Forensic Analysis of Terrorist Counter-Financing to Combat Nuclear Proliferation
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The lack of international consensus about whether a floating nuclear power plant is a facility or vessel presents an ambiguity about a pirate's status if they board a floating nuclear power plant, As piracy continues to be a concern for maritime security, the deployment of floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs) on the high seas raises questions about laws on piracy.
This paper develops a bottom-up approach that focuses on behavioral responses in estimating the total economic impacts of the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center (WTC) attacks. The estimation includes several new features. First, is the collection of data on the relocation of firms displaced by the attack, the major source of resilience in muting the direct impacts of the event. Second, is a new estimate of the major source of impacts off-site -- the ensuing decline of air travel and related tourism in the U.S. due to the social amplification of the fear of terrorism. Third, the estimation is performed for the first time using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis, including a new approach to reflecting the direct effects of external shocks. This modeling framework has many advantages in this application, such as the ability to include behavioral responses of individual businesses and households, to incorporate features of inherent and adaptive resilience at the level of the individual decision maker and the market, and to gauge quantity and price interaction effects across sectors of the regional and national economies. We find that the total business interruption losses from the WTC attacks on the U.S. economy were only slightly over $100 billion, or less than 1.0% of Gross Domestic Product. The impacts were only a loss of $14 billion of Gross Regional Product for the New York Metropolitan Area.
The use of predictive analytics to model terrorist rhetoric is highly instrumental in developing a strategy to deter terrorism. Traditional (e.g. Cold-War) deterrence methods are ineffective with terrorist groups such as al Qaida. Terrorists typically regard the prospect of death or loss of property as acceptable consequences of their struggle. Deterrence by threat of punishment is therefore fruitless. On the other hand, isolating terrorists from the community that may sympathize with their cause can have a decisive deterring outcome. Without the moral backing of a supportive audience, terrorism cannot be successfully framed as a justifiable political strategy and recruiting is curtailed. Ultimately, terrorism deterrence is more effectively enforced by exerting influence to neutralize the communicative reach of terrorists.
A primary goal of terrorism is to instill a sense of fear and vulnerability in a population and to erode confidence in government and law enforcement agencies to protect citizens against future attacks. In recognition of its importance, the Department of Homeland Security includes public confidence as one of the metrics it uses to assess the consequences of terrorist attacks. Hence, several factors--including a detailed understanding of the variations in public confidence among individuals, by type of terrorist event, and as a function of time--are critical to developing this metric. In this exploratory study, a questionnaire was designed, tested, and administered to small groups of individuals to measure public confidence in the ability of federal, state, and local governments and their public safety agencies to prevent acts of terrorism. Data were collected from the groups before and after they watched mock television news broadcasts portraying a smallpox attack, a series of suicide bomber attacks, a refinery bombing, and cyber intrusions on financial institutions that resulted in identity theft and financial losses. Our findings include the following: (a) the subjects can be classified into at least three distinct groups on the basis of their baseline outlook--optimistic, pessimistic, and unaffected; (b) the subjects make discriminations in their interpretations of an event on the basis of the nature of a terrorist attack, the time horizon, and its impact; (c) the recovery of confidence after a terrorist event has an incubation period and typically does not return to its initial level in the long-term; (d) the patterns of recovery of confidence differ between the optimists and the pessimists; and (e) individuals are able to associate a monetary value with a loss or gain in confidence, and the value associated with a loss is greater than the value associated with a gain. These findings illustrate the importance the public places in their confidence in government and law enforcement and also indicate that the level of importance is clearly of a magnitude on the order of other major terrorist event consequences, such as loss of human life and impacts to the economy.
