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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1988

Active Vibration Control of a Large Flexible Manipulator by Inertial Force and Joint Torque

The efficiency and positional accuracy of a lightweight flexible manipulator are limited by its flexural vibrations, which last after a gross motion is completed. The vibration delays subsequent operations. In the proposed work, the vibration is suppressed by inertial force of a small arm in addition to the joint actuators and passive damping treatment. The proposed approach is: (1) Dynamic modeling of a combined system, a large flexible manipulator and a small arm, (2) Determination of optimal sensor location and controller algorithm, and (3) Verification of the fitness of model and the performance of controller.

Lee, Soo Han↗
DOE OSTI2020

Confirming the absence of nuclear warheads via passive gamma-ray measurements

Arms-control agreements between the United States and Russia negotiated after the end of the Cold War have imposed limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Verification of these agreements has relied on onsite inspections, sometimes supported by radiation detection techniques to confirm the absence of a nuclear warhead when ambiguities arise. So far, these measurements have sought to detect neutron emissions associated with the presence of plutonium, but they would be inadequate for uranium devices. In an effort to offer instruments that could be used to confirm the absence of both plutonium and uranium weapons, here we propose an inspection system that uses only passive gamma radiation detection techniques. Such a system would be particularly valuable for next-generation arms-control agreements that limit total numbers of weapons and would involve containerized items in storage. We conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations to support the development of a verification protocol and detection algorithm. Here, we demonstrate the viability of the technique using standard laboratory check sources and MCNP simulations for simplified configurations of special nuclear material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Results of an In-Field Validation Exercise in Support of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NA-24) is evaluating Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES) as an additional safeguards verification tool for the International Atomic Energy Agency to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The NNSA is evaluating strategies for conducting a generic WAES campaign, the cost of a WAES campaign, and the effect of technological advancements that have occurred since the last major WAES review in 1999. Until now, the NNSA effort has focused on tabletop exercises (TTXs) in which high-performance computing allows for advanced modeling and simulation efforts to be applied to the WAES question. Although the modeling and simulations used in the TTXs are extremely valuable, field campaigns are still needed to validate the assumptions that underpin the models and the modeling process itself. During a 7 week period beginning in May 2023 and ending in June 2023, which included 4 weeks of active field collections, a multilaboratory team conducted its first in-field validation exercise. Prior to the in-field exercise, abbreviated TTXs were conducted to estimate the performance of all collection systems to be used during the field test. These TTXs guided the selection of materials to be released and the placement of the collection system. Based on these determinations, materials were procured to use in the field test, and an injection/release system was designed, built, and installed at the test facility. Background samples were collected during weeks one and four, and environmental collections against active releases were conducted during weeks two and three. The goals of this validation exercise included a demonstration of (1) the ability to provide controlled releases of particulates of surrogate materials, (2) the fielding and operation of collection systems (including deposition and active air collectors), and (3) the flexibility to revise equipment and campaign plans in the field. This paper presents the results and preliminary conclusions for this initial validation test. Based on these results, subsequent field campaigns are anticipated and will include the addition of other released materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Prototype for Unclassified Algorithm

Continuing previous efforts to investigate and develop the Unclassified Radioisotope Algorithm, the goal of the FY19-FY20 effort was to develop a prototype detector system which uses the algorithm to confirm warhead attributes related to the presence of either weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The final deliverable is a prototype attribute measurement system built with common, commercially available gamma radiation detector components, capable of confirming the presence of specific, complex radioactive sources of interest, without the collection and storage of gamma energy spectra. This is accomplished by processing each gamma pulse as it is received, applying weight values based on the energy and incrementing or decrementing scalar counters which can be compared with expected values to determine if the measured source is consistent with WGPu or HEU. This report documents the design of the prototype system as well as the development of the algorithm and performance testing results. While the previously conceptualized, simple algorithm resulted in a prohibitive amount of false positives, the goal for a simple attribute measurement system capable of verifying Ba-133 and Ra-226 (weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium surrogate testing sources) at over 95% accuracy with sub 5% false positive rate was demonstrated.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verifying Deep Reductions in the Nuclear Arsenals: Development and Demonstration of a Motion-detection Subsystem for a “Buddy Tag” Using Non-export Controlled Accelerometers

