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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

Space Shuttle Communications Coverage Analysis for Thermal Tile Inspection

The space shuttle ultra-high frequency Space-to-Space Communication System has to provide adequate communication coverage for astronauts who are performing thermal tile inspection and repair on the underside of the space shuttle orbiter (SSO). Careful planning and quantitative assessment are necessary to ensure successful system operations and mission safety in this work environment. This study assesses communication systems performance for astronauts who are working in the underside, non-line-of-sight shadow region on the space shuttle. All of the space shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) transmitting antennas are blocked by the SSO structure. To ensure communication coverage at planned inspection worksites, the signal strength and link margin between the SSO/ISS antennas and the extravehicular activity astronauts, whose line-of-sight is blocked by vehicle structure, was analyzed. Investigations were performed using rigorous computational electromagnetic modeling techniques. Signal strength was obtained by computing the reflected and diffracted fields along the signal propagation paths between transmitting and receiving antennas. Radio frequency (RF) coverage was determined for thermal tile inspection and repair missions using the results of this computation. Analysis results from this paper are important in formulating the limits on reliable communication range and RF coverage at planned underside inspection and repair worksites.

Kroll, Quin D.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Psychophysiological Methods to Assess Pilot Productive Safety Behaviors

The NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project is focused on developing new technologies and operational concepts for the aviation industry to meet the increasing global demand while maintaining the current ultra-safe system safety levels. To achieve this, the SWS Project is developing research priorities, including In-time System-wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) and In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS; Ellis et al., 2019). A critical component of the IASMS is the human as pilot and in other roles in aviation operations as demonstrated by SWS human factors research on rare occurrences of human error and the far more prevalent human safety producing behaviors (e.g., Hollnagel, 2016). The talk presented by Chad Stephens of NASA Langley Research Center and NASA SWS Project will describe the history of human factors research involving psychophysiological and biocybernetics methods supporting aviation safety conducted at NASA. Specific examples of recent NASA crew state monitoring research focused on a psychophysiological assessment method and system to enable Training for Attention Management will be demonstrated. Current SWS research including the SWS Operations and Technologies for Enabling Resilient In-Time Assurance (SOTERIA) flight simulation study and a data testbed created to enable study of Human Contributions to Safety (HC2S) will be presented. Ongoing collaborative research efforts with Boeing researchers will be highlighted and opportunities for further collaboration will be discussed.

psychophysiology↗
NASA NTRS1988

A matrix safety frame approach to robot safety for space applications

The planned use of autonomous robots in space applications has generated many new safety problems. This thesis assesses safety of autonomous robot systems through the structure of a proposed three-dimensional matrix safety frame. By identifying the common points of accidents and fatalities involving terrestrial robots, reviewing terrestrial robot safety standards, and modifying and extending these results to space applications, hazards are identified and their associated risks assessed. Three components of the safeguarding dimension of the matrix safety frame, safeguarding through design and operation for intrinsic safety, and incorporation of add-on safety systems are explained through examples for both terrestrial and space robots. A space robot hazard identification checklist, a qualitative tool for robot systems designers, is developed using the structure imparted by the matrix safety frame. The development of an expert system from the contents of the checklist is discussed.

Montgomery, T. D.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Aviation Safety Concerns for the Future

The Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) is a multidisciplinary international group of aviation professionals that was established to identify possible future aviation safety hazards. The principle was adopted that future hazards are undesirable consequences of changes, and a primary activity of FAST became identification and prioritization of possible future changes affecting aviation. Since 2004, FAST has been maintaining a catalogue of "Areas of Change" (AoC) that could potentially influence aviation safety. The horizon for such changes is between 5 to 20 years. In this context, changes must be understood as broadly as possible. An AoC is a description of the change, not an identification of the hazards that result from the change. An ex-post analysis of the AoCs identified in 2004 demonstrates that changes catalogued many years previous were directly implicated in the majority of fatal aviation accidents over the past ten years. This paper presents an overview of the current content of the AoC catalogue and a subsequent discussion of aviation safety concerns related to these possible changes. Interactions among these future changes may weaken critical functions that must be maintained to ensure safe operations. Safety assessments that do not appreciate or reflect the consequences of significant interaction complexity will not be fully informative and can lead to inappropriate trade-offs and increases in other risks. The FAST strongly encourages a system-wide approach to safety risk assessment across the global aviation system, not just within the domain for which future technologies or operational concepts are being considered. The FAST advocates the use of the "Areas of Change" concept, considering that several possible future phenomena may interact with a technology or operational concept under study producing unanticipated hazards.

