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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Need for research and training reactors for advanced reactor designs

Full text of publication follows. Research and training reactors have served a valuable role in helping train workforce for currently operating fleet of light water reactors. These research and training reactors have been used in reactor laboratory classes to familiarize the students with such vital concepts as approach to criticality, reactor period, neutron moderation, reactivity, flux distribution and leakage, etc. As the industry moves toward advanced non-light-water reactor designs, it is critical that research and training reactors be developed and deployed at university campuses to help train the new generation of nuclear and non-nuclear engineers who are likely to design, build, and operate these advanced reactors. Among the designs currently being pursued for nuclear power generation include molten salt, sodium cooled, and gas cooled designs, with options for various fuel forms. Thus, industry and DOE in collaboration with academic institutions should devise plans on how to familiarize the next generation of nuclear workforce with hands-on experience necessary for such designs. These research and training reactors will play a vital role in familiarizing the future workforce with hands-on experience with concepts associated with fast spectrum reactors, gas cooled reactors, and other features not associated with light water reactors. In addition to classical nuclear engineering concepts, these advanced research and training reactors can also be used for hands-on training as well as for research on features being considered in the design of GEN-IV reactors: cyber security for digital control room operations, hybrid energy system, hydrogen generation, district heating, autonomous control... (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Encrypted Control Using Modified Learning With Errors-based Schemes

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) require reliable, safe, and secure control of critical infrastructure, combining computational and networking capabilities, which heighten the risk of cyber attacks. These attacks can disrupt the physical process, causing unforeseen consequences. One solution is the use of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to protect the control loop, allowing for secure computations and communications without compromising signal and control system privacy. The challenge with FHE, however, is its requirement for inputs to be integers. This paper introduces a modified Learning With Errors (LWE) FHE approach that encodes control system dynamics and signals into integers. Our proposed scheme leverages a generalized LWE encoding function and modifies the Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) gadget decomposition tool to encrypt the control system. Using the modified LWE scheme, we formalize a fully encrypted control system, supported by simulated results.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Assessment of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Cybersecurity Initiative

Recent cyber-attacks on industrial control systems, and inadvertent exposure of nuclear plant systems to cyber-exploits underscore the need for plant operators to adopt and deploy cyber-security defense solutions made for industrial control systems. Of increasing concern is the fact that international cyber hackers are beginning to target critical infrastructure, and because these more modern controls systems depend on advanced use of digital systems, they are more vulnerable than ever before to cyber-attacks. Traditional cyber defense strategies and products that have been available for decades are tailored for use on IT or corporate networks but can cause interruptions and catastrophic damage when deployed on industrial control system networks. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy established the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program to provide private companies pursuing innovative nuclear energy technologies with access to the technical support necessary to move toward commercialization. One of these GAIN small business vouchers was awarded to Dragos, Inc. to enable collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the Dragos Platform on a production nuclear reactor test bed, hence laying the path for future commercial adoption. The vision was to provide a guide for industrial operators on implementing an industrial monitoring solution and to show how these solutions can be deployed without causing safety and reliability issues. This report documents the results of the collaboration between ORNL and Dragos, Inc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Agent-Based Coordination Scheme for PV Integration (ABC4PV)