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may place numerical limits on items that are difficult to monitor with national technical means, even when complemented with onsite inspections. Such items could include small objects and mobile assets, such as non-deployed nuclear warheads and mobile missile launchers. Typically, this verification task can be addressed with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. First proposed in the late 1980s and partially developed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s, the “Proximity Tag” or “Buddy Tag” concept seeks to overcome these concerns by separating the tag from the treaty accountable item itself. A buddy tag has two key elements: a tamper-indicating enclosure and a motion-detection system designed to detect illicit movements in a stand-down period. As part of this project, we have built a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper reviews the design choices and functionalities of the tag’s motion-detection subsystem.We pursue a modular approach for the tag’s hardware, built around an Arduino-class microcontroller and a non-export-controlled low-noise accelerometer, and use open-source algorithms for the motion-detection software. Finally, we discuss the results of an extensive experimental campaign involving both indoor and outdoor measurements assessing the performance of the tag under real-world environmental conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification

Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
NASA NTRS1990

Development of a multipurpose hand controller for JEMRMS

A prototype multipurpose hand controller for the JEMRMS (Japanese Experiment Module Remote Manipulator System) was developed. The hand controller (H/C) is an orthogonal type, with 6 degrees of freedom (DOF) and small size. The orthogonal type H/C is very simple for coordinate transformations and can easily control any type of manipulators. In fact, the JEMRMS is planned to have two manipulators controlled by a common H/C at this stage. The H/C was able to be used as a rate control joystick and a force reflection master arm, using an experimental 6 DOF manipulator. Good maneuverability was confirmed in the verification test. The orthogonal type H/C is suitable for use as a common H/C for the two manipulators of the JEMRMS.

Matsuhira, Nobuto↗
NASA NTRS1980

The role of the real-time simulation facility, SIMFAC, in the design, development and performance verification of the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) with man-in-the-loop

The SIMFAC has played a vital role in the design, development, and performance verification of the shuttle remote manipulator system (SRMS) to be installed in the space shuttle orbiter. The facility provides for realistic man-in-the-loop operation of the SRMS by an operator in the operator complex, a flightlike crew station patterned after the orbiter aft flight deck with all necessary man machine interface elements, including SRMS displays and controls and simulated out-of-the-window and CCTV scenes. The characteristics of the manipulator system, including arm and joint servo dynamics and control algorithms, are simulated by a comprehensive mathematical model within the simulation subsystem of the facility. Major studies carried out using SIMFAC include: SRMS parameter sensitivity evaluations; the development, evaluation, and verification of operating procedures; and malfunction simulation and analysis of malfunction performance. Among the most important and comprehensive man-in-the-loop simulations carried out to date on SIMFAC are those which support SRMS performance verification and certification when the SRMS is part of the integrated orbiter-manipulator system.

Mccllough, J. R.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiation Detection Technologies

When governing bodies seek to reduce the spread and development of nuclear material and weapons, arms control and safeguards technologies play an important role in preventing proliferation within a state that has already developed a nuclear weapon. Arms control treaties work to control the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, distribution, or the usage of a certain weapon type or delivery system. Treaty guidelines are met using combinations of monitoring, detection, and verification technologies. 1 To verify compliance, a country must determine if the activities of another country are within the limits and obligations established by the treaty. A verifiable treaty contains an interlocking web of constraints and provisions designed to deter cheating, to make cheating more complicated and more expensive, or to make its detection timelier. In the past, the U.S. has deemed treaties to be effectively verifiable if there is confidence that significant violations can be detected in time to respond and offset any threat that the violation may create for the U.S.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
NASA NTRS2014

Advanced Inspection System: Integrating Robotic Configurations & Controls

The Advanced Inspection System (AIS) promotes the ability to perform field inspections and repairs remotely by operator command. The robotic system is required to be a fully autonomous operation, managed by computer execution of scripts with limited user control. AIS is a complex yet intriguing challenge in which various goals must be reached to achieve complete autonomy. The first steps to building such a system require human computer interactions and computer simulations for testing and verification. Such applications include the use of a wireless video game controller via Bluetooth Technology and the use of Leap Motion, a gesture based motion controller which can be used to manipulate robotic arm movements. Utilizing the Robotic Operating System (ROS) environment, these applications, in accordance to developing a 3D simulation of the system, will provide a foundational test bed for AIS development.

