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Johnson Space Center has devised a checklist for the skylab inflight medical support system that has been transferred for public emergencies. The checklist illustrates a procedure for diagnosis, treatment, and stabilization of a wide variety of emergencies. Handbook presents comprehensive ordered description of emergency medical equipment and its use in treating victims. Paramedics assigned to the Houston Fire Department are now using the checklist.
Believe it or not, this has been a simplistic look at starting a checklist for SEE testing. Given a memory that has 68 operating modes, when a SEU occurs that changes the mode, just how do you determine what's going on? Laser and microbeam tests can help, but not easily for modern packaged devices. Expanding this approach to other more complex devices such as ADCs or processors as well as analog devices should be considered. The recommendation is to use the existing text standards as the starting point. Just make your own checklist for the device/technology/issues being considered. At HEART 2007, we presented some of the burgeoning challenges associated with single event effect(SEE) testing of modern commercial memories: a) Package, device complexity, test fixture, and data analysis issues were discussed; b) "Complete" SEE Characterization would take 15 years; c) Qualification test costs have a greater than 4 times increase over the last decade. In this talk, we continue to explore the roles of technology with an emphasis on the existing SEE Test Procedures and some of the concerns related to modern devices. The primary objective of the briefing is to provide some overarching guidance concerning the many considerations involved in the formulation of a SEE test plan provided in a " Checklist" format.we note that there is no such thing as a complete check list and that the best approach is to develop a flexible test plan that takes into account the device type and functions, the device technology, circuit and package design, and, of course, test facility and beam characteristics.
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.
Many engineering methods have been developed to help management select technology for a system design or further research. The simplest way to compare technologies is to use a checklist containing all the more or less important selection criteria, so that nothing is overlooked. The criteria usually include cost, safety, reliability and maintainability, and potential problems such as noise generation and microgravity sensitivity. The next step typically is to weight and score all the criteria. The process of weighting and scoring is helpful in bringing out different priorities and reaching a shared point of view. Group technology selection methods are designed to highlight initial disagreements and produce a shared consensus. Often a frank discussion led by management rather than decision analysts can be more effective. The final selection depends on management and engineering judgment and may include programmatic and organizational factors that are beyond the engineering checklist. The objective of engineering technology selection methods is to provide engineering information to assist management in making sound decisions. Project management and technology selection are assumed to use rational engineering analytic methods, but they often do not. The reason is that human insight, intuition, and “gut feel,” rather than logic, more frequently determine our decisions. Project selection and management are strongly influenced by nonrational psychological influences, which can produce unjustified confidence and determination. Nevertheless, there is a strong need for space projects to do rational project analysis and selection. Demonstrating a rational spirit is necessary for a scientific and technical organization. Professional ethics at its best requires an open, honest, and fair process, without damaging politics. Rational analysis can help improve good projects and avoid selecting bad ones. A sanity check using rational analysis guided by a checklist can help avoid egregious and damaging errors.
Loss of control inflight continues to be the leading contributor to airline accidents worldwide and unreliable airspeed has been a contributing factor in many of these accidents. Airlines and the FAA developed training programs for pilot recognition of these airspeed events and many checklists have been designed to help pilots troubleshoot. In addition, new aircraft designs incorporate features to detect and respond in such situations. NASA has been using unreliable airspeed events while conducting research recommended by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team. Even after significant industry focus on unreliable airspeed, research and other evidence shows that highly skilled and trained pilots can still be confused by the condition and there is a lack of understanding of what the associated checklist(s) attempts to uncover. Common mode failures of analog sensors designed for measuring airspeed continue to confound both humans and automation when determining which indicators are correct. This paper describes failures that have occurred in the past and where/how pilots may still struggle in determining reliable airspeed when confronted with conflicting information. Two latest generation aircraft architectures will be discussed and contrasted. This information will be used to describe why more sensors used in classic control theory will not solve the problem. Technology concepts are suggested for utilizing existing synoptic pages and a new synoptic page called System Interactive Synoptic (SIS). SIS details the flow of flight critical data through the avionics system and how it is used by the automation. This new synoptic page as well as existing synoptics can be designed to be used in concert with a simplified electronic checklist (sECL) to significantly reduce the time to configure the flight deck avionics in the event of a system or sensor failure.
