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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Degradation and Upcycling of Poly(acrylic) Acid (PAA)

Poly(acrylic acid) (PAA) is a superabsorbent polymer (SAP) widely used in food, paint, textiles, and household products, such as absorbent hygiene products. Specifically, disposable diaper waste comprises a large majority of hygiene waste, in which 80% is landfilled and 20% is incinerated. This proposal describes new methods to valorize PAA to mitigate pollution and risk of large-scale release, dispersion, and accumulation of PAA into aquatic and terrestrial environments. The first strategy builds upon photoredox catalysis to oxidize PAA, which will allow for subsequent cleavage to PAA into valuable chemical feedstocks with intriguing functional groups that can readily undergo further transformations. Moreover, in conjunction with RAFT polymerization, photoredox catalysis would also lead to preparation of new graft block polymers to serve as pH-sensitive drug delivery vehicles. The second strategy invokes electrocatalysis, which can access different intermediates compared to photoredox catalysis. This method would lead to refunctionalization and repurpose of PAA into hydrogels and zwitterionic polymers that can find utilities in ion exchange, water treatment, soil conditioning, paper reinforcement, pigment retention, shampoo formulation, and drug delivery.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2024

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance

As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches may occur that need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron. However the conjunction screening process in use by the 19th was developed over 30 years ago and was not designed with automation in mind, so screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process. Many operators assume that automated maneuver planning must be real-time; however this time between planning and execution to allow for screening is possible if planned for during system design. In an effort to speed up the screening process, NASA has developed a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings. This prototype system was necessitated to support the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of 4 cubesats that planned to fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation, both performing automated maneuvering. Without screening of the planned maneuvers, the two constellations risked a collision. Once converted from a prototype to an operational system, this capability will greatly help smallsats, for example those that are planning to test propulsive capabilities, by allowing fast turnaround feedback to ensure safety form collision with other objects. This paper describes the existing CA process, the prototype real-time capability, and results from the experiment that tested the prototype.

Matthew Hejduk↗
NASA NTRS2000

Mir Contamination Observations and Implications to the International Space Station

A series of external contamination measurements were made on the Russian Mir Space Station. The Mir external contamination observations summarized in this paper were essential in assessing the system level impact of Russian Segment induced contamination on the International Space Station (ISS). Mir contamination observations include results from a series of flight experiments: CNES Comes-Aragatz, retrieved NASA camera bracket, Euro-Mir '95 ICA, retrieved NASA Trek blanket, Russian Astra-II, Mir Solar Array Return Experiment (SARE), etc. Results from these experiments were studied in detail to characterize Mir induced contamination. In conjunction with Mir contamination observations, Russian materials samples were tested for condensable outgassing rates in the U.S. These test results were essential in the characterization of Mir contamination sources. Once Mir contamination sources were identified and characterized, activities to assess the implications to ISS were implemented. As a result, modifications in Russian materials selection and/or usage were implemented to control contamination and mitigate risk to ISS.

Soares, Carlos↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evolution of Spaceflight Renal Stone Risks and Update to the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) Renal Stone Evidence Report and Integrated Concept of Operations

BACKGROUND: The NASA HRP Evidence Report on the Risk of Renal Stone Formation is being updated based on new information obtained from 9 years of data from NASA’s astronaut renal stone surveillance program. In addition, the Concept of Operations for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) was created to supplement the Evidence Report, and the NASA clinical practice guideline(CPG)for renal stone surveillance was updated. OVERVIEW: A literature review was performed to evaluate the state of literature regarding renal stone prevention, mitigation, and management both in terrestrial and spaceflight environments. Current renal stone treatment guidelines for the ISS, which were created by the Inflight Clinical Medicine Working Group and approved by the Multilateral Medical Operations Panel (MMOP)were reviewed, as well as recent ultrasound technology demonstrations onboard the ISS. This information was used in conjunction with emerging evidence from the surveillance program to update the Evidence Report and in-flight Concept of Operations. DISCUSSION: There are known and emerging renal stone prevention strategies including astronaut selection, the use of medications and resistive exercise, early diagnosis with regular urine studies and ultrasound imaging. In-flight treatment options include pharmaceuticals, use of lithotripsy and propulsive ultrasound, placement of percutaneous drains and other modalities. This information is useful to gauge future risks and update our strategies for prevention and management of renal stones in astronauts to reduce the risk of in-flight renal stone colic that could cause morbidity and mission impact.

