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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2017

A CubeSat-Payload Radiation-Reliability Assurance Case using Goal Structuring Notation

CubeSats have become an attractive platform for universities, industry, and government space missions because they are cheaper and quicker to develop than full-scale satellites. One way CubeSats keep costs low is by using commercial off-the-shelf parts (COTS) instead of space-qualified parts. Space-qualified parts are often costlier, larger, and consume more power than their commercial counterparts precluding their use within the CubeSat form-factor. Given typical power budgets, monetary budgets, and timelines for CubeSat missions, conventional radiation hardness assurance, like the use of space-qualified parts and radiation testing campaigns of COTS parts, is not practical. Instead, a system-level approach to radiation effects mitigation is needed. In this paper an assurance case for a system-level approach to mitigate radiation effects of a CubeSat science experiment is expressed using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), a graphical argument standard. The case specifically looks at three main mitigation strategies for the radiation environment: total ionizing dose (TID) screening of parts, detection and recovery from single-event latch-ups (SEL) and single-event functional interrupts (SEFI). The graphical assurance case presented makes a qualitative argument for the radiation reliability of the CubeSat experiment using part and system-level mitigation strategies.

COTS↗
NASA NTRS2021

A Primer on Argument

The purpose of this document is to provide a common understanding of terms, concepts, principles, and uses of argument. It emphasizes the practical over the theoretical and the simple over the complicated.

argument↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗
NASA NTRS2021

An Assurance Case with a Model at its Core

We describe our pilot study development of an Assurance Case arguing the robustness of a spacecraft demonstration of optical communication. Our Assurance Case addresses the concern that optical communication may be interrupted by the presence of cloud cover, threatening the success of the demonstration. Central to our Assurance Case is its use of a model of atmospheric attenuation to support a key portion of the robustness argument. The conclusion for the demonstration is that its schedule slack plus ability to store data for transmission later accommodates occasional weather-caused atmospheric attenuation.We indicate how the overall structure of the Assurance Case derives from the Objectives Hierarchy set forth in the NASA Reliability and Maintainability standard. We then present the portions of the Assurance Case that argue (1) the atmospheric attenuation model is sufficiently accurate, (2) application of the model shows the desired robustness of the demonstration, and (3) all the model assumptions are satisfied in its application. Lastly, we suggest how an engineering model of the demonstration system and its use could inform the development of the Assurance Case encompassing additional plausible hazards.

DiVenti, Anthony↗
NASA NTRS2015

Safety Case Patterns: Theory and Applications

We develop the foundations for a theory of patterns of safety case argument structures, clarifying the concepts involved in pattern specification, including choices, labeling, and well-founded recursion. We specify six new patterns in addition to those existing in the literature. We give a generic way to specify the data required to instantiate patterns and a generic algorithm for their instantiation. This generalizes earlier work on generating argument fragments from requirements tables. We describe an implementation of these concepts in AdvoCATE, the Assurance Case Automation Toolset, showing how patterns are defined and can be instantiated. In particular, we describe how our extended notion of patterns can be specified, how they can be instantiated in an interactive manner, and, finally, how they can be automatically instantiated using our algorithm.

Safety Assurance↗
NASA NTRS2020

A Primer on Argument (Overarching Properties Edition)

The purpose of this document is to establish for the Overarching Properties Working Group (OPWG) a common understanding of the terms, concepts, principles, and uses of argument. It emphasizes the practical over the theoretical and the simple over the complicated.

argument↗
NASA NTRS2021

Systems Engineering and Assurance Modeling (SEAM): A Web-Based Solution for Integrated Mission Assurance

We present an overview of the Systems Engineering and Assurance Modeling (SEAM) platform, a web-browser-based tool which is designed to help engineers evaluate the radiation vulnerabilities and develop an assurance approach for electronic parts in space systems. The SEAM framework consists of three interconnected modeling tools, a SysML compatible system description tool, a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) visual argument tool, and Bayesian Net and Fault Tree extraction and export tools. The SysML and GSN sections also have a coverage check application that ensures that every radiation fault identified on the SysML side is also addressed in the assurance case in GSN. The SEAM platform works on space systems of any degree of radiation hardness but is especially helpful for assessing radiation performance in systems with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic components.

