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Functionally generated acceptance tests are examined using structural coverage metrics. A method of comparing acceptance tests and operational usage was generated. Acceptance tests are prepresentative of operational usage except for the mix of statement types. Structural coverage metrics may provide insight into software faults.
Technology-driven efforts to implement computer technology often encounter problems due to lack of acceptance or begrudging acceptance of the personnel involved. It is argued that individuals' acceptance of automation, in terms of either computerization or computer aiding, is heavily influenced by their perceptions of the impact of the automation on their discretion in performing their jobs. It is suggested that desired levels of discretion reflect needs to feel in control and achieve self-satisfaction in task performance, as well as perceptions of inadequacies of computer technology. Discussion of these factors leads to a structured set of considerations for performing front-end analysis, deciding what to automate, and implementing the resulting changes.
Acceptance and qualification tests have been performed on the TSS-1 flight tether and its associated qualification tether. Acceptance testing during production included periodic measurement of conductor resistance, off-line breakstrength tests on strength member samples, continuous measurement of the insulation layer voltage withstand capability, and a continuous mechanical proof-loading procedure during the tether jacketing operation. The qualification test sequence consisted of thermal vacuum, voltage withstand and breakstrength tests on samples taken from the production runs for both the qualification and flight tethers. This paper will analyze the acceptance and qualification test data, respectively. Results indicate that the completed flight tether exceeds the design requirements for the TSS-1 mission.
Details of a proposed test program for PV thin-film modules which the Department of Energy has directed the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI) to prepare are presented. Results of one of the characterization tests that SERI has performed are also presented. The objective is to establish a common approach to testing modules that will be acceptable to both users and manufacturers. The tests include acceptance, qualification, and characterization tests. Acceptance tests verify that randomly selected modules have similar characteristics. Qualification tests are based on accelerated test methods designed to simulate adverse conditions. Characterization tests provide data on performance in a predefined environment.
This paper examines the problems encountered in assessing the reliability of dye-penetrant nondestructive inspection (NDI) techniques in preventing failures due to undetected surface flaws, as well as from flaw acceptance (Fitness-For-Purpose). A Monte Carlo simulation procedure which includes the major variables of the problem is presented as a means of quantifying reliability. Some issues associated with distribution selection are examined. A methodology for selecting the penetrant type and flaw acceptance size for the specific components analyzed using the simulation is proposed. Current methodology limitations are discussed along with possible future effort. Penetrant selection and acceptable sizes of detected flaws are based on a probabilistic assessment of the effect of component and dye-penetrant system variables on structural reliability.
From user requirements definition to accepted software system, the software project management wants to be sure that the system will meet the requirements. For the development of a telecommunication satellites Control Centre, C.N.E.S. has used new rules to make the use of tracing matrix easier. From Requirements to Acceptance Tests, each item of a document must have an identifier. A unique matrix traces the system and allows the tracking of the consequences of a change in the requirements. A tool has been developed, to import documents into a relational data base. Each record of the data base corresponds to an item of a document, the access key is the item identifier. Tracing matrix is also processed, providing automatically links between the different documents. It enables the reading on the same screen of traced items. For example one can read simultaneously the User Requirements items, the corresponding Software Requirements items and the Acceptance Tests.
The final acceptance, or rejection, of the Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS) will be determined by the instrument's on-orbit operation. There is, however, an extensive set of laboratory measurements describing the operating characteristics of the radiometer. Many of the requirements in the Ocean Color Data Mission (OCDM) specifications can be checked only by laboratory measurements. Here, the calibration review panel examines the laboratory characterization and calibration of SeaWiFS in the light of the OCDM performance specification. Overall, the performance of the SeaWiFS instrument meets or exceeds the requirements of the OCDM contract in all but a few unimportant details. The detailed results of this examination are presented here by following the outline of the specifications, as found in the Contract. The results are presented in the form of requirements and compliance pairs. These results give conclusions on many, but not all, of the performance specifications. The acceptance by this panel of the performance of SeaWiFS must only be considered as an intermediate conclusion. The ultimate acceptance (or rejection) of the SeaWiFS data set will rely on the measurements made by the instrument on orbit.