emerging risks↗
NASA NTRS1981

Practical aspects of instrumentation system installation, volume 13

A review of factors influencing installation of aircraft flight test instrumentation is presented. Requirements, including such factors as environment, reliability, maintainability, and system safety are discussed. The assessment of the mission profile is followed by an overview of electrical and mechanical installation factors with emphasis on shock/vibration isolation systems and standardization of the electric wiring installation, two factors often overlooked by instrumentation engineers. A discussion of installation hardware reviews the performance capabilities of wiring, connectors, fuses and circuit breakers, and a guide to proper selections is provided. The discussion of the installation is primarily concerned with the electrical wire routing, shield terminations and grounding. Also inclued are some examples of installation mistakes that could affect system accuracy. System verification procedures and special considerations such as sneak circuits, pyrotechnics, aircraft antenna patterns, and lightning strikes are discussed.

Borek, R. W.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Probabilistic Design Analysis (PDA) Approach to Determine the Probability of Cross-System Failures for a Space Launch Vehicle

Quantifying the probability of significant launch vehicle failure scenarios for a given design, while still in the design process, is critical to mission success and to the safety of the astronauts. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is chosen from many system safety and reliability tools to verify the loss of mission (LOM) and loss of crew (LOC) requirements set by the NASA Program Office. To support the integrated vehicle PRA, probabilistic design analysis (PDA) models are developed by using vehicle design and operation data to better quantify failure probabilities and to better understand the characteristics of a failure and its outcome. This PDA approach uses a physics-based model to describe the system behavior and response for a given failure scenario. Each driving parameter in the model is treated as a random variable with a distribution function. Monte Carlo simulation is used to perform probabilistic calculations to statistically obtain the failure probability. Sensitivity analyses are performed to show how input parameters affect the predicted failure probability, providing insight for potential design improvements to mitigate the risk. The paper discusses the application of the PDA approach in determining the probability of failure for two scenarios from the NASA Ares I project

Shih, Ann T.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Assessment of Biocide Impacts on Life Support (LS) and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Architectures

The Project Manager for the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate’s Advanced Exploration Systems Life Support Systems (LSS) project, requested a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) assessment to evaluate potable water system biocide options impacting Gateway, Human Lander Systems, Foundation Surface Habitat, and Exploration Command Module missions. The assessment focused on identifying feasible biocide options, evaluating the impacts of their implementation on crew health, extravehicular activity hardware, and LSS hardware, and conducting a trade on architecture options. This report contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Extravehicular Activity; Life Support; NASA Engine↗
NASA NTRS2011

L-Band System Engineering - Concepts of Use, Systems Performance Requirements, and Architecture

This document is being provided as part of ITT s NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: New ATM Requirements-Future Communications, C-band and L-band Communications Standard Development. Task 7 was motivated by the five year technology assessment performed for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the joint FAA-EUROCONTROL cooperative research Action Plan (AP-17), also known as the Future Communications Study (FCS). It was based on direction provided by the FAA project-level agreement (PLA FY09_G1M.02-02v1) for "New ATM Requirements-Future Communications." Task 7 was separated into two distinct subtasks, each aligned with specific work elements and deliverable items. Subtask 7-1 addressed C-band airport surface data communications standards development, systems engineering, test bed development, and tests/demonstrations to establish operational capability for what is now referred to as the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS). Subtask 7-2, which is the subject of this report, focused on preliminary systems engineering and support of joint FAA/EUROCONTROL development and evaluation of a future L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) air/ground (A/G) communication system known as the L-band digital aeronautical communications system (L-DACS), which was defined during the FCS. The proposed L-DACS will be capable of providing ATM services in continental airspace in the 2020+ timeframe. Subtask 7-2 was performed in two phases. Phase I featured development of Concepts of Use, high level functional analyses, performance of initial L-band system safety and security risk assessments, and development of high level requirements and architectures. It also included the aforementioned support of joint L-DACS development and evaluation, including inputs to L-DACS design specifications. Phase II provided a refinement of the systems engineering activities performed during Phase I, along with continued joint FAA/EUROCONTROL L-DACS development and evaluation support.

