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A method for auto-commissioning of multiple device control modules on a power line during the power up of the system. Device control modules associated with the peripheral devices are powered up sequentially and a unique address is assigned to each device controller when it is powered up.
A method includes identifying power connections between plural components of a time sensitive network (TSN) that are interconnected via a predetermined connection plan. The method also includes determining a topology of the components of the TSN based on the power connections. Also, the method includes scheduling flows for the TSN based on the topology determined based on the power connections.
Consequence-driven Cybersecurity Analysis for Extreme Fast Charging Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Electric vehicle (EV) development and associated charging infrastructure are expected to advance rapidly. Thirty percent of all global vehicle sales may be EVs and hybrid EVs by 2025, and they will rely on increasingly sophisticated strategies for grid integration. Next-generation EV charging infrastructure is expected to include interconnected renewable resources, such as photovoltaic (PV) arrays and battery storage systems, along with grid-edge devices. Although distributed energy resources (DERs) are useful in several ways, such as peak shaving at high demand times and backup supply for added resilience, the integration of vehicle charging and DERs could create more avenues for cyberattack. Physical and/or remote access to EV charging station components, including charge ports, power electronics, controllers, and local generation (e.g., PV and energy storage) could be paths to cause power fluctuations, leading to altered operations at the charging station, escalated privileges to administrative systems, exfiltration of financial information (including personally identifiable information), and reduced grid stability. One compromised EV supply equipment component can open the door to a variety of exploitable vulnerabilities. Cloud computing and mobile application control have the potential to expand the threat surface to non-repudiation and firmware integrity challenges. Vendor clouds have access to hundreds of chargers, and if compromised, can scale the attack surface exponentially. The high power and voltage levels of xFC infrastructure (e.g., 400 kW at 1000- V DC) increase the hazards and ability to impact the grid and vehicles more than lower-power charging systems. Legacy communications systems and protocols could also put EV infrastructure at risk of cyberattacks requiring a robust patch management process. Communications networks link EVs and chargers to several stakeholders - including charging station operators, grid operators, vendors/manufacturers, and aggregators - who have both physical and network access to share information for control, monitoring, and analytics. Information in these networks that is vulnerable to compromise includes the state of charge, charging duration, payment information, electricity price, and load control. Analyzing and prioritizing these interconnections risks could help address cybersecurity related to data leakage and manipulation.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition). The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Revision 3, issued November 2012) contains detailed design review procedures. As part of the review process, the interfaces between plant personnel and the plant's systems and components are evaluated for conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3), provides the guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces (HSIs). Because these guidelines only address the HFE aspects of design and not other related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a design-specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: information displays, user-interface interaction and management, and analog displays and controls. These elements are used as building blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the guidelines for reviewing the following HSI systems: alarm system, safety parameter display system, group-view display system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, automation system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for the review of HSI support (i.e., maintainability of digital systems and degraded HSI and instrumentation and control conditions).
Circularly pulse-shaped waveforms for communication systems are disclosed herein, including a single carrier modulation in which pulse-shaping is performed using a circular convolution by the transmitter for various modulation schemes. A transmitter, related method, and corresponding receiver are also disclosed for demodulation of the single carrier circularly pulse-shaped signal and data extraction.
Systems, apparatuses, and methods for performing network packet templating for graphics processing unit (GPU)-initiated communication are disclosed. A central processing unit (CPU) creates a network packet according to a template and populates a first subset of fields of the network packet with static data. Next, the CPU stores the network packet in a memory. A GPU initiates execution of a kernel and detects a network communication request within the kernel and prior to the kernel completing execution. Responsive to this determination, the GPU populates a second subset of fields of the network packet with runtime data. Then, the GPU generates a notification that the network packet is ready to be processed. A network interface controller (NIC) processes the network packet using data retrieved from the first subset of fields and from the second subset of fields responsive to detecting the notification.