E Stratton↗
NASA NTRS2013

LightForce Photon-Pressure Collision Avoidance: Efficiency Assessment on an Entire Catalogue of Space Debris

The potential to perturb debris orbits using photon pressure from ground-based lasers has been confirmed by independent research teams. Two useful applications of this scheme are protecting space assets from impacts with debris and stabilizing the orbital debris environment, both relying on collision avoidance rather than de-orbiting debris. This paper presents the results of a new assessment method to analyze the efficiency of the concept for collision avoidance. Earlier research concluded that one ground based system consisting of a 10 kW class laser, directed by a 1.5 m telescope with adaptive optics, can prevent a significant fraction of debris-debris collisions in low Earth orbit. That research used in-track displacement to measure efficiency and restricted itself to an analysis of a limited number of objects. As orbit prediction error is dependent on debris object properties, a static displacement threshold should be complemented with another measure to assess the efficiency of the scheme. In this paper we present the results of an approach using probability of collision. Using a least-squares fitting method, we improve the quality of the original TLE catalogue in terms of state and co-state accuracy. We then calculate collision probabilities for all the objects in the catalogue. The conjunctions with the highest risk of collision are then engaged by a simulated network of laser ground stations. After those engagements, the perturbed orbits are used to re-assess the collision probability in a 20 minute window around the original conjunction. We then use different criteria to evaluate the utility of the laser-based collision avoidance scheme and assess the number of base-line ground stations needed to mitigate a significant number of high probability conjunctions. Finally, we also give an account how a laser ground station can be used for both orbit deflection and debris tracking.

laser↗
DOE OSTI2020

Investigation of Polyurethane and Fire-Retardant Foams as a Radiological Contamination Fixatives - 20202

Fixation of radiological contamination in decommissioning and deactivation can reduce worker risk, and mitigate potentially hazardous conditions; however, nearly every marketed contamination fixative has been found to be flammable, a significant concern in radiological facilities. Coupled with this, industry fixatives are normally used as a thin coating which can present problems when attempting to stabilize irregular void spaces or areas that are difficult to access and ensure full coverage. To this end, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), in conjunction with Florida International University (FIU), have begun investigating the applicability of polyurethane based foaming materials, which will expand to fill a given asymmetric volume and provide fire retardancy to ensure no release of contamination in the event of a facility fire. Commercial foams undergo exothermic reactions resulting in gaseous release that subsequently causes the curing foam material to expand. Heat generation during curing can potentially compromise rubber parts of an enclosure, a significant concern in nuclear facilities. To mitigate large body heat generation, SRNL has also examined multiple layering of the material to ensure compatibility of the curing material with a previously cured body of the same material. Environmental studies were also completed in order to determine the influence on polyurethane based foams curing process. These studies showed that nearly half of the materials tested delaminated from a cured body of the same material, a property not discussed in commercially available documentation on the products. Of note was the compatibility of the foaming material with the substrate, depending on the type material that the foam was cured in/on, significant delamination could occur. Mechanical testing via tensile pull tester, dynamic mechanical analysis (DMA), and thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) was also performed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2008