SEAM↗
NASA NTRS2008

A New Bond Albedo for Performing Orbital Debris Brightness to Size Transformations

We have developed a technique for estimating the intrinsic size distribution of orbital debris objects via optical measurements alone. The process is predicated on the empirically observed power-law size distribution of debris (as indicated by radar RCS measurements) and the log-normal probability distribution of optical albedos as ascertained from phase (Lambertian) and range-corrected telescopic brightness measurements. Since the observed distribution of optical brightness is the product integral of the size distribution of the parent [debris] population with the albedo probability distribution, it is a straightforward matter to transform a given distribution of optical brightness back to a size distribution by the appropriate choice of a single albedo value. This is true because the integration of a powerlaw with a log-normal distribution (Fredholm Integral of the First Kind) yields a Gaussian-blurred power-law distribution with identical power-law exponent. Application of a single albedo to this distribution recovers a simple power-law [in size] which is linearly offset from the original distribution by a constant whose value depends on the choice of the albedo. Significantly, there exists a unique Bond albedo which, when applied to an observed brightness distribution, yields zero offset and therefore recovers the original size distribution. For physically realistic powerlaws of negative slope, the proper choice of albedo recovers the parent size distribution by compensating for the observational bias caused by the large number of small objects that appear anomalously large (bright) - and thereby skew the small population upward by rising above the detection threshold - and the lower number of large objects that appear anomalously small (dim). Based on this comprehensive analysis, a value of 0.13 should be applied to all orbital debris albedo-based brightness-to-size transformations regardless of data source. Its prima fascia genesis, derived and constructed from the current RCS to size conversion methodology (SiBAM Size-Based Estimation Model) and optical data reduction standards, assures consistency in application with the prior canonical value of 0.1. Herein we present the empirical and mathematical arguments for this approach and by example apply it to a comprehensive set of photometric data acquired via NASA's Liquid Mirror Telescopes during the 2000-2001 observing season.

Mulrooney, Mark K.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0

Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.

Groen, Frank↗
NASA NTRS1971

Communicating the risk

The balance between benefits and risk is discussed from the standpoint of the decision or policy making process. The basic premise of the discussion is that applied technology may be divided into two parts: (1) benefit oriented technology which includes design, development, manufacturing or construction, and operations; and (2) risk or uncertainty technology which includes safety, reliability, quality assurance, test, and maintenance. Whereas the primary emphasis of the discussion is placed on the importance of a balance in the application of these technologies, arguments are presented which indicate that risk technologies lag far behind benefit technologies. In addition, existing conditions and pressures are described which lead to underestimating risk. The importance is stressed of developing a better sense of the advantages that knowledge of risk could provide via the decision making process. It is suggested that by experiment and analysis on the effects of increasing the contribution of risk technologies, a better understanding of their potentiality and limitations would result.

Raymond M. Wilmotte↗
NASA NTRS2013

Making the Implicit Explicit: Towards an Assurance Case for DO-178C

For about two decades, compliance with Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification (DO-178B) has been the primary means for receiving regulatory approval for using software on commercial airplanes. A new edition of the standard, DO-178C, was published in December 2011, and regulatory bodies have started the process towards recognizing this edition. The stated purpose of DO-178C remains unchanged from its predecessor: providing guidance “for the production of software for airborne systems and equipment that performs its intended function with a level of confidence in safety that complies with airworthiness requirements.” Within the text of the guidance, little or no rationale is given for how a particular objective or collection of objectives contributes to achieving this purpose. Thus the assurance case for the document is implicit. This paper discusses a current effort to make the implicit explicit. In particular, the paper describes the current status of the research seeking to identify the specific arguments contained in, or implied by, the DO-178C guidance that implicitly justify the assumption that the document meets its stated purpose.

