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The unique environment of the Kennedy Space Center includes a wide variety of industrial processes culminating in launch and spaceflight. Many are potentially hazardous to the work force and the astronauts. Technology, planning, training, and quality control are utilized to prevent contingencies and expedite response should a contingency occur.
The unique environment of the Kennedy Space Center includes a wide variety of industrial processes culminating in launch and spaceflight. Many are potentially hazardous to the work force and the astronauts. Technology, planning, training, and quality control are utilized to prevent contingencies and expedite response should a contingency occur.
This paper discusses the Concept of Operations of the nine contingency strategies available for off-nominal Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, and Docking of Orion with the Gateway in a Near-Rectilinear Halo Orbit around the Moon. Explanations are provided for each contingency strategy, how they are initiated, when they can be initiated, and how they are designed to protect the crew. Then an overview is provided of the sequencing of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control flight software used to achieve each contingency strategy, in the form of Phases, Segments, Activities, and Modes. These off-nominal scenarios re-quire the definition of new Segments and Activities.
Flywheels can exert torque that alters the Station's attitude motion, either intentionally or unintentionally. A design is presented for a once planned experiment to contribute torque for Station attitude control, while storing or discharging energy. Two contingencies are studied: the abrupt stop of one rotor while another rotor continues to spin at high speed, and energy storage performed with one rotor instead of a counter rotating pair. Finally, the possible advantages to attitude control offered by a system of ninety-six flywheels are discussed.
Using the first optical observatory in space, the Hubble Space Telescope, images of possible extrasolar planets will have poor contrast against the background of diffracted and scattered starlight. The very long exposure time required to achieve an adequate signal-to-noise ratio will make their detection infeasible. For a future telescope, a 16-fold increase in either the smoothness of the collecting area of the optics would reduce the exposure time to a tolerable value, but the contrast would remain low and the required photometric precision high. In this situation, the feasibility of detection would be contingent on the careful identification and control of systematic errors.
Algorithms for on-board attitude determination and control of the Solar, Anomalous, and Magnetospheric Particle Explorer (SAMPEX) have been expanded to include a constant gain Kalman filter for the spacecraft angular momentum, pulse width modulation for the reaction wheel command, an algorithm to avoid pointing the Heavy Ion Large Telescope (HILT) instrument boresight along the spacecraft velocity vector, and the addition of digital sun sensor (DSS) failure detection logic. These improved algorithms were tested in a closed-loop environment for three orbit geometries, one with the sun perpendicular to the orbit plane, and two with the sun near the orbit plane - at Autumnal Equinox and at Winter Solstice. The closed-loop simulator was enhanced and used as a truth model for the control systems' performance evaluation and sensor/actuator contingency analysis. The simulations were performed on a VAX 8830 using a prototype version of the on-board software.
Four experiments address the degree of top-down selectivity in attention capture by feature singletons through manipulations of the spatial relationship and featural similarity of target and distractor singletons in a modified spatial cuing paradigm. Contrary to previous studies, all four experiments show that when searching for a singleton target, an irrelevant featural singleton captures attention only when defined by the same feature value as the target. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 provide a potential explanation for this empirical discrepancy by showing that irrelevant singletons can produce distraction effects that are independent of shifts of spatial attention. The results further support the notion that attentional capture is contingent on top-down attention control settings but indicates that such settings can be instantiated at the level of feature values.
NASA is currently building the Space Launch System (SLS) Block-1 launch vehicle for the Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) test flight. The design of the next evolution of SLS, Block-1B, is well underway. The Block-1B vehicle is more capable overall than Block-1; however, the relatively low thrust-to-weight ratio of the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) presents a challenge to the Powered Explicit Guidance (PEG) algorithm used by Block-1. To handle the long burn durations (on the order of 1000 seconds) of EUS missions, two algorithms were examined. An alternative algorithm, OPGUID, was introduced, while modifications were made to PEG. A trade study was conducted to select the guidance algorithm for future SLS vehicles. The chosen algorithm needs to support a wide variety of mission operations: ascent burns to LEO, apogee raise burns, trans-lunar injection burns, hyperbolic Earth departure burns, and contingency disposal burns using the Reaction Control System (RCS). Additionally, the algorithm must be able to respond to a single engine failure scenario. Each algorithm was scored based on pre-selected criteria, including insertion accuracy, algorithmic complexity and robustness, extensibility for potential future missions, and flight heritage. Monte Carlo analysis was used to select the final algorithm. This paper covers the design criteria, approach, and results of this trade study, showing impacts and considerations when adapting launch vehicle guidance algorithms to a broader breadth of in-space operations.
