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NASA NTRS2011

Breakdowns in Coordination Between Air Traffic Controllers

This talk outlines the complexity of coordination in air traffic control, introduces the NextGen technologies, identifies common causes for coordination breakdowns in air traffic control and examines whether these causes are likely to be reduced with the introduction of NextGen technologies. While some of the common causes of breakdowns will be reduced in a NextGen environment this conclusion should be drawn carefully given the current stage of development of the technologies and the observation that new technologies often shift problems rather than reduce them.

Bearman, Chris↗

NASA NTRS1995

Evaluation of control parameters for Spray-In-Air (SIA) aqueous cleaning for shuttle RSRM hardware

HD-2 grease is deliberately applied to Shuttle Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) D6AC steel hardware parts as a temporary protective coating for storage and shipping. This HD-2 grease is the most common form of surface contamination on RSRM hardware and must be removed prior to subsequent surface treatment. Failure to achieve an acceptable level of cleanliness (HD-2 calcium grease removal) is a common cause of defect incidence. Common failures from ineffective cleaning include poor adhesion of surface coatings, reduced bond performance of structural adhesives, and failure to pass cleanliness inspection standards. The RSRM hardware is currently cleaned and refurbished using methyl chloroform (1,1,1-trichloroethane). This chlorinated solvent is mandated for elimination due to its ozone depleting characteristics. This report describes an experimental study of an aqueous cleaning system (which uses Brulin 815 GD) as a replacement for methyl chloroform. Evaluation of process control parameters for this cleaner are discussed as well as cleaning mechanisms for a spray-in-air process.

Davis, S. J.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Spacesuit Water Membrane Evaporator Integration with the ISS Extravehicular Mobility Unit

NASA has developed a Solid Water Membrane Evaporation (SWME) to provide cooling for the next generation spacesuit. The current spacesuit team has looked at this technology from the standpoint of using the ISS EMU to demonstrate the SWME technology while EVA, and from the standpoint of augmenting EMU cooling in the case of a fouled EMU cooling system. One approach to increasing the TRL of the system is to incorporate this hardware with the existing EMU. Several integration issues were addressed to support a potential demonstration of the SWME with the existing EMU. Systems analysis was performed to assess the capability of the SWME to maintain crewmember cooling and comfort as a replacement for sublimation. The materials of the SWME were reviewed to address compatibility with the EMU. Conceptual system placement and integration with the EMU via an EVA umbilical system to ensure crew mobility and Airlock egress were performed. A concept of operation for EVA use was identified that is compatible with the existing system. This concept is extensible as a means to provide cooling for the existing EMU. The cooling system of one of the EMUs on orbit has degraded, with the root cause undetermined. Should there be a common cause resident on ISS, this integration could provide a means to recover cooling capability for EMUs on orbit.

Margiott, Victoria↗

NASA NTRS2014

Spacesuit Water Membrane Evaporator Integration with the ISS Extravehicular Mobility

NASA has developed a Solid Water Membrane Evaporation (SWME) to provide cooling for the next generation spacesuit. One approach to increasing the TRL of the system is to incorporate this hardware with the existing EMU. Several integration issues were addressed to support a potential demonstration of the SWME with the existing EMU. Systems analysis was performed to assess the capability of the SWME to maintain crewmember cooling and comfort as a replacement for sublimation. The materials of the SWME were reviewed to address compatibility with the EMU. Conceptual system placement and integration with the EMU via an EVA umbilical system to ensure crew mobility and Airlock egress were performed. A concept of operation for EVA use was identified that is compatible with the existing system. This concept is extensible as a means to provide cooling for the existing EMU. The cooling system of one of the EMUs on orbit has degraded, with the root cause undetermined. Should there be a common cause resident on ISS, this integration could provide a means to recover cooling capability for EMUs on orbit.