Developers of robotic scientific and commercial spacecraft are trending towards use of onboard autonomous capabilities for responding quickly to dynamic environments and rapidly changing situations. These capabilities need to know the state of the spacecraft’s health. Model-based fault diagnosis (MBFD) is an approach to estimating health by continuously verifying accurate behavior and diagnosing off-nominal behavior. Proper functioning of MBFD depends on 1) the quality of the diagnostic system model that is analyzed and compared to commands and onboard measurements to estimate a system’s health state, and 2) the correct functionality of the diagnosis engine interrogating the model and comparing its analyses to observed system behavior. Our goal is to develop Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques for MBFD to provide future missions sufficient confidence in its functionality and performance to deploy it on the systems they develop. Our work has been focused on infusing the techniques we developed earlier to an operational mission. First, we are constructing diagnostic models of a spacecraft attitude control system and updating our diagnostic engine so they can be demonstrated aboard the Arcsecond Space Telescope Enabling Research in Astrophysics (ASTERIA) mission, an operational spacecraft for which experiments in autonomy are being planned and executed, using the V&V techniques we have previously developed to assure they are both correct and complete. Since it is nearing the end of its life, ASTERIA provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate MBFD since the monitored components are expected to fail. Our demonstration will give system developers additional confidence to make timely, informed MBFD deployment decisions. Second, we will be completing performance assessments of the diagnostic engine/diagnostic model ensemble both on the flight system and ground-based testbeds to gain confidence in MBFD’s ability to run successfully in a spacecraft’s resource-constrained environment without adversely affecting other on-board activities. Finally, we are capturing our experience in preparing this demonstration in a set of checklists and guidance documents. Current practice includes high-level institutional guidance documents and standards, but at a high level of abstraction that does not necessarily address specific MBFD concerns. The purpose of the new checklists is to provide future mission developers clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on assuring MBFD. This paper describes our work in these areas. For the first area, we describe the diagnostic models and updated diagnostic engine that will be used for the on-board demonstration. We describe how the V&V techniques we developed earlier are used to assure model and engine correctness and completeness. For the second area, we identify the performance measurement and assessment techniques used to characterize the diagnostic engine and diagnostic models, and discuss the effect of measured performance on overall mission operation. Finally, we present the checklist and guidance documents and describe how they meet the goals of providing system developers with clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on MBFD assurance. We show how the techniques we have developed map into those artifacts.
Sexual harassment is a pervasive problem on oceanographic research vessels and while conducting fieldwork in general. A variety of factors contribute to inadequate protection against sexual harassment, such as poor training in prevention, support, and response; the remoteness of field sites; academic hierarchies that reinforce uneven power dynamics that extend to fieldwork; and multi-institutional teams with distinct policies or reporting structures that can lead to confusion in reporting and responding to incidents in the field. In compromising individuals’ physical and mental health, sexual harassment can negatively affect research expeditions. For example, harassed individuals may decide to refrain from working on complicated team-based tasks, which can be a safety issue. A broader concern is that sexual harassment deters talented people from pursing or maintaining employment in ocean science. Harassment must be treated with the same gravity as research misconduct and safety policy infringements. When planning a research expedition, science team leaders are responsible for the safety of their team and other colleagues aboard and would benefit from resources aimed at helping team leadership create a plan to ensure safety and inclusivity. To address this resource gap and support consistent safety preparedness, 18 participants in the Workshop to Promote Field Safety in Ocean Sciences, convened by the Consortium for Ocean Leadership and held May 17-18, 2022, in Washington, D.C., developed a checklist for use by scientific leaders and others to assist in planning for participant safety and to prevent harassment the field. The checklist specifies the timing of, and who is responsible for, specific actions that should be taken to improve safety while conducting fieldwork, whether on a research vessel or on land. It also provides additional resources and suggestions for leaders on how to amend the checklist to address their specific fieldwork situations.
Small- and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) in the United States, making up over 98% of manufacturing firms, account for 48.3% of the sector’s energy consumption. Despite access to energy assessments and technical resources, such as those from the US Department of Energy’s Better Plants program and Industrial Training and Assessment Centers, implementation rates for identified energy-saving measures remain lower than expectations, averaging 47%. Some barriers were identified by other researchers as limited workforce capacity, inadequate training, and time constraints hinder progress. This article studied the development of customized checklists together with the energy assessment report as a practical solution to improve implementation rates for energy efficiency projects among SMMs. The framework for the checklists was grounded in five principles: short, precise, actionable, relevant, and codeveloped (SPARC). A case study of a 500,000-squarefoot SMM demonstrates how tailored checklists targeting significant energy users—such as heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC), lighting, and compressed air systems for this facility—can simplify the process for staff to do facility walkthroughs to monitor best practices and track the progress of energy efficiency project implementation.
