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At least 55 records · Page 3

Economic Consequence Analysis of Disasters: The ECAT Software Tool

This study develops a methodology for rapidly obtaining approximate estimates of the economic consequences from numerous natural, man-made and technological threats. This software tool is intended for use by various decision makers and analysts to obtain estimates rapidly. It is programmed in Excel and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) to facilitate its use. This tool is called E-CAT (Economic Consequence Analysis Tool) and accounts for the cumulative direct and indirect impacts (including resilience and behavioral factors that significantly affect base estimates) on the U.S. economy. E-CAT is intended to be a major step toward advancing the current state of economic consequence analysis (ECA) and also contributing to and developing interest in further research into complex but rapid turnaround approaches. The essence of the methodology involves running numerous simulations in a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for each threat, yielding synthetic data for the estimation of a single regression equation based on the identification of key explanatory variables (threat characteristics and background conditions). This transforms the results of a complex model, which is beyond the reach of most users, into a "reduced form" model that is readily comprehensible. Functionality has been built into E-CAT so that its users can switch various consequence categories on and off in order to create customized profiles of economic consequences of numerous risk events. E-CAT incorporates uncertainty on both the input and output side in the course of the analysis.

Environmental Economics↗

Criticality Consequence Analysis Roadmap for Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister in a Repository

This report discusses an initial criticality consequence analysis approach of commercial spent fuel canisters in a repository that will be developed to support a performance assessment (PA) of a repository with criticality events. A repository PA with criticality events may be needed to support direct disposal of currently loaded dual-purpose canisters. The ultimate goal is to develop a criticality consequence analysis model that can interface with any repository PA model. The criticality consequence analysis approach describes multi-physics coupling between neutronics, thermal hydraulics, and mechanics analysis codes. This report also discusses the sensitivity and uncertainty analysis approach for quantifying conservatism in the criticality consequence outcomes, as well as a defensible multi-physics validation approach to support any future licensing effort. This criticality consequence analysis approach will be refined in the future to support specific regulatory frameworks for a specific repository PA if needed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiological Consequences of Hydrogen Explosions in Vessels and Piping at the WTP

Hydrogen (along with other gases) is generated in process vessels and other components at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) due to the radiolysis of water and to the radiolysis and thermolysis of organics in WTP radioactive process wastes. In the absence of controls, the hydrogen may accumulate until a flammable or explosive concentration is reached. Once a buildup has occurred, ignition of the hydrogen causes an explosion that creates radioactive aerosols that could escape the confinement boundary and be released to the environment. Such a release could cause significant radiological exposures to a public receptor at the site boundary and to a co-located worker (CLW/) in the yard areas outside the physical facilities. Hydrogen explosion events therefore require evaluation as to the potential magnitude of their consequences. The WTP methodology for the evaluation of the potential radiological consequences due to hydrogen explosions in vessels and piping is a conservative approach that is defensible from a regulatory standpoint yet only results in the need for Safety controls for the most highly radioactive process vessels (generally those containing waste with significant quantities of solids). For WTP vessels with waste not containing significant quantities of solids, radiological dose consequences are sufficiently low such that neither Safety Class controls for the public receptor nor Safety Significant controls for the CLW are required. Similarly, the dose consequences for hydrogen explosions in piping and ancillary vessels are all very low to both receptors, again indicating that no Safety Class or Safety Significant controls are required. The WTP vessel and piping hydrogen explosion calculations are dependent on vessel and pipe sizes, hydrogen generation rates, operational requirements, and waste stream properties such as solids content, radioisotope concentration, and slurry density. Consequently, the WTP-specific results discussed above cannot be extrapolated directly to other facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering (CCE)

The Idaho National Lab (INL) is leading a high-impact, national security-level initiative to reprioritize the way the nation looks at high-consequence risk within the industrial control systems (ICS) environment of the country’s most critical infrastructure and other national assets. The Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) effort provides both private and public organizations with the steps required to examine their own environments for high-impact events/risks; identify implementation of key devices and components that facilitate that risk; illuminate specific, plausible cyber attack paths to manipulate these devices; and develop concrete mitigations, protections, and tripwires to address the high-consequence risk. The ultimate goal of the CCE effort is to help organizations take the steps necessary to thwart cyber attacks from even top-tier, highly resourced adversaries that would result in a catastrophic physical effect. CCE participants are encouraged to work collaboratively with each other and with key U.S. Government (USG) contributors to establish a coalition, maximizing the positive effect of lessons-learned and further contributing to the protection of critical infrastructure and other national assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection Equipment Categorization for Consequence Management

