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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Smart connected worker edge platform for smart manufacturing: Part 1—Architecture and platform design

Abstract The challenge of sustainably producing goods and services for healthy living on a healthy planet requires simultaneous consideration of economic, societal, and environmental dimensions in manufacturing. Enabling technology for data driven manufacturing paradigms like Smart Manufacturing (a.k.a. Industry 4.0) serve as the technological backbone from which sustainable approaches to manufacturing can be implemented. Unfortunately, these technologies are typically associated with broader and deeper factory automation that is often too expensive and complex for the small and medium sized manufacturers (SMMs) that comprise the majority of manufacturing business in the USA and for whom their most valuable asset are the people whose jobs automation while replace. This paper describes an edge intelligent platform to integrate internet‐of‐things technologies with computing hardware, software, computational workflows for machine learning, and data ingestion, enabling SMMs to transition into smart manufacturing paradigms by leveraging the intelligence of their people. The platform leverages consumer grade electronics and sensors (affordable and portable), customized software with open source software packages (accessible), and existing communication network infrastructures (scalable). The software systems are implemented via Kubernetes orchestration of Docker containerization to ensure scalability and programmability. The platform is adaptive via computational workflow engines that produce information from data by processing with low‐cost edge computing devices while efficiently accessing resources of cloud servers as needed. The proposed edge platform connects workers to technological resources that provide computational intelligence (i.e., silicon‐based sensing and computation for data collection and contextualization) to enable decision making at the edge of advanced manufacturing.

Kim, Yoon G.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Module-OT: A Hardware Security Module for Operational Technology

Increased penetration levels of renewable energy and other types of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the modern electric grid-combined with technological advancements for electric system monitoring and control-introduce new cyberattack vectors and increase the cyberattack surface of energy systems. According to the IEEE Std. 1547-2018, DERs must use Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), or Smart Energy Profile 2.0 (SEP2) as their communication protocol. Previous research identified several vulnerabilities and security breaches in each one of these communication protocols; despite this, existing standards for DERs do not recommend cybersecurity measures. In order to reduce vulnerabilities in power distribution systems, this paper presents a novel open-source hardware security module that improves both information and operational security to better protect data and communications on the distribution grid. The security hardware is called “module for operational technology,” or simply Module-OT, and it has been validated and tested in an emulated distribution system application. Module-OT is integrated within a communication system in the transport layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. It improves system security through encryption, authentication, authorization, certificate management, and user access control. The main advancement of Module-OT is the addition of hardware cryptographic acceleration that improves the overall communication performance in terms of end-to-end latency.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Review of Current Research Trends in Power-Electronic Innovations in Cyber–Physical Systems

Here, in this article, a broad overview of the current research trends in power-electronic innovations in cyber–physical systems (CPSs) is presented. The recent advances in semiconductor device technologies, control architectures, and communication methodologies have enabled researchers to develop integrated smart CPSs that can cater to the emerging requirements of smart grids, renewable energy, electric vehicles, trains, ships, the Internet of Things (IoT), and so on. The topics presented in this article include novel power-distribution architectures, protection techniques considering large renewable integration in smart grids, wireless charging in electric vehicles, simultaneous power and information transmission, multihop network-based coordination, power technologies for renewable energy and smart transformer, CPS reliability, transactive smart railway grid, and real-time simulation of shipboard power systems. It is anticipated that the research trends presented in this article will provide a timely and useful overview to the power-electronics researchers with broad applications in CPSs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Best Practices for Grid Communications