Holloway, C. Michael↗
NASA NTRS1997

Application of Domain Knowledge to Software Quality Assurance

This work focused on capturing, using, and evolving a qualitative decision support structure across the life cycle of a project. The particular application of this study was towards business process reengineering and the representation of the business process in a set of Business Rules (BR). In this work, we defined a decision model which captured the qualitative decision deliberation process. It represented arguments both for and against proposed alternatives to a problem. It was felt that the subjective nature of many critical business policy decisions required a qualitative modeling approach similar to that of Lee and Mylopoulos. While previous work was limited almost exclusively to the decision capture phase, which occurs early in the project life cycle, we investigated the use of such a model during the later stages as well. One of our significant developments was the use of the decision model during the operational phase of a project. By operational phase, we mean the phase in which the system or set of policies which were earlier decided are deployed and put into practice. By making the decision model available to operational decision makers, they would have access to the arguments pro and con for a variety of actions and can thus make a more informed decision which balances the often conflicting criteria by which the value of action is measured. We also developed the concept of a 'monitored decision' in which metrics of performance were identified during the decision making process and used to evaluate the quality of that decision. It is important to monitor those decision which seem at highest risk of not meeting their stated objectives. Operational decisions are also potentially high risk decisions. Finally, we investigated the use of performance metrics for monitored decisions and audit logs of operational decisions in order to feed an evolutionary phase of the the life cycle. During evolution, decisions are revisisted, assumptions verified or refuted, and possible reassessments resulting in new policy are made. In this regard we implemented a machine learning algorithm which automatically defined business rules based on expert assessment of the quality of operational decisions as recorded during deployment.

Wild, Christian W.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Towards a Coherent View of Evidence in Safety Assurance

This paper explains why labeling something as evidence does not make it special and proposes a systematic approach for avoiding giving the word more authority than it warrants in rational inquiry about the real world.

evidence↗
NASA NTRS1989

Compact finite volume methods for the diffusion equation

An approach to treating initial-boundary value problems by finite volume methods is described, in which the parallel between differential and difference arguments is closely maintained. By using intrinsic geometrical properties of the volume elements, it is possible to describe discrete versions of the div, curl, and grad operators which lead, using summation-by-parts techniques, to familiar energy equations as well as the div curl = 0 and curl grad = 0 identities. For the diffusion equation, these operators describe compact schemes whose convergence is assured by the energy equations and which yield both the potential and the flux vector with second order accuracy. A simplified potential form is especially useful for obtaining numerical results by multigrid and alternating direction implicit (ADI) methods. The treatment of general curvilinear coordinates is shown to result from a specialization of these general results.

Rose, Milton E.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Compact finite volume methods for the diffusion equation

The paper describes an approach to treating initial-boundary-value problems by finite volume methods in which the parallel between differential and difference arguments is closely maintained. By using intrinsic geometrical properties of the volume elements, it is possible to describe discrete versions of the div, curl, and grad operators which lead, using summation-by-parts techniques, to familiar energy equations as well as the div curl = 0 and curl grad = 0 identities. For the diffusion equation, these operators describe compact schemes whose convergence is assured by the energy equations and which yield both the potential and the flux vector with second-order accuracy. A simplified potential form is especially useful for obtaining numerical results by multigrid and ADI methods.

Rose, Milton E.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Unmanned Aircraft Hazards and their Implications for Regulation

Use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) has been characterized as the next great step forward in the evolution of civil aviation. Indeed, UASs are in limited civil use in the United States today, and many believe that the time is rapidly approaching when they will move into the commercial marketplace, too. To make this a reality, a number of challenges must be overcome to develop the necessary regulatory framework for assuring safe operation of this special class of aircraft. This paper discusses some of what must be done to establish that framework. In particular, we examine hazards specific to the design, operation, and flight crew of UASs, and discuss implications of these hazards for existing policy and guidance. Understanding unique characteristics of UASs that pose new hazards is essential to developing a cogent argument, and the corresponding regulatory framework, for safely integrating these aircraft into civil airspace.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Evaluation of the concept of pressure proof testing fuselage structures

The FAA and NASA have recently completed independent technical evaluations of the concept of pressure proof testing the fuselage of commercial transport airplanes. The results of these evaluations are summarized. The objectives of the evaluations were to establish the potential benefit of the pressure proof test, to quantify the most desirable proof test pressure, and to quantify the required proof test interval. The focus of the evaluations was on multiple-site cracks extending from adjacent rivet holes of a typical fuselage longitudinal lap splice joint. The FAA and NASA do not support pressure proof testing the fuselage of aging commercial transport aircraft. The argument against proof testing is as follows: (1) a single proof test does not insure an indefinite life; therefore, the proof test must be repeated at regular intervals; (2) for a proof factor of 1.33, the required proof test interval must be below 300 flights to account for uncertainties in the evaluation; (3) conducting the proof test at a proof factor of 1.5 would considerably exceed the fuselage design limit load; therefore, it is not consistent with accepted safe practices; and (4) better safety can be assured by implementing enhanced nondestructive inspection requirements, and adequate reliability can be achieved by an inspection interval several times longer than the proof test interval.

Harris, Charles E.↗