The final acceptance, or rejection, of the Sea-viewing Wide field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS) will be determined by the instrument's on-orbit operation. There is, however, an extensive set of laboratory measurements describing the operating characteristics of the radiometer. Many of the requirements in the Ocean Color Data Mission (OCDM) specifications can be checked only by laboratory measurements. Here, the calibration review panel (composed of the authors of this technical memorandum) examines the laboratory characterization and calibration of SeaWiFS in the light of the OCDM performance specification. Overall, the performance of the SeaWiFS instrument meets or exceeds the requirements of the OCDM contract in all but a few unimportant details. The detailed results of this examination are presented here by following the outline of the specifications, as found in the Contract. The results are presented in the form of requirements and compliance pairs. These results give conclusions on many, but not all, of the performance specifications. The acceptance of this panel of the performance of SeaWiFS must only be considered as an intermediate conclusion. The ultimate acceptance (or rejection) of the SeaWiFS data set will rely on the measurements made by the instrument on orbit.
Two loop heat pipes (LHPs) are to be used for tight thermal control of the Geoscience Laser Altimeter System (GLAS) instrument, planned for flight in late 2001. The LHPs are charged with Propylene as a working fluid. One LHP will be used to transport 110 W from a laser to a radiator, the other will transport 160 W from electronic boxes to a separate radiator. The application includes a large amount of thermal mass in each LHP system and low initial startup powers. The initial design had some non-ideal flight design compromises, resulted in a less than ideal charge level for this design concept with a symmetrical secondary wick. This less than ideal charge was identified as the source of inadequate performance of the flight LHPs during the flight thermal vacuum test in October of 2000. We modified the compensation chamber design, re-built and charged the LHPs for a final LHP acceptance thermal vacuum test. This test performed March of 2001 was 100% successful. This is the last testing to be performed on the LHPs prior to instrument thermal vacuum test. This sensitivity to charge level was shown through varying the charge on a Development Model Loop Heat Pipe (DM LHP) and evaluating performance at various fill levels. At lower fills similar to the original charge in the flight units, the same poor performance was observed. When the flight units were re-designed and filled to the levels similar to the initial successful DM LHP test, the flight units also successfully fulfilled all requirements. This final flight Acceptance test assessed performance with respect to startup, low power operation, conductance, and control heater power, and steady state control. The results of the testing showed that both LHPs operated within specification. Startup on one of the LHPs was better than the other LHP because of the starter heater placement and a difference in evaporator design. These differences resulted in a variation in the achieved superheat prior to startup. The LHP with the lower superheat was sensitive to the thermal environment around the compensation chamber, while the LHP with the higher superheat (similar in design to DM LHP) was not. In response to the test results the placement of the starter heater will be optimized for the flight instrument testing for higher achieved superheat. This presentation discusses startup behavior, overall conductance of a radiator system, low power operation, high power operation, temperature control stability, and control heater power requirements as measured during this acceptance thermal vacuum test. A brief summary of 'lessons learned' will be included.
The NAS Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation Facility's HSP 2 computer system, a CRI Y-MP 832 SN #1002, underwent a major hardware upgrade in February of 1990. The 32 MWord, 6.3 ns mainframe component of the system was replaced with a 128 MWord, 6.0 ns CRI Y-MP 8128 mainframe, SN #1030. A 30 day Acceptance Test of the computer system was performed by the NAS RND HSP group from 08:00 February 10, 1990 to 08:00 March 12, 1990. Overall responsibility for the RND HSP Acceptance Test was assumed by Duane Carbon. The terms of the contract required that the SN #1030 achieve an effectiveness level of greater than or equal to ninety (90) percent for 30 consecutive days within a 60 day time frame. After the first thirty days, the effectiveness level of SN #1030 was 94.4 percent, hence the acceptance test was passed.
Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.
Over the last three decades, NASA has been diligent in qualifying systems for human space flight. As the Agency transitions from operating the Space Shuttle, its employees must learn to accept higher risk levels to generate the data needed to certify its next human space flight system. The Marshall Center s Engineering workforce is developing the Ares I crew launch vehicle and designing the Ares V cargo launch vehicle for safety, reliability, and cost-effective operations. This presentation will provide a risk retrospective, using first-hand examples from the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DC-XA) and the X-33 single-stage-to-orbit flight demonstrators, while looking ahead to the upcoming Ares I-X uncrewed test flight. The DC-XA was successfully flown twice in 26 hours, setting a new turnaround-time record. Later, one of its 3 landing gears did not deploy, it tipped over, and was destroyed. During structural testing, the X-33 s advanced composite tanks were unable to withstand the forces to which it was subjected and the project was later cancelled. These are examples of successful failures, as the data generated are captured in databases used by vehicle designers today. More recently, the Ares I-X flight readiness review process was streamlined in keeping with the mission's objectives, since human lives are not at stake, which reflects the beginning of a cultural change. Failures are acceptable during testing, as they provide the lessons that actually lead to mission success. These and other examples will stimulate the discussion of when to accept risk in aerospace projects.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to improve on the Best Practices document produced for the NESC assessment, Verification of Probabilistic Requirements for the Constellation Program, by giving a recommended procedure for using acceptance sampling by variables techniques as an alternative to the potentially resource-intensive acceptance sampling by attributes method given in the document. In this paper, the results of empirical tests intended to assess the accuracy of acceptance sampling plan calculators implemented for six variable distributions are presented.
