the authenticator; the authenticator including means for independently determining each ADS-B transmitter's secret key, a receiver receiving each ADS-B transmitter's response, one or more secure processing stages merging the unique id, ADS-B transmitter's identification and data and generating a secure code, and comparison processing comparing the authenticator-generated secure code and the ADS-B transmitter-generated secure code and providing an authentication signal based on the comparison result.

Viggiano, Marc J↗
NASA NTRS2024

DSS Security Assessment

The Discovery and Synchronization service (DSS) has implemented some reasonable technical controls that help improve security and there are very few technical findings. The use of Docker and Kubernetes helps simplify the deployment process, and the DSS uses mutual TLS (mTLS) to connect. Much of the security risk across the DSS is a factor of its nature, a distributed environment that relies on all members to secure their parts correctly. As such, the DSS team should attempt to emphasize security controls that reduce complexity for securing entities’ Cockroach DB (CRDB) instances properly and improve coordination among DSS members for things like security patching, incident response, detecting, and removing bad actors. The DSS team must recognize that operating a DSS instance securely will require a combination of technical and procedural controls. Each DSS entity must configure their instance properly and follow standard operating procedures to ensure that the DSS service is secure.

threat modeling↗
DOE OSTI2024

Synergies Between Nuclear Security and Critical Infrastructure: National Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

Nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities are part of a nation's critical infrastructure assets. Key cross-sector interdependencies, in relation to energy, transportation systems, communications, emergency services, water, information technologies and others, result in inevitable synergies between legal frameworks for the security of nuclear facilities and legal frameworks for the protection of critical infrastructure. The protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage and other malicious acts is paramount in ensuring energy security and thus ensuring uninterrupted energy supply. The protection of other sectors, such as uninterrupted communications, secure water supply, and others, supports a safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. Some countries rely on broader critical infrastructure frameworks to impose security requirements on nuclear facilities, or to achieve robust cybersecurity systems. This paper will analyze the interdependencies and synergies between the legal and regulatory frameworks for critical infrastructure protection and nuclear facilities' security by comparing various national frameworks. The paper will also propose modalities to leverage the best practices and requirements from each framework towards energy security goals and stronger national nuclear security regimes.

Man, Madalina-Anca↗
DOE OSTI2025

Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)

The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗
DOE OSTI2025

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2002

Gross anatomy of network security

Information security involves many branches of effort, including information assurance, host level security, physical security, and network security. Computer network security methods and implementations are given a top-down description to permit a medically focused audience to anchor this information to their daily practice. The depth of detail of network functionality and security measures, like that of the study of human anatomy, can be highly involved. Presented at the level of major gross anatomical systems, this paper will focus on network backbone implementation and perimeter defenses, then diagnostic tools, and finally the user practices (the human element). Physical security measures, though significant, have been defined as beyond the scope of this presentation.

Computer Security↗
NASA NTRS2014

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