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This report describes objectives completed for the GACP (Global Climatology Aerosol Project). The objectives included the analysis of satellite aerosol data, including the optical properties and global distributions of major aerosol types, and human contributions to major aerosol types. The researchers have conducted simulations and field work.
The NASA Earth Observing System (EOS) mission includes the construction and launch of two nearly identical Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) instruments. The MODIS proto-flight model (PFM) is onboard the EOS Terra satellite (formerly EOS AM-1) launched on December 18, 1999 and hereafter referred to as Terra MODIS. Flight model-1 (FM1) is onboard the EOS Aqua satellite (formerly EOS PM-1) launched on May 04, 2002 and referred to as Aqua MODIS. MODIS was developed based on the science community s desire to collect multiyear continuous datasets for monitoring changes in the Earth s land, oceans and atmosphere, and the human contributions to these changes. It was designed to measure discrete spectral bands, which includes many used by a number of heritage sensors, and thus extends the heritage datasets to better understand both long- and short-term changes in the global environment (Barnes and Salomonson 1993; Salomonson et al. 2002; Barnes et al. 2002). The MODIS development, launch, and operation were managed by NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Greenbelt, Maryland. The sensors were designed, built, and tested by Raytheon/ Santa Barbara Remote Sensing (SBRS), Goleta, California. Each MODIS instrument offers 36 spectral bands, which span the spectral region from the visible (0.41 m) to long-wave infrared (14.4 m). MODIS collects data at three different nadir spatial resolutions: 0.25, 0.5, and 1 km. Key design specifications, such as spectral bandwidths, typical scene radiances, required signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) or noise equivalent temperature differences (NEDT), and primary applications of each MODIS spectral band are summarized in Table 7.1. These parameters were the basis for the MODIS design. More details on the evolution of the NASA EOS and development of the MODIS instruments are provided in Chap. 1. This chapter focuses on the MODIS sensor design, radiometry, and geometry as they apply to land remote sensing. With near-daily coverage of the Earth's surface, MODIS provides comprehensive measurements that enable scientists and policy makers to better understand and effectively manage the natural resources on both regional and global scales. Terra, the first large multisensor EOS satellite, is operated in a 10:30 am (local equatorial crossing time, descending southwards) polar orbit. Aqua, the second multisensor EOS satellite is operated in a 1:30 pm (local equatorial crossing time, ascending northwards) polar orbit. With complementing morning and afternoon observations, the Terra and Aqua MODIS, together with other sensors housed on both satellites, have greatly improved our understanding of the dynamics of the global environmental system.
The identification, modelling, and analysis of root causes of accidents and incidents dominate conventional safety management approaches. However, the effect of humans’ safety-producing behavior on the overall resilience of the system is often neglected. Additionally, emerging aviation markets are giving rise to concepts of operation, such as urban air mobility and optionally piloted air cargo operations, that are leading to a shift in locus of control between humans and automation. Without an understanding of the human contribution to safety, it is difficult to assess the effects of these novel role allocations on overall system safety. In this work, safety-producing behaviors are identified and abstracted into resilient performance strategies. Production rules that encapsulate these strategies are then generated and classified in the Soar cognitive architecture. The strategies are then applied to a remotely-operated air cargo example to demonstrate how safe learning is facilitated. The learned rules and strategies are then formally verified.
As it evolves, aviation will continue to require integration of a wide range of safety systems and practices, some of which are already in place and others that are yet to be developed. New concepts in system safety thinking have emerged to consider not only what may go wrong, but also what can be learned when things go right during commercial flight operations. Taken together, these complementary perspectives form a more comprehensive approach to systemsafety thinking that can help to recognize and preserve the resilient performance capabilities currently provided by humans. A need exists, however, for research methods to enable better understanding of the human contributions to aviation safety. NASA’s System-Wide Safety Project supports research on using flight simulation methods to study operator resilience and safety-producing behaviors. Building on prior NASA efforts investigating procedural non-adherences during area navigation standard terminal route arrivals, a high-fidelity commercial aviation line operational simulation (LOS) experiment has been designed to study how flight crews anticipate, monitor for, respond to, and learn from expected and unexpected disturbances during these operations. A diverse set of LOS scenarios were developed to simulate highly realistic, complex, but routinely encountered operational situations. Each scenario provided multiple opportunities to collect data on how flight crews manage threats and errors, as well as novel opportunities to observe resilient and safety-producing behaviors. The experimental design, implications for the study of safety-producing behaviors using simulation, and considerations for airline pilot training will be discussed.