The overall objective of this project is to research, evaluate, and test first responder preventive radiological/nuclear detection equipment (PRND) to provide state and local agencies with guidance on how to best use this equipment for response after a radiological/nuclear release or detonation. While the equipment being tested in this effort has been specifically designed for detection and interdiction operations, the fleet of PRND equipment can help fill critical needs for radiological instrumentation should a consequence management response take place. This effort will provide scientific guidance on the best way to deploy and operate this class of equipment for consequence management missions. With the support of the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), PRND equipment has been placed into service at federal, state, and local agencies throughout the nation. If the equipment capability and limitations are taken into account, this large inventory can be repurposed to support the emergency response in the aftermath of a radiological of nuclear event. This report evaluates PRND equipment to define key categories of equipment and the types of missions they can be used for. This is important because there are over 100 different types of PRND equipment, often with significantly different capabilities with respect to the consequence management mission. The current DNDO draft NIMS PRND equipment types were used as a foundation and expanded, when necessary, to address key characteristics important for the consequence mission. Table 1 provides a summary of the PRND instrument categories developed for this effort. Also included on the table are some common response mission detection equipment categories that will be used for capability comparisons.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Mission Analysis for Using Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection Equipment for Consequence Management

The overall objective of this project is to research, evaluate, and test first responder preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) equipment to provide state and local agencies with scientific guidance on how to effectively use this equipment for response after a radiological/nuclear release or detonation. While the equipment being tested in this effort has been specifically designed by technology manufacturers and purchased by responders for preventive detection and source interdiction operations, the fleet of PRND equipment can help fill critical needs for radiological instrumentation should a consequence management (CM) response take place, as it is currently the most widely available and fielded radiological instrumentation by state and local agencies. This effort will provide scientific guidance on the most effective way to utilize this class of equipment for consequence management missions. Gaining a better understanding of how PRND equipment can operate and perform for these missions will allow for recommendations on the tactical approach responders can use for consequence management operations. PRND equipment has been placed into service by federal, state, and local agencies throughout the nation. If the equipment capability and limitations are taken into account, this large inventory can be leveraged to support the emergency response in the aftermath of a radiological or nuclear event. With several hundred makes and models of PRND equipment, often with significantly different detection capabilities that do not align with their nominal PRND equipment type, development of a streamlined categorization scheme with respect to consequence management missions was the first step to identifying safe and effective uses of PRND equipment for radiological/nuclear incident response.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Mission Analysis for using Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection Equipment for Consequence Management

The overall objective of this project is to research, evaluate, and test first responder preventive radiological/nuclear detection equipment (PRND) to provide state and local agencies with guidance on how to best use radiological search and interdiction systems and equipment for consequence management and response after a radiological/nuclear release or detonation. While the equipment being tested in this effort has been specifically designed by technology manufacturers and purchased by responders for preventive detection and source interdiction operations, the fleet of PRND equipment will help fill the needs for radiological instrumentation should a consequence management response take place, as it is currently the most widely available and fielded radiological instrumentation by state and local agencies. This effort will provide scientific guidance on the best way to deploy and operate this class of equipment for consequence management missions. Gaining a better understanding of how PRND equipment can operate and perform for these missions will allow for recommendations on the tactical approach responders can use for consequence management operations. With the support of the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), PRND equipment has been placed into service at federal, state, and local agencies throughout the nation. If the equipment capability and limitations are taken into account, this large inventory and capability can be repurposed to support the emergency response in the aftermath of a radiological of nuclear event.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) User Guide

The MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) is used by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This User Guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/WinMACCS model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 3.10.0. Features that have been added to MACCS in subsequent versions are described in separate documentation. This User Guide provides a brief description of the model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The NUREG does not contain information collection requirements and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 USC 3501, et seq.). PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Contributions to this User Guide were received from NRC and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) project managers, technical experts, and code authors dedicated to the production of a valuable resource for the MACCS user community. Instructions and guidance included herein were developed over many years and include advancements in the code that provide users the ability to develop complex consequence modeling scenarios. WinMACCS and many of the early MACCS developments were due to vision of an earlier Project Manager, Jocelyn Mitchell. Jonathan Barr and AJ Nosek also contributed to the development of this report. The current NRC Project Manager, Salman Haq, provided the leadership to ensure this document was completed. Several other NRC and Sandia staff provided insights supporting development of the MACCS code and of this document.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Comparative Assessment of Radiological Consequences from Sabotage-Induced Releases in Diverse Microreactor Designs