The Illicit nuclear trafficking panel was conducted at the 4th Annual INMM workshop on Reducing the Risk from Radioactive and Nuclear Materials on February 2-3, 2010 in Washington DC. While the workshop occurred prior to the Nuclear Security Summit, April 12-13 2010 in Washington DC, some of the summit issues were raised during the workshop. The Communique of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit stated that 'Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.' The Illicit Trafficking panel is one means to strengthen nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Such a panel promotes nuclear security culture through technology development, human resources development, education and training. It is a tool which stresses the importance of international cooperation and coordination of assistance to improve efforts to prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking. Illicit trafficking panel included representatives from US government, an international organization (IAEA), private industry and a non-governmental organization to discuss illicit nuclear trafficking issues. The focus of discussions was on best practices and challenges for addressing illicit nuclear trafficking. Terrorism connection. Workshop discussions pointed out the identification of terrorist connections with several trafficking incidents. Several trafficking cases involved real buyers (as opposed to undercover law enforcement agents) and there have been reports identifying individuals associated with terrorist organizations as prospective plutonium buyers. Some specific groups have been identified that consistently search for materials to buy on the black market, but no criminal groups were identified that specialize in nuclear materials or isotope smuggling. In most cases, sellers do not find legitimate buyers; however, there have been specific cases where sellers did find actual terrorist group representatives. There appears to be a connection between terrorist groups engaged in trafficking conventional arms and explosives components that are also looking for both nuclear materials and radioisotopes. Sale opportunities may create additional demand for such materials. As we can observe from Figure 1, many cases in the mid-90s involved kilogram quantities of material. There were smaller amounts of material moved in 2001, 2003 and 2006. While we have seen less trafficking cases involving PujHEU in recent years, the fact that it continues at all is troubling. The trafficking cases can be presented through their life cycle: Diversion of materials leads to Trafficker and then to Terrorist/Proliferator. Most of the information we have in trafficking cases is on the Trafficker. In 16 cases reported by the IAEA, there are 10 prosecutions of the involved trafficker. However, there are no confirmed diversions of material recorded in any of the 18 seizures. Most seizures were sting operations performed by law enforcement or security agents with no actual illicit end-user involved.
Aviation terrorism is powerful and symbolic, and will likely remain a staple target for terrorists aiming to inflict chaos and cause mass casualties similar to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The majority of international and domestic aviation terrorist attacks involves outsiders, or people who do not have direct access to or affiliation with a target through employment. However, several significant attacks and plots against the industry involved malicious employees motivated by suicide or devotion to a terrorist organization. Malicious insiders’ access and knowledge of aviation security, systems, networks, and infrastructure is valuable to terrorists, providing a different pathway for attacking the industry through the insider threat. Indicators and warnings of insider threats in these cases exist, providing insight into how security agencies, such as the Transportation Security Administration, can better predict and identify insider involvement. Understanding previous aviation insider threat events will likely aid in stimulating proactive security measures, rather than reactive responses. However, similar to traditional airport security measures, there are social, political, and economic challenges in protecting against the insider threat, including privacy concerns and cost-benefit analysis.
Public facility restoration planning traditionally focused on response to natural disasters and hazardous materials accidental releases. These plans now need to integrate response to terrorist actions. Therefore, plans must address a wide range of potential vulnerabilities. Similar types of broad remediation planning are needed for restoration of waste and hazardous material handling areas and facilities. There are strong similarities in damage results and remediation activities between unintentional and terrorist actions; however, the uncertainties associated with terrorist actions result in a re-evaluation of approaches to planning. Restoration of public facilities following a release of a hazardous material is inherently far more complex than in confined industrial settings and has many unique technical, economic, social, and political challenges. Therefore, they arguably involve a superset of drivers, concerns and public agencies compared to other restoration efforts. This superset of conditions increases complexity of interactions, reduces our knowledge of the initial conditions, and even condenses the timeline for restoration response. Therefore, evaluations of alternative restoration management approaches developed for responding to terrorist actions provide useful knowledge for large, complex waste management projects. Whereas present planning documents have substantial linearity in their organization, the 'adaptive management' paradigm provides a constructive parallel operations paradigm for restoration of facilities that anticipates and plans for uncertainty, multiple/simUltaneous public agency actions, and stakeholder participation. Adaptive management grew out of the need to manage and restore natural resources in highly complex and changing environments with limited knowledge about causal relationships and responses to restoration actions. Similarities between natural resource management and restoration of a facility and surrounding area(s) after a disruptive event suggest numerous advantages over preset linearly-structured plans by incorporating the flexibility and overlap of processes inherent in effective facility restoration. We discuss three restoration case studies (e.g., the Hart Senate Office Building anthrax restoration, Rocky Flats actinide remediation, and hurricane destruction restoration), that implement aspects of adaptive management but not a formal approach. We propose that more formal adoption of adaptive management principles could be a basis for more flexible standards to improve site-specific remediation plans under conditions of high uncertainty.
