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42 records · Page 3

Motivation and Design of the Sirocco Storage System Version 1.0.

Sirocco is a massively parallel, high performance storage system for the exascale era. It emphasizes client-to-client coordination, low server-side coupling, and free data movement to improve resilience and performance. Its architecture is inspired by peer-to-peer and victim- cache architectures. By leveraging these ideas, Sirocco natively supports several media types, including RAM, flash, disk, and archival storage, with automatic migration between levels. Sirocco also includes storage interfaces and support that are more advanced than typical block storage. Sirocco enables clients to efficiently use key-value storage or block-based storage with the same interface. It also provides several levels of transactional data updates within a single storage command, including full ACID-compliant updates. This transaction support extends to updating several objects within a single transaction. Further support is provided for con- currency control, enabling greater performance for workloads while providing safe concurrent modification. By pioneering these and other technologies and techniques in the storage system, Sirocco is poised to fulfill a need for a massively scalable, write-optimized storage system for exascale systems. This is version 1.0 of a document reflecting the current and planned state of Sirocco. Further versions of this document will be accessible at http://www.cs.sandia.gov/Scalable_IO/ sirocco .

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Power Grid Simulation Testbed for Transactive Energy Management Systems

To effectively engage demand-side and distributed energy resources (DERs) for dynamically maintaining the electric power balance, the challenges of controlling and coordinating building equipment and DERs on a large scale must be overcome. Although several control techniques have been proposed in the literature, a significant obstacle to applying these techniques in practice is having access to an effective testing platform. Performing tests at scale using real equipment is impractical, so simulation offers the only viable route to developmental testing at scales of practical interest. Existing power-grid testbeds are unable to model individual residential end-use devices for developing detailed control formulations for responsive loads and DERs. Furthermore, they cannot simulate the control and communications at subminute timescales. To address these issues, this paper presents a novel power-grid simulation testbed for transactive energy management systems. Detailed models of primary home appliances (e.g., heating and cooling systems, water heaters, photovoltaic panels, energy storage systems) are provided to simulate realistic load behaviors in response to environmental parameters and control commands. The proposed testbed incorporates software as it will be deployed, and enables deployable software to interact with various building equipment models for end-to-end performance evaluation at scale.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Platoon management with cooperative adaptive cruise control enabled by VANET

Previous studies have shown the ability of vehicle platooning to improve highway safety and throughput. With Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) and Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) system, vehicle platooning with small headway becomes feasible. In this paper, we developed a platoon management protocol for CACC vehicles based on wireless communication through VANET. This protocol includes three basic platooning maneuvers and a set of micro-commands to accomplish these maneuvers. Various platooning operations such as vehicle entry and vehicle (including platoon leader) leaving can be captured by these basic platoon maneuvers. The protocol operation is described in detail using various Finite State Machines (FSM), and can be applied in collaborative driving and intelligent highway systems. This protocol is determined in an integrated simulation platform, VENTOS, which is developed based on SUMO and OMNET++. The validity and effectiveness of our approach is shown by means of simulations, and different platooning setting are calibrated.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Development of Methodologies for Technology Deployment for Advanced Outage Control Centers that Improve Outage Coordination, Problem Resolution and Outage Risk Management