NASA is planning to return to the Moon in the mid-2020s as a stepping stone to Mars missions in the 2030s. Spacewalks, or extravehicular activities (EVAs), performed on the Moon and Mars will differ in a variety of ways from those that have been performed in decades past. NASA has identified multiple risks to human health and performance associated with a crewed mission to Mars, especially those associated with exploration EVAs which are expected to be a primary mission activity. Crew may be expected to conduct up to 24 hours of EVA per person per week, where the likelihood of injury and/or mental mistakes are increased compared to ground-based training or current microgravity EVAs and the consequences of which can be catastrophic. Current test environments for exploration EVA research and technology development are large, costly facilities that are limited in their availability or capabilities. Spacesuit testing in a reduced gravity environment such as NASA’s Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory, while a good representation of the crew’s physical workload during exploration EVAs, typically has small datasets and is difficult to integrate physiological sensors or other types of crew performance measures. Meanwhile, scientific field-based testing such as NASA’s Desert Research and Technology Studies offers an operationally relevant environment for exploration EVAs, particularly for cognitive workload, but is also limited by small datasets, lack of a pressurized spacesuit, and obtrusive measures. The limitations of current analogs for exploration EVAs identify a need for a new test environment that can approximate both the physical and cognitive demands associated with exploration EVAs to enable rapid, controlled, and repeatable evaluations of human health and performance risks of exploration missions. In response, the Human Physiology, Performance, Protection, and Operations Laboratory (H-3PO) at NASA Johnson Space Center has developed a hybrid reality exploration EVA analog named the Assessments of Physiology And Cognition in Hybrid-reality Environments (APACHE) to address these limitations using a combination of virtual, physical, and hybrid reality techniques. The APACHE facility resides at NASA Johnson Space Center and serves as a large “sandbox” for EVA research and simulation. At its center is a roughly 15x20ft space surrounded by a 14” tall sandbox partially filled with lunar regolith simulant to emulate the physical feeling of walking on a planetary surface and to allow for simulated geology operations. Nearby, a curved passive treadmill (Skillmill Connect, Technogym, Fairfield, NJ) and an omnidirectional treadmill (Infinadeck, Infinadeck, Rocklin, CA) are included to enable exploration of these large virtual environments while also imposing the physical demands, representative timelines, and cognitive burdens required to navigate and traverse these distances during exploration EVA. A 6DOF motion platform is used to simulate rover operations and supports various human performance evaluations and associated risks. Lastly, APACHE can support two extravehicular (EV) crewmembers working in tandem. A computer workstation is located nearby and also supports an intravehicular (IV) crewmember as part of a full mission simulation. The IV crewmember has direct video and audio communication with the EV crew in VR to provide operational and procedural support. The software used in APACHE was created by the JSC Engineering Directorate, in partnership with Buendea, powered by a custom Unreal Engine 5 (UE5.3, Epic Games) project. APACHE currently utilizes the HTC Vive Pro Eye in a wireless configuration for VR simulations. There are two virtual environments that subjects can explore within APACHE, a Lunar and Martian surface. The virtual Lunar surface was created from LIDAR data of the Lunar South Pole to create roughly 16 sq km of explorable terrain. The virtual Martian surface contains roughly 400 sq km of explorable terrain derived from Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter LIDAR data of the Jezero Crater. The immersion and related cognitive burdens of conducting a planetary EVA is simulated through a series of EVA-relevant tasks performed in the VR environment, using these high-fidelity visual representations. Additionally, APACHE includes biosensor driven informatics, such as real-time heart rate monitoring and/or derived values from model simulations, for active monitoring by the EV crew and added cognitive demand. A “Wizard of Oz” control panel enables test operators to activate contingency events such as simulated spacesuit malfunctions, loss of communications, and/or limited visibility. Embedded performance measures such as accuracy, completeness, and execution time have been developed for various exploration tasks to objectively quantify crew performance during an EVA and compare impacts to performance when different environmental stressors, both physical and cognitive, are added to or removed from the simulation. Additionally, validated cognitive and operational performance measures such as the Digit Symbol Substitution Task have been recreated and embedded in VR for direct and relatively unobtrusive measurement of motor perception. The APACHE environment currently supports multiple research studies at NASA. Examples include the CHAPEA project, a series of simulated year-long missions on Mars by a 4-person crew; and the CO2 Contingency Walk Back Study, an investigation of elevated CO2 exposure on crew performance during a contingency EVA scenario. APACHE also provides a test environment to support the development of the Crew State and Risk Model, which is a collection of individualized, mathematical models of crew physical and cognitive state; and the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support system, an operational tool for flight controllers, and eventually a self-reliant Martian crew, to make biomedically-informed decisions in real-time to optimize the EVA planning and execution with respect to crew health and performance. Some technical challenges associated with developing the APACHE environment, as well as current limitations, include VR limitless natural walking with a hybrid spacesuit simulator, optimizing performance for wireless PC VR streaming while maintaining a high degree of visual fidelity, and the integration of various physiological (metabolic masks) and psychometric (eye tracking) sensors with the VR headset.
