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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Evaluation of Advanced Signal Processing Techniques to Improve Detection and Identification of Embedded Defects

By the end of 1996, 109 Nuclear Power Plants were operating in the United States, producing 22% of the Nation’s electricity [1]. At present, more than two thirds of these power plants are more than 40 years old. The purpose of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is to develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants (NPPs) beyond 60 years [2]. The most important safety structures in an NPP are constructed of concrete. The structures generally do not allow for destructive evaluation and access is limited to one side of the concrete element. Therefore, there is a need for techniques and technologies that can assess the internal health of complex, reinforced concrete structures nondestructively. Previously, we documented the challenges associated with Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) of thick, reinforced concrete sections and prioritized conceptual designs of specimens that could be fabricated to represent NPP concrete structures [3]. Consequently, a 7 feet tall, by 7 feet wide, by 3 feet and 4-inch-thick concrete specimen was constructed with 2.257-inch-and 1-inch-diameter rebar every 6 to 12 inches. In addition, defects were embedded the specimen to assess the performance of existing and future NDE techniques. The defects were designed to give a mix of realistic and controlled defects for assessment of the necessary measures needed to overcome the challenges with more heavily reinforced concrete structures. Information on the embedded defects is documented in [4]. We also documented the superiority of Frequency Banded Decomposition (FBD) Synthetic Aperture Focusing Technique (SAFT) over conventional SAFT when probing defects under deep concrete cover. Improvements include seeing an intensity corresponding to a defect that is either not visible at all in regular, full frequency content SAFT, or an improvement in contrast over conventional SAFT reconstructed images. This report documents our efforts in four fronts: 1) Comparative study between traditional SAFT and FBD SAFT for concrete specimen with and without Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) damage, 2) improvement of our Model-Based Iterative Reconstruction (MBIR) for thick reinforced concrete [5], 3) development of a universal framework for sharing, reconstruction, and visualization of ultrasound NDE datasets, and 4) application of machine learning techniques for automated detection of ASR inside concrete. Our comparative study between FBD and traditional SAFT reconstruction images shows a clear difference between images of ASR and non-ASR specimens. In particular, the left first harmonic shows an increased contrast and sensitivity to ASR damage. For MBIR, we show the superiority of model-based techniques over delay and sum techniques such as SAFT. Improvements include elimination of artifacts caused by direct arrival signals, and increased contrast and Signal to Noise Ratio. For the universal framework, we document a format for data storage based on the HDF5 file format, and also propose a modular Graphic User Interface (GUI) for easy customization of data conversion, reconstruction, and visualization routines. Finally, two techniques for ASR automated detection are presented. The first technique is based on an analysis of the frequency content using Hilbert Transform Indicator (HTI) and the second technique employees Artificial Neural Network (ANN) techniques for training and classification of ultrasound data as ASR or non-ASR damaged classes. The ANN technique shows great potential with classification accuracy above 95%. These approaches are extensible to the detection of additional reinforced, thick concrete defects and damage.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

End-Use Load Profiles for the U.S. Building Stock: Practical Guidance on Accessing and Using the Data

End-use load profiles (EULP), which quantify how and when energy is used, are critically important to utilities, public utility commissions, state energy offices, and other stakeholders. Applications of EULPs focus on understanding how efficiency, demand response, and other distributed energy resources are valued and used in R&D prioritization, utility resource and distribution system planning, and state and local energy planning and regulations. Consequently, high-quality EULPs are critical for widespread adoption of electrification, demand flexibility, and grid-interactive efficient buildings. For example, EULPs can be used to forecast energy savings in buildings or to identify energy using activities that can be shifted to different times of the day.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Applications of Measuring and Valuing Resilience in Energy Systems

The electricity sector is vulnerable to numerous hazards that are being exacerbated by climate change, which can cause an increase in the hazards' frequency and intensity. Consumers, system regulators, system operators, and communities are now preparing to mitigate the increased risks posed by climate change. New York State's energy infrastructure resilience can be increased with targeted investments including but not limited to installing emergency backup systems, integrating microgrid solutions, weatherizing buildings, increasing energy efficiency, adding redundancy, investing in restoration and recovery, and hardening critical components. Such investments can reduce the likelihood, impact, and consequences of disruptive events but can also increase capital and operating costs. A barrier to prioritizing investments in resilience is that there is no widely established method for quantifying and assigning the benefits of resilience investments across various stakeholders. Decision-makers need better information detailing the value of resilience improvements. Developing methods to quantify, value, and price resilience helps meet resilience needs in an effective manner that also supports broader societal welfare. This report lays out considerations for quantifying and valuing resilience, discusses the current state of resilience valuation tools, and provides case studies of resilience projects that demonstrate how resilience attributes could be measured while highlighting broader, project-specific challenges to increasing resilience. Further, we present insights into methods and challenges to measuring, valuing, and enacting resilience investments.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Lessons Learned from Performing a Human Factors Engineering Validation of an Upgraded Digital Control System in a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room