Wlodarczyk, Stephan J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Integrated Simulation Design Challenges to Support TPS Repair Operations

During the Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) operations planned for Return to Flight (RTF), the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) must grapple the International Space Station (ISS), undock the Orbiter, maneuver it through a long duration trajectory, and orient it to an EVA crewman poised at the end of the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) to facilitate the repair of the Thermal Protection System (TPS). Once repair has been completed and confirmed, then the SRMS proceeds back through the trajectory to dock the Orbiter to the Orbiter Docking System. In order to support analysis of the complex dynamic interactions of the integrated system formed by the Orbiter, ISS, SRMS, and SSMS during the ORM, simulation tools used for previous ‘nominal’ mission support required substantial enhancements. These upgrades were necessary to provide analysts with the capabilities needed to study integrated system performance. Prevalent throughout this ORM operation is a dynamically varying topology. In other words, the ORM starts with the SRMS grappled to the mated Shuttle/ISS stack (closed loop topology), moves to an open loop chain topology consisting of the Shuttle, SRMS, and ISS, and then, at the repair configuration, extends the chain topology to one consisting of the Shuttle, SMS, ISS, and SSRMS/EVA crewman. The resulting long dynamic chain of vehicles and manipulators may exhibit significant motion between the Shuttle worksite and the EVA crewman due to the system flexibility throughout the topology (particularly within the SRMS/SSRMS joints and links). Since the attachment points of both manipulators span the flexible structure of the ISS, simulation analysis may also need to take that into consideration. Moreover, due to the lengthy time duration associated with the maneuver and repair, orbital effects become a factor and require the ISS vehicle control system to maintain active attitude control. Several facets of the ORM operation make the associated analytical efforts different from previous mission support, including: (1) the magnitude of the SRMS handled payload (Le., Orbiter class), (2) the orbital effects induced on the integrated system consisting of the large Shuttle and ISS masses connected by a light flexible SRMS, (3) long duration environmental consequences due to the lengthy operational times associated with the maneuver and repair of the TPS, (4) active attitude control (as opposed to free drift) interacting with the SRMS and SSRMS manipulators (also due to the length of the maneuver and repair), (5) relative dynamics between the EVA crewman and thc worksite influenced by the extended flexible topology. In order to meet these analysis challenges, an ORM simulation architecture was developed leveraging upon numerous pre-existing simulation elements to analyze the various subsystems individually. For example, core manipulator subsystem simulations for both the SRMS and SSRMS were originally combined to provide the dual-arm dynamics topology simulation (in the absence of orbital dynamics and vehicle control). This capability was later merged with the simulation used to analyze SRMS loading with a heavy payload in the orbital environment with an active payload control system (in this case, the ISS Attitude Control System (ACS)), configured for the ORM. The resulting worksite dynamics simulation, based off of the modified ORM simulation, provided the extended topological chain of vehicles and manipulators, while taking into account the orbital effects of both the Shuttle and ISS (as well as its ACS). Verification and validation (V&V) of these integrated simulations became a challenge in itself. A systematic approach needed to be developed such that integration simulation results could be tested against previous constituent simulations upon which these simulations were built. General V&V categories included: (1) core orbital state propagation, (2), stand-alone SRMS, (3) stand-alone SSRMS, (4) stand-alone ISS ACS, (5) integrated Shuttle, SRMS, ISS (with active ACS) in the orbital environment, and (5) dual-arm SRMS/SSRMS dynamics topology. Integrated simulation V&V run suites were created and correlated to verification runs from subsystem simulations, in order to establish the validity of the results. This paper discusses the simulation design challenges encountered while developing simulation capabilities to mirror the ORM operations. The paper also describes the incremental build approach that was utilized, starting with the subsystem simulation elements and integration into increasing more complex simulations until the resulting ORM worksite dynamics simulation had been assembled. Furthermore, the paper presents an overall integrated simulation V&V methodology based upon a subsystem level testing, integrated comparisons, and phased checkout.

Thermal Protection System↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE Focus Area 4: Structured Decision Metrics Analysis (Final Report)

A structured decision metrics analysis was developed as one of the tasks under PROACTIVE’s Focus Area 4 (FA4) and used structured decision metrics for processes, items, and facilities (PIF) to determine the efficacy of an M&V system in meeting treaty goals and technical objectives. The method starts with the functional decomposition of a “treaty” with the M&V system overlaid on it. A Functional Decomposition Rubric (FDR) for each PIF is used to determine a score ranging from 0 (weak) to 4 (strong) for assurance, security, and burden. The individual scores are combined to provide an overall Verification System Score (VSS) which assesses the overall verification system’s suitability given goals; scores for each step of the process are also given. The outcome of the evaluation is to identify needs or modifications to the enterprise model, verification system, or proposed testbed capabilities. VeriScore was used to evaluate FA4’s Spiral 0 exercise; those results are included in this report. The VeriScore and FDR framework can also be used in a non-treaty environment, as any goal/objective/method structure will work, thus expanding its applicability beyond traditional arms control structures.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1988