As the grid evolves, the communications architecture will need to evolve with it. That architecture affords a structured means by which the evolving complexities of the modern electric grid can be managed. This document provides best practices that can be implemented in the grid of today and evolve towards the grid and grid architecture of the future. The evolving grid and its control communications increasingly rely on commercial communications providers and a variety of technologies, from wireless (e.g., 5G, microwave, Wi-Fi) to wireline (fiber, copper) to radio communications (P25, other repeater-based systems), and all these communications systems rely on electric power. A reliable and resilient grid must account for this complex set of interdependencies in its planning activities, especially those involving restoration and recovery. The participation of all relevant parties in both planning and exercising of plans can prevent unexpected conditions that impede the reliable operation and recovery of the grid. Best practices for grid communications include using a Network Management System to document the operational state, define and monitor baselines, detect changes, and accelerate response to abnormalities. If transitioning from SONET to IP/packet-based systems, translating grid requirements into communications requirements for latency, bandwidth and throughput, IP packet delay variation, packet loss, and availability should inform and drive technology planning and selection as well as that communication system’s Quality of Service (QoS) policies and Service Level Agreements (SLAs). Secure and reliable timing is another key component of a reliable and resilient grid that can operate through adverse events. A trusted internal NTP configuration, an integrated and diverse timing delivery system, optimizing the timing architecture based on the transport technologies of the communications system, and using established standards can deliver the level of timing accuracy required by a range of time-sensitive power system applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Sensing Electrical Networks Securely & Economically (SENSE)

The growing adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs) like battery energy storage systems and roof top solar/PV and the rapid penetration of electric vehicles (EVs), the electric grid is undergoing a major transformation with elevated stress on legacy grid assets. Despite a lot of expenditure to address these challenges, both in dollars and manpower, utilities have not been able to receive the value that was promised. The gains have been most visible at the transmission and substation level, especially where the main objective was improving operational and economic efficiency for the utility. Improving visibility and control at a few select points enhances the existing and established paradigm of centralized command and control. With changing load patterns, load types and the overall transition to an “active grid”, the centralized control and coordination paradigm gets challenged. To address the challenges, a new architecture and mechanism is needed, one that supports decentralized control and decision making, extracting value streams at the grid edge, particularly as the changes are fueled by transitions occurring in the distribution system. To address this, a communications and data processing platform, “GAMMA” was developed and demonstrated through the project. At the heart of the platform, are distributed, intelligent edge nodes with sensing and compute capabilities, that can record and analyze information locally. They are embedded in sensors and actuators specific to different distribution system applications. Phase 1 of the project focused on developing novel sensor technology that can be used for monitoring utility pole top distribution transformers. The sensors were designed with the objective of being low-cost, communicating with the GAMMA cloud using novel “delay-tolerant” networking using Bluetooth and a secure mobile application. They were non-intrusive in nature so that they can be installed quickly in the field, resulting in overall low cost of deployment and operations. Following the successful completion of Phase 1, the team manufactured 100 units for a field demonstration in Phase 2. The field demonstration was carried out on two real feeder systems with the local utility partner. In total, 100 sensors were installed and operated over a period of 6 months in the state of Georgia. The platform is operational end to end, with the cloud infrastructure deployed on a distributed, serverless environment that can serve multiple data streams, an analytics engine and a portal to securely view the data from multiple assets. The data collected through the GAMMA Mobile Phone app showcased the viability of the novel delay tolerant networking architecture, and the data processing algorithms developed through the course of the project, were successful in extracting important information about the overall network, improving the utility’s visibility and situational awareness in the distribution feeder.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Bayesian GAN-Based False Data Injection Attack Detection in Active Distribution Grids With DERs

Advancements in information and communication technologies have revolutionized monitoring and control capabilities within smart grids. However, it also brings new vulnerabilities to data acquisition systems and state estimation functions, which attackers can subtly tamper with the measurement data through compromising the communication network. Moreover, the high penetration of renewable energy sources with the inherited characteristics of uncertainty and variability further complicates the design of effective intrusion detection systems. In this paper, a Bayesian deep learning-based approach is developed to detect cyber attacks and maintain the security of smart grids. Our method specifically addresses the prevalent issue of imbalanced data in real power systems, which arises from the predominance of normal system operations over compromised or attacked states. Employing a novel Bayesian GAN-based technique, our approach successfully discriminates between secure and compromised measurement data, even in scenarios with significant data imbalance. Furthermore, the proposed method accommodates various practical application factors, ensuring accurate intrusion detection despite the presence of measurement noise. The feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed detection mechanism are validated by testing on IEEE 13-node and 123-node test systems. Simulation results and comparisons with literature methods demonstrate the superiority of proposed cybersecurity solutions.