Many microreactor design developers are planning to reduce on-site physical protection measures and emergency planning zones by relying on robust fuel and reactor designs and leveraging passive safety systems. These reductions raise the risk of sabotage at these microreactors. To evaluate these requirements, this study assessed the radiological consequences of sabotage-induced accidents at microreactors. For the assessment, five diverse designs, each producing 30 MWt, were considered. These designs included pressurized water microreactors (PWMs), sodium-cooled fast microreactors (SFMs), high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors (HTPMs), heat pipe–cooled microreactors (HPMs), and molten salt–cooled microreactors (MSMs). For each design, two postulated sabotage-induced accidents were defined along with the associated release percentages of fission products. Additionally, consequences from the release of activation products were assessed. With regard to evaluating physical protection and emergency planning requirements, the consequences of sabotage-induced accidents for each design type were found to be comparable. The differences were primarily because of the distinct fuel forms (and associated release mechanisms), burnup, and neutron spectra of the different microreactor types. Future effort will further investigate the release percentages of fission products to perform accurate dose consequence assessment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Consequence and Resilience Modeling for Chemical Supply Chains

The U.S. chemical sector produces more than 70,000 chemicals that are essential material inputs to critical infrastructure systems, such as the energy, public health, and food and agriculture sectors. Disruptions to the chemical sector can potentially cascade to other dependent sectors, resulting in serious national consequences. To address this concern, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) tasked Sandia National Laboratories to develop a predictive consequence modeling and simulation capability for global chemical supply chains. This paper describes that capability , which includes a dynamic supply chain simulation platform called N_ABLE(tm). The paper also presents results from a case study that simulates the consequences of a Gulf Coast hurricane on selected segments of the U.S. chemical sector. The case study identified consequences that include impacted chemical facilities, cascading impacts to other parts of the chemical sector. and estimates of the lengths of chemical shortages and recovery . Overall. these simulation results can DHS prepare for and respond to actual disruptions.

Stamber, Kevin L.↗

Consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering and related systems and methods

Embodiments of the disclosure relate to a computer-implemented consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering tool for performing and reporting consequence-based prioritization, system-of-systems breakdown, consequence-based targeting, and mitigations and protections. Embodiments of a CCE tool may perform one or more steps of defining a target industrial control system (ICS), wherein the target ICS includes operational goals, critical functions, and critical services; determining one or more scored high consequence events (HCE) associated with the defined target ICS; prioritizing the scored HCEs according to an HCE severity index; and updating a dashboard with one or more representations of the prioritized HCEs, wherein the updated dashboard is associated with the CCE tool and presented at a display.

Assante, Michael↗

Glovebox Handling of High-Consequence Materials with Super Baxter and Gesture-Based Programming - 18598