Henriksen, Stephen↗
NASA NTRS1981

Safety analysis for complex systems

Operational risk assessment considers hardware, environment, and human factors. Technique starts with division of postulated mission into segments which are further subdivided into separate operational steps. Consequences of steps, nonoccurrence, premature operation, out-of-sequence operation, and inadvertent execution are examined at subevent, event, and phase levels. Hazards are identified and treated individually. Analysis is well suited to application in energy and transportation fields.

Onesty, J. P.↗
NASA NTRS1988

A computer-based Safety Assessment for Flight Evacuation - SAFE

The Safety Assessment for Flight Evacuation (SAFE) system has been developed for the computerized evaluation of safety in civil Emergency Medical Service (EMS) operations. The speed of the microprocessor used to analyze data allows many individual factors to be considered, as well as the interactions among those factors. SAFE's data base is structured as if-then conditional statements. SAFE also allows the most important of the factors to be given greater weight in the final score. The questionnaire filled by EMS crews encompassed mission-, crew-, organization-, environment-, and aircraft-related factors; each of these was subdivided into as many as eight variables affecting the EMS-mission risk of that factor.

Shively, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Systems Engineering Approach to Technology Integration for NASA's 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

The overall goal of the 2nd Generation RLV Program is to substantially reduce technical and business risks associated with developing a new class of reusable launch vehicles. NASA's specific goals are to improve the safety of a 2nd generation system by 2 orders of magnitude - equivalent to a crew risk of 1-in-10,000 missions - and decrease the cost tenfold, to approximately $1,000 per pound of payload launched. Architecture definition is being conducted in parallel with the maturating of key technologies specifically identified to improve safety and reliability, while reducing operational costs. An architecture broadly includes an Earth-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and support infrastructure, both on the ground and in orbit. The systems engineering approach ensures that the technologies developed - such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, reliable crew escape, and robust thermal protection systems - will synergistically integrate into the optimum vehicle. To best direct technology development decisions, analytical models are employed to accurately predict the benefits of each technology toward potential space transportation architectures as well as the risks associated with each technology. Rigorous systems analysis provides the foundation for assessing progress toward safety and cost goals. The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for investment decisions in the 2nd Generation RLV Program's risk-reduction activities. Through this process, NASA will continually refine its specialized needs and identify where Defense and commercial requirements overlap those of civil missions.

Thomas, Dale↗
NASA NTRS2002

Systems Engineering Approach to Technology Integration for NASA's 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle

The overall goal of the 2nd Generation RLV Program is to substantially reduce technical and business risks associated with developing a new class of reusable launch vehicles. NASA's specific goals are to improve the safety of a 2nd-generation system by 2 orders of magnitude - equivalent to a crew risk of 1-in-10,000 missions - and decrease the cost tenfold, to approximately $1,000 per pound of payload launched. Architecture definition is being conducted in parallel with the maturating of key technologies specifically identified to improve safety and reliability, while reducing operational costs. An architecture broadly includes an Earth-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle, on-orbit transfer vehicles and upper stages, mission planning, ground and flight operations, and support infrastructure, both on the ground and in orbit. The systems engineering approach ensures that the technologies developed - such as lightweight structures, long-life rocket engines, reliable crew escape, and robust thermal protection systems - will synergistically integrate into the optimum vehicle. To best direct technology development decisions, analytical models are employed to accurately predict the benefits of each technology toward potential space transportation architectures as well as the risks associated with each technology. Rigorous systems analysis provides the foundation for assessing progress toward safety and cost goals. The systems engineering review process factors in comprehensive budget estimates, detailed project schedules, and business and performance plans, against the goals of safety, reliability, and cost, in addition to overall technical feasibility. This approach forms the basis for investment decisions in the 2nd Generation RLV Program's risk-reduction activities. Through this process, NASA will continually refine its specialized needs and identify where Defense and commercial requirements overlap those of civil missions.

