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THERMAL STRESS ANALYSIS OF A SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CANISTER

The potential for chloride induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) in spent nuclear fuel dry storage canisters is a current topic of research by the US Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program. One of the important prerequisites for CISCC is a tensile residual stress state. This study utilizes computational models to provide an initial analysis of thermal stresses in a generic spent nuclear fuel canister. A STAR-CCM+ thermal fluid model provides a temperature profile analysis of the canister based on four different ambient temperature conditions. An ANSYS APDL finite element model incorporates the temperature profiles to analyze the thermal stresses in the canister. The calculated thermal stress magnitudes are in the range of 10 MPa to 80 MPa, which could be significant for crack propagation through the canister wall. The maximum thermal stress is not a concern for the structural failure of the canister, but it is high enough that it is a significant contribution to the total stress state of the canister wall, which also includes residual stress from fabrication, internal pressure from helium cover gas, and potential transient mechanical loads, such as earthquakes. This paper describes the initial finite element thermal stress analysis that was completed in 2020, reports the initial findings, and identifies areas where model refinement is still needed to complete this work in the future.

Jensen, Ben J.↗

HELIUM LEAK TEST MODELING OF A SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CANISTER

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is considering the development of one or more federal consolidated interim storage facilities (CISFs) to be used to store commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at locations in the U.S. One of the first technical challenges of a CISF is performing an inspection of SNF canisters upon their receipt to confirm they can be placed into the CISF’s licensed storage configuration. The canister receipt inspection is critical to CISF site operations. The test is conceived as being a helium (He) leak check, intended to confirm that the confinement boundary of a SNF canister is intact. SNF canisters are filled with He when they are sealed, so detection of a He leak indicates that a through-wall flaw has occurred in the canister confinement boundary. Other measurements are planned to occur upon canister receipt in addition to the He leak check such as krypton-85 measurements, which would indicate confinement breaches of one or more fuel rods in addition to a breach of the SNF canister. However, the He leak check has been identified as one of such high importance and has such significant technical challenges that a full-scale demonstration is needed to confirm the He leak test’s viability and to assist in planning relative to its operational requirements. A modeling methodology for simulating the He detection test was developed to help inform the test plan and the design of the test vessels. To develop the modeling methodology a detailed computational fluid dynamics (CFD) benchmark model was constructed to compare against leak rate test data from a transportation package for radioactive material. This report is focused on modeling efforts to simulate the benchmark leak test.

Suffield, Sarah R.↗

Fracture toughness evaluations for spent nuclear fuel dry storage canister welds and spent nuclear fuel clad-pellet structures

Integrity of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) interim storage canisters is very important to the safety of the back-end nuclear fuel cycle. Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) potential of interim storage canister has been considered as a high priority. Because no post-weld heat treatment was required for forming these canisters, the high tensile residual stress existed within these canister welds. This can change the fracture resistance capacity significantly as well as increase SCC potential. Due to relative thin shell thickness of a canister weldment, the spiral notch torsion test (SNTT) method was used to estimate the canister weldment fracture toughness. SNTT was developed to measure the intrinsic fracture toughness of structural materials using small specimens. The SNTT method has been applied to a wide variety of structural materials, such as low-alloy steels, stainless steel, aluminum alloy, ceramics, concrete, and composites. The SNTT system operates by applying pure torsion to cylindrical specimens with a notch line that spirals around the specimen at a 45° pitch. In order to carry out pure torsion load mode, biaxial tension/torsion tester was developed accordingly to perform SNTT protocol. Moreover, applying fracture mechanics approach to SNF system reliability investigation is warranted due to the inherent flaws and hydride structures existed in a SNF system after nuclear reactor operation. However, none of the existing fracture toughness data deal with fuel cladding specific geometry or spent fuel material conditions, such as cladding structure with the pellet-inserts and the associated pellet clad mechanical interactions induced mixed-mode damage mechanisms. Thus, the development of an intrinsic fracture mechanics approach that is suitable for SNF materials is needed. Furthermore, due to thin wall and small dimension of clad tubing structure, the SNTT method was used to estimate the clad tubing structure fracture toughness. Fracture testing were performed on the received stainless steel canister weldment, most SNTT weld samples fracture initiation sites are at heat-affected zone (HAZ) regions. The estimated fracture toughness J Q ’ for the baseline SS304 steel is at 283 kJ/m². The estimated JQ’ for the SS304/308 weld and baseline metals are 148 kJ/m 2 and 459 kJ/m 2 , respectively. Out of cell fracture testing for spent fuel structure were carried out on the surrogate rods made of Zr-4 clad and alumina inserts, the estimated fracture toughness values for baseline Zr-4 cladding with alumina-pellet inserts are: (1) For SNTT samples with a short or medium crack length, between 5.4-mm and 8-mm, the estimate J IQ upon fracture initiation for the baseline Zr-4 cladding is at 50 kJ/m 2 with 2-sigma uncertainty of 3.26 kJ/m 2 , and the associated K IQ is at 67.46 MPa$\sqrt{m}$; and (2) For SNTT samples with a long crack length, around 13-mm, the crack initialization is deviated from that of the Mode-I tensile fracture and appears to be a mixed-mode fracture of Mode I - tensile stress and Mode III - out of plane shear stress; the estimated J MQ is at 18.9 kJ/m 2 , the associated K MQ is at 41.4 MPa$\sqrt{m}$.