Margiott, Victoria↗

NASA NTRS2016

We Can't Count on Repairing All Failures Going to Mars

Reliability analysis often assumes that a complex system can be kept operating indefinitely with scheduled maintenance and emergency repair using a stock of spare parts, as long as the spare parts are not depleted. This assumption seems justified for well-tested, widely used, long operational systems with a multigenerational history of failure, redesign, and reliability growth. It seems doubtful that newer, relatively untried, high technology space systems can always be repaired. We cannot assume space systems will have a low rate of random failures that can all be repaired with a few identical spares. New untried systems usually have a high initial failure rate, called infant mortality, due to errors in requirements, design, parts, materials, and operations planning. These problems can cause groups of related failures called Common Cause Failures (CCFs). The practical definition of a CCF is any failure mode that cannot be cured using identical redundant systems or spare parts. Systems with CCFs may fail repeatedly for the same reason. Can a life support system be kept operating on the way to Mars using only redundant systems and spare parts? The failure history of International Space Station (ISS) life support systems suggests that CCFs are likely to occur and will probably require design changes rather than being reparable with spare parts.

Mars↗

DOE OSTI2020

Limitations of traditional tools for beyond design basis external hazard PRA

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is being used increasingly by the nuclear industry for safety during normal operations as well as for the protection against external hazards. Computation of total risk in an external hazard PRA is dependent on hazard assessment, fragility assessment, and systems analysis. A systems analysis for propagation of component fragilities is conducted using event and fault trees. The event and fault trees for an actual power plant can be fairly large in size, which imposes computational challenges. Hence, certain assumptions are employed for computational efficiency. These assumptions typically represent the conditions imposed during the design basis (DB) scenario. The traditional PRA tools based on these assumptions are also widely applied to perform risk assessment in the context of beyond design basis (BDB) scenarios. However, some of these assumptions may not be valid for certain BDB scenarios. In addition, the probability of dependent failures also increases in BDB scenarios due to common cause failures (CCF) which usually results from design modifications, human errors, etc. In this manuscript, a simple and a relatively more complex illustrative examples are used to show the limitation of these assumptions in the numerical quantification of risk for the case of BDB conditions. Case studies with CCF events across multiple fault trees are also presented to illustrate the effect of these assumptions when traditional approach is used in BDB risk assessment. It is shown that the assumptions are valid for the case of DB conditions but may lead to excessively conservative risk estimates in the case of BDB conditions. Finally, a Bayesian network based top-down algorithm is proposed as an alternative tool for accurate numerical quantification of total risk in systems analysis.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2022

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. Here this paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Quantitative Risk Analysis of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants using IRADIC Technology

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. In FY-2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems (IRADIC technology) was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the High Safety Significant Safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) develop an advanced risk assessment technology to support transition from analog to DI&C technologies for nuclear industry, (3) assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital HSSSR DI&C systems, (4) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the IRADIC technology is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify responding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level, (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks; thus, to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). In this report, an approach for performing software CCF analysis, given limited data, is developed and demonstrated using a case study of a highly redundant digital reactor trip system. Consequence analysis is also performed based on different accident scenarios. Results indicate that plant modernization including the improvement of HSSSR DI&C systems will make great benefits to plant safety by providing more safety margins to accident management. In addition, a novel approach is proposed in this report for the quantification of software hazards when sufficient operational and testing data available. The method incorporates software development quality as well as strong analysis techniques to identify and link software defects to potential failure modes. The approach includes both semantic and test-based analysis to detect failures that can exist in different stages of the software development life cycle. This method is applied to an advanced human system interface relevant to reactor trip safety developed from the APR 1400 design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Operating Experience Data Analysis for Digital Instrumentation and Control System Reliability and Risk Assessment in Nuclear Power Plants

The implementation of advanced digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) can bring significant advancements in reliability, monitoring, and control capabilities. However, these systems also introduce new challenges, particularly in assessing risks such as common-cause failures (CCFs) and establishing robust reliability estimates for DI&C components. Addressing these challenges is critical for ensuring the safe and efficient operation of NPPs. Recently, Idaho National Laboratory was tasked by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct a DI&C reliability study using operating experience data from the nuclear industry. The two operating experience data sources for the study are the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations’ Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS) and the NRC’s Licensee Event Report database which is hosted at Idaho National Laboratory at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx. This report provides a comprehensive examination of DI&C systems, including their architecture, operational advantages, and associated challenges. It reviews existing industry DI&C studies and failure mode taxonomies, along with reliability data from various industries. Through a detailed analysis of these databases, the study provides insights into DI&C system performance. Considerations should be given to incorporate DI&C failure data into the NRC's Integrated Data Collection and Coding System and updating the Reliability and Availability Data System to support ongoing DI&C reliability studies. Recommendations are also provided for modeling DI&C reliability and CCF in probabilistic risk assessment, thereby supporting risk-informed decision-making and enhancing the reliability and safety of NPPs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update