Bayesian GAN↗
DOE OSTI2023

Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams

Hydropower facilities are often remotely monitored or controlled from a centralized remote control room. Additionally, major component manufacturers monitor the performance of installed components, increasingly via public communication infrastructures. While these communications enable efficiencies and increased reliability, they also expand the cyber-attack surface. Communications may use the internet to remote control a facility’s control systems, or it may involve sending control commands over a network from a control room to a machine. The content could be encrypted and decrypted using a public key to protect the communicated information. These cryptographic encoding and decoding schemes become vulnerable as more advances are made in computer technologies, such as quantum computing. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) and other quantum cryptographic protocols are not based upon a computational problem, and offer an alternative to symmetric cryptography in some scenarios. Although the underlying mechanism of quantum cryptogrpahic protocols such as QKD ensure that any attempt by an adversary to observe the quantum part of the protocol will result in a detectable signature as an increased error rate, potentially even preventing key generation, it serves as a warning for further investigation. In QKD, when the error rate is low enough and enough photons have been detected, a shared private key can be generated known only to the sender and receiver. We describe how this novel technology and its several modalities could benefit the critical infrastructures of dams or hydropower facilities. The presented discussions may be viewed as a precursor to a quantum cybersecurity roadmap for the identification of relevant threats and mitigation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Using the CYBER-Champ Model to Determine Cyber Competencies and Role Alignment

Cybersecurity roles, tasks, and skills are seen by many organizations as nonessential, abstract, or complicated. Although standards are in place, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-181 document titled “Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework)” available since September 2012, companies are still showing security vulnerabilities in their cyber networks (Hatzes, 2020). Barriers towards creating a cyber-ready workforce are not always due to a lack of resources, but often caused by organizational structure. The need for cyber-cognizant job postings, improved communication between Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) employees, increases in staffing and funding for cyber teams, and better communication of standards and training can all contribute to increasing an organization’s cyber resilience. Cybersecurity Competency Health and Maturity Progression model (CYBER-CHAMP) is a model aimed at evaluating an organization’s structure and individual employee’s cyber knowledge and helps develop a plan to reach competency. This model was used to engage with organizations to promote proper cyber protocols and policies. The aim of this paper is to answer if it is possible for an organization to build a cyber-ready workforce by providing education and training options for current employees and prepare the future workforce to be ready on day one of employment. Both open source and firsthand interviews with organizations were used to conduct the research contained in this document. Further research may include additional development to the CYBER-CHAMP model and its delivery platform.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Attack-resilient algorithms and testbed federation for wide-area protection and control in smart grid

Today’s energy infrastructure is undergoing a massive transformation across all generation, transmission, and distribution systems to provide reliability, efficiency, and sustainability to the power system network. During the past 10 years, there has been a remarkable enhancement in developing close-loop wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) applications, such as automatic generation control (AGC), wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), synchrophasor-based wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), etc., in the energy management system (EMS) to provide an adequate situational awareness to control center operators during physical disturbances and natural events. The rapid digitalization, unencrypted communication, and numerous data-sharing devices have increased digital access points that have exposed the grid network to countless cyberattacks pertinent to the WAPAC cybersecurity. Given the amount of complex grid network coupled with legacy infrastructures, it is untrustworthy to completely rely on information technology (IT)-based conventional security measures to defend against evolving cyberattacks. Hence, there is a compelling need to go beyond the traditional paradigm of ‘security by obscurity’ and ‘bolt-on’ security measures, and develop a suite of innovative security solutions at multiple layers to transform the current “fault-resilient” grid into “fault and attack-resilient” grid of the future. This dissertation specifically focuses on developing application-specific attack-resilient solutions for critical WAPAC applications in the smart grid. The first part of the study, Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Protection Scheme, presents a cyber-physical attack-resilient system (CPARS) for WAPS, where two anomaly detection methods are proposed to detect multi-level cyberattacks followed by the rules-based intrusion mitigation system (RIMS) to initiate effective mitigation strategies, tailored to these attacks, to restore the normal grid operation after disturbances. The first anomaly detection component, Machine learning-based Anomaly Detection for Centralized WAPS, discusses a novel architecture and methodology for developing a machine-learning-based anomaly detection system (ADS) for the centralized wide-area protection system (CWAPS) by applying the variational mode decomposition (VMD) technique and decision tree (DT) algorithms using cyber logs and synchrophasor measurements. The second component, Multi-Agent-based Anomaly Detection for Decentralized WAPS, presents a two-level hierarchical multi-agent-based decentralized WAPS against the system-aware stealthy cyber-attacks. Finally, for the RIMS, the state transition diagram-based mitigation measures are defined based on the grid operation states and experimental testing and evaluation are presented in a cyber-physical testbed environment. The second part of the study, Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Voltage Control System, addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), presents the methodology for performing an impact analysis during data integrity attacks, and proposes a data-driven attackresilient system (DARS) by incorporating machine learning-based ADS and rules-based anomaly mitigation system (RAMS) to detect these attacks and provide necessary mitigation actions to maintain the transient voltage stability after disturbances. Finally, the third part, Networked Federation Testbed (NEFTSec) for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, focuses on developing an interconnected federated testbed through a common network like the internet, describes its conceptual architectures, and also presents its design components for experimental testing, validation, and evaluation. Further, it presents the co-simulation interface algorithm (CIA) to facilitate the geographically-dispersed real-time distributed simulation (GD-RTDS) during the cyber-physical federation. In general, this dissertation presents innovative attack-resilient solutions for WAPAC applications that are experimentally tested and evaluated using the PowerCyber testbed and NEFTSec platform to accelerate the transition of state-of-the-art research works to the real-field deployments.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Aggregate attack surface management for network discovery of operational technology