The increased implementation of smart grid technologies in the power distribution grid presents unique opportunities that enable resiliency, but also brings challenges motivating needs for novel solutions and mitigation techniques. The bi-directional power and data flow allow for the grid to operate with increased resiliency, which is the ability to avoid discontinuity of service to end-use loads during extreme events. However, in applications where control of the distribution grid or microgrid relies on communication networks, the degradation of communication systems in the form of loss or high latency can cause maloperation and result in loss of end-use loads. Here this paper presents a novel framework to enable delay tolerance of centralized microgrid control schemes to mitigate communication system latency impacts and guarantee successful control action. We demonstrate the delay tolerance on a control scheme that operates a battery energy storage system (BESS) to offset the sudden loss of generation and maintain system frequency. During periods of severely degraded communication system performance, the proposed delay-tolerant algorithm compensates for the latency by utilizing a data-driven model generated at the device level using dynamic mode decomposition (DMD) to determine the performance of the communications. The DMD technique predicts the system’s frequency using device-level terminal measurements and provides updated control signals. The HELICS cosimulation platform evaluates the cyber-physical interaction of the power system model in GridLAB-D, the centralized control agent in Python, and the discrete network model in NS-3. The framework is tested and validated on the IEEE-123 node system modified to represent a networked remote microgrid model, and the results show an improvement in the dynamic performance
Power electronic systems (PES) incorporate complex intra-system communication, which are of vital importance for the successful operation of these systems. This paper proposes and outlines a communication testbed that will help in the development and testing of the communications between the components of PES. It allows for the comparison and evaluation of different communication methods, such as MQTT, Modbus, or User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and for the characterization of how these communication protocols perform.
Network segmentation of a power grid's communication system can make the grid more resilient to cyberattacks. Here we develop a novel trilevel programming model to optimally segment a grid communication system, taking into account the actions of an information technology (IT) administrator, attacker, and grid operator. The IT administrator is allowed to segment existing networks, and the attacker is given a budget to inflict damage on the grid by attacking the segmented communication system. Finally, the grid operator can redispatch the grid after the attack to minimize damage. The resulting problem is a trilevel interdiction problem that we solve using a branch and bound algorithm for bilevel problems. We demonstrate the benefits of optimal network segmentation through case studies on the 9-bus Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) system and the 30-bus IEEE system. These examples illustrate that network segmentation can significantly reduce the threat posed by a cyberattacker.
The Pierre Auger Observatory (Auger) and the Telescope Array (TA) are the world's two largest ultra-high-energy cosmic ray (UHECR) observatories. They operate in the Southern and Northern hemispheres, respectively, at similar latitudes but with distinct surface detector (SD) designs. A significant challenge in studying UHECR physics across the full sky is the apparent discrepancy in flux measurements between the two experiments. This discrepancy could arise from astrophysical differences and/or systematic effects related to their detector designs and sensitivities to extensive air shower components. To address this, the Auger@TA working group aims to cross-calibrate the two observatories with a self-triggering micro-Auger array within the TA array. This micro-array consists of eight Auger Surface Detector (SD) stations equipped with Water Cherenkov Detectors (WCDs) and AugerPrime Surface Scintillator Detectors. Seven SD stations, configured with a centered-1-PMT design, are arranged in a hexagonal pattern with one station in the center, with 1.5 km spacing, mirroring the Auger layout. The eighth station, which features a standard 3-PMT Auger station, is located in conjunction with a TA detector at the center of the hexagon, forming a triplet for high-statistics and low-uncertainty cross-calibration. A custom communication system that uses readily available components enables seamless communication between stations and remote access to each station through a central computer. The micro-array is now fully deployed, and initial data-taking is about to start. This presentation will detail the instrumentation, communication systems, central data acquisition system, expected performance of the micro-array, and preliminary results as appropriate.
This document describes systems and techniques for evaluating and improving distribution-grid data transportability. These systems and techniques allow engineers to quantify the data transportability of a communication system within or connected to a distribution grid, which represents an ability to transport in real-time telemetry from source locations (e.g., sensors in the distribution grid) to control mechanisms. Distribution engineers can use the sensor readings to perform grid analytics, control operating parameters, and operate protection systems. Distribution engineers can also use the transportability of the communication system to evaluate the observability of the distribution grid, which represents an ability to combine actual measurements and various types of computations (e.g., analytics, estimators, forecasters) from a system model. Distribution engineers can then generate a sensor allocation plan that indicates the number and location of sensors to maximize observability for a fixed sensor cost and/or minimize sensor cost for predetermined observability.
This work focuses on the development and testing of a low-cost wireless communication system for heliostat fields, enabling significant capital costs reductions for concentrating solar thermal systems. Outputs of this work include a working demonstration of a multi-node communication system, clear reporting of system performance, and technical documentation of system development and architecture for reproducibility. Through this process, an open-source repository was created for manufacturing hardware at ~$30/heliostat. The system includes software for cybersecurity, achieving sub-second communication latencies and derisking of hardware for eventual scale-up to tens of thousands of heliostats. While the system is not currently off-the-shelf ready, there is now a clearly defined pathway for scaling up and completing the commercial development process.