The New NASA Orbital Debris Mitigation Procedural Requirements and Standards

NASA has issued major updates to its principal orbital debris mitigation policy directive and standards. The new NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris (NPR 8715.6), with its supporting NASA Standard 8719.14, both refine earlier orbital debris mitigation documents and in some areas expand their applicability. Organizational and individual responsibilities along with general directives are set forth in NPR 8715.6. New requirements include routine conjunction assessments for all maneuverable NASA spacecraft in LEO and GEO, prompt notifications of intended or unintended debris generation, preparation and maintenance of formal end-of-mission plans, and disposal of vehicles in operation around the Moon and Mars and at the Earth-Sun Lagrangian points. NASA Standard 8719.14 replaces the 1995 NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 with no major new requirements but with several refinements and additions, some of which had already been adopted. Compliance with human casualty risk limitations from reentering debris will be calculated explicitly and not be expressed in terms of average debris casualty area. Moreover, the minimum kinetic energy threshold for potentially injurious reentering debris is set at 15 Joules. The overarching requirement for the disposal of GEO spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages is to ensure that the vehicles do not come within GEO + 200 km for at least 100 km after end of mission, rather than setting specific requirements for the disposal orbit. Spacecraft operating in or routinely transiting LEO must remain in the region for no more than 25 years after end of mission or 30 years after launch, whichever occurs sooner. A comprehensive new NASA handbook on orbital debris has also been prepared to provide background on the orbital debris environment and the related NASA mitigation requirements and standards.

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Historical Overview of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to help build and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew members wear extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. NASA includes detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper3 MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew-member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and duration. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuits and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the inner “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling an EVA to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗
NASA NTRS2014

Aeroelastic Control of a Segmented Trailing Edge Using Fiber Optic Strain Sensing Technology

Currently, design of aircraft structures incorporate a safety factor which is essentially an over design to mitigate the risk of structure failure during operation. Typically this safety factor is to design the structure to withstand loads much greater than what is expected to be experienced during flight. NASA Dryden Flight Research Centers has developed a Fiber Optic Strain Sensing (FOSS) system which can measure strain values in real-time. The Aeroelastics Lab at the AERO Institute is developing a segmented trailing edged wing with multiple control surfaces that can utilize the data from the FOSS system, in conjunction with an adaptive controller to redistribute the lift across a wing. This redistribution can decrease the amount of strain experienced by the wing as well as be used to dampen vibration and reduce flutter.

aeronautics↗
DOE OSTI2024

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Development of Human System Integration at NASA

Human Systems Integration seeks to design systems around the capabilities and limitations of the humans which use and interact with the system, ensuring greater efficiency of use, reduced error rates, and less rework in the design, manufacturing and operational deployment of hardware and software. One of the primary goals of HSI is to get the human factors practitioner involved early in the design process. In doing so, the aim is to reduce future budget costs and resources in redesign and training. By the preliminary design phase of a project nearly 80% of the total cost of the project is locked in. Potential design changes recommended by evaluations past this point will have little effect due to lack of funding or a huge cost in terms of resources to make changes. Three key concepts define an effective HSI program. First, systems are comprised of hardware, software, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. Too often, engineers and developers fail to consider the human capacity or requirements as part of the system. This leads to poor task allocation within the system. To promote ideal task allocation, it is critical that the human element be considered early in system development. Poor design, or designs that do not adequately consider the human component, could negatively affect physical or mental performance, as well as, social behavior. Second, successful HSI depends upon integration and collaboration of all the domains that represent acquisition efforts. Too often, these domains exist as independent disciplines due to the location of expertise within the service structure. Proper implementation of HSI through participation would help to integrate these domains and disciplines to leverage and apply their interdependencies to attain an optimal design. Via this process domain interests can be integrated to perform effective HSI through trade-offs and collaboration. This provides a common basis upon which to make knowledgeable decisions. Finally, HSI must be considered early in the requirements development phase of system design and acquisition. This will provide the best opportunity to maximize return on investment (ROI) and system performance. HSI requirements must be developed in conjunction with capability ]based requirements generation through functional. HSI requirements will drive HSI metrics and embed HSI issues within the system design. After a system is designed, implementation of HSI oversights can be very expensive. An HSI program should be included as an integral part of a total system approach to vehicle and habitat development. This would include, but not limited to, workstation design, D&C development, volumetric analysis, training, operations, and human -robotic interaction. HSI is a necessary process for Human Space Flight programs to meet the Agency Human ]System standards and thus mitigate human risks to acceptable levels. NASA has been involved in HSI planning, procedures development, process, and implementation for many years, and has been building several internal and publicly accessible products to facilitate HSI fs inclusion in the NASA Systems Engineering Lifecycle. Some of these products include: NASA STD 3001 Volumes 1 and 2, Human Integration Design Handbook, NASA HSI Implementation Plan, NASA HSI Implementation Plan Templates, NASA HSI Implementation Handbook, and a 2 ]hour short course on HSI delivered as part of the NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate Academy. These products have been created leveraging industry best practices and lessons learned from other Federal Government agencies.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRS2008