Renewables and especially photovoltaics (PV) have benefitted significantly from a host of incentives and policies targeted toward enhanced integration and adoption of specific energy technologies. However, with the push to move forward into a subsidy-free market framework, behind-the-meter residential PV applications have generally struggled to retain their value (unlike utility scale and commercial projects) [1]. This project focused on developing control-theoretic solutions aimed at improving the integration and interaction of behind-the-meter residential PV with other distribution system assets (controllable and non-controllable) to enhance the integrated value of residential PV. To this end, a suite of decentralized control methodologies have been developed to enable effective coordination and control of behind-the-meter residential load customers’ PV, battery storage systems (BSS), controllable loads and other similar assets within a distribution feeder. This interaction aims at procuring energy savings and, thus, energy bill savings. The main source of savings is drawn from reducing the effect of demand charge pricing and is realized at the feeder level, assuming community level interaction and management among the aforementioned assets. Optimal control of the assets is implemented with a distributed optimization methodology, leveraging consensus-based algorithms. The results gathered from the optimal control simulations demonstrates that the savings can be duly achieved and the algorithm decision times (to dynamically control asset set points, for example) are fast. As for the overall efficiency of PV+BSS systems, to procure energy savings from curtailment of the demand charge pricing effects, the optimal control is set up so as to minimize the variance of the load for all customers, throughout a feeder and throughout time in a rolling horizon scheduling with model predictive control. The control takes into account inter-temporal electrochemical storage (battery) degradation costs: specifically, we have developed a long-term lifetime model for the BSS that weighs in the effect of the degradation factor in the dispatch formulations, thus, a considerable operating cost that affects energy decision making. The levelized cost of energy (LCOE – redefined for the purpose of quantifying asset integration effectiveness through the customers’ energy cost) is shown to be below the threshold set for the combined PV+BSS topology of $ 0.14/kWh for multiple cases of PV penetration all the way up to 50%, provided that a policy of shared ownership of and savings is in place. Further, the LCOE calculated for the case before the deployment PV+BSS systems is also achievable, i.e. the deployment of PV+BSS, if planned and scheduled optimally. will have no effect on customers’ energy costs. From the control methodology viewpoint, the developed consensus-based algorithms are shown to converge for a wide range of problem cases (spanning normal operating scenarios and contingencies), guaranteeing dispatch solutions under forecasting errors, communication break-downs and cyber-security attacks. The proposed control solutions are scalable and real-time implementable, with dispatch computations and device set-point updates converging in less than 2s in most practical instances of the above events.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

ARCADE (Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment)

SAND2025-11780O ARCADE (Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment) software performs cybersecurity experiments on Defensive Cyber Security Architectures (DCSA) for Distributed Control Systems (DCSs). The application is integrated into a cohesive environment that performs cyber risk analyses and reduces costs. ARCADE can investigate the entire cyber-attack surface of a DCS from the physics of control, down to the firmware of individual components with automated efficiency. ARCADE has five major functional components: the Data Broker system, the virtualization environment, the cyber-attack simulator, the cyber-physical analysis system, and the physics simulator. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Valme, Romuald↗
DOE OSTI2022

The evolution of the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory in nuclear power research

The events at Three Mile Island in the United States brought about fundamental changes in the ways that simulation would be used in nuclear operations. The need for research simulators was identified to scientifically study human-centered risk and make recommendations for process control system designs. This paper documents the human factors research conducted at the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) since its inception in 2010 at Idaho National Laboratory. The facility’s primary purposes are to provide support to utilities for system upgrades and to validate modernized control room concepts. In the last decade, however, as nuclear industry needs have evolved, so too have the purposes of the HSSL. Thus, beyond control room modernization, human factors researchers have evaluated the security of nuclear infrastructure from cyber adversaries and evaluated human-in-the-loop simulations for joint operations with an integrated hydrogen generation plant. Lastly, our review presents research using human reliability analysis techniques with data collected from HSSL-based studies and concludes with potential future directions for the HSSL, including severe accident management and advanced control room technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2024

End-to-End Encryption for Cyber-Physical Systems Using Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Cyber-physical systems require reliable, safe, and secure control of critical infrastructure, combining computational and networking capabilities, which heighten the risk of cyber attacks. These attacks can disrupt the physical process, causing unforeseen consequences. One solution is the use of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to protect the control loop, allowing for secure computations and communications without compromising signal and control system privacy. The challenge with FHE, however, is its requirement for inputs to be integers. This presentation introduces a modified Learning With Errors (LWE) FHE approach that encodes control system dynamics and signals into integers. Our proposed scheme leverages a generalized LWE encoding function and modifies the Gentry-Sahai-Waters gadget decomposition tool to encrypt the control system. Using the modified LWE scheme, we formalize a fully encrypted control system, supported by simulated results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems

Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enable the smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among system components as well as with outside entities, such as the cloud, to enable low-cost remote management, optimized automation via outsourced cloud analytics, and increased building-grid integrations. As smart buildings move towards open communication technologies, providing access to BASs through the building's intranet, or even remotely through the Internet, has become a common practice. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber resilient control strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols (i.e., BACnet, KNX, LonWorks, and Modbus) are reviewed, followed by a discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. Furthermore, the impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber resilient control strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally discussed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber Informed Engineering Cie Analysis Tool

Main Benefits: • Collaborate on assessment via the web and access and share assessments on your mobile device. • Helps you maximize your cybersecurity investment and resources • Saves you significant time and money by eliminating the requirement to research each government and industry standard in order to understand your cybersecurity posture • Contains easy to follow, step by step instructions to guide you through the process of identifying the cybersecurity posture of your organization • Provides a place to begin with cybersecurity improvement and a way to prioritize your tasks and budgets. • Covers all major cyber relevant topic areas for a comprehensive assessment of your organization’s cybersecurity posture. • Dives deep into the details of each topic area. • Contributes to the organization's risk management and decision-making process • Highlights vulnerabilities and gaps in your organization's IT and control systems. • Raises awareness and facilitates discussion on cybersecurity within your organization • Educates the controls system community on cyber security.

Hansen, Barry [Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Id↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Resilient Automatic Generation Control for Systems of AC Microgrids

In this paper we propose a co-design of the secondary frequency regulation in systems of AC microgrids and its cyber security solutions. We term the secondary frequency regulator a Micro-Automatic Generation Control (μ AGC) for highlighting its same functionality as the AGC in bulk power systems. We identify sensory challenges and cyber threats facing the μ AGC. To address the sensory challenges, we introduce a new microgrid model by exploiting the rank-one deficiency property of microgrid dynamics. This model is used to pose an optimal μ AGC control problem that is easily implemented, because it does not require fast frequency measurements. An end-to-end cyber security solution to the False Data Injection (FDI) attack detection and mitigation is developed for the proposed μ AGC. The front-end barrier of applying off-the-shelf algorithms for cyber attack detection is removed by introducing a data-driven modeling approach. Finally, we propose an observer-based corrective control for an islanded microgrid and a collaborative mitigation scheme in systems of AC microgrids. We demonstrate a collaborative role of systems of microgrids during cyber attacks. Furthermore, the performance of the proposed cyber-resilient μ AGC is tested in a system of two networked microgrids.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity Attacks in Vehicular Sensors

Today's modern vehicles contain anywhere from sixty to one-hundred sensors and exhibit the characteristics of Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPS). There is a high degree of coupling, cohesiveness, and interactions among vehicle's CPS components (e.g., sensors, devices, systems, systems-of-systems) across sensing, communication, and control layers. Cyber-attacks in the sensing or communication layers can compromise the security of the control layer. This paper provides a detailed review of potential cyber threats related to the sensing layer. Notably, the focus is mainly towards two categories of sensors: vehicle dynamics sensors (e.g., Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS), magnetic encoders, and inertial sensors) and environment sensors (e.g., Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), ultrasonic, camera, Radio Detection and Ranging (Radar) systems, and Global Positioning System (GPS) units). Furthermore, the paper also offers perspectives through existing countermeasures from literature and stresses the need for data-driven cybersecurity solutions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

SECURED: Simulator-Enhanced Control and Understanding of Reactor systems for cyber-Event Defense

The study discusses a learning approach for analyzing cyber-events in reactor systems using integrated hardware and personal computer simulator models. Key points include the rise in cyber-attacks and their sophistication in industrial control systems (ICS), the necessity for awareness, understanding, resource allocation, and preparation to combat these threats, and the digital transformation of old and new nuclear plants, increasing their exposure to cyber threats. It highlights the cyber vulnerabilities of advanced reactor systems, which rely on digital instrumentation and control for operations and safety functions, making them susceptible to cyber-attacks. The approach involves demonstrating reactor system plant ICS cyber-attacks under various operational conditions utilizing tools like simulator models and hardware-based kits. A strategic solution approach tailored to critical infrastructure is emphasized, along with community engagement for public and government support, adopting effective learning approaches, and the preparation for anticipated future challenges. The presentation concludes with a call to action to address challenges, leverage opportunities, and advance through lesson learning in cybersecurity for nuclear energy systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Unleashing the Frequency: Multi-Megawatt Demonstration of 100% Renewable Power Systems with Decentralized Communication-Less Control Scheme