Electronic systems contained within sealed metallic enclosures, such as nuclear waste containers where wire penetration is not an option, require a through-wall data transfer technology to communicate. One such technology utilizes piezoelectric ultrasonic transducers to communicate through the barrier using elastic waves. Currently demonstrated ultrasonic through-wall data communication techniques have relied on having a direct interface with the ultrasonic transducers on either side. Here, this work studies the coupling of an antenna to such an ultrasonic communication system. A computationally efficient model of a piezobarrier ultrasonic communication system and antenna using a simplified antenna model and a transfer matrix piezobarrier model is utilized to perform a representative parameter space search. The system efficiency and bandwidth trends are shown for the system parameters as well as operating frequency. The tradeoff between efficiency and bandwidth is also presented. A system configuration within the parameter space is fabricated and demonstrated to achieve a data rate of up to 100 kb/s.
Network protector units (NPUs) are crucial parts of the protection of secondary networks to effectively isolate faults occurring on the primary feeders. When a fault occurs on the primary feeder, there is a path of the fault current going through the service transformers that causes a negative flow of current on the NPU connected to the faulted feeder. Conventionally, NPUs rely on the direction of current with respect to the voltage to detect faults and make a correct trip decision. However, the conventional NPU logic does not allow the reverse power flow caused by distributed energy resources installed on secondary networks. The communication-assisted direct transfer trip logic for NPUs can be used to address this challenge. However, the communication-assisted scheme is exposed to some vulnerabilities arising from the disruption or corruption of the communicated data that can endanger the reliable operation of NPUs. This paper evaluates the impact of the malfunction of the communication system on the operation of communication-assisted NPU logic. To this end, the impact of packet modification and denial-of-service cyberattacks on the communication-assisted scheme are evaluated. The evaluation was performed using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) co-simulation testbed that includes both real-time power system and communication network digital simulators. This paper evaluates the impact of the cyberattacks for different fault scenarios and provides a list of recommendations to improve the reliability of communication-assisted NPU protection.
This document provides the final report for the CYPRES project. The purpose is (1) to highlight and summarize its major accomplishments and (2) to provide guidance on how its outcomes have informed and can inform important additional research and technology transfer. The goal of CYPRES was the research, development, and demonstration of a security-oriented next generation cyber-physical EMS for electric power systems that detects malicious and abnormal events through the fusion of cyber and physical data. To achieve this, the CYPRES project team researched, developed, and built a prototype of the solution, referred to as the CYPRES EMS. The CYPRES EMS is a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that demonstrates the management of the energy system, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. As part of the capabilities of the CYPRES EMS, the team designed and developed a suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control that are inherently cyberaware. At its core, the project aimed to research, develop, and demonstrate a security-oriented next-generation cyber-physical Energy Management System (EMS) capable of detecting malicious and abnormal events through the innovative fusion of cyber and physical data. This approach represents a fundamental shift from traditional EMS, reimagining how critical infrastructure can be protected through unified cyber-aware and physics-aware secure data flow pipelines. The project’s cornerstone deliverable, the CYPRES EMS, serves as a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that revolutionizes the management of energy systems, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. This prototype implements a comprehensive suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control, all designed with inherent cyber awareness. The system’s architecture extends from end-devices in the field through to control center applications, establishing a secure and resilient control framework that addresses the challenges posed by diverse devices of unknown trustworthiness connecting to modern power systems. Through this innovative approach to deep cyber-physical situational awareness, the CYPRES project not only advances the state-of-the-art in energy infrastructure protection but also establishes a new paradigm for how EMS can be designed, deployed, and operated in an increasingly complex threat landscape. The findings and developments from this project provide crucial insights for stakeholders across the energy sector, offering a blueprint for enhancing the reliability and resilience of our nation’s critical energy infrastructure in the face of evolving cyber threats.
The present disclosure relates to a free-space optical communications system that may make use of a controller and a digital micro mirror (DMM) assembly in communication with the controller. The DMM may have a plurality of independently controllable micromirror elements forming both an emitter and a receiver. A laser is included which is configured to generate an optical beam which may be applied to select ones of the first subpluralities of micromirror elements to generate a transmitted free space optical signal along a selected vector. A detector is included for receiving an incoming free space optical signal imaged by at least one of the micromirror elements.