The handling of high-consequence materials is a difficult task requiring safe object manipulation while avoiding the risk of contamination or spillage. Specific operations including opening containers, segregating the wastes, and repackaging are required to be safely executed inside contained spaces such as gloveboxes. However, the workers' ability and dexterity to manipulate objects through thick protective gloves are compromised in many aspects. The fixed position of the glovebox arm ports restricts the movements of the workers' arms, which also makes it hard to lift heavy objects. Further, the operational workspace inside the glovebox is restricted by the gloves' reachability. Safety of workers is the paramount concern in glovebox operations and the very reason for their existence. Sharp edges and tools increases the risk of glove punctures, which may expose the operator to chemicals and radiation and risks contamination in the vicinity outside the glovebox. The operators are also affected by ergonomic stressors due to prolonged and repetitive operations. To achieve a high degree of human safety, robotic solutions to handle high-consequence materials inside the glovebox are desirable, as they remove the operators from the hazards listed above. However, robots, in general, lack the degree of adaptability necessary for most high-consequence material handling tasks as these tasks are often unstructured or highly variable. Likewise, most human operators, while highly skilled in the tasks at hand (task expertise), lack the robot programming skills necessary to adapt the robot's motions to the variations (programming expertise). A way to bridge this divide is to make robot programming more intuitive to human operators. Since humans naturally teach one another through demonstration and learning, robotic 'programming by demonstration' paradigms have begun to appear to reduce the burden of robot reprogramming. Gesture-Based Programming attempts to achieve that by enabling a robot to observe the normal actions and affordances of a human performing a task to learn to map those onto the skills of the robot. In the end, this approach permits benefits from both the human and the robot: the human's adaptive decision making and the robot's resilience to high-consequence material. Robotic solutions assuringly provide protection for the operators, however their autonomy brings about other potential risks. Artificial Intelligence is not perfect; it is a black box, which can produce results, but the full extent of those results may not be known precisely. In self-driving cars, a hypothetical AI problem is the 'green man detector'. Since self-driving cars have presumably never seen a green man, how can we know it won't veer toward him the first time it sees a green man? Likewise, even though GbP provides an open method for safe task execution replicating a human, incorrect task inferences can lead to potential collisions or unintended operations. Thus, a hardware safety measure is proposed to provide reliable operation inside the glovebox, and true safe operations are achieved by mechanically limiting the operational range of each arm link. The operational range is computed and validated through exhaustive offline simulations, which can be streamlined by affordable computing power. Super Baxter is one such robot which incorporates these capabilities. It is a human-like, bimanual robot, being developed at the Collaborative Robotics Lab (CRL) in conjunction with the Dept. of Energy/Environmental Management, Rethink Robotics, Barrett Technology, and the NSF Center for Robots and Sensors for the Human Well-Being (RoSe-HUB). Super Baxter is envisioned to represent the next generation of collaborative robots that will be intrinsically human-safe, as well as exceptionally human-intuitive. In summary, Super Baxter will enable safe glovebox operations through low-shot Gesture based Programming incorporated with hardware safety measures. Two aspects of safety will be discussed in the paper. First, the safety of the operator achieved by allowing him to program Super Baxter remotely through Gesture based Programming. Second, the safety of the glovebox, achieved by incorporating hardware safety measures using joint limits. Further, the capability of Super Baxter on Gesture based Programming is demonstrated through typical object manipulation tasks in glovebox operations. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Approach for Assessing Consequences of Potential Supply Chain and Insider Contributed Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants

The Stuxnet attack at the Natanz facility is an example of a targeted and successful cyber attack on a nuclear facility. Snowden's release of National Security Agency documents demonstrated the consequences of the insider threat. More recently, the United States tried to attack North Korea but failed, South Korea was attempting to attack North Korea, and both applied Stuxnet-like approaches. These sophisticated targeted attacks differ from web-site hacking events that are reported almost daily in the news mainly because targeted attacks require detailed design and operation information of the systems attacked and/or are often carried out by insiders. For instance, in order to minimize disruption of facilities around the world, Stuxnet remained idle until it recognized the specific configuration of the Natanz facility, demonstrating that the attackers possessed extremely detailed information about the facility. Such targeted cyber attacks could become a national-level military weapon and be used in coercion of hostile countries. While U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) are well designed and protected and not easily attacked through internet hacking, there have been a few digital-system-related incidents. For example, in 2003, the Slammer worm breached the private network of the Davis Besse plant and disabled a safety monitoring system for almost five hours. The breach did not pose a safety hazard because the plant was offline, but it demonstrates the vulnerability of NPP systems. The worm did not enter the plant systems directly; it began by entering the systems of a Davis Besse contractor, and entered through the T1 line bridging the contractor's computer and Davis Besse's corporate networks. The T1 line was not protected by the plant's firewall. The success of the Stuxnet-Natanz case demonstrates that supply-chain level attack (i.e., physically tampering with digital systems to install undetectable malware for the purpose of bringing harm to a player further down the supply chain network) plays a crucial role in a successful attack. Although attacking an NPP naturally requires more complex strategies and tactics than internet hacking, NPP's have a variety of sophisticated and possibly sensitive systems that may be attacked. Previous studies, for example, Baylon, have identified and confirmed that such attack strategies and tactics can be designed and could produce severe damage to an NPP. Current NPPs were designed according to design basis accidents that predate use of the internet by the general public and did not take into consideration potential cyber attacks that could be carried out by state-sponsored attackers and malicious insiders. To date, no detailed engineering analysis has been performed to realistically examine the consequences these attacks may have on the plants. In this paper, we discuss an approach for assessing the potential consequences of Stuxnet type of attacks. We will examine the engineering criteria used in designing the plants, develop possible attack scenarios in terms of the structures, components, and systems (SSCs) being controlled by digital systems at the NPPs, perform engineering analysis to determine if the attacks would impose conditions that are beyond design bases, and categorize the consequences of the potential accidents. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in sodium-cooled fast microreactors