Cassini Information Management System in Distributed Operations Collaboration and Cassini Science Planning

Launched on October 15, 1997, the Cassini-Huygens spacecraft began its ambitious journey to the Saturnian system with a complex suite of 12 scientific instruments, and another 6 instruments aboard the European Space Agencies Huygens Probe. Over the next 6 1/2 years, Cassini would continue its relatively simplistic cruise phase operations, flying past Venus, Earth, and Jupiter. However, following Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI), Cassini would become involved in a complex series of tasks that required detailed resource management, distributed operations collaboration, and a data base for capturing science objectives. Collectively, these needs were met through a web-based software tool designed to help with the Cassini uplink process and ultimately used to generate more robust sequences for spacecraft operations. In 2001, in conjunction with the Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) and later Venustar Software and Engineering Inc., the Cassini Information Management System (CIMS) was released which enabled the Cassini spacecraft and science planning teams to perform complex information management and team collaboration between scientists and engineers in 17 countries. Originally tailored to help manage the science planning uplink process, CIMS has been actively evolving since its inception to meet the changing and growing needs of the Cassini uplink team and effectively reduce mission risk through a series of resource management validation algorithms. These algorithms have been implemented in the web-based software tool to identify potential sequence conflicts early in the science planning process. CIMS mitigates these sequence conflicts through identification of timing incongruities, pointing inconsistencies, flight rule violations, data volume issues, and by assisting in Deep Space Network (DSN) coverage analysis. In preparation for extended mission operations, CIMS has also evolved further to assist in the planning and coordination of the dual playback redundancy of highvalue data from targets such as Titan and Enceladus. This paper will outline the critical role that CIMS has played for Cassini in the distributed ops paradigm throughout operations. This paper will also examine the evolution that CIMS has undergone in the face of new science discoveries and fluctuating operational needs. And finally, this paper will conclude with theoretical adaptation of CIMS for other projects and the potential savings in cost and risk reduction that could potentially be tapped into by future missions.

Equils, Douglas J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance

As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However, the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches will occur that may need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron; screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process in advance of maneuver execution in case one screening is missed and the next needs to be used. In an effort to speed up the screening process to benefit spacecraft using automated maneuvering, a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings has been developed in support of the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of four cubesats that fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation. Both of these constellations perform automated maneuvering, so without screening the planned maneuvers before execution, the two constellations would risk a collision. This paper describes the traditional conjunction assessment (CA) process, the prototype real-time CA screening capability, plans for the experiment to test the prototype, and next steps.

conjunction assessment↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance

As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However, the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches will occur that may need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron; screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process in advance of maneuver execution in case one screening is missed and the next needs to be used. In an effort to speed up the screening process to benefit spacecraft using automated maneuvering, a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings has been developed in support of the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of four cubesats that fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation. Both of these constellations perform automated maneuvering, so without screening the planned maneuvers before execution, the two constellations would risk a collision. This paper describes the traditional conjunction assessment (CA) process, the prototype real-time CA screening capability, plans for the experiment to test the prototype, and next steps.

conjunction assessment↗