The primary goal of this document is to provide guidance on how to design, implement, and evaluate flight deck procedures. It provides a process for developing procedures that meet clear and specific requirements. This document provides a brief overview of: 1) the requirements for procedures, 2) a process for the design of procedures, and 3) a process for the design of checklists. The brief overview is followed by amplified procedures that follow the above steps and provide details for the proper design, implementation and evaluation of good flight deck procedures and checklists.
Aviation is a dynamic industry which is constantly changing. These changes require the continuous update of people’s knowledge and skills. A fundamental part of that knowledge and skill is procedures, because procedures form the backbone of aviation operations. On the flightdeck, on the ramp, and in the maintenance shop, procedures and checklists help support pilots, line crews, and mechanics in performing their work effectively, efficiently, and thus -- safely. To design effective and efficient procedures and checklists, one must take into account the full operational context within which these procedures are embedded. This context is defined by the requirements of the technology, the capabilities and limitations of the human operators, and the constraints and affordances of the operational environment. The complexity of this context arises from the interactions of the human, machine, and environment. Procedures are in place to govern those interactions. We present a model of that operational context, namely THE Model (Technology, Human, Environment in the context of a Mission), that lays a foundation for the analysis of each of these elements and their interactions. But procedures have their limitations, and there are risks involved in over-proceduralizing. To understand these limitations and risks, and to determine when to proceduralize and when not, we present the 4P Framework (Practice, Procedures, Policies, Philosophy) as a holistic approach to procedures. This approach brings together the understanding of human behavior, of organizational and operational factors, and of the technologies involved.
DNA/RNA-stable isotope probing (SIP) is a powerful tool to link in situ microbial activity to sequencing data. Every SIP dataset captures distinct information about microbial community metabolism, process rates, and population dynamics, offering valuable insights for a wide range of research questions. Data reuse maximizes the information derived from the labor and resource-intensive SIP approaches. Yet, a review of publicly available SIP sequencing metadata showed that critical information necessary for reproducibility and reuse was often missing. Here, we outline the Minimum Information for any Stable Isotope Probing Sequence (MISIP) according to the Minimum Information for any (x) Sequence (MIxS) framework and include examples of MISIP reporting for common SIP experiments. Our objectives are to expand the capacity of MIxS to accommodate SIP-specific metadata and guide SIP users in metadata collection when planning and reporting an experiment. The MISIP standard requires 5 metadata fields—isotope, isotopolog, isotopolog label, labeling approach, and gradient position—and recommends several fields that represent best practices in acquiring and reporting SIP sequencing data (e.g., gradient density and nucleic acid amount). The standard is intended to be used in concert with other MIxS checklists to comprehensively describe the origin of sequence data, such as for marker genes (MISIP-MIMARKS) or metagenomes (MISIP-MIMS), in combination with metadata required by an environmental extension (e.g., soil). The adoption of the proposed data standard will improve the reuse of any sequence derived from a SIP experiment and, by extension, deepen understanding of in situ biogeochemical processes and microbial ecology.
A multifunction display and control system (MFDCS) design concept has been developed for the Orbiter spacecraft. The system provides for automation of crew procedures, fault prioritization, incorporation of checklists and procedures into the display and control system and system flexibility in response to mission variation, increased experience and advancing display and control technology. Hardware included in the system includes a multifunction keyboard using programmable legend switches, a medium size flat panel display for presentation of alphanumeric information and a color CRT for the display of schematic diagrams. The access schema for the multifunction display and control system preserves the single function capability of the present set of dedicated switches while also providing for automation of many of the checklists and procedures. A basic design feature of the system is the ability to change the relative level of automation and crew interaction without modifying the system hardware or basic software operating system.
Currently, almost all aircraft documentation in commercial aircraft cockpits is presented via hardcopy manuals. Several recent projects are aimed at eliminating all paper documentation in cockpits using electronic libraries. Electronic libraries encompass diverse information bases including aircraft system documentation, operations and procedures, checklists, maintenance logs, minimum equipment lists, maps and charts, and flight management information. These electronic libraries are envisioned to be embedded in the avionics so as to provide real time monitoring and display of information. Background issues are examined (motivation, information retrieval models, and preliminary designs) for the on-line presentation of aircraft systems documentation including operations, procedures, and checklists.
