Cyberattack Defense With Cyber-Physical Alert and Control Logic in Industrial Controllers
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Key components of power systems—such as energy management systems, automatic generation control, and state estimation—are under serious vulnerability from cyber attacks. Cyber threats in electric grids have increased significantly because of the increased interconnectivity of supervisory control and data acquisition systems and public network infrastructure. As the penetration level of distributed energy resources increases, it is imperative to employ system-monitoring techniques such as state estimation for the reliable operation of distribution systems. Recently, multiple methods have been developed that exploit the low rank property of distribution system state matrix and are robust to bad data, such as matrix completion. This paper analyzes the impact of various realistic cyber attack scenarios on matrix completion. Realistic cyber attack scenarios are converted into data corruption models that are used in an extensive simulation of a custom IEEE 123-bus system.
This project will develop the scientific basis for evaluating risk in high consequence cyber-physical systems that make up critical infrastructure
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This project is a DOE follow-up effort on the CREDC workshop held on September 13, 2018 in Cambridge, MA to discuss cybersecurity of distance relays, which considered the benefits, vulnerabilities and risk mitigations for the use of communication systems in power system protection. The objectives of this project are to define the taxonomy of relay protection and associated communications; define use cases describing approaches to reduce the cyber-attack surface on those protective relays; and evaluate the loss of operational functional capability from changes to communication coverage. Mitigating controls will also be evaluated to understand if there are other approaches to reduce attack surfaces while maintaining communications or partial communications. Distance relays are used to protect transmission lines of approximately 10 to 300 miles in length, by detecting short circuits (i.e., faults) on the lines and then tripping circuit breakers in the substation. Such protection systems are a subset of the power system and they incorporate sensing, logic and communication functions. Protection system exposure to cyberattack could be drastically limited by disconnecting relays from all vulnerable communication systems, but this may adversely impact overall power system performance in the absence of cyberattack. This project began with a use case analysis of protection systems with communications, as summarized in this report. It continued with modeling, testing and evaluation in a miniature power system (MPS), located in the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Electric Power Training Center (EPTC). The project also incorporated feedback from two industry meetings held in February and September 2019. The suggested next steps account for and complement the work already underway with DOE/CESER funding: 1. Study the performance of LCD and PC vs. PUTT, which is less reliant on communication system performance and GPS timing references. The PUTT scheme could prove to be more resilient to cyberattack or communications-related disruption. It could also be more tolerant of message re-routing with SDN/SDR communication systems. On the other hand, it will be more vulnerable to false tripping during dynamic events or to loss of the voltage signal. The optimum choice of scheme may depend on the specific power system and risk assessment. This study could provide a new template for evaluation based on business functions. 2. Research and develop new methods to detect and monitor distributed physical attacks, possibly using drones, video sensors, thermal sensors, machine learning and other advanced techniques. This will help mitigate the impact of cyberattack on the protection system, and will also help mitigate the impact of wild fires. 3. Implement a scalable PKI for use in electric utility protection systems. This will encourage widespread adoption of secure authentication methods that are already available, but not widely used at present. This will help secure engineering access to the relays. 4. Investigate the use of SDN in combination with SDR to achieve better cybersecurity and electromagnetic security of the network, incorporating path variability. This would help secure both engineering access and peer-to-peer GOOSE messaging. 5. Perform additional testing, with operator evaluation of “red button” scenarios, PUTT vs. LCD, relay mis-operations, and other cyberattacks in the EPTC. This is an important advantage of testing in the EPTC rather than by computer simulation or even hardware-in-the-loop simulation; the EPTC is already dedicated to managing the situational awareness, operator response times and other human impacts. One of the project objectives was to settle on a common nomenclature for this problem space. We have concluded that the OSI layer model, supplemented by ANSI device numbers and other IEEE standards, is already well-accepted by the industry. The IEEE PSRC knowledge base provides a great deal of public information
If the United States (U.S.) government allows cyberattacks to continue on their current trajectory of increased frequency and effect, the bonds holding our society together will be jeopardized, potentially impacting the survival of our society as we know it. Actions must be taken not only to defend against, but also to deter future cyberattacks. To achieve a credible and actionable U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy, the following three lines of effort are recommended for implementation by the White House: 1. Add a sixth priority to the Obama Administration's current cyberspace priorities to state: "Advance our cyber response policies and capabilities to further protect the country's national interests by deterring attacks within cyberspace." 2. Adopt the proposed Cyber Deterrence Analytic Framework as a guide for policy makers to use when determining the appropriate response to a cyberattack. 3. Implement the proposed Presidential Policy Directive outlining the United States' deterrence policy for cyber. These recommendations for establishing a U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy address the following key findings: As the U.S. private sector owns and operates over 90% of all of the networks and infrastructure of cyberspace, an effective policy must be communicated clearly across the government, business enterprise, and most importantly, to the people; More so than any time in our nation's history, individuals, companies, and organizations depend on cyberspace for uses ranging from social interactions to sustaining democracy; Threats existing within the cyber domain have grown both in attack vector complexity and societal impact; and, The current Presidential Executive Orders and Policy Directives related to cyber deterrence do not include a strategy for deterring attacks. The concepts presented in this paper were derived from interviews with experts in subjects ranging from deterrence philosophy, nuclear weapons implementation, U.S. cyber operations, and U.S. cyber policy. In addition, theories on deterrence strategies are explored, ranging from the 1960s to present to develop a deterrence strategy unique to cyber. Lastly, recent examples of cyberattacks are examined to provide evidence for the need to establish consequences for those individuals or countries that continue to behave nefariously within cyberspace. To form a strong foundation for a U.S. Cyber Deterrence Strategy, the U.S. must establish and clearly articulate the consequences for nations or individuals if they choose to initiate a cyberattack on the U.S. or its national interests.
