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IER 498: Godiva-IV CAAS benchmark [Slides]

This presentation discusses the benchmark of the IER 498: Godiva-IV criticality accident alarm system (CAAS). It details the goal of the project which is to create a CAAS benchmark capability for Godiva-IV in order to create a shielding benchmark for NCSP software and data, to add geometrically diverse benchmark/benchmarks to the ICSBEP Handbook, to enable more precise measurements at NCERC, and to help assure CAAS performance is as-stated. It also states that work was completed on CED-1 in 2019 and that future work includes the completion of CED-2 in 2020.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The Need for a Maximum Intensity Accident in ANS 8-Series Standards

The Y-12 National Security Complex has installed one Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) under the ANS 8.3 framework as a safety significant system, and is in the process of designing, installing, and qualifying another. As a safety significant system, the Y-12 CAAS is required to demonstrate that it is able to perform its function and actuate an alarm when exposed to the radiation from both a Minimum Accident of Concern and a maximum intensity accident. The ANS 8-series standards do not present a maximum accident to be considered, nor do they specify radiation tolerance requirements for the CAAS equipment, leading CAAS vendors to potentially use other standards that provide inadequate criteria. In this paper, the historical basis and need for a maximum intensity accident in the ANS standards is discussed, the fission rate of a maximum intensity accident is proposed, and the effects of this accident on CAAS analysis and the vendor’s equipment qualification are discussed.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Application of the ANSI/ANS-8.3-2022 Minimum Accident to Tube Vault Storage

In support of planned site activities, the existing basis for criticality safety in nuclear facilities is being revisited. One such technical basis is the demonstration of Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) coverage in tube vaults at Y-12 National Security Complex. The configuration of the vaults places significant shielding between the source and the detector stations and is dissimilar to drum storage or other processes. This paper describes tube vault storage at Y-12, describes the basis for the application of the 2022 minimum accident for system design (MASD) to the analysis, and presents how the accident is implemented in the analysis.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Sulfur Pellets Responses to a Bare and Steel Reflected Pulse of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Health Physics Research Reactor

The experiments analyzed in this report were conducted at the Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR), also known as the $\textit{Fast Burst Reactor}$. The reactor was designed and built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 1961. The HPRR was an unmoderated, unshielded fast reactor that used highly enriched uranium and molybdenum alloy as fuel. The reactor was initially sent to the Nevada Test Site in 1962, where it was used to evaluate radiation doses received as a result of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings during World War II. A few years later, the reactor was sent back to ORNL to be part of the Dosimetry Application Research (DOSAR) facility shown in Figure 1, which included a reactor building shown on the left (west) of the picture and a control and laboratory building in the upper right corner (northeast). The critical assembly was used for numerous technical studies, including systems calibration, dosimetry, radiobiology of plants and animals, testing of radiation alarms, as well as teaching and training in radiation dosimetry and nuclear engineering. Between 1963 and 1987, the HPRR was operated for thousands of hours, achieving criticality close to 10,000 times and motivating many publications. The HPRR was decommissioned in 1987. The goal of this effort was to use historical data from operation of the HPRR to create a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) benchmark to be included in the $\textit{International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments}$ (ICSBEP Handbook). A thorough inspection was performed of all available documentation and information available. The most promising experiments that were selected for evaluation were those described in the 1987 ORNL report entitled $\textit{Health Physics Research Reactor Reference Dosimetry}$, ORNL-6240. The report includes reference dosimetry results of the shielded and unshielded configurations of the HPRR after burst operations. Because of changes to the reactor positioning and storage systems that were made in 1985, the previous dosimetry reports became obsolete, and the newly designed experiments were needed to create the HPRR’s adjusted dosimetry data. The various results reported in ORNL-6240 include reference doses and dose equivalents from different conventions at different distances and elevations as determined using the detected neutron fluence and conversion factors. The HPRR neutron fluence was obtained through different methods, including sulfur pellet analysis and threshold detector unit data. Information about the HPRR spectrum was also obtained through Bonner sphere measurements. This benchmark is focused on a part of the measured sulfur fluences reported in Appendix H of ORNL-6240. Standard commercial sulfur pellets were placed at different distances from the HPRR centerline during burst operation and were activated due to the 32 S(n,p) 32 P reaction. The resulting 32 P activity was then measured and the information about the corresponding sulfur fluence and/or neutron dose could be extracted. Many of those measurements have 7 been performed with the HPRR in its bare configuration or with different shields (combinations of Lucite, concrete, steel). All the necessary, precise information about material and/or dimensions of the different shields was not found, so it was decided to focus only on the unshielded and steel-shielded configurations to minimize the benchmark uncertainty. A total of 31 cases (24 unshielded and 7 shielded cases at different positions) of sulfur fluence were selected before evaluation to develop the benchmark.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Evaluation of Oak Ridge National Laboratory Health Physics Research Reactor Operation Data for Critical Benchmark Creation [Abstract]