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Basket Modification Concepts for Disposal Reactivity Control of Dual Purpose Canisters

This report documents work performed supporting the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology, under work breakdown structure element 1.08.01.03.05, “Direct Disposal of Dual Purpose Canisters.” In particular, this report fulfills milestone M3SF-21OR010305125, “DPC criticality analysis with fuel/basket modification,” within work package SF-21OR01030512, “DPC Reactivity and Criticality Modeling—ORNL.” This report uses three of the most reactive canisters that have been analyzed to-date using UNFST&DARDS to examine the performance of three potential reactivity suppression technologies under disposal conditions. Three already loaded canisters were analyzed using as-loaded contents including TSC-37 and MPC-32 pressurized water reactor (PWR) dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) and the MPC-89 DPCs. The reactivity suppression technologies considered were the B4C-filled disposal control rod assembly (DCRA) and the advanced neutron absorber (ANA)–based chevron insert for the PWR canisters and the ANA-based fuel channel replacement absorber for the MPC-89. For each combination of absorber concept and DPC, various insert patterns and absorber material concentrations were considered. The results of the analysis show that the DCRA concept has promise for providing reactivity hold-down for PWR DPCs, and the ANA fuel channel replacement absorber has promise for providing reactivity holddown in BWR DPCs. The ANA chevron basket insert showed mixed results, providing sufficient reactivity hold-down in the lower reactivity canister, but failing to do so in the higher reactivity canister considered herein.

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Modeling Summary of ASNF in DOE Sealed Standard Canisters

A pathway for road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ANSF) fuel dictates storage within helium backfilled sealed DOE standard canisters. The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE canisters places 10 advance test reactor (ATR) elements within a Type 1a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water bound to the surface. The results of this modeling will include results at fully saturated and fully dried conditions. In addition, fuels that are currently stored at the Savannah River Site were also studied for their potential for hydrogen and pressure build up. These two additional fuels modeled were the Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) fuel, which is packaged in the same configuration as the ATR, but with a 10-foot-tall DOE standard canister. This was selected due to its relatively high decay heat compared to other DOE-managed ASNF. The second additional fuel studied with the modeling effort was the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel. This fuel is modeled as two separate DOE canisters with the inner and outer annulus split for storage. The HFIR was selected for study due to its high aluminum cladding surface area. In the associated experimental work, Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution, additional tests were completed in a helium environment, and updated G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. These values were 2.92 ×10 -4 µmol/J at 50% relative humidity and 4.12 ×10 -4 µmol/J at 100% relative humidity. These values are lower than the value for Argon that was used in prior modeling results. In addition, prior modeling results have been completed with the G-value applied to just the mass of the corrosion layer, and this has been updated to apply the G-value for hydrogen generation to the full mass of the fuel. These two effects combine to show much smaller pressure and hydrogen build up for the sealed canister model. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, after 50 years the model results give a 1.36 atm total pressure, 7% mole percent hydrogen, for the upper decay heat, 1.51 atm total pressure, 16% mole percent hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel 2.6 atm total pressure, 15% mole percent hydrogen. For the MURR nominal case, the model results give 1.34 atm and 6% hydrogen, for upper decay heat this gives 1.41 atm total pressure with 10.8 % hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel, this gives 2.38 atm total pressure with 9.9% hydrogen. The nominal scenario for HFIR fuel gives 1.39 atm total pressure with 9.9% hydrogen, the upper decay heat case gives 1.43 atm with 12.1% hydrogen, and the upper decay heat with undried fuel gives 2.17 atm total pressure with 11.9% hydrogen. These results confirm the ATR scenario bounds the other intact ASNF modeled here. No case modeled yields significant oxygen, and the lower decay heat cases for all fuels modeled have hydrogen concentrations that are under the 4% flammability limit after 50 years of storage. In addition, the modeled pressures for all cases are all significantly below the 500-psi limit for the DOE standard sealed canister.