The United States' fleet of nuclear power plants (NPPs) have exceeded their original 40-year licenses and many are seeking license renewals to continue operations into the future. To support continued operation the Department of Energy's (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program (LWRS) provides support for utilities to maintain and upgrade their power production capabilities. Control room modernization is one focus area, which aims to modernization the analog control rooms with digital controls and human-system interfaces (HSIs). The Turbine Control System (TCS) is a non-safety related system undergoing modernization efforts at multiple plants and utilities. Considerable human factors research efforts, comprised of expert reviews and operator in the loop studies were performed to develop human factors compliant and usable TCS. This report documents the final phase of the human factors engineering program used to design and validate the new digital TCS. According to the NUREG-0711 review guide, one of the last steps of human factors engineering program prior to implementation is human factors validation. This report details the method, results and conclusions from the human factors validation study of a collaborating utilities TCS slated to be implemented in one of their plants. One control room team consisting of two control room supervisors and two reactor operators participated in the validation. All team members had participated in the BNP TCS training program foregoing the TCS validation. Performance measures included task performance, situation awareness and workload, expert observation of any negative influences of human-system interface features on control room team performance, and interviews with the participating operators. Performance criteria were based on the performance scores and the topics identified by interviews and expert observations. The results showed that the crew using the new TCS clearly could achieve their overall objectives in the test scenarios with sufficient situation awareness. The new TCS compared to the old system provided clear improvements of the control room work regarding shell and chest warming and regarding valve and other system testing. However, a number of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) were identified. HEDs were prioritized (level 1, 2 or 3) according to potential safety, plant availability, operability or personnel performance consequences. Since no priority 1 HEDs were identified there is no HFE reason not to continue implementation of the TCS. The TCS upgrade is acceptable if the Priority 2 HEDs are resolved and dispositioned in a satisfactory way. Priority 3 HEDs should be noted and considered for future modifications.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Synopsis of the Oak Ridge Radiation Protection Research Needs Workshop

Radiation protection is foundational to harnessing the societal benefits of radiation in nuclear energy, security, and medicine applications. Significant challenges in radiation protection remain unaddressed for the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear medicine, emergency response, national defense, and space exploration, as the United States is lacking a coherent research strategy prioritizing radiation protection mission needs and gaps in scientific knowledge to meet these needs. Research and development in the field of radiation protection calls for cooperation among governmental agencies, emergency responders, research organizations, and the academic community. Amidst atrophying national expertise in radiation protection, the Radiation Protection Research Needs Workshop was spearheaded by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Health Physics Society. This workshop facilitated critical dialogue among radiation stakeholders in the governmental and scientific communities, including national laboratories, academic institutions, and industry partners. The workshop featured presentations representing 12 federal agencies and breakout sessions involving the identification of scientific drivers by subject matter experts in each of the following areas: new fuel cycles/reactors, dosimetry, medical physics, instrumentation and operations, decontamination and decommissioning, space radiation, national defense, emergency response, environmental modeling, and low-dose effects. The goal of this workshop was to seek stakeholder input toward the development of a national strategic research agenda in the field of radiation protection. Consequently, the Health Physics Society has established a Special Task Force on Health Physics Research Needs, tasked with the prioritization of scientific drivers in radiation protection for the development of a national strategic research agenda.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: An Approach for Understanding an Organization’s Unique Infrastructure Environment

The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure landscape in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure landscape as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Identifying University Chemicals That Pose Security Risks: A Simple Qualitative Approach

Various laboratory-focused tools and methodologies for completing a safety risk assessment have been published, yet few similar resources to address chemical security exist. Herein, we describe a chemical security risk assessment case study at a university in a developing country. In this case study, we demonstrate a chemical security risk assessment for a university chemistry department, using an original inventory of 645 entries which was condensed to 295 chemicals after removing duplicates and erroneous entries. We then prioritized to highlight 83 chemicals of interest based on hazardous or dual-use properties that could lead to unacceptable consequences. We further refined to a list of 34 high-risk chemicals that required action, 48 chemicals that may need further justification and consideration for additional protection, and 1 chemical that did not need further consideration for additional protection.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2022