This report documents the quantitative results of the common-cause failure (CCF) data collection effort (which included data through 2020) and summarizes the results of the parameter estimation quantification process performed on CCF data in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) CCF database. This is the 2020 update to NUREG/CR-5497, updating data and parameter estimations for CCFs. This release, CCF Parameter Estimation 2020, reflects the CCF data contained within the CCF database, https://rads.inl.gov/Pages/CCF.aspx, by executing (in August 2021) the CCF query rules in the folder SPAR Rules 2020. The data covers the period from 1/1/2006 to 12/31/2020, the most recent 15-year period in which data are available. The use of the most recent rolling 15-year data in parameter estimation differs from previous updates, in which 1/1/1997 was used as the starting date (e.g., 1/1/1997 to 12/31/2015 for the 2015 update, 1/1/1997 to 12/31/2012 for the 2012 update). The new date range (i.e., the most recent 15-year period), was selected for this CCF update so as to be consistent with the date range chosen for the component reliability parameter estimation, and with the effort to include sufficient data for analysis while simultaneously reflecting the most recent industry performance. These results are appropriate for use in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies, including the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models of commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the U.S. This update may be referred as: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update," https://nrcoe.inl.gov/publicdocs/CCF/ccfparamest2020.pdf, November 2021.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS2019

High Reliability Requires More than Providing Spares

It is sometimes optimistically hoped that a space life support system can be kept working throughout a long duration mission by repairing failed components, as long as sufficient spares are flown. It is usually assumed that the components have constant known failure rates. Then the needed numbers of spares can be computed to have any particular probability that all failed components can be replaced by available spares. This approach can provide high reliability if its favorable assumptions, including constant known failure rates, are satisfied. Other favorable assumptions are that the failures are statistically independent, repair will be successful without causing further failures, and all failures are due to internal component failures. These assumptions are not usually justified. The failure rates may be estimates that are inadequately verified because of insufficient testing. Failure rates may change due to materials substitutions, manufacturing changes, redesigns to fix failures, and new failures caused by redesigns. Failures that are not statistically independent may result from one common cause, such as a design or manufacturing error or a cascade of cause and effect, possibly caused by an external event such as a power outage. Repair may be unsuccessful or cause damage. Many failures occur at component interfaces or at the overall systems level, not within isolated components. Other failures causes are completely external to the system, due to assembly, maintenance, and operational errors or to unexpected environmental challenges. Replacement with sufficient spares can compensate for expected internal component failures but may not be able to cope with unpredictable design and manufacturing flaws, human errors, and environmental impacts. Reliability estimates based on providing sufficient spares to compensate for expected failures may be far too high. They are essentially upper bounds on reliability that might be approached if many frequent but often unconsidered failure causes can be eliminated.

spares↗

DOE OSTI2023

Probabilidad de que los murcielagos sufran barotraumatismo cerca de palas de aerogeneradores en movimiento (Spanish)

In October 2018, the International Energy Agency Wind Task 34 - Working Together to Resolve the Environmental Effects of Wind Energy (WREN) - organized a virtual forum to discuss the likelihood of bats experiencing barotrauma when flying near moving wind turbine blades. The forum included experts in bat biology and physiology, bat and wind turbine interactions, wind turbine technology, and atmospheric sciences. This educational brief summarizes the discussion during the forum and written comments from those who could not attend. Relevant literature was used to provide additional context when needed. Possible explanations regarding the direct cause of bat mortality at operating wind turbines are (1) blunt force trauma caused by turbine blades striking individual bats, often referred to as collisions, and (2) barotrauma, resulting from exposure to pressure changes located near the surface of moving wind turbine blades. While collision- related mortality is easily understood, the mechanism causing barotrauma is more complex. Fast-moving wind turbine blades create regions of high- and low-pressure variations along the blade surfaces. If bats fly within these regions, the rapid change in pressure may cause internal bleeding, damage to lungs or other organs, and damage to the inner ear. However, sufficient data demonstrating barotrauma as a common cause of bat mortality at wind turbines are lacking. Moreover, the pressure variation necessary to cause barotrauma in bats is so close to the surface of turbine blades that there is a higher probability of direct contact with the blades than of solely experiencing barotrauma. Regardless of the cause, bats are interacting with fast-moving wind turbine blades, and these interactions are resulting in fatalities. Resolving this issue will require a better understanding of bat behavior and cost-effective measures to reduce interactions between bats and wind turbines. This is the Spanish translation of NREL/FS-5000-84749, "The Likelihood of Bats Experiencing Barotrauma Near Moving Wind Turbine Blades."