The national airspace (NAS) will rapidly evolve in the next ten to twenty years. Plans for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) during that period envision highly automated airspace management systems and electrically powered vehicles. AAM concepts also anticipate limited human roles. The goal of limiting the human role is to minimize the potential for misadventures, yet how the human role is limited needs to be carefully considered in order to also preserve the potential for human successes. The field of resilience engineering (RE) focuses on how systems can change in order to seize an opportunity or withstand an unforeseen challenge. RE methods rely on the use of empirical data to optimize the ability of any system to adapt. RE studies have shown how individual and team initiatives ensure resilient system performance by creating safety through flexibility. Benefits of the RE approach include improved awareness of operational circumstances and how system elements depend on each other, and the ability to allocate limited resources and prepare for surprise. RE offers the ability to account for and incorporate the human role as an essential element in order to ensure NAS systems’ resilient performance. Data on the human contribution to safe and resilient system performance, which is termed “work as done,” are available but are not being considered as the NAS evolves. We present an approach that describes how use of RE can enable the evolving NAS to adapt, and perform, in a resilient manner.
Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. The study of human contributions to safety represents a vast and largely unexplored opportunity to learn. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform system design, safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors.
This presentation will discuss NASA needs in advanced technology to support future human exploration of space and how developments in chemistry can be applied to meet those needs. The presentation will provide some examples of chemistry-related research currently supported by the NASA and discuss opportunities for students, faculty, and industry researchers to get involved in NASA R&D efforts to support space exploration.
It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. During each focus group session, a note taker produced a de-identified written record of the incident narratives. At the end of the session, participants reviewed each written incident report, and made edits and corrections as necessary. The incidents were later analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot during the events. A total of 90 incidents were reported. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Pilots participated willingly and enthusiastically in the study, and generally had little difficulty recalling critical incidents. The results suggest that pilot interviews can be a productive method of gathering information on incidents that might not otherwise be reported. Some of the issues described in the reports have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. In other cases, incident reports involved human factors that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.
In high-performance aircraft, the need for total environmental awareness coupled with high-g loading (often with abrupt onset) creates a predilection for cervical spine injury while the pilot is performing routine movements within the cockpit. In this study, the prevalence and severity of cervical spine injury are assessed via a modified cross-sectional survey of pilots of multiple aircraft types (T-38 and F-14, F-16, and F/A-18 fighters). Ninety-five surveys were administered, with 58 full responses. Fifty percent of all pilots reported in-flight or immediate post-flight spine-based pain, and 90% of fighter pilots reported at least one event, most commonly (> 90%) occurring during high-g (> 5 g) turns of the aircraft with the head deviated from the anatomical neutral position. Pre-flight stretching was not associated with a statistically significant reduction in neck pain episodes in this evaluation, whereas a regular weight training program in the F/A-18 group approached a significant reduction (mean = 2.492; p < 0.064). Different cockpit ergonomics may vary the predisposition to cervical injury from airframe to airframe. Several strategies for prevention are possible from both an aircraft design and a preventive medicine standpoint. Countermeasure strategies against spine injury in pilots of high-performance aircraft require additional research, so that future aircraft will not be limited by the human in control.
We hypothesized that vestibular otolith organ stimulation contributes to human orthostatic responses. Twelve subjects underwent three 60 degrees upright tilts: (1) with the neck flexed from 0 degrees to 30 degrees relative to the body during 60 degrees tilt, such that the head moved from horizontal to 90 degrees above horizontal (0 to 1 Gz otolith stimulation); (2) with the head and body aligned, such that they tilted together to 60 degrees (0 to 0.87 Gz otolith stimulation); and (3) with the neck flexed 30 degrees relative to the body during supine conditions, and the neck then extended to -30 degrees during 60 degrees body tilting, such that the head remained at 30 degrees above horizontal throughout body tilting (constant 0.5 Gz otolith stimulation). All three tilt procedures increased thoracic impedance, sympathetic nerve activity (N = 8 of 12), arterial pressure, and heart rate relative to supine conditions (all P < 0.04). Within the first 20 s of tilt, arterial pressure increased most obviously in the 0 to 1 Gz otolith condition. Thoracic impedance tended to increase more in otolith-constant conditions, but no dependent variable differed significantly between tilt conditions, and no significant time x tilt interactions emerged. Otolith inputs may contribute to early transient adjustments to orthostasis. However, lack of significant main effects of tilt condition and time x tilt interactions suggests that potential otolith effects on the variables we studied are relatively subtle and ephemeral, or that other mechanisms compensate for a lack of change in otolith input with orthostasis.
Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport aircraft fatal accidents. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. The latter statement, while generally accepted, cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how and how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base simulation experiment specifically addressed this void by collecting data to quantify the human (pilot) contribution to safety-of-flight and the methods they use in today's National Airspace System. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using the FAA's Oklahoma City Flight Simulation Branch Level D-certified B-737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to aircraft system failures. These data are fundamental to and critical for the design and development of future increasingly autonomous systems that can better support the human in the cockpit. Eighteen U.S. airline crews flew various normal and non-normal procedures over a two-day period and their actions were recorded in response to failures. To quantify the human's contribution to safety of flight, crew complement was used as the experiment independent variable in a between-subjects design. Pilot actions and performance during single pilot and reduced crew operations were measured for comparison against the normal two-crew complement during normal and non-normal situations. This paper details the crew's actions, including decision-making, and responses while dealing with a drive shaft failure - one of 6 non-normal events that were simulated in this experiment.
Traditional human factors design involves the development of human factors requirements based on a desire to accommodate a certain percentage of the intended user population. As the product is developed human factors evaluation involves comparison between the resulting design and the specifications. Sometimes performance metrics are involved that allow leniency in the design requirements given that the human performance result is satisfactory. Clearly such approaches may work but they give rise to uncertainty and negotiation. An alternative approach is to adopt human factors design rules that articulate a range of each design continuum over which there are varying outcome expectations and interactions with other variables, including time. These rules are based on a consensus of human factors specialists, designers, managers and customers. The International Space Station faces exactly this challenge in interior volume control, which is based on anthropometric, performance and subjective preference criteria. This paper describes the traditional approach and then proposes a rule-based alternative. The proposed rules involve spatial, temporal and importance dimensions. If successful this rule-based concept could be applied to many traditional human factors design variables and could lead to a more effective and efficient contribution of human factors input to the design process.
Key problem areas in the management and transfer of information in the National Airspace System, contributing to human errors are identified. Information-management aspects supporting the user's ability to assess prevailing situations accurately with adequate time to make an informed decision are considered. The relationship between judgment biases and requirements for managing weather information is illustrated by examining such hazardous weather phenomena as microbursts and windshears. The system of air-ground communication relying almost exclusively on voice transmissions is discussed, and recommendations in the areas of communications procedures and technology development are provided.
The literature on human performance is rich with findings of cognitive failures and methods to identify, label, and measure them. In many real-world contexts, however, outcomes are driven far more by successful than failed cognition. Designers of systems intended for human use, in an effort to be “data driven,” rely upon findings from the cognitive performance literature to inform their system designs. When most available data are about human error, data-driven designs focus on the human primarily as a source of failure. Designs intended to support or replace humans often fail to acknowledge or understand the capabilities that humans routinely contribute to successful performance. Consequently, designs intended to “protect” the system from “error-prone” humans can design-out the capability for the human to effectively intervene or adapt. The development of paradigms to study successful human performance represents a significant and largely untapped opportunity for research in cognition.