Systems integration for the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Robotics Applications Development Laboratory (RADL)

A laboratory for developing robotics technology for hazardous and repetitive Shuttle and payload processing activities is discussed. An overview of the computer hardware and software responsible for integrating the laboratory systems is given. The center's anthropomorphic robot is placed on a track allowing it to be moved to different stations. Various aspects of the laboratory equipment are described, including industrial robot arm control, smart systems integration, the supervisory computer, programmable process controller, real-time tracking controller, image processing hardware, and control display graphics. Topics of research include: automated loading and unloading of hypergolics for space vehicles and payloads; the use of mobile robotics for security, fire fighting, and hazardous spill operations; nondestructive testing for SRB joint and seal verification; Shuttle Orbiter radiator damage inspection; and Orbiter contour measurements. The possibility of expanding the laboratory in the future is examined.

Davis, V. Leon↗
NASA NTRS2022

How to Build a Rover: An Overview of the Mars 2020 Mission’s Vehicle System Testbed

While NASA’s Mars rover Perseverance continues to make groundbreaking achievements on the Red Planet, its twin is hard at work here on Earth. The Operational Perseverance Twin for the Integration of Mechanisms and Instruments Sent to Mars, or OPTIMISM, is the Mars 2020 Vehicle System Testbed (VSTB) rover operated by NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California. OPTIMISM’s home is the JPL Mars Yard; an outdoor field with red soil that simulates the terrain encountered by Perseverance. The VSTB is a full-scale engineering model of the flight rover, serving a number of functions to ensure mission operations can continue smoothly and on schedule. The VSTB possesses instrumentation, computers, mechanisms, cameras, and a Mobility subsystem that are nearly identical to its extraterrestrial twin. Its high fidelity allows the rover to be a highly effective tool to fully test system functionality and performance prior to commanding the flight rover. The early stages of building OPTIMISM began a few months prior to Perseverance departing JPL for Cape Canaveral, FL in early 2020. Electrical integration of the flight system avionics, and compatibility checkouts of the electrical ground support equipment ensured that the foundation of the electrical system was operational and in place. Next, the internal harnessing was installed and compatibility checks of the rover instrumentation and mechanisms were performed to confirm the system was prepared for full buildup. Finally, mechanical assembly of the rover chassis with its external components completed the integration of the system before it was moved to the Mars Yard for its initial phase of testing to perform verification & validation (V&V) of the Mobility subsystem requirements. By the time Perseverance landed at Jezero Crater in February 2021, the first phase of VSTB operations was underway. Surface guidance, navigation, and control (SGNC) testing for the Mobility subsystem ensured functionality and performance requirements were met for various capabilities such as visual odometry (VO), mapping, and automatic navigation (AutoNav). Subsequent integration of the robotic arm (RA) onto the VSTB enabled the V&V campaign for surface sampling operations (SSO) to commence. As the mission’s engineering operations (EO) have gotten underway, the VSTB has been utilized for an array of purposes including troubleshooting software anomalies, and performing dry-runs for first time activities (FTAs) prior to sending the commands to Perseverance. OPTIMISM will continue to serve mission critical functions as long as Perseverance is roving the Red Planet.

Rojas, Jose Trujillo↗
DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1990

Space station definitions, design, and development. Task 5: Multiple arm telerobot coordination and control: Manipulator design methodology

A proposed methodology applicable to the design of manipulator systems is described. The current design process is especially weak in the preliminary design phase, since there is no accepted measure to be used in trading off different options available for the various subsystems. The design process described uses Cartesian End-Effector Impedance as a measure of performance for the system. Having this measure of performance, it is shown how it may be used to determine the trade-offs necessary to the preliminary design phase. The design process involves three main parts: (1) determination of desired system performance in terms of End-Effector Impedance; (2) trade-off design options to achieve this desired performance; and (3) verification of system performance through laboratory testing. The design process is developed using numerous examples and experiments to demonstrate the feasability of this approach to manipulator design.

Stoughton, R. M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Isolating Insecurely: A Call to Arms for the Security and Privacy Community During the Time of COVID-19

The privacy question is one that has only begun to be addressed. While on one hand, many of the staunchest privacy advocates have argued for relaxation of privacy controls in order to develop better tests, “back to work” protocols, and vaccines and other treatments, the same advocates point out that any loss of privacy for the public good should be temporary, transparent, necessary, proportionate, and follow a due process. What should solutions look like for data gathering, sharing, use, and disposal; or for protocols requiring strong individual identity verification and validation?

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