Protection of commercial nuclear fuel cycles against adversary groups who may attempt to steal weapons-usable material is an issue of interest to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. The wide array of potential nuclear fuel cycle configurations and the security measures that could be deployed to protect them pose a daunting system design problem. In general, there are billions of potential design configurations. Moreover, the design choices are not independent – the effectiveness of one design feature or security measure can affect the desirability of other design choices. To explore this issue, we develop a mixed-integer optimization problem that solves a complex decision tree to allocate security resources across a commercial nuclear fuel cycle configuration. A nominal UREX+ reprocessing facility is used to demonstrate how the model allocates resources across a particular fuel cycle facility and shows how the problem can be scaled up to include other facilities and design features in the fuel cycle. In our model, the defender first chooses a set of safeguards to implement in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist theft from various unit operations in the reprocessing facility. The attacker observes the defender’s strategy choice and executes an attack to acquire material, including the possibility of declining to attack at all. The model considers the terrorist as an intelligent adversary with a set of attack strategies known to the defender. The strategic choices made by both the defender and attacker affect the probability of a successful attack by the terrorist and in turn affect the distribution of consequences to the defender. We use a decision tree to illustrate the interactions among costs, decisions, correlated uncertainties, and outcomes, and then show how to formulate the problem as a mixed-integer program with an equivalent solution. The novel features of our formulation include the following. First, as discussed above, we use a sequential game-theoretic formulation (a Stackelberg game). This formulation assumes the attacker can observe the defender’s actions before the attack is executed. Many previous game-theoretic studies have assumed attacker and defender act simultaneously without knowledge of the other’s strategy choice. We believe the sequential game formulation is more applicable for knowledgeable insider adversaries, the focus of this study. Second, we build on our previous work that has developed a methodology to reflect the correlation among probability distributions represented as discrete chance nodes in a decision tree. We illustrate how this methodology can be applied to two chance nodes in a decision tree that relate the quality of the materials that might be stolen or diverted by an adversary with the yield of a weapon that might be constructed from that material. In a decision tree, the dependence of the yield on the quality of the material could be modeled with conditional probabilities of the weapon yield given the quality of the materials obtained. For three outcome discretizations, this would require the assessment of nine conditional probabilities from domain experts as part of the model building effort. In contrast, our methodology will allow this same representation of the tree based on the assessment of the correlation between these two chance nodes by the experts, which we believe is a much easier and more reliable assessment task. The advantage of this approach increases as the number of dependent chance nodes grows in a decision tree representation of this problem. Third, we extend this approach to the approximation of the dependence between discrete binary events such as success or failure represented by binary chance nodes in a decision tree or in the special case of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) based on an event tree. This extension is a novel application in this domain, and uses Monte Carlo simulation to determine the appropriate conditional probabilities on the binary chance nodes when the number of correlated uncertainties is more than two. Fourth, we show how these decision trees or probability trees can be formulated and solved as equivalent integer programming (IP) problems. The advantages of the IP representation include the opportunity to use the computing power associated with powerful optimization solver algorithms available on high speed computers to solve very large versions of these trees, and the ability to include several such models of different facilities into a much larger IP with connecting constraints that represent budget restrictions, number of available inspection opportunities in a given time window, or other dependencies among these facilities. Policy makers can use the resulting model to inform their decisions about how to assess terrorism risk and to safeguard the commercial nuclear fuel cycle.