This project is a DOE follow-up effort on the CREDC workshop held on September 13, 2018 in Cambridge, MA to discuss cybersecurity of distance relays, which considered the benefits, vulnerabilities and risk mitigations for the use of communication systems in power system protection. The objectives of this project are to define the taxonomy of relay protection and associated communications; define use cases describing approaches to reduce the cyber-attack surface on those protective relays; and evaluate the loss of operational functional capability from changes to communication coverage. Mitigating controls will also be evaluated to understand if there are other approaches to reduce attack surfaces while maintaining communications or partial communications. Distance relays are used to protect transmission lines of approximately 10 to 300 miles in length, by detecting short circuits (i.e., faults) on the lines and then tripping circuit breakers in the substation. Such protection systems are a subset of the power system and they incorporate sensing, logic and communication functions. Protection system exposure to cyberattack could be drastically limited by disconnecting relays from all vulnerable communication systems, but this may adversely impact overall power system performance in the absence of cyberattack. This project began with a use case analysis of protection systems with communications, as summarized in this report. It continued with modeling, testing and evaluation in a miniature power system (MPS), located in the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Electric Power Training Center (EPTC). The project also incorporated feedback from two industry meetings held in February and September 2019. The suggested next steps account for and complement the work already underway with DOE/CESER funding: 1. Study the performance of LCD and PC vs. PUTT, which is less reliant on communication system performance and GPS timing references. The PUTT scheme could prove to be more resilient to cyberattack or communications-related disruption. It could also be more tolerant of message re-routing with SDN/SDR communication systems. On the other hand, it will be more vulnerable to false tripping during dynamic events or to loss of the voltage signal. The optimum choice of scheme may depend on the specific power system and risk assessment. This study could provide a new template for evaluation based on business functions. 2. Research and develop new methods to detect and monitor distributed physical attacks, possibly using drones, video sensors, thermal sensors, machine learning and other advanced techniques. This will help mitigate the impact of cyberattack on the protection system, and will also help mitigate the impact of wild fires. 3. Implement a scalable PKI for use in electric utility protection systems. This will encourage widespread adoption of secure authentication methods that are already available, but not widely used at present. This will help secure engineering access to the relays. 4. Investigate the use of SDN in combination with SDR to achieve better cybersecurity and electromagnetic security of the network, incorporating path variability. This would help secure both engineering access and peer-to-peer GOOSE messaging. 5. Perform additional testing, with operator evaluation of “red button” scenarios, PUTT vs. LCD, relay mis-operations, and other cyberattacks in the EPTC. This is an important advantage of testing in the EPTC rather than by computer simulation or even hardware-in-the-loop simulation; the EPTC is already dedicated to managing the situational awareness, operator response times and other human impacts. One of the project objectives was to settle on a common nomenclature for this problem space. We have concluded that the OSI layer model, supplemented by ANSI device numbers and other IEEE standards, is already well-accepted by the industry. The IEEE PSRC knowledge base provides a great deal of public information
Grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEBs) have been considered as an important asset to support the power grid reliability by utilizing the demand flexibility offered by GEBs. GEBs are enabled by advances in sensors and controls, and the communication between building equipment, whole buildings, and the grid. The integration of different building technologies and network-based communication system makes GEBs vulnerable to passive threats such as equipment failure and active threats such as cyber-attacks. Modeling and simulation is an effective way to evaluate the impact of threats on the system performance. This paper proposes a generic and flexible threat injection framework for commonly-used building energy simulators such as EnergyPlus and Modelica to support threat modeling and evaluation. This framework leverages functional mock-up unit (FMU) to develop a general modeling interface for threat injection and simulation. A numerical case study using Modelica as a building energy simulator is conducted to demonstrate the capability of the framework for supporting single/multiple-order threat modeling and simulation of a GEB. Four threats and their combinations are injected on a Modelica-based threat-free building energy and control system, including operating supply fan at its full speed, remotely cycling the chiller on and off, blocking the chiller from receiving the chilled water supply temperature setpoints, and hijacking the global zone air temperature setpoint. Simulation results show that the cyber-attack that leads to short-term signal blocking has small effects on the system operation due to the "self-healing" feature of the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) interactive control system. The threat that takes control of resetting the global zone air temperature setpoints has the most adverse impact on the system energy use, peak power demand, thermal comfort and the provision of demand flexibility. The combination of four threats have aggregative effects on the system but the effects are less than the additive effects of the individual threat.