Analysis of three sodium-cooled fast microreactors (SFMs) with thermal powers of 10, 30, and 50 MWt showed that smaller reactors result in lower radiological consequences during a postulated sabotage-induced event because of their reduced core inventory. All SFMs used U-10Zr metal fuel enriched to 15 wt% high-assay low-enriched uranium and operated until their respective effective multiplication factor (k eff ) reduced to less than 1 or until the end of their operational lifespan. Sabotage scenarios were simulated at this point, when the fuel inventory within the core contains the highest-level of radioactivity. Radionuclide core inventories were calculated using the SCALE code at shutdown and 3 days post-shutdown. Dose consequence analyses were performed for three sabotage scenarios using the RASCAL tool. As microreactor developers plan for minimal on-site or complete off-site emergency response, it remains essential to evaluate their physical protection needs and potential hazards, including assessing postulated sabotage-induced events that could become more relevant. SFM licensees should identify a credible worst-case, major accident, estimate release source terms, and perform dose consequence analyses to evaluate site-specific physical protection measures. In conclusion, this recommendation supports a risk-informed, performance-based approach, aligning with applicable regulatory requirements, i.e., 10 CFR Parts 100 and 53 rulemaking in the United States.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Accident Consequence Analysis P-301

? Discuss the 3 levels of PRA (PSA) and how Level 3 fits in ? Learn the relationship between consequence and risk ? Discover the characteristics of consequence analysis ? Discuss the overall course scope ? Consider some applications of consequence modeling ? Summarize the course schedule

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment and Validation of Collision "Consequence" Method of Assessing Orbital Regime Risk Posed by Potential Satellite Conjunctions

Collision risk management theory requires a thorough assessment of both the likelihood and consequence of potential collision events. Satellite conjunction risk assessment has produced a highly-developed theory for assessing the likelihood of collision but neglects to account for the consequences of a given collision. While any collision may compromise the operational survival of a spacecraft, the amount of debris produced by the potential collision, and therefore the degree to which the orbital corridor may be compromised, can vary greatly among satellite conjunctions. Previous studies leveraged work on satellite collision modeling to develop a method to estimate whether a particular collision is likely to produce a relatively large or relatively small amount of resultant debris. The approximation of the number of debris pieces is dependent on a mass estimation process for the secondary objects utilizing the radar cross section of said object. This study examines the validity of the mass estimation process and establishes uncertainty bounds on the secondary object mass, which will be used to best approximate the possible consequences of a potential collision. This process is then applied to a large set of historical conjunctions to assess the frequency at which possible collisions may significantly augment the orbital debris environment in operational spacecraft.

Collision Consequence↗

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

The lunar environment offers unique challenges for human health and safety over the course of performing Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) during early Artemis missions. Driver medical conditions leading to an injured EVA crewmember needing assistance or rescue were analyzed and correlated to established, defined consequence categories. Catastrophic Drivers were identified, and three mitigation strategies were analyzed to determine if there was a potential change in consequence with their application. Risk consequence across the mitigations were compared with each other and the original risk without mitigations. Mitigations were further evaluated in a broader context with prospective preventions to understand the design and risk trade space associated with an early Artemis EVA.

Risk↗

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

The lunar environment offers unique challenges for human health and safety over the course of performing Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) during early Artemis missions. Driver medical conditions leading to an injured EVA crewmember needing assistance or rescue were analyzed and correlated to established, defined consequence categories. Catastrophic Drivers were identified, and three mitigation strategies were analyzed to determine if there was a potential change in consequence with their application. Risk consequence across the mitigations were compared with each other and the original risk without mitigations. Mitigations were further evaluated in a broader context with prospective preventions to understand the design and risk trade space associated with an early Artemis EVA.

Risk↗