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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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40 records · Page 3

The Resource Prospector Neutron Spectrometer System: RP's Bloodhound

The primary goal of the Resource Prospector Neutron Spectrometer System (NSS) is to locate and characterize hydrogen-bearing volatile deposits, especially subsurface ice, that may exist at the lunar poles. A key objective is to detect water-equivalent hydrogen concentrations of 0.5 wt% or greater while on a moving rover. A second objective is to determine approximate burial depth of enhanced hydrogen-bearing materials up to 1 meter below otherwise dry regolith. The instrument will be carried aboard a landed mobility system at the lunar poles. The instrument operates by measuring the changes in the leakage flux of low energy neutrons out of the regolith. These neutrons are produced by galactic cosmic rays, which are so energetic that they shatter the nuclei in surface materials. The neutrons interact with other nuclei and lose energy, becoming thermalized in the process. Hydrogen is most efficient at thermalizing neutrons owing to protons' similar mass - statistically, neutrons lose half their energy per collision with protons. With hydrogen in the soil, leakage fluxes of neutrons in the 0.5 eV to 500 keV energy range are reduced. A concentration of only1-2 wt% water-equivalent hydrogen results in a decrease in epithermal leakage flux of a factor of two. The leakage flux of thermal neutrons, from 0 to 0.5 eV in energy, can either increase or decrease depending on the hydrogen abundance and stratigraphy. As with the highly successful Lunar Prospector Neutron Spectrometer, the RP NSS detects both thermal and epithermal neutrons by using two helium-3 gas proportional counters, one covered by cadmium and the other uncovered. The former detects only epithermal neutrons with energies above approximately 0.5 eV, the latter detects both thermal (less than 0.5 eV) and epithermal energies (greater than 0.5 eV). When a neutron enters the detector tube and interacts with a helium-3 nucleus, the resulting reaction produces an energetic proton and triton that ionize the gas. The resulting electrons are accelerated toward a high-voltage anode and cascade, amplifying the net charge, which is collected at the anode. The number of electrons produced is proportional to the energy that the triton and proton deposit in the gas. A charge sensitive pre-amplifier converts the total charge to a step voltage output. A shaper amplifier then shapes this step into a uni-polar waveform with peaking time appropriate for the detection depending on the event rate. The integrated shaped waveform, representing the deposited triton/proton energy, is then measured. A histogram, or pulse height analysis, is performed to record the main capture peak and wall effect pulses. A threshold for detection is also required to limit the low amplitude counting rate such as noise floor. The system electronics consists of 2 modules - the Sensor Module (SM) front-end and the Data Processing Module (DPM) back-end circuits. SM is designed as a light-weight and low power front-end housing the two helium-3 proportional counter detectors, preamp and HVPS. It is mounted external to the rover body to detect the thermalized neutron flux with a minimum of host background. The DPM is located inside the rover; it digitizes the SM signals, performs pulse height analysis and accumulates the count rate for each spectral channel. The DPM controls high voltage and thresholding, and sends the science data to the host craft via an RS422 serial asynchronous protocol. The payload host provides all thermal management and control for the SM and DPM.

hydrogen-bearing volatile deposits↗

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗

The Effectiveness of TAG or Guard-Gates in SET Suppression Using Delay and Dual-Rail Configurations at 0.35 microns

Design options for decreasing the susceptibility of integrated circuits to Single Event Upset (SEU) fall into two categories: (1) increasing the critical charge to cause an upset at a particular node, and (2) employing redundancy to mask or correct errors. With decreasing device sizes on an Integrated Circuit (IC), the amount of charge required to represent a logic state has steadily reduced. Critical charge methods such as increasing drive strength or increasing the time required to change state as in capacitive or resistive hardening or delay based approaches extract a steadily increasing penalty as a percentage of device resources and performance. Dual redundancy is commonly assumed only to provide error detection with Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) required for correction, but less well known methods employ dual redundancy to achieve full error correction by voting two inputs with a prior state to resolve ambiguity. This requires special circuits such as the Whitaker latch [1], or the guard-gate [2] which some of us have called a Transition AND Gate (TAG) [3]. A 2-input guard gate is shown in Figure 1. It is similar to a Muller Completion Element [4] and relies on capacitance at node "out" to retain the prior state when inputs disagree, while eliminating any output buffer which would be susceptible to radiation strikes. This paper experimentally compares delay based and dual rail flip-flop designs wherein both types of circuits employ guard-gates to optimize layout and performance, and draws conclusions about design criteria and suitability of each option. In both cases a design goal is protection against Single Event Transients (SET) in combinational logic as well as SEU in the storage elements. For the delay based design, it is also a goal to allow asynchronous clear or preset inputs on the storage elements, which are often not available in radiation tolerant designs.

Shuler, Robert L.↗