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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Radiation Response of Ga 2 O 3 MOSFETs Probed via Focused Particle Beams

Gallium Oxide (Ga 2 O 3 ), particularly in its β-phase, is attracting lots of interest for high-power and high-voltage electronics due to its wide bandgap, high breakdown field, and thermal stability. This study investigates the radiation response of Ga 2 O 3 Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistors (MOSFETs) under Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage (DD) conditions, which are critical for applications in radiation environments. Utilizing a dual-beam Focused Ion Beam and Scanning Electron Microscope setup, microscale analysis of radiation effects on individual devices is performed. The findings reveal distinct behaviors under TID and DD + TID conditions, with TID leading to threshold voltage shifts due to trapped charges, while DD results in decreased drive current attributed to increased carrier scattering from lattice defects. Notably, it is demonstrated that the TID effect can be mitigated through dynamic threshold voltage adjustments and that the predicted TID from ions calculated by Monte Carlo simulations overestimates actual TID due to unaccounted charge yield effects. In conclusion, this research enhances the understanding of Ga2O3 MOSFETs' performance in harsh radiation environments, providing insights for the design of robust electronic devices for space and nuclear applications.

MOSFET↗
DOE OSTI2025

Time-interval distributions in a digital gamma multi-channel analyzer at extreme input rates

Here, this study explores the relationship between experimentally observed inter-event time-interval distributions (TIDs) and measured dead times for pulses generated by a HPGe gamma detector and processed by a digital spectrometer. The system utilizes a fast and slow channel, pile-up rejector, trapezoid filtering, and flash analog-to-digital converter. The experimentally derived TIDs were compared with theory for validation. The results demonstrate that the theoretical model reliably describes measured TIDs up to 40% dead time. However, significant distortion effects become increasingly pronounced at higher input rates. It appears that the deviation between the measured and calculated time-interval distributions take the shape of higher-order convolutions of the TID, which represent the time difference between counts for more than two successive events. In this work, theoretical functions for the TID are expanded to reproduce measurements up to 90%. This refinement in the interpretation and treatment of the measured TIDs provides improved accuracy and precision in the prediction of the true event rate and measured dead time in the counter. Even though it reflects occasional count loss that is specific to the set-up, it is expected that a similar adjustment may be applicable to other detection systems as well.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Higher‐Order Gravity Waves and Traveling Ionospheric Disturbances From the Polar Vortex Jet on 11–15 January 2016: Modeling With HIAMCM‐SAMI3 and Comparison With Observations in the Thermosphere and Ionosphere

Abstract In Vadas et al. (2024, https://doi.org/10.1029/2024ja032521 ), we modeled the atmospheric gravity waves (GWs) during 11–14 January 2016 using the HIAMCM, and found that the polar vortex jet generates medium to large‐scale, higher‐order GWs in the thermosphere. In this paper, we model the traveling ionospheric disturbances (TIDs) generated by these GWs using the HIAMCM‐SAMI3 and compare with ionospheric observations from ground‐based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers, Incoherent Scatter Radars (ISR) and the Super Dual Auroral Radar Network (SuperDARN). We find that medium to large‐scale TIDs are generated worldwide by the higher‐order GWs from this event. Many of the TIDs over Europe and Asia have concentric ring/arc‐like structure, and most of those over North/South America have planar wave structure and occur during the daytime. Those over North/South America propagate southward and are generated by higher‐order GWs from Europe/Asia which propagate over the Arctic. These latter TIDs can be misidentified as arising from geomagnetic forcing. We find that the higher‐order GWs that propagate to Africa and Brazil from Europe may aid in the formation of equatorial plasma bubbles (EPBs) there. We find that the simulated GWs, TIDs and EPBs agree with EISCAT, PFISR, GNSS, and SuperDARN measurements. We find that the higher‐order GWs are concentrated at N at 200 km, in agreement with GOCE and CHAMP data. Thus the polar vortex jet is important for generating TIDs in the northern winter ionosphere via multi‐step vertical coupling through GWs.