Power systems, which range in size from small microgrids to island systems to large regional grids, are typically managed by a central controller that requires complex communication methods and can be unreliable and pose cyber security risks in certain applications, especially when controlling a larger number of nodes. We propose an inherently robust, scalable method of integration using multiple energy storage systems and distributed energy resources, which does not require any means of dedicated communication. This method moves beyond the paradigm of controlling grid frequency at a fixed value (e.g., 60 Hz), instead allowing the frequency to fluctuate within certain limits (e.g., 59.6-60.4 Hz). With a greater operating range, the frequency can carry necessary information from energy storage systems to highly variable distributed energy resources like photovoltaics, wind, hydro, etc.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber-Informed Engineering Case Study of an Integrated Hydrogen Generation Plant

Strategies for securing digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems within the nuclear industry are provided by multiple standards and guidance documents. However, since selection and use of security controls outlined in these documents are frequently only considered during or after installation, there are often limitations on their use, such as technological constraints related to design or operation. Furthermore, alternative controls intended to provide the same or similar security countermeasure as the primary control may also be infeasible at these stages, leaving the I&C system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The limitations associated with ‘bolting on’ security controls late in the systems engineering lifecycle can be reduced by integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the process. This paper evaluates the use of CIE during the high-level design stage of a hydrogen generation project where heat and electricity are provided by a nuclear power plant. Applying CIE to this project highlighted potential cyber vulnerabilities of the initial design, leading to recommendations for process flow and I&C system design modifications to reduce, and at times eliminate, the risk from both deliberate and unintentional cyber incidents.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs) Supplier Cohort Workshops Cohort Summary [Slides]

This Summary slide deck summarizes the key outcomes of the Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs) supplier cohort, part of Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program. The program aimed to strengthen grid resilience through cybersecurity controls, supply-chain security, and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) for advanced transmission technologies. The cohort brought together vendors representing the full range of Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs), including providers of Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO), and High-Performance Conductors (HPCs). Discussions focused on institutional, integration, and operational barriers limiting GET adoption; cybersecurity risks at EMS/SCADA, cloud, and network integration points; and supply-chain transparency issues such as semiconductor dependence and SBOM/HBOM expectations. Participants also addressed operator trust, human-in-the-loop requirements, and challenges with utility adoption, while exploring how CIE can support secure deployment of GETs. This deck represents a consolidated summary of challenges and risks identified by vendors, cross-cutting themes and technology-specific insights from three cohort workshops, and actionable mitigations to guide utilities, vendors, and the Department of Energy in advancing secure, trusted deployment of GETs.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2011

Access Control of Web and Java Based Applications

Cyber security has gained national and international attention as a result of near continuous headlines from financial institutions, retail stores, government offices and universities reporting compromised systems and stolen data. Concerns continue to rise as threats of service interruption, and spreading of viruses become ever more prevalent and serious. Controlling access to application layer resources is a critical component in a layered security solution that includes encryption, firewalls, virtual private networks, antivirus, and intrusion detection. In this paper we discuss the development of an application-level access control solution, based on an open-source access manager augmented with custom software components, to provide protection to both Web-based and Java-based client and server applications.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Infrastructure for the Smart Electric Grid

As electric power systems undergo a transformative upgrade with the integration of advanced technologies to enable the smarter electric grid, professionals who work in the area require a new understanding of the evolving complexity of the grid. Cyber Infrastructure for the Smart Electric Grid delivers a comprehensive overview of the fundamental principles of smart grid operation and control, smart grid technologies, including sensors, communication networks, computation, data management, and cyber security, and the interdependencies between the component technologies on which a smart grid's security depends. The book offers readers the opportunity to critically analyze the smart grid infrastructure needed to sense, communicate, compute, and control in a secure way.

communication networks↗