SG-Pu, WG-Pu, FG-Pu, RG-Pu, HEU, and Np should not be ignored in safeguards or security discussions: Nation states prefer SG-Pu and WG-Pu for missile delivery. Terrorists and some nation states will prefer FG-Pu and RG-Pu to minimize the mass that must be stolen/diverted and to minimize the risk of detection. Terrorists and some nation states will prefer HEU to eliminate the need for testing. A nation state with reprocessing capabilities might prefer 237 Np because the IAEA doesn’t require it to be safeguarded. Terrorists might prefer 237 Np if the nation state does not provide adequate safeguards and security for it.
Homeland security relies heavily on analytical chemistry to identify suspicious materials and persons. Traditionally this role has focused on attribution, determining the type and origin of an explosive, for example. But as technology advances, analytical chemistry can and will play an important role in the prevention and preemption of terrorist attacks. More sensitive and selective detection techniques can allow suspicious materials and persons to be identified even before a final destructive product is made. The work presented herein focuses on the use of commercial and novel detection techniques for application to the prevention of terrorist activities. Although drugs are not commonly thought of when discussing terrorism, narcoterrorism has become a significant threat in the 21st century. The role of the drug trade in the funding of terrorist groups is prevalent; thus, reducing the trafficking of illegal drugs can play a role in the prevention of terrorism by cutting off much needed funding. To do so, sensitive, specific, and robust analytical equipment is needed to quickly identify a suspected drug sample no matter what matrix it is in. Single Particle Aerosol Mass Spectrometry (SPAMS) is a novel technique that has previously been applied to biological and chemical detection. The current work applies SPAMS to drug analysis, identifying the active ingredients in single component, multi-component, and multi-tablet drug samples in a relatively non-destructive manner. In order to do so, a sampling apparatus was created to allow particle generation from drug tablets with on-line introduction to the SPAMS instrument. Rules trees were developed to automate the identification of drug samples on a single particle basis. A novel analytical scheme was also developed to identify suspect individuals based on chemical signatures in human breath. Human breath was sampled using an RTube{trademark} and the trace volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were preconcentrated using solid phase microextraction (SPME) and identified using gas chromatography - mass spectrometry (GC-MS). Modifications to the sampling apparatus allowed for increased VOC collection efficiency, and reduced the time of sampling and analysis by over 25%. The VOCs are present in breath due to either endogenous production, or exposure to an external source through absorption, inhalation, or ingestion. Detection of these exogenous chemicals can provide information on the prior location and activities of the subject. Breath samples collected before and after exposure in a hardware store and nail salon were analyzed to investigate the prior location of a subject; breath samples collected before and after oral exposure to terpenes and terpenoid compounds, pseudoephedrine, and inhalation exposure to hexamine and other explosive related compounds were analyzed to investigate the prior activity of a subject. The elimination of such compounds from the body was also monitored. In application, this technique may provide an early warning system to identify persons of interest in the prevention and preemption stages of homeland security.
In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logged 1562 incidents, of which only 18 include weapons grade nuclear materials. As much as 66% of the radioactive material involved in these incidents was not recovered. Since 2004, there has been a 75% increase in incidents of unrecoverable material, much of which is labeled dangerous with potential for deterministic health affects if misused. This makes clear that a black market of illicit trade in sources exists. The incidents reported to the IAEA's database rely only on voluntary state reporting; therefore, the number of lost or stolen sources is expected to be much higher.
In anticipation of a nuclear terrorist attack, techniques to quickly assess the radiation exposure of evacuees have been developed. Based on past experience relating neutron radiation exposures to activation products, quick measurement of activation products (counting time of a few seconds) in personal items exposed to significant levels of radiation should allow a neutron dose assessment. This approach allows prompt collection of important data on human exposure following a terrorist attack. Data collected will facilitate triage decisions for timely emergency medical treatment to ameliorate the radiation effects on exposed individuals. Experiments with ubiquitous items exposed to a neutron source will be outlined and presented.