Many types of paper documentation are employed on the flight-deck. They range from a simple checklist card to a bulky Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM). Some of these documentations have typographical and graphical deficiencies; yet, many cockpit tasks such as conducting checklists, way-point entry, limitations and performance calculations, and many more, require the use of these documents. Moreover, during emergency and abnormal situations, the flight crews' effectiveness in combating the situation is highly dependent on such documentation; accessing and reading procedures has a significant impact on flight safety. Although flight-deck documentation are an important (and sometimes critical) form of display in the modern cockpit, there is a dearth of information on how to effectively design these displays. The object of this report is to provide a summary of the available literature regarding the design and typographical aspects of printed matter. The report attempts 'to bridge' the gap between basic research about typography, and the kind of information needed by designers of flight-deck documentation. The report focuses on typographical factors such as type-faces, character height, use of lower- and upper-case characters, line length, and spacing. Some graphical aspects such as layout, color coding, fonts, and character contrast are also discussed. In addition, several aspects of cockpit reading conditions such as glare, angular alignment, and paper quality are addressed. Finally, a list of recommendations for the graphical design of flight-deck documentation is provided.
The planned use of autonomous robots in space applications has generated many new safety problems. This thesis assesses safety of autonomous robot systems through the structure of a proposed three-dimensional matrix safety frame. By identifying the common points of accidents and fatalities involving terrestrial robots, reviewing terrestrial robot safety standards, and modifying and extending these results to space applications, hazards are identified and their associated risks assessed. Three components of the safeguarding dimension of the matrix safety frame, safeguarding through design and operation for intrinsic safety, and incorporation of add-on safety systems are explained through examples for both terrestrial and space robots. A space robot hazard identification checklist, a qualitative tool for robot systems designers, is developed using the structure imparted by the matrix safety frame. The development of an expert system from the contents of the checklist is discussed.
The recent proliferation of high performance work stations and the increased reliability of parallel systems have illustrated the need for robust job management systems to support parallel applications. To address this issue, the national Aerodynamic Simulation (NAS) supercomputer facility compiled a requirements checklist for job queuing/scheduling software. Next, NAS began an evaluation of the leading job management system (JMS) software packages against the checklist. This report describes the three-phase evaluation process, and presents the results of Phase 1: Capabilities versus Requirements. We show that JMS support for running parallel applications on clusters of workstations and parallel systems is still insufficient, even in the leading JMS's. However, by ranking each JMS evaluated against the requirements, we provide data that will be useful to other sites in selecting a JMS.
The primary purpose of this study was to determine the relative priorities of various events and activities by examining the probability that a given activity was interrupted by a given event. The analysis will begin by providing frequency of interruption data by crew position (captain versus first officer) and event type. Any differences in the pattern of interruptions between the first officers and the captains will be explored and interpreted in terms of standard operating procedures. Subsequent data analyses will focus on comparing the frequency of interruptions for different types of activities and for the same activities under normal versus emergency conditions. Briefings and checklists will receive particular attention. The frequency with which specific activities are interrupted under multiple- versus single-task conditions also will be examined; because the majority of multiple-task data were obtained under laboratory conditions, LOFT-type tapes offer a unique opportunity to examine concurrent task performance under 'real-world' conditions. A second purpose of this study is to examine the effects of the interruptions on performance. More specifically, when possible, the time to resume specific activities will be compared to determine if pilots are slower to resume certain types of activities. Errors in resumption or failures to resume specific activities will be noted and any patterns in these errors will be identified. Again, particular attention will be given to the effects of interruptions on the completion of checklists and briefings. Other types of errors and missed events (i.e., the crew should have responded to the event but did not) will be examined. Any methodology using interruptions to examine task prioritization must be able to identify when an interruption has occurred and describe the ongoing activities that were interrupted. Both of these methodological problems are discussed In detail in the following section,
The recent proliferation of high performance workstations and the increased reliability of parallel systems have illustrated the need for robust job management systems to support parallel applications. To address this issue, NAS compiled a requirements checklist for job queuing/scheduling software. Next, NAS evaluated the leading job management system (JMS) software packages against the checklist. A year has now elapsed since the first comparison was published, and NAS has repeated the evaluation. This report describes this second evaluation, and presents the results of Phase 1: Capabilities versus Requirements. We show that JMS support for running parallel applications on clusters of workstations and parallel systems is still lacking, however, definite progress has been made by the vendors to correct the deficiencies. This report is supplemented by a WWW interface to the data collected, to aid other sites in extracting the evaluation information on specific requirements of interest.