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FY23 Update: Surface Sampling Activities for the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration

This report describes the results of a field demonstration of the proposed surface sampling techniques and plan for the multi-year Canister Deposition Field Demonstration (CDFD). The CDFD will evaluate salt deposition rates on three commercial 32PTH2 NUHOMS welded stainless steel storage canisters in Advanced Horizontal Storage Modules. Exposure testing is planned for up to 10 years and will incorporate periodic surface sampling campaigns. The goal of the planned dust sampling and analysis is to determine important environmental parameters that impact the potential occurrence of stress corrosion cracking on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters. Specifically, measured dust deposition rates and deposited particle sizes will improve parameterization of dust deposition models employed to predict the potential occurrence and timing of stress corrosion cracks on the stainless steel SNF canisters. Previously, a preliminary sampling plan was developed, identifying possible sampling locations on the canister surfaces and sampling intervals; possible sampling methods were also described. Building from previous work, this report documents hand sampling from a spent nuclear fuel canister on a transfer skid mockup designed by Sandia National Laboratories. The sampling took place from a boom lift and salts were collected from mounted sample plates. The results of these efforts are presented in this report and compared to previous laboratory-controlled tests. The information obtained from the CDFD will be critical for ongoing efforts to develop a detailed understanding of the potential for stress corrosion cracking of SNF dry storage canisters.

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SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations (FY22 Status Update)

High-level purpose of this work: This report summarizes work carried out by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in the fiscal year 2022 (FY22) to evaluate the potential occurrence of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters. The U.S. currently lacks a repository for permanent disposal of SNF; thus, dry storage systems will be in use for much longer time periods than originally intended. Gap analyses by the US Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB), and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) have all determined that an improved understanding of the occurrence and risk of canister SCC is critical to demonstrating the safety of long-term dry storage. Should canister penetration by SCC occur, the containment boundary represented by the canister would be breached. A loss of the inert environment (helium) within the canister could occur and intrusion of air and moisture could react with and damage the fuel within the canister. For this reason, the DOE is funding an effort to evaluate the potential occurrence and consequences of dry storage canister SCC and to develop prevention, mitigation, and repair technologies for this degradation mechanism.

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Modeling of ATR Fuel in DOE Standard Canisters with Helium Backfill

One pathway for road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ANSF) fuel is storage within helium backfilled sealed Department of Energy (DOE) standard canisters. The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE standard canisters places 10 advance test reactor (ATR) elements a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water bound to the surface. A 50-year CFD model of the DOE canister packaged with fuel was developed to provide a temperature profile for coupled chemical modeling of the conditions within the canister. The results of this modeling include results at fully saturated and fully dried fuel cladding conditions. In the associated experimental work, radiolysis experiments tests were completed in a helium environment, and G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. That reaction was coupled with the thermal profiles and gas-phase reactions to develop a 50-year model of the conditions within a sealed DOE canister with ATR fuel. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, after 50 years the model results give a 1.36 atm total pressure, 7% mole percent hydrogen, for the upper decay heat, 1.51 atm total pressure, 16% mole percent hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel 2.6 atm total pressure, 15% mole percent hydrogen. No case modeled yields significant oxygen, and for the lower decay heat case that is modeled, hydrogen concentrations are under the 4% flammability limit after 50 years of storage. The modeled pressures for all cases modeled are below the pressure limit for the DOE standard sealed canister.

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RAMM-TM for detection of gas leakage from canisters containing spent nuclear fuel

Remote Area Modular Monitoring (RAMM) for canister surface temperature measurement (TM), or RAMM-TM, is a novel remote monitoring device for detection of gas leakage based on surface temperature measurements of canisters containing spent nuclear fuel. Here we describe the development of RAMM-TM, as is the demonstration of its performance in detecting canister gas leakage from a small, simulated chloride-induced stress corrosion crack in experiments using a 1/4.5-scale model cask. Both helium and air gas leakage from a canister were detected within hours after the start of the leakage. The change in surface temperatures at the top and bottom of the canister (ΔTBT) during gas leakage (depressurization) triggered automatic alarms, providing a sound basis for early detection of gas leakage from the canister. This methodology would allow consequence management through the implementation of mitigatory actions to continue effective aging management and to reduce risks to public safety, health, and the environment.