Here, this paper describes the recent changes that the authors have perceived in the use of radiation and radioisotope measurement applications. The first change is that due to the increased use of Monte Carlo simulation which has occurred from a normal evolutionary process. This is due in large part to the increased accuracy that is being obtained by the use of detector response functions (DRFs) and the simultaneous increased computational efficiency that has become available with these DRFs, the availability of a greatly improved weight windows variance reduction method, and the availability of in-expensive computer clusters. This first change is a happy one. The other change that is occurring is in response to recent terrorist activities. That change is the replacement or major change in the use of long-lived radioisotopes in radioisotope measurement and other radioisotope source applications. In general this can be done by improving the security of these radioisotope sources or by replacing them altogether by using machine sources of radiation. In either case one would like to preclude altogether or at least minimize the possibility of terrorists being able to obtain radioisotopes and use them for clandestine purposes.
The naturally occurring radionuclides radium (Ra-226) and polonium (Po-210) have the potential to be used for criminal acts. Analysis of international incident data contained in the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (CSTO), operated at the University of Salzburg, shows that several acts of murder and terrorism with natural radionuclides have already been carried out in Europe and Russia. Five different modes of attack (T) are possible: (1) Covert irradiation of an individual in order to deliver a high individual dose; (2) Covert irradiation of a group of persons delivering a large collective dose; (3) Contamination of food or drink; (4) Generation of radioactive aerosols or solutions; (5) Combination of Ra-226 with conventional explosives (Dirty Bomb).This paper assesses the risk (R) of such criminal acts in terms of: (a) Probability of terrorist motivation deploying a certain attack mode T; (b) Probability of success by the terrorists for the selected attack mode T; (c) Primary damage consequence (C) to the attacked target (activity, dose); (d) Secondary damage consequence (C') to the attacked target (psychological and socio-economic effects); (e) Probability that the consequences (C, C') cannot be brought under control, resulting in a failure to manage successfully the emergency situation due to logistical and/or technical deficits in implementing adequate countermeasures. Extensive computer modelling is used to determine the potential impact of such a criminal attack on directly affected victims and on the environment.
The risk of nuclear or dirty bomb attack by terrorists is one of the most urgent and threatening danger. The Cambodian national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) depicts a layered system of preventive measures ranging from securing materials at foreign sources to interdicting weapons or nuclear or other radioactive materials at ports, border crossings, and within the Cambodian institutions dealing with the nuclear security to manage the preventive programs. The aim of this study is to formulate guidance, to identify scenario of threat and risk, and to pinpoint necessary legal frameworks on nuclear security in the context of counterterrorism based on the International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear security series. The analysis of this study is guided by theoretical review, the review of international laws and politics, by identifying and interpreting applicable rules and norms establishing the nuclear security regime and how well enforcement of the regime is carried out and, what is the likelihood of the future reform might be. This study will examine the existing national legal frameworks of Cambodia in the context of counterterrorism to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack within the Cambodia territory. It will shed light on departmental lanes of national nuclear security responsibility, and provide a holistic perspective on the needs of additional resources and emphasis regarding nuclear security policy in the context of counterterrorism in Cambodia.
We present a computational approach to radical rhetoric that leverages the co-expression of rhetoric and action features in discourse to identify violent intent. The approach combines text mining and machine learning techniques with insights from Frame Analysis and theories that explain the emergence of violence in terms of moral disengagement, the violation of sacred values and social isolation in order to build computational models that identify messages from terrorist sources and estimate their proximity to an attack. We discuss a specific application of this approach to a body of documents from and about radical and terrorist groups in the Middle East and present the results achieved.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), focused a great deal of interest and concern on how individual and social perceptions of risk change behavior and subsequently affect commercial sector venues. Argonne conducted a review of the literature to identify studies that quantify the direct and indirect economic consequences of avoidance behaviors that result from terrorist attacks. Despite a growing amount of literature addressing terrorism impacts, relatively little is known about the causal relationships between risk perception, human avoidance behaviors, and the economic effects on commercial venues. Nevertheless, the technical and academic literature does provide some evidence, both directly and by inference, of the level and duration of post-event avoidance behaviors on commercial venues. Key findings are summarized in this Executive Summary. Also included as an appendix is a more detailed summary table of literature findings reproduced from the full report.