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR) was a research reactor designed and built at ORNL in 1961. The critical assembly was using a highly enriched uranium and molybdenum alloy as the fuel, and it could be operated in steady-state or burst modes. The reactor was used for about 25 years to produce a lot of publications related to dosimetry, radiobiology and radiation detectors testing before its decommissioning in 1987. In recent years, the idea of using legacy operation data from the to create a valuable critical accident alarm system shielding benchmark arose. Such a benchmark has been submitted to the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiment Project (ICSBEP) Technical Review Group for a potential inclusion in the 2022 version of the handbook. Another way to use the valuable data from the operation of the HPRR is to evaluate the feasibility of the creation of a subcritical or prompt supercritical benchmark for inclusion in the ICSBEP or the International Reactor Physics Experiments Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) handbooks. To initiate a burst, the HPRR had to be operated in a slightly subcritical state for a few minutes. Then, the insertion of the burst control rod would greatly increase the reactivity of the system and start the burst. No critical configuration of the HPRR critical assembly could be located. The only information available concerns stable subcritical and prompt supercritical states, found in a burst experiments’ logbook. In the recovered logbook pages, information about 8 different bursts is available. The information includes the rods positions before and during a burst, the recorded subcritical reactor period and reactivity, and the burst fission yield derived from the temperature elevation sulfur pellet irradiation analysis. By using the HPRR logbook information and the as-built drawings of the critical assembly, a highly detailed model of the HPRR was created with SCALE 6.2.4/KENO-VI. Eight KENO-VI models were created to replicate the sub-critical assembly configurations described in the eight bursts from the recovered logbook pages. KENO-VI calculates k eff and it can be linked to a reactivity value in cents by using the delayed neutron fraction B eff , also calculated by KENO-VI. KENO-VI can also be used to model the prompt super-critical configurations of the HPRR and to assess the similarity with the burst measurements by comparing the calculated k eff and the measured fission yields between each burst. Unfortunately, high uncertainty exist and the obtained discrepancies between experiments and calculation results are high, compromising the creation of a valuable critical benchmark from HPRR operation data. The reasons of the discrepancies and potential ways to solve them are explored.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Experimental Steps toward a Density Law for Chlorine-Crediting Criticality Models of Aqueous Plutonium solutions

Criticality accident prevention is an essential safety consideration for all operations involving fissionable and fissile materials. Predictive criticality calculations using advanced neutron transport codes, such as Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport (MCNP), are invaluable tools for designing and implementing operational limits. While indispensable, these tools are limited by the quality and accuracy of the inputs that the user provides to define the modeled system. Parameters such as atomic composition, shape, and material density must be accurately defined to obtain a meaningful result. In the case of material property details for a plutonium model, accurate material characterization data is sometimes sparse. Thus limitations in calculation accuracy can be reduced by improving our knowledge of material properties in the targeted fissile systems. One of the biggest remaining challenges to accurately defining fissile systems is the description of aqueous fissile solutions. Even simple properties, such as density, are not well-known for fissile solutions relevant to nuclear energy and security. Described here are initial efforts undertaken to improve criticality calculation inputs for fissile plutonium chloride solutions in water. This effort is focused on experimentally determining accurate solution characteristics for ternary plutonium chloride/hydrochloric acid/water systems, by measurement of water activity and solution density. The effect of inputting experimental densities for these solutions into MCNP criticality calculations is compared to the traditional approach of modeling an idealized (and fictitious) plutonium-water mixture. Expansion of these efforts to a working density law for aqueous plutonium chloride solutions is also discussed.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Logistics for the 2026 International Nuclear Accident Dosimetry Intercomparison Exercise