Risk Management and Risk Aversion, from Benefit to Impediment

Risk management is a critical tool for improving the probability of project success by identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and attempting to control threats to project realization. For industries that require high operational reliability due to the potential consequences of off-normal events, such as the nuclear, aerospace, and chemical sectors, a major focus of risk management is the preservation of process safety. Due to the nature of the processes or systems under consideration, the associated process safety analyses (such as risk and safety assessments) and safety features can require significant resources. These costs are typically tolerated either due to the need to satisfy regulatory requirements or based on the assumption that they generally decrease the occurrence of unwanted events and therefore improve the probability of project success. However, as the level of acceptable or tolerable risk from unwanted events decreases, the required resources necessary for ensuring and demonstrating satisfaction of these criteria can grow and in turn can become one of the dominant impediments to project success. This paper outlines a high-level theoretical framework for the consideration of dominant project risks, which includes potential project failure from both the occurrence of high consequence off-normal events and the inability to achieve project completion due to the resource needs and innovation losses associated with extreme risk aversion. Utilizing such an integrated approach permits an attempt to optimize the probability of successful project realization while also providing valuable insight into the proper level of acceptable risk. The work is presented as a first step, in hopes of spurring additional discussion and analysis regarding appropriate levels of risk tolerance and the balance of project benefits.

Grabaskas, David↗
DOE OSTI2016

Regulatory Technology Development Plan - Sodium Fast Reactor: Mechanistic Source Term – Trial Calculation

The potential release of radioactive material during a plant incident, referred to as the source term, is a vital design metric and will be a major focus of advanced reactor licensing. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has stated an expectation for advanced reactor vendors to present a mechanistic assessment of the potential source term in their license applications. The mechanistic source term presents an opportunity for vendors to realistically assess the radiological consequences of an incident, and may allow reduced emergency planning zones and smaller plant sites. However, the development of a mechanistic source term for advanced reactors is not without challenges, as there are often numerous phenomena impacting the transportation and retention of radionuclides. This project sought to evaluate U.S. capabilities regarding the mechanistic assessment of radionuclide release from core damage incidents at metal fueled, pool-type sodium fast reactors (SFRs). The purpose of the analysis was to identify, and prioritize, any gaps regarding computational tools or data necessary for the modeling of radionuclide transport and retention phenomena. To accomplish this task, a parallel-path analysis approach was utilized. One path, led by Argonne and Sandia National Laboratories, sought to perform a mechanistic source term assessment using available codes, data, and models, with the goal to identify gaps in the current knowledge base. The second path, performed by an independent contractor, performed sensitivity analyses to determine the importance of particular radionuclides and transport phenomena in regards to offsite consequences. The results of the two pathways were combined to prioritize gaps in current capabilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comprehensive characterization of protein–protein interactions perturbed by disease mutations

Technological and computational advances in genomics and interactomics have made it possible to identify how disease mutations perturb protein–protein interaction (PPI) networks within human cells. Here, we show that disease-associated germline variants are significantly enriched in sequences encoding PPI interfaces compared to variants identified in healthy participants from the projects 1000 Genomes and ExAC. Somatic missense mutations are also significantly enriched in PPI interfaces compared to noninterfaces in 10,861 tumor exomes. We computationally identified 470 putative oncoPPIs in a pan-cancer analysis and demonstrate that oncoPPIs are highly correlated with patient survival and drug resistance/sensitivity. Further, we experimentally validate the network effects of 13 oncoPPIs using a systematic binary interaction assay, and also demonstrate the functional consequences of two of these on tumor cell growth. In summary, this human interactome network framework provides a powerful tool for prioritization of alleles with PPI-perturbing mutations to inform pathobiological mechanism- and genotype-based therapeutic discovery.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Developing a Supply Chain Security Program

Amid growing concerns over foreign manufacturing for components and devices deployed in critical energy infrastructure, this research from the national labs will highlight best practices for developing and maintaining a supply chain security program. Tools for asset inventory, tips for developing and maintaining software- and hardware-bills-of-materials (SBOMs and HBOMs), recommended contractual language for vendor agreements, and identification of responsibilities will be shared. We discuss the one-time requirements to enable a successful supply chain security program and the best ways to operationalize this program for maximum impact, including development of robust practices for vulnerability tracking, patch management, and workarounds, with understanding of the reliability and uptime requirements for utilities. The recommendations shared are based on a cyber-informed engineering approach to identification of high-consequence impacts and the engineering controls related to supply chain management that can best mitigate these impacts. This approach allows for prioritization of resources. Additionally, we highlight relative up-front and ongoing costs associated with recommended controls. Viewers will leave with an understanding what a supply chain security program is, and what steps, prioritized for resource-constrained organizations, can build a robust program.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2017