This research effort is a part of the Light-Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, which is a research and development (R&D) program sponsored by Department of Energy (DOE) and performed in close collaboration with industry R&D programs that provides the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe, and economical operation of current nuclear power plants. The LWRS program serves to help the U.S. nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. The long term viability of existing nuclear power plants in the U.S. will depend upon maintaining high capacity factors, avoiding nuclear safety issues and reducing operating costs. The slow progress in the construction on new nuclear power plants has placed in increased importance on maintaining the output of the current fleet of nuclear power plants. Recently expanded natural gas production has placed increased economic pressure on nuclear power plants due to lower cost competition. Until recently, power uprate projects had steadily increased the total output of the U.S. nuclear fleet. Errors made during power plant upgrade projects have now removed three nuclear power plants from the U.S. fleet and economic considerations have caused the permanent shutdown of a fourth plant. Additionally, several utilities have cancelled power uprate projects citing economic concerns. For the past several years net electrical generation from U.S. nuclear power plants has been declining. One of few remaining areas where significant improvements in plant capacity factors can be made is in minimizing the duration of refueling outages. Managing nuclear power plant outages is a complex and difficult task. Due to the large number of complex tasks and the uncertainty that accompanies them, outage durations routinely exceed the planned duration. The ability to complete an outage on or near schedule depends upon the performance of the outage management organization. During an outage, the outage control center (OCC) is the temporary command center for outage managers and provides several critical functions for the successful execution of the outage schedule. Essentially, the OCC functions to facilitate information inflow, assist outage management in processing information and to facilitate the dissemination of information to stakeholders. Currently, outage management activities primarily rely on telephone communication, face to face reports of status and periodic briefings in the OCC. Much of the information displayed in OCCs is static and out of date requiring an evaluation to determine if it is still valid. Several advanced communication and collaboration technologies have shown promise for facilitating the information flow into, across and out of the OCC. Additionally, advances in the areas of mobile worker technologies, computer based procedures and electronic work packages can be leveraged to improve the availability of real time status to outage managers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Precise Motion Control of Hybrid Hydraulic Electric Architecture (HHEA)

Off-highway heavy-duty vehicles have been long-standing users of hydraulic systems for power transmission and control. However, traditional hydraulic systems suffer from significant energy losses which lead to increased operating costs and a larger carbon footprint due to higher CO2 emissions. Improving the efficiency of these mobile machines is crucial not only for reducing their environmental impact but also for saving billions of dollars in operating costs. Currently, the state-of-the-art Load Sensing Architecture uses throttling valves for control, which significantly reduces its efficiency and does not recuperate energy from over-running loads. Researchers have developed several architectures such as Common Pressure Rail systems, Displacement Control, STEAM, and Electrohydraulic Architecture to improve the efficiency of off-road mobile machines. However, each of these architectures has its drawbacks. To increase system efficiency and take advantage of electrification benefits, our research group has developed a novel Hybrid Hydraulic-Electric Architecture (HHEA). The HHEA can significantly improve efficiency, decrease the size of electrical components, and maintain control performance. This new architecture has the potential to revolutionize the off-highway mobile machine industry and lead to a more sustainable future. The HHEA uses a set of common pressure rails to provide the majority of power to the actuators via power-dense hydraulics and uses electric motors for precise control and power modulation. In the context of off-road mobile machines, energy savings are undoubtedly important but it is equally important to consider the machines’ ability to perform tasks with precision and accuracy according to given commands. Therefore, precise motion control is of utmost importance to maintain the utility of Hybrid Hydraulic-Electric Architecture (HHEA). The HHEA presents a unique challenge to motion control due to the discrete pressure changes that occur when the system switches between selected pressure rails. These changes are made to minimize system inefficiencies or to keep the system within the torque capability of the electric motor. Hence, it is important to solve the motion control challenges for HHEA. This thesis aims at developing an effective motion control strategy for HHEA. The dissertation presents a two-tiered control strategy for HHEA, comprising a high-level and a low-level controller. The primary responsibility of the high- level controller is to optimize energy efficiency by making informed pressure rail selections. On the other hand, the low-level controller is focused on achieving precise motion control of the HHEA, which is crucial for realizing the desired reference trajectories. To achieve this, the low-level controller utilizes a passivity-based backstepping integral controller as the nominal control, which handles the motion control between two pressure rail switches. Additionally, a separate least norm controller is utilized as a transition controller to manage motion control during pressure rail transitions. The effectiveness of the combined control strategy is demonstrated through experiments conducted on two hardware-in-the-loop testbeds. Furthermore, the HHEA is installed on the boom and stick actuators of a backhoe arm to build a Human-in-the-Loop system that a human operator can control. A real-time rail switching algorithm is developed to determine pressure rail switching based on present duty cycle information from the operator. Modifications have been made to the human-machine interface to achieve more intuitive control. Modifications include performing control in the task-oriented coordinates, incorporating pressure feedback to enhance control with physical interaction, and using velocity field control to simplify multi-degree-of-freedom tasks and to enable novice operators to perform them with reduced risk, improved efficiency, and productivity. The research in this dissertation makes significant contributions to the field of off-road mobile machine control, providing a novel and effective control strategy for the HHEA, and demonstrating the potential for simplified machine operation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