The purpose of this exercise is to test participants’ nuclear accident dosimeters (NADs) and personnel to the requirements established by American National Standards Institute (ANSI), Health Physics Society (HPS) standard ANSI/HPS-N13.3-2013 (R2025) Dosimetry for Criticality Accidents. IER-634 is the second nuclear accident dosimetry exercise taking place at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) in Bethesda, MD, a Department of Defense (DOD) facility. This effort continues use of the high-dose neutron exposure test bed maintained by the DOD and represents the continued collaboration between the DOD and Department of Energy (DOE). Previous work at AFRRI included a reactor characterization (IER 484) in 2023 and a nuclear accident intercomparison exercise (IER-602) in 2024.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2: Accident Model Document (AMD)

The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.

Source record↗

A Semi-Empirical Density Law for Ternary, Homogeneous PuCl 3 /HCl/H 2 O Solutions

Nuclear material operations pose unique hazards that are not encountered in other chemical, energy, or manufacturing industries. One of these hazards is the potential for a nuclear criticality accident when handling fissile isotopes such as 235 U and 239 Pu. These hazards are particularly high when fissile material is dissolved in solution as the neutron behaviors of the system can change rapidly with the physical and chemical changes accessible in solution. Current estimates of solution density used for criticality safety are outdated and hinder fissile material handling. Developing new estimates for these safety calculations requires experimental characterization and the derivation of empirical density models. We have derived a density law describing PuCl 3 /HCl/H 2 O solutions from experimental data characterizing solution density. Density data was treated using a Pitzer-derived eight-parameter equation, defining density as a function of analyte concentrations, temperature, and interactions between these variables. The model is predictive across the concentration and temperature ranges from which it was derived. The potential effects of varying oxidation states of plutonium, which are easily accessible in aqueous media, on the bulk solution density of the ternary system were also investigated. The resulting Pitzer-derived density law was applied to a nuclear criticality safety model, and the impact of the experimental characterization of solution density relative to previous estimates was demonstrated to be significant and suggest that the current approach to estimating density in nuclear criticality safety calculations may lead to overly conservative controls.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Potential Improvements to the Nuclear Safety and Launch Approval Process for Nuclear Reactors Utilized for Space Power and Propulsion Applications

This study examines potential improvements that could be made to the nuclear safety and launch approval process for fission reactors to reduce the associated uncertainties in cost and schedule while continuing to ensure public safety and environmental protection. It concentrates on the launch approval and mission safety of fission power and propulsion applications of nuclear energy. Improvements to the launch approval process for radioisotope power systems (RPSs) are being considered elsewhere but are acknowledged throughout the report. The study considered technical, process, and organizational improvements to the launch approval processes. The study exclusively evaluated reactors that would not be started up prior to achieving a “sufficiently high orbit,” per United Nations (UN) Resolution 47/68.Potential criticality accidents were considered that could occur during a launch failure or abort or during reentry. Numerous scenarios were examined that might involve one or more Earth flybys as well as potential transportation missions that could intentionally return an active, or previously active fission reactor to Earth orbit. The Study Group was guided in its deliberations according to a number of fundamental principles. These included the paramount importance of adequate and appropriate levels of public safety and environmental protection as well as the importance of the inclusion of independent scientific, engineering, and safety reviews of the applications and proposals as a critical part of the process. Also considered was the need for the development of launch approval processes that might be different, depending upon the source of the application for launch approval, whether it be derived as a governmental launch, a commercial launch, or a hybrid/combination of the two. It is clear that all launches of nuclear reactors into space should have similar safety requirements; however, the safety review effort and the details of the analysis that are required should be commensurate with the potential hazards and the actual risk, which may differ based on the reactor design and its intended purpose. Finally, the study aimed at ensuring that whatever processes and procedures are developed should maximize the sufficiency, simplicity, and transparency of the processes. The Study Group reached five Conclusions and makes thirteen Recommendations. The Conclusions and Recommendations presented here are extensions of those presented previously in other studies. This report attempts to add specificity to the actions that need to be taken in order to move forward with successful space fission reactor programs. Without action to address the perceived and real problems in the launch approval process, designers and mission managers will be reluctant to commit the resources necessary to make space fission reactors a reality.