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Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF– 24138

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

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Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. “Road-ready dry storage” is a management concept where SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later removal. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE SNF for road-ready dry storage. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the demonstration will package a select amount of DOE-managed SNF into DOE Standard Canisters. The closure process for the DOE Standard Canisters will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussion on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly, this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOE Standard Canisters are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds. Both are performed by remotely operated and semi-autonomous welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld connects the vent plug to the vent port with an identical butt joint to the circumferential pipe weld. After the second weld is performed on the vent port, these welds are helium leak tested using an inside-out technique. In addition to the commercially available vacuum and leak detector systems, the DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes fabrication and performance testing associated with the inside-out technique. INL staff designed and tested systems to accomplish these tasks. Hardware fabrication occurred at INL facilities. Forthcoming work includes design optimization, integration to existing systems, and implementation to packaging demonstration operations.

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Test Plan for Investigation of Hydrogen Generation in SNF Canisters

This report presents a test plan to investigate radiolytic hydrogen generation in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters containing Zr-based cladding materials. The initial primary contributor to the generation of radiolytic hydrogen is estimated to be the residual physisorbed water on the ZrO 2 film, post-dry out. Over the longer term the primary hydrogen source is associated with the aluminum hydroxides and water vapor. The proposed testing to be conducted in FY22 would consist of lab-scale testing on non-radioactive surrogates of oxidized ZIRLO tubing and unalloyed zirconium using a miniature steel canister (“mini-canister") designed to allow intermittent, in-situ sampling of the canister gas during irradiation. The mini-canister approach for irradiation with in-situ monitoring system was used in a recent and on-going study [McNamara and Verst, 2020a & 2020b; Verst et al., 2021] to measure radiolytic hydrogen generation from aluminum SNF cladding surrogate materials. This proposed testing will form part of the overall materials performance evaluation of the commercial SNF-in-canister system and is part of the technical bases for their continued safe dry storage

08 HYDROGEN↗

Thermal and Deposition Modeling of the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration

This report provides initial thermal and deposition modeling results of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage system planned for use in the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration (CDFD). The goal of the CDFD testing is to collect deposition measurements on the surface of the dry shielded canister (DSC) to aid in chloride-induced stress corrosion crack (CISCC) research. Ideally this testing will occur in a marine coastal environment but at the time of this report no official site has been selected. The CDFD will use the NUHOMS ® Advanced Horizontal Storage Module – High Seismic (AHSM-HS) with a 32PTH2 canister. The SNF assemblies will be replaced with electrical heaters. Canisters are currently being outfitted with these heaters and tested at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). Thermal modeling was conducted to ensure the electrical heaters were representative of the temperature distribution found within a storage system with SNF. Deposition models were built to evaluate contaminant deposition on SNF canisters. The CDFD testing will help to validate these models, which will then be used to plan and inform on-site test programs and predictive models for the timing and occurrence of canister CISCC.

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Predeployment progress of the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration

This report updates the high-level test plan for evaluating surface deposition on three commercial 32PTH2 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters inside NUTECH Horizontal Modular Storage (NUHOMS) Advanced Horizontal Storage Modules (AHSMs) from Orano (formerly Transnuclear Inc.) and provides a summary of the surface sampling activities that have been conducted to date. The details contained in this report represent the best designs and approaches explored for testing as of this publication. Given the rapidly developing nature of this test program, some of these plans may change to accommodate new objectives or requirements. One goal of this testing is to collect defensible and detailed dust deposition measurements from the surface of dry storage canisters in a marine coastal environment to guide chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) research. Another goal is to provide data for the validation of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) based deposition modeling. To facilitate surface sampling, the otherwise highly prototypic dry storage systems will not contain SNF but rather will be electrically heated to mimic the decay heat and thermal hydraulic environment. Test and heater design is supported by detailed CFD modeling. Instrumentation throughout the canister, storage module, and environment will provide extensive information about the thermal-hydraulic behavior of horizontal dry cask storage systems. Manual sampling over a comprehensive portion of the canister surface at regular time intervals will offer detailed quantification and composition of the deposited particulates from a realistic storage environment. Discussions of a potential host site for the Canister Deposition Field Demonstration (CDFD) are ongoing. Until a host site is chosen, testing of key CDFD hardware components including the heater assemblies, power skid, and remote data acquisition system will continue. Functional testing of the finalized heater assemblies and test apparatus started this fiscal year. These initial heater tests have shown the assemblies are performing within design specifications. Staged surface sampling of a mockup of a canister outside the AHSM on a transfer skid was also performed. Refinements to the sampling procedures and techniques were captured from observation of these activities and lessons-learned debriefs. These updated sampling procedures and techniques are planned to be tested again in the field using the mockup in order to assure personnel are using the most accurate and repeatable methods possible prior to deployment for actual CDFD testing.