The primary purpose of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference was to bring together people and organizations which have a common interest in protecting intellectual property generated in space. Operational concerns are discussed, taking into account security implications of the space station information system, Space Shuttle security policies and programs, potential uses of probabilistic risk assessment techniques for space station development, key considerations in contingency planning for secure space flight ground control centers, a systematic method for evaluating security requirements compliance, and security engineering of secure ground stations. Subjects related to security technologies are also explored, giving attention to processing requirements of secure C3/I and battle management systems and the development of the Gemini trusted multiple microcomputer base, the Restricted Access Processor system as a security guard designed to protect classified information, and observations on local area network security.
MSG is a third generation glovebox for Microgravity Science investigations: SpaceLab Glovebox (GBX); Middeck/MIR Gloveboxes (M/MGBX); and GBX and M/MGBX developed by Bradford Engineering (NL). Previous flights have demonstrated utility of glovebox facilities: Contained environment enables broader range of science experiments; Affords better control of video and photographic imaging (a prime data source); Provides better environmental control than cabin atmosphere; and Useful for contingency operations. MSG developed in response to demands for increased work volume, increased capabilities and additional resources. MSG is multi-user facility to support a wide range of small science and technology investigations: Fluid physics; Combustion science; Material science; Biotechnology (cell culturing and protein crystal growth); Space processing; Fundamental physics; and Technology demonstrations. Topics included in this viewgraph are: MSG capabilities; MSG hardware items; MSG, GSE, and OSE items; MSG development approach; and Science utilization.
The purpose of this Functional Requirements Document (FRD) is to compile the functional requirements needed to achieve the Access 5 Vision of "operating High Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) routinely, safely, and reliably in the national airspace system (NAS)" for Step 1. These functional requirements could support the development of a minimum set of policies, procedures and standards by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and various standards organizations. It is envisioned that this comprehensive body of work will enable the FAA to establish and approve regulations to govern safe operation of UAS in the NAS on a routine or daily "file and fly" basis. The approach used to derive the functional requirements found within this FRD was to decompose the operational requirements and objectives identified within the Access 5 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) into the functions needed to routinely and safely operate a HALE UAS in the NAS. As a result, four major functional areas evolved to enable routine and safe UAS operations for an on-demand basis in the NAS. These four major functions are: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, and Avoid Hazards. All of the functional requirements within this document can be directly traceable to one of these four major functions. Some functions, however, are traceable to several, or even all, of these four major functions. These cross-cutting functional requirements support the "Command / Control: function as well as the "Manage Contingencies" function. The requirements associated to these high-level functions and all of their supporting low-level functions are addressed in subsequent sections of this document.
During the early years of human spaceflight, short duration missions allowed for monitoring of the spacecraft environment to be performed via archival sampling, in which samples were returned to Earth for analysis. With the construction of the International Space Station (ISS) and the accompanying extended mission durations, the need for enhanced, real-time monitors became apparent. The Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) operated on ISS for 7 years, where it assessed trace volatile organic compounds in the cabin air. The large and fixed-position VOA was eventually replaced with the smaller Air Quality Monitor (AQM). Since March 2013, the atmosphere of the U.S. Operating Segment (USOS) has been monitored in near real-time by a pair of AQMs. These devices consist of a gas chromatograph (GC) coupled with a differential mobility spectrometer (DMS) and currently target detection list of 22 compounds. These targets are of importance to both crew health and the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) on ISS. Data is collected autonomously every 73 hours, though the units can be controlled remotely from mission control to collect data more frequently during contingency or troubleshooting operations. Due to a nominal three-year lifetime on-orbit, the initial units were replaced in February 2016. This paper will focus on the preparation and use of the AQMs over the past several years. A description of the technical aspects of the AQM will be followed by lessons learned from the deployment and operation of the first set of AQMs. These lessons were used to improve the already-excellent performance of the instruments prior to deployment of the replacement units. Data trending over the past several years of operation on ISS will also be discussed, including data obtained during a survey of the USOS modules. Finally, a description of AQM use for contingency and investigative studies will be presented.
NASA’s Mars 2020 mission successfully launched to Mars July 30, 2020. An on-orbit contingency plan was developed to accomplish a controlled re-entry of the spacecraft in the event of a launch vehicle anomaly. The entire launch period was assessed, and satisfactory de-orbit burns were designed for every launch opportunity. An operational implementation was created for rapid adoption if needed, and validated using information from the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) satellites. This paper presents the orbit determination models and filter strategies used to conduct the pre-launch analyses, as well as the operational implementation validation methodologies and results.
The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.
The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.
The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Displays and Controls (D and C) subsystem hardware. The function of the D and C hardware is to provide the crew with the monitor, command, and control capabilities required for management of all normal and contingency mission and flight operations. The D and C hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed consists of the following: Acceleration Indicator (G-METER); Head Up Display (HUD); Display Driver Unit (DDU); Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI); Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI); Attitude Director Indicator (ADI); Propellant Quantity Indicator (PQI); Surface Position Indicator (SPI); Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI); Caution and Warning Assembly (CWA); Annunciator Control Assembly (ACA); Event Timer (ET); Mission Timer (MT); Interior Lighting; and Exterior Lighting. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.