Hard Fault Protection for a 1 kV Silicon Carbide-based Aerospace Motor Drive
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This is a companion presentation for a paper by the same name for the same conference. The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the fundamentals of fault tolerant design for GN&C. The common heritage of ideas behind both faulted and normal operation is explored, as is the increasingly indistinct line between these realms in complex missions. Techniques in common practice are then evaluated in this light to suggest a better direction for future efforts.
The QuickScat and Sea Winds instruments are radar scatterometer instruments that will be used to measure ocean surface winds.
This paper documents the application of RA technologies in the field of interferometer instrument control.
Use SysML/UML to describe the physical structure of the system This part of the model would be shared with other teams - FS Systems Engineering, Planning & Execution, V&V, Operations, etc., in an integrated model-based engineering environment Use the UML Profile mechanism, defining Stereotypes to precisely express the concepts of the FP domain This extends the UML/SysML languages to contain our FP concepts Use UML/SysML, along with our profile, to capture FP concepts and relationships in the model Generate typical FP engineering products (the FMECA, Fault Tree, MRD, V&V Matrices)
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Cassini is a NASA/JPL spacecraft that is planned to be launched in 1997 for a 10.7 year mission to
A paper discusses techniques for protecting against faults in spacecraft designed and operated by NASA s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). The paper addresses, more specifically, fault-protection requirements and techniques common to most JPL spacecraft (in contradistinction to unique, mission specific techniques), standard practices in the implementation of these techniques, and fault-protection software architectures. Common requirements include those to protect onboard command, data-processing, and control computers; protect against loss of Earth/spacecraft radio communication; maintain safe temperatures; and recover from power overloads. The paper describes fault-protection techniques as part of a fault-management strategy that also includes functional redundancy, redundant hardware, and autonomous monitoring of (1) the operational and health statuses of spacecraft components, (2) temperatures inside and outside the spacecraft, and (3) allocation of power. The strategy also provides for preprogrammed automated responses to anomalous conditions. In addition, the software running in almost every JPL spacecraft incorporates a general-purpose "Safe Mode" response algorithm that configures the spacecraft in a lower-power state that is safe and predictable, thereby facilitating diagnosis of more complex faults by a team of human experts on Earth.
This research concentrated on the application of advanced signal processing, expert system, and digital technologies for the detection and control of low grade, incipient faults on spaceborne power systems. The researchers have considerable experience in the application of advanced digital technologies and the protection of terrestrial power systems. This experience was used in the current contracts to develop new approaches for protecting the electrical distribution system in spaceborne applications. The project was divided into three distinct areas: (1) investigate the applicability of fault detection algorithms developed for terrestrial power systems to the detection of faults in spaceborne systems; (2) investigate the digital hardware and architectures required to monitor and control spaceborne power systems with full capability to implement new detection and diagnostic algorithms; and (3) develop a real-time expert operating system for implementing diagnostic and protection algorithms. Significant progress has been made in each of the above areas. Several terrestrial fault detection algorithms were modified to better adapt to spaceborne power system environments. Several digital architectures were developed and evaluated in light of the fault detection algorithms.
The work presented in this paper describes an approach used to develop SysML modeling patterns to express the behavior of fault protection, test the model's logic by performing fault injection simulations, and verify the fault protection system's logical design via model checking. A representative example, using a subset of the fault protection design for the Soil Moisture Active-Passive (SMAP) system, was modeled with SysML State Machines and JavaScript as Action Language. The SysML model captures interactions between relevant system components and system behavior abstractions (mode managers, error monitors, fault protection engine, and devices/switches). Development of a method to implement verifiable and lightweight executable fault protection models enables future missions to have access to larger fault test domains and verifiable design patterns. A tool-chain to transform the SysML model to jpf-Statechart compliant Java code and then verify the generated code via model checking was established. Conclusions and lessons learned from this work are also described, as well as potential avenues for further research and development.
Systems1,2 required to exhibit high operational reliability often rely on some form of fault protection to recognize and respond to faults, preventing faults' escalation to catastrophic failures. Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) extends the functionality of fault protection to both scale to more complex systems (and systems of systems), and to maintain capability rather than just avert catastrophe. Forms of ISHM have been utilized to good effect in the maintenance phase of systems' total lifecycles (often referred to as 'condition-based mainte-nance'), but less so in a 'fault protection' role during actual operations. One of the impediments to such use lies in the challenges of verification, validation and certification of ISHM systems themselves. This paper makes the case that state-of-the-practice V&V and certification techniques will not suffice for emerging forms of ISHM systems; however, a number of maturing software engineering assurance technologies show particular promise for addressing these ISHM V&V challenges.
The Cassini spacecraft fault protection design includes fault monitors that use a state-space architecture to monitor the performance of spacecraft functions.
Decisions made during the operational phase of a space mission often have significant and immediate consequences. Without the explicit consideration of the risks involved and their representation in a solid model, it is very likely that these risks are not considered systematically in trade studies. Wrong decisions during the operational phase of a space mission can lead to immediate system failure whereas correct decisions can help recover the system even from faulty conditions. A problem of special interest is the determination of the system fault protection strategies upon the occurrence of faults within the system. Decisions regarding the fault protection strategy also heavily rely on a correct understanding of the state of the system and an integrated risk model that represents the various possible scenarios and their respective likelihoods. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling is applicable to the full lifecycle of a space mission project, from concept development to preliminary design, detailed design, development and operations. The benefits and utilities of the model, however, depend on the phase of the mission for which it is used. This is because of the difference in the key strategic decisions that support each mission phase. The focus of this paper is on describing the particular methods used for PRA modeling during the operational phase of a spacecraft by gleaning insight from recently conducted case studies on two operational Mars orbiters. During operations, the key decisions relate to the commands sent to the spacecraft for any kind of diagnostics, anomaly resolution, trajectory changes, or planning. Often, faults and failures occur in the parts of the spacecraft but are contained or mitigated before they can cause serious damage. The failure behavior of the system during operations provides valuable data for updating and adjusting the related PRA models that are built primarily based on historical failure data. The PRA models, in turn, provide insight into the effect of various faults or failures on the risk and failure drivers of the system and the likelihood of possible end case scenarios, thereby facilitating the decision making process during operations. This paper describes the process of adjusting PRA models based on observed spacecraft data, on one hand, and utilizing the models for insight into the future system behavior on the other hand. While PRA models are typically used as a decision aid during the design phase of a space mission, we advocate adjusting them based on the observed behavior of the spacecraft and utilizing them for decision support during the operations phase.
On October 24th, 1998, the Deep Space One (DS-1) spacecraft launched aboard a Delta II rocket as the first step towards the bold task of testing and validating 12 new technologies for future missions. This launch also represented yet another thrilling event; namely, the successful test and validation of a 13th heretofore undisclosed technology: model-based code-generation of the spacecraft's system-level fault-protection (FP) software from behavioral state diagrams and structural models.In this paper, we describe the process we used to leverage model-based code generation from state diagrams and structural specifications to better respond to the evolving requirements and scope of DS- I's system-level fault-protection design, development, test and operation. The evolution of the high-level design and the low-level changes in the flight software architecture and interfaces contributed to multiplying the number and frequency of fault-protection software releases thereby creating a multitude of software integration issues. To address the resulting software integration issues, we broadened the scope of code -eneration to other forms of model- based analysis techniques more traditionally associated with first-principle's reasoning about physical models. Additionally, we describe our in-flight launch and initial acquisition experience.