Consider the Consequences: A Powerful Approach for Reducing ICS Cyber Risk

Here, by identifying and analyzing threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts, asset owners can develop a risk profile for their industrial control systems (ICSs). This information is essential in developing, prioritizing, and implementing mitigations to reduce ICS cyber risk. To help bridge the gap between the cyber and physical domains, and gain a better understanding of cascading cyber/physical impacts, this paper will discuss the safety perspective of physical impacts, describe the ICS cyber kill chain model, explain the cyber/physical interface, review the “layers of protection analysis model” from a security perspective, discuss protection layers, and suggest a reference architecture for securing digital control devices.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the Advanced Reactor Concepts 100 (ARC-100) sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design. The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, and used fuel assembly wash station. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. However, the consequence assessment results are the similar to a previously assessed generic SFR. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. This work will continue in the Fiscal Year 2025 for the remaining ARC-100 systems, including cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks (dewar bottles), and used fuel dry storage facility, to provide safety-and-security-by-design insights and recommendations on non-core systems. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2018

Stakeholder Engaged Structured Decision Making to Improve Performance and Reduce Costs While Protecting Human Health and the Environment - 18645

The objective of the Best Practice is to facilitate a paradigm shift when it comes to approaches to the decision making process for nuclear waste management, disposal, and remediation decisions. The stakeholder-engaged structured decision making (SDM) paradigm shift provides a transparent framework for developing optimal solutions to complex problems (Keeney, 1992, Gregory et al, 2012). This is a deliberative-analytical process. The deliberative side centers on understanding stakeholder concerns and values, and developing objectives while identifying options that may achieve those objectives. SDM is implemented with the aid of computer tools that are aimed specifically at capturing these deliberative aspects of a decision analysis. SDM captures this information in a structured format that allows access to the values, objectives, and options that have been identified to help. Through this approach we achieve transparency, traceability, and reproducibility. The goal of SDM at this stage is to provide a formal structure for capturing and processing deliberative information. The deliberative part sets the stage for the analytical part of SDM. A variety of Subject matter experts (SMEs) are engaged in how to evaluate the options through the objectives. Objectives often include minimizing human health risk and minimizing cost, but in the full scope of a sustainability-based approach to decision making, it can include objectives related to economic, environmental and social issues. Subject matter experts might provide other options for achieving the objectives, but their primary role is to evaluate/model the options to the endpoint defined by the objectives or in other words perform a consequence analysis. The structure of SDM makes it clear exactly what is needed from the SMEs, because the options are identified, and the endpoint (objectives) are defined - evaluations and/or models are needed to connect options to objectives. This consequence analysis completes the evaluation, and directly addresses which of the options is the best option. The same SDM approach to finding the best options can also be used for prioritization and resource allocation. Because all of the information is captured in a formal system with the help of computer tools (a software framework for implementing SDM), the decision models that are developed for an application can be fully evaluated numerically and for the insights gained from using a formal process for managing the multiple factors that need to be considered for complex decisions. This includes uncertainty and sensitivity analysis that can be used to guide the need for further data/information collection if the optimal decision is not adequately supported - that is, if there is insufficient confidence in the decision. Also, this feeds directly into adaptive management therefore if more data/information are collected then the efficacy of the current decision can be evaluated, potentially leading to a change in decisions if warranted. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of Integrated Safety and Security Models for Comprehensive Reliability and Resiliency Evaluation

The security of the electric grid and supporting energy systems is crucial to national security. One of the complexities in analyzing the security of energy systems is the safety consequences that may result from accidents. For energy systems, the goal is to ensure that they operate as intended and that any consequences are mitigated or prevented. The integration of safety and security is paramount to protecting these systems from attacks and ensuring that large consequences are prevented. This report describes an integrated safety and security methodology to evaluate cybersecurity events that can lead to large consequences. This novel approach first describes how Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) provides a digital causal analysis for Bayesian Networks (BNs). The use of STPA causal analysis provides a systematic approach to constructing BNs that adequately model cyber scenarios that result in consequences. When combined with the technical principles described in Risk-Informed Management of Enterprise Systems (RIMES), a comprehensive risk-informed cybersecurity analysis results that allows decision-makers to prioritize systems that most impact risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