Camp, Allen↗

CAAS-3S Radiation Testing for Y-12 and UPF with Godiva-IV

The Y-12 National Security Complex and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) selected the Mirion CAAS-3S as the Criticality Accident Alarm System for UPF and for Y-12 facilities replacing their legacy CAAS as part of efforts to extend the facility lifespans. As part of this process, the CAAS-3S system was exposed to a high radiation dose and dose rate during reactor testing with the Godiva-IV fast burst reactor. The reactor testing was designed around preliminary analyses that determined Y-12 and UPF requirements, and simulations of the radiation field within the reactor facility were used to determine reactor operating parameters, CAAS equipment locations, and the design of a neutron shield wall. This paper presents the design and results of the testing, and discusses how the test results were interpreted by criticality safety engineers at Y-12 and UPF.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear Criticality Experiments Research Center Futures: A Report of a Workshop held September 6-9, 2022, Los Alamos, NM, November, 2022

Experiments and training with critical assemblies and fissionable material (at or near the critical state) that explore reactivity phenomena are central to a number of national security challenges. From fission energy to nuclear weapons to a broad suite of scientific challenges, it is clear that additional capacity and capability are needed. The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) marked 10 years of operations in 2021. This anniversary was an opportune time to celebrate our successes and progress, and to evaluate the remaining and emergent challenges. Against this backdrop, a workshop of approximately 140 national and international leaders in nuclear research was convened in Los Alamos, New Mexico to explore “NCERC Futures.” Therefore, the present workshop focused specifically on needed capabilities and tools to meet the research challenges in eight topical mission areas served by NCERC. As each Topical Group summarized their discussions in the out brief, it was recognized that key challenges could be met through enabling infrastructure investments and new critical assemblies. Enabling infrastructure includes staffing, additional space/buildings, developing an agile bounding safety basis, the ability to keep pace with technological advances in detectors and data acquisition systems (allowing use of those with Bluetooth™ and similar technologies), an expanded set of materials options (especially plutonium), a “Plug and Play” design and implementation mindset, and a facility that enabled free-field measurements. The new critical assemblies that were identified as having the most impact were a bare plutonium (Pu) Critical Assembly, a Horizontal Split Table (HST), a Super Comet, and a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly. NECRC is a unique, one-of-a-kind facility in the United States. If all the improvements were to be made, NCERC would enable the United States and its partners to address many important research questions related to criticality. These include but are not limited to: (1) Covering the entire neutron energy spectrum for both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and Pu in configurations for virtually all conceivable applications; (2) Performing multi-physics solution experiments and irradiations with a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly, which more closely resembles actual criticality accidents; (3) Conducting free-field experiments to make basic fission physics measurements and much cleaner benchmarks with various experimental observables; and (4) Providing more training classes and more experiments annually at greater cost efficiency enabled by additional buildings and machines and an agile, bounding, risk-balanced Safety Basis. In the end, workshop attendees enthusiastically concluded that NCERC Futures are bright and the workshop helped to identify a roadmap of capability gaps that need to be addressed. This report documents the results of those efforts.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Introduction, Investigation, and Experimental Validation of a Novel Passive Neutron Spectrometer

