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At least 55 records · Page 3
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NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the body flap subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Body Flap (BF) subsystem hardware are documented. The BF is a large aerosurface located at the trailing edge of the lower aft fuselage of the Orbiter. The proper function of the BF is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. During the ascent phase of flight, the BF trails in a fixed position. For entry, the BF provides elevon load relief, trim control, and acts as a heat shield for the main engines. Specifically, the BF hardware comprises the following components: Power Drive Unit (PDU), rotary actuators, and torque tubes. The IOA analysis process utilized available BF hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 35 failure modes analyzed, 19 were determined to be PCIs.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the active thermal control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical (PCIs) items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Active Thermal Control Subsystem (ATCS) are documented. The major purpose of the ATCS is to remove the heat, generated during normal Shuttle operations from the Orbiter systems and subsystems. The four major components of the ATCS contributing to the heat removal are: Freon Coolant Loops; Radiator and Flow Control Assembly; Flash Evaporator System; and Ammonia Boiler System. In order to perform the analysis, the IOA process utilized available ATCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 310 failure modes analyzed, 101 were determined to be PCIs.

Sinclair, S. K.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the instrumentation subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Instrumentation Subsystem are documented. The Instrumentation Subsystem (SS) consists of transducers, signal conditioning equipment, pulse code modulation (PCM) encoding equipment, tape recorders, frequency division multiplexers, and timing equipment. For this analysis, the SS is broken into two major groupings: Operational Instrumentation (OI) equipment and Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS) equipment. The OI equipment is required to acquire, condition, scale, digitize, interleave/multiplex, format, and distribute operational Orbiter and payload data and voice for display, recording, telemetry, and checkout. It also must provide accurate timing for time critical functions for crew and payload specialist use. The MADS provides additional instrumentation to measure and record selected pressure, temperature, strain, vibration, and event data for post-flight playback and analysis. MADS data is used to assess vehicle responses to the flight environment and to permit correlation of such data from flight to flight. The IOA analysis utilized available SS hardware drawings and schematics for identifying hardware assemblies and components and their interfaces. Criticality for each item was assigned on the basis of the worst-case effect of the failure modes identified.

Howard, B. S.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware. The EPD and C hardware performs the functions of distributing, sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting, distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 400 Hz AC power to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the Electrical Power Generation (EPG) subsystem. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 1671 failure modes analyzed, 9 single failures were determined to result in loss of crew or vehicle. Three single failures unique to intact abort were determined to result in possible loss of the crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of 136 single failures occurred. Six of the criticality 1/1 failures are in two rotary and two pushbutton switches that control External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster separation. The other 6 criticality 1/1 failures are fuses, one each per Aft Power Control Assembly (APCA) 4, 5, and 6 and one each per Forward Power Control Assembly (FPCA) 1, 2, and 3, that supply power to certain Main Propulsion System (MPS) valves and Forward Reaction Control System (RCS) circuits.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bradway, M. W.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the displays and controls subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Displays and Controls (D and C) subsystem hardware. The function of the D and C hardware is to provide the crew with the monitor, command, and control capabilities required for management of all normal and contingency mission and flight operations. The D and C hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed consists of the following: Acceleration Indicator (G-METER); Head Up Display (HUD); Display Driver Unit (DDU); Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI); Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI); Attitude Director Indicator (ADI); Propellant Quantity Indicator (PQI); Surface Position Indicator (SPI); Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI); Caution and Warning Assembly (CWA); Annunciator Control Assembly (ACA); Event Timer (ET); Mission Timer (MT); Interior Lighting; and Exterior Lighting. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the landing/deceleration subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Landing/Deceleration Subsystem hardware. The Landing/Deceleration Subsystem is utilized to allow the Orbiter to perform a safe landing, allowing for landing-gear deploy activities, steering and braking control throughout the landing rollout to wheel-stop, and to allow for ground-handling capability during the ground-processing phase of the flight cycle. Specifically, the Landing/Deceleration hardware consists of the following components: Nose Landing Gear (NLG); Main Landing Gear (MLG); Brake and Antiskid (B and AS) Electrical Power Distribution and Controls (EPD and C); Nose Wheel Steering (NWS); and Hydraulics Actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the lack of redundancy in the Landing/Deceleration Subsystems there is a high number of critical items.