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Drop Analysis of a Department of Energy Standard Canister Containing Fort Saint Vrain SNF

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, many of which are located at the INL site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage (RRDS) is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale RRDS program at the INL site. One critical aspect of RRDS is the ability to certify the DOE Standard Canister and its associated transportation package in accordance with 10 CFR 71 for offsite transportation. Depending on the SNF type and transportation strategy, DOE Standard Canisters may be required to maintain structural integrity under hypothetical accident scenarios (e.g., drop events). The DOE Standard Canisters have been tested and analyzed under various SNF loading configurations and accident drop events in support of the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility and other DOE programs; however, no analysis has yet been completed in support of the recently initiated Road-Ready Demonstration. This paper presents preliminary results from a finite element analysis of the Ø45.7 cm × 4.6 m (Ø18 in. × 15 ft) DOE Standard Canister under the 9 m drop at 80 degrees off-vertical drop scenario considered in previous INL tests and analyses. It considers the Fort St. Vrain spent nuclear fuel loading configuration proposed for the Road-Ready Demonstration, uses updated material properties, and applies the strain-based acceptance criteria established in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code’s Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation spent nuclear fuel containments. This updated analysis is compared to previous DOE Standard Canister drop analyses. Preliminary results from the updated analysis show that certain regions of the containment exceed the allowable limits during the accidental drop event. However, these regions are limited to components performing a non-structural function. While further work on this analysis will be pursued, this analysis serves as the foundation for formal calculations used to support applicable certification efforts of the RRDS system at INL.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE Standard Canister Loading Methodology Poster

Over 250 different types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are managed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The current configuration of SNF at INL is not transportable off-site. In the Yucca Mountain Repository License Application, the SNF was to be loaded into DOE Standard Canisters which are capable of storage, transportation, and eventual disposal using the proper overpacks. The DOE Standard Canister will allow INL to place the SNF in a Road-Ready configuration in preparation for transportation off-site. The focus of this work is development of a general loading methodology for the DOE Standard Canister. This methodology is to be general enough that it will apply to all SNF to be loaded into the DOE Standard Canister. The main sections of the methodology to be outlined are prerequisites before loading (including any issues with materials such as inserts or baskets), loading of SNF, and canister closure and quality assurance (including welding and inspection). Each subsection will analyze and provide the bases for each step.

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Non-destructive evaluation and machine learning methods for inspection of spent nuclear fuel canisters: A state-of-the-art review

Nuclear energy is among the cleanest and most efficient energy sources currently available. The operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) produces large amounts of high-level radioactive waste known as spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Currently, large amounts of SNF is stored in dry cask storage systems (DCSSs) for extended interim storage until a permanent disposal solution becomes available. During the extended interim storage, the DCSS, particularly the SNF canisters, may degrade and abnormal conditions may occur. Therefore, non-destructive evaluation (NDE) and machine learning (ML) approaches are necessary for inspection of SNF canisters. This paper presents a state-of-the-art review of literature by summarizing recent progress made on the applications of NDE and ML for inspection of SNF canisters. Sixteen NDE methods are examined and compared: visual inspection, ultrasonic guided waves (UGWs), laser-based approaches, acoustic emission (AE), eddy current testing (ECT), non-invasive acoustic sensing, dynamic modal testing, cosmic ray muons tomography, neutron imaging, gamma rays detection, fiber optical sensors, through-wall communications, X-ray computed tomography (CT), vibrothermography, monoenergetic photon sources, and surface acoustic wave (SAW) sensors. The technology readiness level (TRL) for each method is assessed and compared. Recent publications on ML-enhanced visual inspection, AE, non-invasive acoustic sensing, dynamic modal testing, and neutron imaging for SNF canisters are summarized and future research needs are identified. In conclusion, this review article provides a convenient reference on the state-of-the-art applications of NDE and ML methods for inspection of SNF canisters.

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DOE SNF Packaging Demonstration Project: Worktable and Canister Loading Sleeve Design [Slides]

This presentation is a briefing for summer interns and others outside the project, to give them a summary of ongoing design activities. The DOE SNF Packaging Demonstration Project is an effort to develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for road ready dry storage (RRDS). The project is to remotely load and seal two types of DOE-managed SNF from the CPP-603 facility into DOE Standard Canisters, place the sealed DOE Standard Canisters into commercial vendor over-canisters (equivalent to commercial MPCs), seal and place the over-canisters into commercial vendor storage overpacks, and place the storage system (over-canister and storage overpack) onto the CPP-2707 cask pad.

42 ENGINEERING↗