Vadas, Sharon L. [Northwest Research Associates Bo↗
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗
DOE OSTI2025

Test and Evaluation of Radiofrequency Tamper Indicating Devices for Remote Monitoring of Advanced/Small Modular Reactors

Advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs), due to their versatile nature, are likely to be used in remote locations to provide electrical power or other services in regions that are difficult to access or have limited transportation infrastructure. This will result in limited on-site staff, therefore driving A/SMR vendors to consider remote monitoring as a solution to support nuclear security. Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of nuclear material quantities and locations is vital to nuclear security, and remote monitoring of active tamper indicating devices (TIDs) has been well established as a component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards since the early 2000s. Active TIDs, such as radiofrequency TIDs (RFTIDs), immediately alarm upon unauthorized access attempts, promoting timely detection. In contrast, passive TIDs require a surveillance regime and offer delayed detection. Active TIDs deter insiders and enable prompt detection of malicious acts. They can be used on nuclear material containers and controlled entry points like vaults and toolboxes. Therefore, the implementation of RFTIDs into security programs bolsters overall nuclear material control, and provides a visible deterrent, with primary efficacy in mitigating the insider threat and potentially allowing for Security by Design considerations. They are a strong candidate technology for maintaining nuclear security of A/SMRs but need to be evaluated for feasibility and implementation into the wider physical protection system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

INS Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Instructional Video Materials- FY 25 Guides

This training video provides an essential guide to understanding and utilizing Tamper Indicating Devices (TIDs), with a specific focus on a common Mylar (Adhesive) variety during the application process. TIDs are a critical part of nuclear security, used to detect unauthorized access to sensitive materials or facilities. The Mylar (adhesive) TID employes a tamper-evident film integrated into the TID that visually indicates any tampering attempts. This video will explain how an example Mylar (adhesive) TID works, demonstrate proper installation techniques, and highlight how to interpret its indicators to ensure the security of nuclear materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1997

Antifuse FPGA for Space Applications

This paper presents viewgraphs of Antifuse FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) for Space Applications. The topics include: 1) A32140DX TID Test; 2) A1280XL Proton Test; 3) SEU (Single Event Upsets) Rate Calculation; 4) Recent Products Test; 5) A1460A TID (Traveling Ionospheric Disturbances) Test; 6) I100 Proton Test; 7) 100/RHI100 SEU Test; 8) I100/RH100 TID Test; 9) A1020S TID Test; 10) TID Charge Pump Failure; 11) Radiation Testing; and SEE (Single Event Effects) Test Setup.

Wang, Jih-Jong↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Shielding Considerations for CubeSat Structures During Solar Maximum

The purpose of this lessons learned is to communicate the utility of shielding in small spacecraft planning for the support of mission assurance and reliability. Numerous SmallSats have been flying in polar low earth orbit for scientific, communications, technology demonstrations, and imaging with academic, commercial, and government interests. Shielding has been part of mission assurance and reliability from the advent of long duration spacecraft missions. The Shields-1 CubeSat has been operating in polar low earth orbit since 16 December 2018 with atomic number (Z)-grade radiation shielding and demonstrates shielding effectiveness. Shields-1 has collected a representative example of solar minimum data in 2019 with 8 Teledyne dosimeters over varying shielding effectiveness. It serves as current experimental data and has been compared with NOVICE Shielding estimates using the AP8 –AE8 trapped radiation model with the Shields-1 CAD and generic CubeSat 3 unit (U) models. Using NOVICE model radiation analysis coding, the shielding effectiveness's, based on a generic CubeSat 3U structure with 4 electronic boards, were estimated for aluminum wall thicknesses ranging from 0.204 cmto4.44 cm (0.550 g/cm2–12.0 g/cm2) thick aluminum. For modeled polar orbiting spacecraft, solar maximum total ionizing dose (TID)increases by nearly a magnitude for thin-walled aluminum 0.550g/cm2-0.686 g/cm2(0.204 cm –0.254 cm) typical CubeSat structures. The shielding effectiveness by NOVICE Sigma estimates, which is a shielding sphere approximation around a detector, showed a linear relationship with wall thickness, which increased over the wall thickness by a ratio of 1.43 determined by linear regression analysis. Using NOVICE Adjoint Monte-Carlo Modeling of solar minimum and solar maximum with the inclusion of a worst-case solar particle event over a one year mission without geomagnetic shielding, the TID for minimum and maximum conditions for a generic 3U with a wall thickness of 0.254 cm is 158 RAD and 1540 RAD, respectively. The modeled total solar maximum TID is over estimated, because at low orbital latitudes a spacecraft will have shielding from Earth's magnetic field. However, TID will still be significant at high latitudes over the poles, where a spacecraft is exposed in a solar particle event. In contrast, to a thin walled generic 3U CubeSat, Shields-1 electronics enclosure has a shielding effectiveness of 21.3 g/cm2from NOVICE Sigma modeling and is expected to show reduced total ionizing dose increases during the present active Solar Cycle 25 period. Because solar particle events during solar maximum increase TID on electronic parts with thin-walled shielding in short periods of time, it is a mission assurance and reliability consideration on the spacecraft’s mission value versus adding shielding for risk reduction of premature spacecraft or instrument payload loss. Since the volumes of many instruments and system electronics have reduced with small spacecraft, shielding material costs and weight penalties have diminished. A small spacecraft project budget and schedule may limit traditional radiation-hardened part use and radiation testing requirements, where shielding can contribute to mission assurance and reliability with reduced costs.