Interconnectivity has become a substratum of technology as the benefits of data-driven functionality are being realized in nearly all industries. Increased connectivity of Operational Technology (OT) exacerbates cyber risks because Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are becoming exposed to the Internet. These exposures are often done inadvertently through misconfigurations as additional network devices come online. Attack surface management (ASM) platforms can be used to identify vulnerabilities by performing external network discovery over the Internet using web spiders. These web spiders enable big data analytics of Internet of Things (IoT) devices as identifiable information of Internet-exposed equipment are archived in searchable databases that are made publicly available. There are a multitude of ASM service providers on the market. Here, this study was conducted to evaluate several commonly known tools to determine the aggregate attack surface of control systems. Queries were crafted by targeting commonly known manufacturers and communication protocols found in OT networks. Identified devices were that categorized based on technology types. Each query was replicated between several tools to target identical ICS equipment. Findings in this paper suggested a significant variance in the exposures discovered by each tool, but unique contributions were identified for each tool when a merged attack surface was derived. Therefore, all tools should be used in aggregate.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

TrustDER: Trusted, Private and Scalable Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources

In this project, the Stanford and SLAC Teams have developed a Trusted, Private and Scalable platform for coordinating Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources (TrustDER). This is a layered system that ensures private, trusted and scalable coordination and monitoring of DERs. It accommodates a variety of resources, such as solar generation, gensets and loads, with a particular focus on battery systems-based resources, as they are a transformational technology experiencing fast growth in adoption by large critical facilities. The platform can be used as standalone or added to existing aggregation systems to enable trust, privacy and resilience. TrustDER consists of layers that address each of the shortcomings of the existing state of the art. Each layer in the platform can operate independently but provides information to the layers above it to enable a novel form of overall coordination architecture. The project consists of several tasks, with each task dedicated to the design of each layer. Task 2 Resource Virtualization defined a software abstraction layer for distributed energy resources (DERs). The goal of this abstraction was to simplify the implementation of algorithms utilizing cooperation of DERs resources in a variety of use cases. Task 3 is on Secure ID for Asset Authentication. Identity Management Systems (IDMS) are a foundational infrastructure for interactions between entities (organizations, users, devices, and services). Secure ID is blockchain-based a distributed identity management system allowing (1) identity provisioning, (2) authentication, (3) authorization, and (4) identity data sharing for IoT-enabled assets on the electricity grid. In this project, the SLAC team focused on designing and testing Keymaker, a protocol for authenticating device identity managed by Secure ID. Task 5 Private and Safe Integration is focused on the design and evaluation of a DER cooperation scheme which allows for the aggregation of DERs without impacting network reliability. The approach is designed based on realistic assumptions regarding data availability, communication infrastructure limitations, and privacy. Task 6 Scalable Distributed Privacy for Information explored how virtualized batteries could be managed privately. Specifically, it examined the case in which a principal provides a partitioned battery to multiple clients. Task 7 Use Cases was to ensure that this technology was applied in relevant situations and scenarios. Primarily, this means that virtualization needed to be employed in a manner that either improved flexibility, bolstered security or privacy, or decreased costs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Scalable Quantum Cryptography Network for Protected Automation Communication (Final Report)