barotrauma↗

DOE OSTI2024

Susceptibility of pESI positive Salmonella to treatment with biocide chemicals approved for use in poultry meat processing as compared to Salmonella without the pESI plasmid

Abstract Salmonella is a common cause of human foodborne illness, which is frequently associated with consumption of contaminated or undercooked poultry meat. Serotype Infantis is among the most common serotypes isolated from poultry meat products globally. Isolates of serotype Infantis carrying the pESI plasmid, the most dominant strain of Infantis, have been shown to exhibit oxidizer tolerance. Therefore, 16 strains of Salmonella with and without pESI carriage were investigated for susceptibility to biocide chemical processing aids approved for use in US poultry meat processing: peracetic acid (PAA), cetylpyridinium chloride (CPC), calcium hypochlorite, and sodium hypochlorite. Strains were exposed for 15 s to simulate spray application and 90 min to simulate application in an immersion chiller. All strains tested were susceptible to all concentrations of PAA, CPC, and sodium hypochlorite when applied for 90 min. When CPC, calcium hypochlorite, and sodium hypochlorite were applied for 15 s to simulate spray time, strains responded similarly to each other. However, strains responded variably to exposure to PAA. The variation was not statistically significant and appears unrelated to pESI carriage. Results highlight the necessity of testing biocide susceptibility in the presence of organic material and in relevant in situ applications.

Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology↗

NASA NTRS1993

Failure environment analysis tool applications

Understanding risks and avoiding failure are daily concerns for the women and men of NASA. Although NASA's mission propels us to push the limits of technology, and though the risks are considerable, the NASA community has instilled within, the determination to preserve the integrity of the systems upon which our mission and, our employees lives and well-being depend. One of the ways this is being done is by expanding and improving the tools used to perform risk assessment. The Failure Environment Analysis Tool (FEAT) was developed to help engineers and analysts more thoroughly and reliably conduct risk assessment and failure analysis. FEAT accomplishes this by providing answers to questions regarding what might have caused a particular failure; or, conversely, what effect the occurrence of a failure might have on an entire system. Additionally, FEAT can determine what common causes could have resulted in other combinations of failures. FEAT will even help determine the vulnerability of a system to failures, in light of reduced capability. FEAT also is useful in training personnel who must develop an understanding of particular systems. FEAT facilitates training on system behavior, by providing an automated environment in which to conduct 'what-if' evaluation. These types of analyses make FEAT a valuable tool for engineers and operations personnel in the design, analysis, and operation of NASA space systems.

Pack, Ginger L.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Failure environment analysis tool applications

Understanding risks and avoiding failure are daily concerns for the women and men of NASA. Although NASA's mission propels us to push the limits of technology, and though the risks are considerable, the NASA community has instilled within it, the determination to preserve the integrity of the systems upon which our mission and, our employees lives and well-being depend. One of the ways this is being done is by expanding and improving the tools used to perform risk assessment. The Failure Environment Analysis Tool (FEAT) was developed to help engineers and analysts more thoroughly and reliably conduct risk assessment and failure analysis. FEAT accomplishes this by providing answers to questions regarding what might have caused a particular failure; or, conversely, what effect the occurrence of a failure might have on an entire system. Additionally, FEAT can determine what common causes could have resulted in other combinations of failures. FEAT will even help determine the vulnerability of a system to failures, in light of reduced capability. FEAT also is useful in training personnel who must develop an understanding of particular systems. FEAT facilitates training on system behavior, by providing an automated environment in which to conduct 'what-if' evaluation. These types of analyses make FEAT a valuable tool for engineers and operations personnel in the design, analysis, and operation of NASA space systems.