Shields-1↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Shielding Considerations for CubeSat Structures During Solar Maximum

The purpose of this lessons learned paper is to communicate the utility of shielding in small spacecraft planning for the support of mission assurance and reliability. Numerous SmallSats have been flying in polar low Earth orbit for science, communications, technology demonstrations, and imaging with academic, commercial, and government interests. Shielding has been part of mission assurance and reliability from the advent of long duration spacecraft missions. The Shields-1 CubeSat has been operating in polar low Earth orbit since 16 December 2018 with atomic number (Z)-grade radiation shielding and demonstrates shielding effectiveness. Shields-1 has collected a representative example of solar minimum data in 2019 with eight Teledyne µDosimeters over varying shielding effectivenesses. It serves as current experimental data and has been compared with NOVICE Shielding estimates using the AP8 – AE8 trapped radiation model with the Shields-1 CAD and generic CubeSat three unit (3U) models. Using NOVICE model radiation analysis coding, the shielding effectivenesses, based on a generic CubeSat 3U structure with four electronic boards, were estimated for aluminum wall thicknesses ranging from 0.204 cm to 4.44 cm (0.550 g/cm 2 to 12.0 g/cm 2 ). For modeled polar orbiting spacecraft, solar maximum total ionizing dose (TID) increases by nearly a magnitude for thin-walled aluminum 0.550-g/cm 2 - 0.686-g/cm 2 (0.204-cm – 0.254-cm) typical CubeSat structures. The shielding effectiveness estimated by NOVICE Sigma, which is a shielding sphere approximation around a detector, showed a linear relationship with wall thickness, which increased over the wall thickness by a ratio of 1.43 determined by linear regression analysis. Using NOVICE Adjoint Monte-Carlo Modeling of solar minimum and solar maximum with the inclusion of a worst-case solar particle event over a one-year mission without geomagnetic shielding, the TID for minimum and maximum conditions for a generic 3U with a wall thickness of 0.254 cm is 158 RAD and 1540 RAD, respectively. The modeled total solar maximum TID is over estimated, because at low orbital latitudes a spacecraft will have shielding from the Earth’s magnetic field. However, TID will still be significant at high latitudes over the poles, where a spacecraft is exposed in a solar particle event. In contrast to a thin-walled generic 3U CubeSat, the Shields-1 electronics enclosure has a shielding effectiveness of 21.3 g/cm 2 from NOVICE Sigma modeling and is expected to show reduced total ionizing dose increases during the present active Solar Cycle 25 period. Because solar particle events during solar maximum increase TID on electronic parts with thin-walled shielding in short periods of time, it is a mission assurance and reliability consideration on the mission value of the spacecraft versus adding shielding for risk reduction of premature spacecraft or instrument payload loss. Since the volumes of many instruments and system electronics have reduced with small spacecraft, shielding material costs and weight penalties have diminished. A small spacecraft project budget and schedule may limit traditional radiation-hardened part use and radiation testing requirements, where shielding can contribute to mission assurance and reliability with reduced costs.

Shields-1↗