This is the final report for a CEDS-funded project aimed at developing a new quantum technology for securing utility communication networks used to control and monitor electrical grid equipment. Securing these control networks represents a unique challenge as the performance of the security solution has a direct impact on the stability and reliability of the electrical grid. Traditional, software-based solutions - developed for information networks - are not suitable for utility control networks because they introduce latency, require burdensome maintenance and upgrades, are often incompatible with legacy equipment, and introduce operational complexity that reduces grid reliability. Consequently, many U.S. utilities do not use existing solutions and, instead, protect their critical control networks through the careful isolation and obscuration of their networked equipment. With more utilities embracing grid automation, the attack surface that utilities must defend from hackers has grown to an unmanageable size. To address this situation, Qubitekk and its partners proposed and developed a hardware-based solution that can secure critical control networks without negatively impacting grid performance. This new solution is based on quantum key distribution (QKD) techniques that guarantee secure key generation and distribution across a utility control network. Through deployment and field testing of a prototype QKD system, we have shown that this solution delivers long-term network security, is technically feasible to implement and maintain on a utility’s distribution substation network and does not negatively impact grid operations. In addition, the project has identified and solved key challenges associated with generating, transmitting, and measuring coherent photonic quantum states on a real-world fiber optic network. These additional findings are playing a critical role in advancing quantum networks for quantum computing applications. An overview of the QKD prototype development effort, field testing activities and results, and additional findings relevant to emerging quantum networks are presented in this report.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2022

Authentication of smart grid communications using quantum key distribution

Smart grid solutions enable utilities and customers to better monitor and control energy use via information and communications technology. Information technology is intended to improve the future electric grid’s reliability, efficiency, and sustainability by implementing advanced monitoring and control systems. However, leveraging modern communications systems also makes the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks. Here we report the first use of quantum key distribution (QKD) keys in the authentication of smart grid communications. In particular, we make such demonstration on a deployed electric utility fiber network. The developed method was prototyped in a software package to manage and utilize cryptographic keys to authenticate machine-to-machine communications used for supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). This demonstration showcases the feasibility of using QKD to improve the security of critical infrastructure, including future distributed energy resources (DERs), such as energy storage.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber–Physical System Security of Distribution Systems

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for control and monitoring of power systems is a layer on top of the physical power system infrastructure. The cyber system and physical power system components form a tightly coupled Cyber–Physical System (CPS). Sources of vulnerabilities arise from the computing and communication systems of the cyber–power grid. Cyber intrusions targeting the power grid are serious threats to the reliability of electricity supply that is critical to society and the economy. In a typical Information Technology environment, numerous attack scenarios have shown how unauthorized users can access and manipulate protected information from a network domain. The need for cyber security has led to industry standards that power grids must meet to ensure that the monitoring, operation, and control functions are not disrupted by cyber intrusions. Cyber security technologies such as encryption and authentication have been deployed on the CPS. Intrusion or anomaly detection and mitigation tools developed for power grids are emerging. Furthermore, this survey paper provides the basic concepts of cyber vulnerabilities of distribution systems and CPS security. The important ICT subjects for distribution systems covered in this paper include Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, Distributed Energy Resources, including renewable energy and smart meters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Online Distribution System State Estimation via Stochastic Gradient Algorithm

Distribution network operation is becoming more challenging because of the growing integration of intermittent and volatile distributed energy resources (DERs). This motivates the development of new distribution system state estimation (DSSE) paradigms that can operate at fast timescale based on real-time data stream of asynchronous measurements enabled by modern information and communications technology. To solve the real-time DSSE with asynchronous measurements effectively and accurately, this paper formulates a weighted least squares DSSE problem and proposes an online stochastic gradient algorithm to solve it. The performance of the proposed scheme is analytically guaranteed and is numerically corroborated with realistic data on IEEE 123-bus feeder.

distribution system state estimation↗