Thomas, Dale↗
NASA NTRS2017

Assessment of a Conceptual Flap System Intended for Enhanced General Aviation Safety

A novel multielement trailing-edge flap system for light general aviation airplanes was conceived for enhanced safety during normal and emergency landings. The system is designed to significantly reduce stall speed, and thus approach speed, with the goal of reducing maneuveringflight accidents and enhancing pilot survivability in the event of an accident. The research objectives were to assess the aerodynamic performance characteristics of the system and to evaluate the extent to which it provided both increased lift and increased drag required for the low-speed landing goal. The flap system was applied to a model of a light general aviation, high-wing trainer and tested in the Langley 12- Foot Low-Speed Wind Tunnel. Data were obtained for several device deflection angles, and component combinations at a dynamic pressure of 4 pounds per square foot. The force and moment data supports the achievement of the desired increase in lift with substantially increased drag, all at relatively shallow angles of attack. The levels of lift and drag can be varied through device deflection angles and inboard/outboard differential deflections. As such, it appears that this flap system may provide an enabling technology to allow steep, controllable glide slopes for safe rapid descent to landing with reduced stall speed. However, a simple flat-plate lower surface spoiler (LSS) provided either similar or superior lift with little impact on pitch or drag as compared to the proposed system. Higher-fidelity studies are suggested prior to use of the proposed system.

Campbell, Bryan A.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Airspace Safety Threshold Study: NAS-Wide Encounter Rate Evaluation Using Historical Radar Data and ACES

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. With regard to the safety aspect being studied by the SC-228 DAA Safety sub-group, NASA has conducted a study using the ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability to determine: 1) the rate at which IFR aircraft encounter other IFR and VFR aircraft, and 2) the rate at which UAS aircraft encounter VFR aircraft as well as the corresponding encounter geometries. Five different separation thresholds were used (two for encounter and one each for well-clear, near mid-air collision, and closest point of approach). The results will be used by the SC-228 DAA Safety sub-group to inform decisions about the safety aspect of UAS DAA systems and future requirements development and validation efforts.

encounter geometry↗
NASA NTRS2001

Assessing Factors of Safety, Margins of Safety, and Reliability of Thermal Protection Systems

This paper provides formally derived definitions for Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) factors of safety and margins of safety borrowing from machine design approaches. The new factors of safety and margins of safety definitions are quite simple and easy to use, and should provide improved comparison of design safety and margins of past, present and future vehicles, These definitions are then applied to several entry vehicles, including Apollo, the Space Shuttle, the Mars Viking and Pathfinder vehicles, and the Pioneer Venus entry vehicle for example and clarity, and to aid in developing a database of previous TPS design experience. In addition to the factors and margins of safety, definitions of computed reliabilities incorporation the reliability index used in machine design are also developed and presented. Adoption and use of the reliability index will hopefully considerably aid the optimization of TPS design for future vehicles.

Rasky, Daniel J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Hydrogen and Storage Initiatives at the NASA JSC White Sands Test Facility

NASA WSTF Hydrogen Activities: a) Aerospace Test; b) System Certification & Verification; c) Component, System, & Facility Hazard Assessment; d) Safety Training Technical Transfer: a) Development of Voluntary Consensus Standards and Practices; b) Support of National Hydrogen Infrastructure Development.

Maes, Miguel↗
NASA NTRS1992

An approach to evaluating reactive airborne wind shear systems

An approach to evaluating reactive airborne windshear detection systems was developed to support a deployment study for future FAA ground-based windshear detection systems. The deployment study methodology assesses potential future safety enhancements beyond planned capabilities. The reactive airborne systems will be an integral part of planned windshear safety enhancements. The approach to evaluating reactive airborne systems involves separate analyses for both landing and take-off scenario. The analysis estimates the probability of effective warning considering several factors including NASA energy height loss characteristics, reactive alert timing, and a probability distribution for microburst strength.

Gibson, Joseph P., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Formal Verification of a Conflict Resolution and Recovery Algorithm

New air traffic management concepts distribute the duty of traffic separation among system participants. As a consequence, these concepts have a greater dependency and rely heavily on on-board software and hardware systems. One example of a new on-board capability in a distributed air traffic management system is air traffic conflict detection and resolution (CD&R). Traditional methods for safety assessment such as human-in-the-loop simulations, testing, and flight experiments may not be sufficient for this highly distributed system as the set of possible scenarios is too large to have a reasonable coverage. This paper proposes a new method for the safety assessment of avionics systems that makes use of formal methods to drive the development of critical systems. As a case study of this approach, the mechanical veri.cation of an algorithm for air traffic conflict resolution and recovery called RR3D is presented. The RR3D algorithm uses a geometric optimization technique to provide a choice of resolution and recovery maneuvers. If the aircraft adheres to these maneuvers, they will bring the aircraft out of conflict and the aircraft will follow a conflict-free path to its original destination. Veri.cation of RR3D is carried out using the Prototype Verification System (PVS).

Maddalon, Jeffrey↗