Traditional human factors contributions to NASA's crewed space programs have been rooted in the classic approaches to quantifying human physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations in the environment of interest, and producing recommendations and standards for the selection or design of mission equipment. Crews then evaluate the interfaces, displays, or equipment, and with the assistance of human factors experts, improvements are made as funds, time, control documentation, and weight allow. We have come a long way from the early spaceflight days, where men with the ' right stuff were the solution to operating whatever equipment was given to them. The large and diverse Shuttle astronaut corps has impacted mission designs to accommodate a wide range of human capabilities and preferences. Yet with existing long duration experience, we have seen the need to address a different set of dynamics when designing for optimal crew performance: critical equipment and mission situations degrade, and human function changes with mission environment, situation, and duration. Strategies for quantifying the critical nature of human factors requirements are being worked by NASA. Any exploration-class mission will place new responsibilities on mission designers to provide the crew with the information and resources to accomplish the mission. The current duties of a Mission Control Center to monitor system status, detect degradation or malfunction, and provide a proven solution, will need to be incorporated into on-board systems to allow the crew autonomous decision-making. The current option to resupply and replace mission systems and resources, including both vehicle equipment and human operators, will be removed, so considerations of maintenance, onboard training, and proficiency assessment are critical to providing a self-sufficient crew. As we 'move in' to the International Space Station, there are tremendous opportunities to investigate our ability to design for autonomous crews. Yet prioritizing the research that can and should be done by NASA will be based on the critical nature of the issues, and the impact of the individual research questions on mission design. The risks to crew health and safety associated with answering critical human factors issues must be properly included and communicated in order to support the Agency's decisions regarding future space programs.
BACKGROUND: Observations in patients with functional mutations of the norepinephrine transporter (NET) gene suggest that impaired norepinephrine uptake may contribute to idiopathic orthostatic intolerance. METHODS AND RESULTS: We studied the effect of the selective NET blocker reboxetine and placebo in a randomized, double-blind, crossover fashion on cardiovascular responses to cold pressor testing, handgrip testing, and a graded head-up tilt test (HUT) in 18 healthy subjects. In a subset, we determined isoproterenol and phenylephrine sensitivities. Subjects ingested 8 mg reboxetine or placebo 12 hours and 1 hour before testing. In the supine position, heart rate was 65+/-2 bpm with placebo and 71+/-3 bpm with reboxetine. At 75 degrees HUT, heart rate was 84+/-3 and 119+/-4 bpm with placebo and with reboxetine (P<0.0001). Mean arterial pressure was 85+/-2 with placebo and 91+/-2 mm Hg with reboxetine while supine (P<0.01) and 88+/-2 mm Hg and 90+/-3 mm Hg at 75 degrees HUT. Blood pressure responses to cold pressor and handgrip testing were attenuated with reboxetine. Reboxetine increased the sensitivity to the chronotropic effect of isoproterenol and the pressor effect of phenylephrine. Vasovagal reactions occurred in 9 subjects on placebo and in 1 subject on reboxetine. CONCLUSIONS: Selective NET blockade creates a phenotype that resembles idiopathic orthostatic intolerance. This observation supports the hypothesis that disordered norepinephrine uptake mechanisms can contribute to human cardiovascular disease. Our study also suggests that NET inhibition might be useful in preventing vasovagal reactions.
For decades, Space Life Sciences and NASA as an Agency have considered NASA-STD-3000, Man-Systems Integration Standards, a significant contribution to human spaceflight programs and to human-systems integration in general. The document has been referenced in numerous design standards both within NASA and by organizations throughout the world. With research program and project results being realized, advances in technology and new information in a variety of topic areas now available, the time arrived to update this extensive suite of requirements and design information. During the past several years, a multi-NASA center effort has been underway to write the update to NASA-STD-3000 with standards and design guidance that would be applicable to all future human spaceflight programs. NASA-STD-3001 - Volumes 1 and 2 - and the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) were created. Volume 1, Crew Health, establishes NASA s spaceflight crew health standards for the pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight phases of human spaceflight. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health, focuses on the requirements of human-system integration and how the human crew interacts with other systems, and how the human and the system function together to accomplish the tasks for mission success. The HIDH is a compendium of human spaceflight history and knowledge, and provides useful background information and research findings. And as the HIDH is a stand-alone companion to the Standards, the maintenance of the document has been streamlined. This unique and flexible approach ensures that the content is current and addresses the fundamental advances of human performance and human capabilities and constraints research. Current work focuses on the development of new sections of Volume 2 and collecting updates to the HIDH. The new sections in development expand the scope of the standard and address mission operations and support operations. This effort is again collaboration with representatives from the Johnson Space Center Missions Operations and Space Life Sciences Directorates and the Engineering Directorate from Kennedy Space Center as well as discipline experts from across the Agency.
It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. A total of 90 incidents were reported. This presentation begins with an overview of RPAS human factors and then considers the emerging issues identified by pilot reports.