Electric grid cybersecurity risk has become a significant concern of industries and governments. This paper proposes a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment method for electric grid cybersecurity risk analysis. The proposed method helps reduce the reliance on expert judgment, capture a broad range of components and system dynamics, and model the interactions between various contributing entities (e.g., attacker, operator). In addition, the scenarios with multiple events, such as the occurrence of both cyberattacks and failures of physical components, the occurrence of both cyberattacks and operators’ (in)correct reactions, are considered and analyzed. Further, for each cyberattack scenario, Monte Carlo simulations are used to obtain possible sequences of the system's evolution under study and then derive risk estimates. As an application of the proposed method, the risk assessment method serves as the basis of risk-informed defense resource allocation to improve electric grid cybersecurity. The proposed method is verified using the IEEE 14-bus system by evaluating different security resource allocations for selected cyberattack scenarios.
The electricity grid has evolved from a physical system to a cyberphysical system with digital devices that perform measurement, control, communication, computation, and actuation. The increased penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) including renewable generation, flexible loads, and storage provides extraordinary opportunities for improvements in efficiency and sustainability. However, they can introduce new vulnerabilities in the form of cyberattacks, which can cause significant challenges in ensuring grid resilience. We propose a framework in this paper for achieving grid resilience through suitably coordinated assets including a network of Internet of Things devices. A local electricity market is proposed to identify trustable assets and carry out this coordination. Situational Awareness (SA) of locally available DERs with the ability to inject power or reduce consumption is enabled by the market, together with a monitoring procedure for their trustability and commitment. With this SA, we show that a variety of cyberattacks can be mitigated using local trustable resources without stressing the bulk grid. Multiple demonstrations are carried out using a high-fidelity cosimulation platform, real-time hardware-in-the-loop validation, and a utility-friendly simulator.
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Combating cyberattacks is an emerging challenge in maintaining the reliable and economic operation of electric power systems. Possible cyberattacks include intrusions to the parameter data at a control center. In this class of attacks, algorithms at the control center are correctly executed, but the attacker's modification of the associated parameter data yields improper results. This paper proposes an algorithm for detecting and characterizing cyberattacks to network parameter data, with specific application to optimal power flow problems. The proposed algorithm evaluates whether historical operating point data are consistent with the network parameters. Inconsistencies indicating potential cyberattacks are characterized using historical operational data (power injections and voltage phasors) along with network parameter data. Simulated test cases illustrate the proposed algorithm's detection and characterization capabilities.
This report includes two main accomplishments of the peer-to-peer communication control for resilient operation of networked microgrids project in FY24, which include a scheme for cyberattack-aware coordination of networked microgrids for supporting voltages of bulk power systems and a scheme for price signal-based operations of EV-rich networked microgrids with mixed ownership. First, the cyberattack-aware scheme enables networked microgrids to distributedly determine the amount of reactive power injection to support the voltage of bulk power system (BPS) in a fair manner. In this scheme, a risk-informed algorithm is presented to generate the peer-to- peer (P2P) communication graph with minimal risk of attack on communication links. To deal with cyberattacks on MG controllers, the resilient consensus algorithm (CA) is utilized for MG controllers to robustly estimate the total reactive power headroom, from which the MGs can accurately provide the needed amount of reactive power injection for supporting the voltage of BPS. The CA implementation and performance within the P2P communication framework are demonstrated on the IEEE 39-bus system with 6 microgrids contained in the distribution feeder under different cyberattack scenarios. Second, the price-based scheme enables the usage of the real-time price signal for the operations of electric vehicle (EV)-rich networked-microgrids with mixed ownership, in which not all the microgrids can communicate with the distribution system operator (DSO). In this scheme, a max consensus is introduced to enable the real-time price signal to be propagated from the DSO to all the microgrids, from which each microgrid controller will manage the DERs to balance the load demand and the power injection from the EV charging stations within its microgrid. Numerical results over one day with 288 slots of 5-minute intervals on the modified 123-node test feeder including 3 microgrids with high penetration of EV are presented to evaluate how the price signal affects the operations of networked microgrids under different charging strategies of the EV charging stations. The result indicates that our proposed EVCS (dis)charging strategy, which leverages the flexibility of EVs to support the grid through discharging during peak demand, proves to be a cost-effective solution that reduces operational costs while improving the social welfare of EV charging.
The world is transitioning from the conventional grid to the smart grid at a rapid pace. Innovation always comes with some flaws; such is the case with a smart grid. One of the major challenges in the smart grid is to protect it from potential cyberattacks. There are millions of sensors continuously sending and receiving data packets over the network, so managing such a gigantic network is the biggest challenge. Any cyberattack can damage the key elements, confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the smart grid. The overall smart grid network is comprised of customers accessing the network, communication network of the smart devices and sensors, and the people managing the network (decision makers); all three of these levels are vulnerable to cyberattacks. In this survey, we explore various threats and vulnerabilities that can affect the key elements of cybersecurity in the smart grid network and then present the security measures to avert those threats and vulnerabilities at three different levels. In addition to that, we suggest techniques to minimize the chances of cyberattack at all three levels.