Unfolding neutron energy spectra are instrumental for determining personal health effects and calculating dose received. This area of study is heavily researched, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is investigating a passive neutron spectrometer for the purpose of acquiring the information needed to determine personnel dose in the event of a criticality accident. A part of this investigation is presented in this article through the examination of four experimental detector responses (DRs). These four DRs were acquired in the presence of 252 Cf, AmBe, GODIVA, and National Ignition Facility (NIF) neutron sources. An algorithm developed at LLNL was used to unfold the neutron fluence from each of the four DRs, and subsequently, fluence-to-dose conversion factors provided by the American National Standards Institute were used to calculate dose. Additionally, a multistep unfolding process was developed and employed to calculate the effects of both direct (from the source) and indirect (from room return) neutrons. The average error when unfolding the direct DR was less than 8%. The dose from 252 Cf was predicted with only 8% error. The multistep approach allowed for the identification of the low-energy neutrons in the 252 Cf, AmBe, and NIF DRs.

Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP)↗

Liquid helium fluid dynamics studies. Final Technical Report

Future high energy physics accelerators depend on a number of advanced technologies to open the many doors of scientific discovery. Among these advanced technologies, superconducting magnets and superconducting radio frequency (SRF) cavities are the backbone of the accelerator and detector systems. But all these low temperature systems depend critically on successful and reliable operation of their supporting technologies, among which the liquid helium cooling system is of the utmost importance. To improve the quality of these systems both in terms of efficiency and reliability, a robust helium cryogenics research and development (R&D) effort is required. The proposed research to be conducted by the FSU cryogenics group aims to produce fundamental knowledge that meets this R&D need. The projects that we have completed over the past grant period at Florida State University consist of experimental research on liquid helium fluid dynamics and heat transfer problems relevant to the development of future superconducting particle physics accelerators. Liquid helium is the coolant used in all such facilities and in many of these facilities He II (the low temperature phase of liquid helium also known as superfluid helium) is preferred due to its outstanding heat transfer characteristics. The work consists of two main experimental studies that probe both fundamental as well as practical aspects of liquid helium cooling. The first is a broad and fundamental study of the heat and mass transfer processes that can occur during a sudden catastrophic loss of vacuum (SCLV) incident in a superconducting accelerator. SCLV refers to the remote but extremely critical accident scenario where atmospheric pressure air is allowed to flood into the insulating vacuum system and impinge on the liquid helium cooled surfaces in the accelerator. Safe performance and recovery from such accidents is essential to the reliable operation of superconducting accelerators. The dynamics of this process is quite complex and so our approach is to conduct a series of well-orchestrated experiments that probe the various physical phenomena that can occur during an SCLV event. The experiments are coupled with analytic and numerical analysis in an effort to develop a general understanding of the process and to assist with future accelerator design and development. The second activity is directed toward fundamental understanding of heat and mass transfer in He II, which is essential to the design of superconducting magnets and radio frequency cavities in accelerators. The work consists of flow visualization of the dynamics of He II using laser assisted techniques. Two complementary techniques are used to study the fundamentals of the turbulent state. The first technique uses neutrally buoyant solid hydrogen particles to probe the flow fields of the superfluid and normal fluid components. The other technique uses laser excited He2* molecules as tracers of the normal fluid motion within the He II. The activities also included an effort to use visualization techniques to locate transient hot spots in radio frequency superconducting cavities. Such work provides valuable information about the heat transfer process in He II and its impact on the performance of superconducting devices. The research effort at Florida State University is not directly in support of a specific high energy physics experiment or facility. Rather, the work is general and coordinated with HEP accelerator laboratories to provide valuable insight that can assist with future accelerator development.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

A Review of Nuclear Reactor Transients

This paper explores the nuclear yield that is produced during nuclear transients in small reactors. Nuclear reactor transients can have a wide range of effects such as the reproducible power excursions as found in Godiva-IV to full reactor destruction as planned for in the Kiwi-TNT test. Criticality accidents are also included in this study as in essence a small nuclear reactor has been inadvertently created. The motivation for this paper is to educate the audience as to the likely fission energy release for a typical transient in a small nuclear reactor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Human Factors and Reliability [Slides]

People come to work, wanting, expecting, and planning to do a good job, but people tend to do what makes sense to them in their context. Understanding basic human factors and establishing controls to prevent common human factors issues helps ensure that a criticality accident will never happen again.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