Previously, we showed that air traffic controllers (ATCos) rated UAS pilot verbal response latencies as acceptable when a 1.5 s delay was added to the UAS pilot responses, but a 5 s delay was rated as mostly unacceptable. In the present study we determined whether a 1.5 s added delay in the UAS pilots' verbal communications would affect ATCos interactions with UAS and other conventional aircraft when the number and speed of the UAS were manipulated. Eight radar-certified ATCos participated in this simulation. The ATCos managed a medium altitude sector containing arrival aircraft, en route aircraft, and one to four UAS. The UAS were conducting a surveillance mission and flew at either a "slow" or "fast" speed. We measured both UAS and conventional pilots' verbal communication latencies, and obtained ATCos' acceptability ratings for these latencies. Although the UAS pilot response latencies were longer than those of conventional pilots, the ATCos rated UAS pilot verbal communication latencies to be as acceptable as those of conventional pilots. Because the overall traffic load within the sector was held constant, ATCos only performed slightly worse when multiple UAS were in their sector compared to when only one UAS was in the sector. Implications of these findings for UAS integration in the NAS are discussed.
This report documents analysis results of the Kennedy Space Center updated 50-MHz Doppler Radar Wind Profiler (DRWP) Operational Acceptance Test (OAT). This test was designed to demonstrate that the new DRWP operates in a similar manner to the previous DRWP for use as a situational awareness asset for mission operations at the Eastern Range to identify rapid changes in the wind environment that weather balloons cannot depict. Data examination and two analyses showed that the updated DRWP meets the specifications in the OAT test plan and performs at least as well as the previous DRWP. Data examination verified that the DRWP provides complete profiles every five minutes from 1.8-19.5 km in vertical increments of 150 m. Analysis of 5,426 wind component reports from 49 concurrent DRWP and balloon profiles presented root mean square (RMS) wind component differences around 2.0 m/s. The DRWP's effective vertical resolution (EVR) was found to be 300 m for both the westerly and southerly wind component, which the best EVR possible given the DRWP's vertical sampling interval. A third analysis quantified the sensitivity to rejecting data that do not have adequate signal by assessing the number of first-guess propagations at each altitude. This report documents the data, quality control procedures, methodology, and results of each analysis. It also shows that analysis of the updated DRWP produced results that were at least as good as the previous DRWP with proper rationale. The report recommends acceptance of the updated DRWP for situational awareness usage as per the OAT's intent.
This paper presents an application of statistical engineering to solve the problem of determining the effects of reducing test sample sizes and environment levels in lot acceptance testing (LAT) of ordnance devices used by NASA and DoD space systems. Unlike environmental testing of dedicated qualification hardware, ordnance devices have a test-like-you-fly exception and use lot acceptance sampling or LAT. LAT is performed by randomly selecting a predefined number of devices from an individual lot and exposing them to a more severe dynamic shock and vibration testing environments than flight (sometimes as high as 6 decibels over flight environments) and then performing a destructive test on the device. Recent trends have been suggested to reduce LAT costs by reducing environment test levels or the number of devices per LAT, or both. A method is given here to compute flight risk, so the proposed methods can be compared by subject matter experts to the baseline LAT methods. In addition, this method can be used to determine the best methods to include in future LAT standards for pyrotechnic devices.
The development of an inorganic separator material for use in construction of 40 ampere-hour silver zinc cells is discussed. Acceptance tests were conducted to determine real quality, physical defects and ampere-hour capacity. All acceptance tests were performed at an ambient temperature of 23 to 27 C at existing relative humidity and atmospheric pressure. Of the 63 cells tested, only one failed to meet the equipment specifications.
The responses of people to special noise characteristics associated with short takeoff aircraft are discussed. The findings of studies which have yielded data that may be pertinent to community acceptance of short takeoff aircraft noise are presented. A three step program to evaluate public acceptance of short takeoff aircraft noise was conducted. The three steps were: (1) definition of short takeoff aircraft noise characteristics, (2) laboratory tests to evaluate individual responses, and (3) the use of community survey data to extrapolate conventional takeoff aircraft experience.