Pack, Ginger L.↗

NASA NTRS1986

The use of flight test techniques in aircraft accident investigations

Wind shear is a serious safety hazard to commercial aviation. Low level wind shear (downburst) was the cause of the takeoff accident in New Orleans, July 9, 1982, and the landing accident in Dallas, Aug. 2, 1985. Shear layer instability is a common cause of clear air turbulence (CAT) at cruising altitudes. A number of encounters with severe CAT, in which passengers were injured, have recently occurred (Hannibal, MO, April 1981; Morton, WY, July 1982; etc.). Improved accident investigation techniques can lead to a better understanding of the nature of the wind environment associated with downbursts and CAT and to better detection and avoidance procedures. For the past several years, NASA-Ames has worked closely with the National Transportation Safety Board in the investigation of wind related accidents.

Parks, E. K.↗

NASA NTRS2013

The SEEDS Direct Imaging Survey for Planets and Scattered Dust Emission in Debris Disk Systems

Debris disks around young main-sequence stars often have gaps and cavities which for a long time have been interpreted as possibly being caused by planets. In recent years, several giant planet discoveries have been made in systems hosting disks of precisely this nature, further implying that interactions with planets could be a common cause of such disk structures. As part of the SEEDS high-contrast imaging survey, we are surveying a population of debris disk-hosting stars with gaps and cavities implied by their spectral energy distributions, in order to attempt to spatially resolve the disk as well as to detect any planets that may be responsible for the disk structure. Here we report on intermediate results from this survey. Five debris disks have been spatially resolved, and a number of faint point sources have been discovered, most of which have been tested for common proper motion, which in each case has excluded physical companionship with the target stars. From the detection limits of the 50 targets that have been observed, we find that beta Pic b-like planets (approximately 10M(sub jup) planets around G-A-type stars) near the gap edges are less frequent than 15-30%, implying that if giant planets are the dominant cause of these wide (27 AU on average) gaps, they are generally less massive than beta Pic b.

high-contrast imaging↗

DOE OSTI2023

Survey of Aging and Monitoring Concerns for Cables and Splices Due to Cable Repair and Replacement

The purpose of this report is to survey aging and monitoring concerns for electrical cable splices in nuclear power plants (NPPs) in long term operation. As portions of existing electrical cable runs in nuclear are replaced over time due to localized events, the total number of splices in NPPs is expected to increase. Relative to cables, the body of knowledge regarding aging of splices and splices in combination with aging cables in nuclear service environments in long-term operations is low. A few reports have considered the aging of cable system components other than cables (Jacobus 1990; Nelson 1998; Villaran and Lofaro 2002), but the nuclear industry has two decades of operating experience since these were published to further enlighten this issue. Herein we discuss electrical cables and splices commonly found in U.S. nuclear power plants, their qualification in safety-related application, and methods for monitoring their health condition. Common environmental stresses that can give rise to cable and splice failure are discussed. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Licensee Event Reports (LER) database was used to identify documented issues of cable and splice failure. The trend in the resultant data over time is considered to see if failures are increasing as plants age. Observations and conclusions of this work include: 1. Cables and splices are highly reliable components. Occurrence rates for events of interest were low and nearly constant over the last 20 years. 2. Common-cause failure for evaluated cable events of interest was observed to primarily be associated with loose connections, which may manifest associated with workmanship issues, thermal cycling, and/or vibration. 3. Replacement of cables is more common than repair, leading to an increase in proportion of new generation cables in the plant over time. 4. Splices on degraded cables have been observed to be problematic. Due to aging NPP infrastructure, including electrical cables, it is expected that such issues will continue to increase. 5. Condition monitoring approaches, while shown to be fruitful for cables, have been shown to be insensitive to degradation of splice sleeves, which are critical to the continued performance of splices. Additional condition monitoring (CM) work is needed to evaluate methods which are sensitive to the degradation of splice components. 6. Extended Material Degradation Assessment (EMDA) knowledge gaps for electrical cables (Bernstein et al. 2014) have not been investigated for splices but may represent similar concerns such as for the accelerated aging process historically used in environmental qualification.

42 ENGINEERING↗