Compton, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) Actuator hardware are documented. The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC) is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation, the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw for each of the three main engines. Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and mechanical failures.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the purge, vent and drain subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter PV and D (Purge, Vent and Drain) Subsystem hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The subsystem is divided into six systems: Purge System (controls the environment of unpressurized structural compartments); Vent System (controls the pressure of unpressurized compartments); Drain System (removes water from unpressurized compartments); Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) (monitors hazardous gas concentrations); Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) (maintains clear windows and provides pressure control of the window cavities); and External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System (prevents cryo-pumping/icing of disconnect hardware). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Four of the sixty-two failure modes analyzed were determined as single failures which could result in the loss of crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of twelve single failures occurred. Two of the criticality 1/1 failures are in the Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) outer window cavity, where leakage and/or restricted flow will cause failure to depressurize/repressurize the window cavity. Two criticality 1/1 failures represent leakage and/or restricted flow in the Orbiter/ET disconnect purge network which prevent cryopumping/icing of disconnect hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bynum, M. C., III↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the elevon subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Orbiter Elevon system hardware. The elevon actuators are located at the trailing edge of the wing surface. The proper function of the elevons is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. In the ascent phase of flight, the elevons are used for relieving high wing loads. For entry, the elevons are used to pitch and roll the vehicle. Specifically, the elevon system hardware comprises the following components: flow cutoff valve; switching valve; electro-hydraulic (EH) servoactuator; secondary delta pressure transducer; bypass valve; power valve; power valve check valve; primary actuator; primary delta pressure transducer; and primary actuator position transducer. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 25 failure modes analyzed, 18 were determined to be PCIs.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of instrumental subsystem FMEA/CIL

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Instrumentation hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter Instrumentation hardware are documented. The IOA product for Instrumentation analysis consisted of 107 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 22 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the Pre 51-L NASA baseline with 14 Post 51-L FMEAs added, which consists of 96 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 25 FMEAs which caused differences in 5 CIL items.

Gardner, J. R.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbiter main propulsion system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware are documented. The Orbiter MPS consists of two subsystems: the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) and the Helium Subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank (ET) to the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and gaseous propellants pass from the SSMEs to the ET. The Helium Subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, check valves, distribution lines, and control valves. The Helium Subsystem supplies helium that is used within the SSMEs for inflight purges and provides pressure for actuation of SSME valves during emergency pneumatic shutdowns. The balance of the helium is used to provide pressure to operate the pneumatically actuated valves within the PMS. Each component was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticalities were assigned based on the worst possible effect of each failure mode. Of the 690 failure modes analyzed, 349 were determined to be PCIs.

Mcnicoll, W. J.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the rudder/speed brake subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the extravehicular mobility unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware. The EMU is an independent anthropomorphic system that provides environmental protection, mobility, life support, and communications for the Shuttle crewmember to perform Extravehicular Activity (EVA) in Earth orbit. Two EMUs are included on each baseline Orbiter mission, and consumables are provided for three two-man EVAs. The EMU consists of the Life Support System (LSS), Caution and Warning System (CWS), and the Space Suit Assembly (SSA). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. The majority of these PCIs are resultant from failures which cause loss of one or more primary functions: pressurization, oxygen delivery, environmental maintenance, and thermal maintenance. It should also be noted that the quantity of PCIs would significantly increase if the SOP were to be treated as an emergency system rather than as an unlike redundant element.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/remote manipulator system subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the results of the independent analysis of the EPD and C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control, and stow or guillotine and jettison two (one port and one starboard) RMSs. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem is subdivided into the four following functional divisions: Remote Manipulator Arm; Manipulator Deploy Control; Manipulator Latch Control; Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison; and Retention Arm Jettison. The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/RMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Robinson, W. W.↗
NASA NTRS1979

Mod 1 wind turbine generator failure modes and effects analysis

A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was directed primarily at identifying those critical failure modes that would be hazardous to life or would result in major damage to the system. Each subsystem was approached from the top down, and broken down to successive lower levels where it appeared that the criticality of the failure mode warranted more detail analysis. The results were reviewed by specialists from outside the Mod 1 program, and corrective action taken wherever recommended.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/power reactant storage and distribution subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NAA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Power Reactants Storage and Distribution (PRSD) System Hardware is documented. The EPG/PRSD hardware is required for performing critical functions of cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen storage and distribution to the Fuel Cell Powerplants (FCP) and Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS). Specifically, the EPG/PRSD hardware consists of the following: Hydryogen (H2) tanks; Oxygen (O2) tanks; H2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (HRVFP); O2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (ORVFP); H2 Valve Modules (HVM); O2 Valve Modules (OVM); and O2 and H2 lines, components, and fittings.

Gotch, S. M.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System (RCS). The purpose of the RCS is to provide thrust in and about the X, Y, Z axes for External Tank (ET) separation; orbit insertion maneuvers; orbit translation maneuvers; on-orbit attitude control; rendezvous; proximity operations (payload deploy and capture); deorbit maneuvers; and abort attitude control. The RCS is situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization Subsystem; Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem; Thruster Subsystem; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem. Of the failure modes analyzed, 307 could potentially result in a loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.

Burkemper, V. J.↗