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At least 55 records · Page 3

Human Error and the International Space Station: Challenges and Triumphs in Science Operations

Any system with a human component is inherently risky. Studies in human factors and psychology have repeatedly shown that human operators will inevitably make errors, regardless of how well they are trained. Onboard the International Space Station (ISS) where crew time is arguably the most valuable resource, errors by the crew or ground operators can be costly to critical science objectives. Operations experts at the ISS Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC), located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, have learned that from payload concept development through execution, there are countless opportunities to introduce errors that can potentially result in costly losses of crew time and science. To effectively address this challenge, we must approach the design, testing, and operation processes with two specific goals in mind. First, a systematic approach to error and human centered design methodology should be implemented to minimize opportunities for user error. Second, we must assume that human errors will be made and enable rapid identification and recoverability when they occur. While a systematic approach and human centered development process can go a long way toward eliminating error, the complete exclusion of operator error is not a reasonable expectation. The ISS environment in particular poses challenging conditions, especially for flight controllers and astronauts. Operating a scientific laboratory 250 miles above the Earth is a complicated and dangerous task with high stakes and a steep learning curve. While human error is a reality that may never be fully eliminated, smart implementation of carefully chosen tools and techniques can go a long way toward minimizing risk and increasing the efficiency of NASA's space science operations.

Harris, Samantha S.↗

What Happened, and Why: Toward an Understanding of Human Error Based on Automated Analyses of Incident Reports

The objective of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) project of NASA s Aviation Safety and Security Program was to develop technologies that will enable proactive management of safety risk, which entails identifying the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents. This presents a particular challenge in the aviation system where people are key components and human error is frequently cited as a major contributing factor or cause of incidents and accidents. In the aviation "world", information about what happened can be extracted from quantitative data sources, but the experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about why an incident happened. This report describes a conceptual model and an approach to automated analyses of textual data sources for the subjective perspective of the reporter of the incident to aid in understanding why an incident occurred. It explores a first-generation process for routinely searching large databases of textual reports of aviation incident or accidents, and reliably analyzing them for causal factors of human behavior (the why of an incident). We have defined a generic structure of information that is postulated to be a sound basis for defining similarities between aviation incidents. Based on this structure, we have introduced the simplifying structure, which we call the Scenario as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what happened based on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. We believe that it will be possible to design an automated analysis process guided by the structure of the Scenario that will aid aviation-safety experts to understand the systemic issues that are conducive to human error.

Maille, Nicolas P.↗

Analyzing human errors in flight mission operations

A long-term program is in progress at JPL to reduce cost and risk of flight mission operations through a defect prevention/error management program. The main thrust of this program is to create an environment in which the performance of the total system, both the human operator and the computer system, is optimized. To this end, 1580 Incident Surprise Anomaly reports (ISA's) from 1977-1991 were analyzed from the Voyager and Magellan projects. A Pareto analysis revealed that 38 percent of the errors were classified as human errors. A preliminary cluster analysis based on the Magellan human errors (204 ISA's) is presented here. The resulting clusters described the underlying relationships among the ISA's. Initial models of human error in flight mission operations are presented. Next, the Voyager ISA's will be scored and included in the analysis. Eventually, these relationships will be used to derive a theoretically motivated and empirically validated model of human error in flight mission operations. Ultimately, this analysis will be used to make continuous process improvements continuous process improvements to end-user applications and training requirements. This Total Quality Management approach will enable the management and prevention of errors in the future.

Bruno, Kristin J.↗

Reflections on human error - Matters of life and death

The last two decades have witnessed a rapid growth in the introduction of automatic devices into aircraft cockpits, and eleswhere in human-machine systems. This was motivated in part by the assumption that when human functioning is replaced by machine functioning, human error is eliminated. Experience to date shows that this is far from true, and that automation does not replace humans, but changes their role in the system, as well as the types and severity of the errors they make. This altered role may lead to fewer, but more critical errors. Intervention strategies to prevent these errors, or ameliorate their consequences include basic human factors engineering of the interface, enhanced warning and alerting systems, and more intelligent interfaces that understand the strategic intent of the crew and can detect and trap inconsistent or erroneous input before it affects the system.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

On Space Exploration and Human Error: A Paper on Reliability and Safety

NASA space exploration should largely address a problem class in reliability and risk management stemming primarily from human error, system risk and multi-objective trade-off analysis, by conducting research into system complexity, risk characterization and modeling, and system reasoning. In general, in every mission we can distinguish risk in three possible ways: a) known-known, b) known-unknown, and c) unknown-unknown. It is probably almost certain that space exploration will partially experience similar known or unknown risks embedded in the Apollo missions, Shuttle or Station unless something alters how NASA will perceive and manage safety and reliability

Bell, David G.↗

Predicting Human Error in Air Traffic Control Decision Support Tools and Free Flight Concepts

The document is a set of briefing slides summarizing the work the Advanced Air Transportation Technologies (AATT) Project is doing on predicting air traffic controller and airline pilot human error when using new decision support software tools and when involved in testing new air traffic control concepts. Previous work in this area is reviewed as well as research being done jointly with the FAA. Plans for error prediction work in the AATT Project are discussed. The audience is human factors researchers and aviation psychologists from government and industry.

Mogford, Richard↗

Human error in aviation operations

This report is a brief description of research being undertaken by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The project is designed to seek out factors in the aviation system which contribute to human error, and to search for ways of minimizing the potential threat posed by these factors. The philosophy and assumptions underlying the study are discussed, together with an outline of the research plan.

Billings, C. E.↗

Resilience, ASRS, and the Narrative about Human Error

We present a study of weather-related incident reports submitted to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) by air carrier pilots in the US. Using specific examples, we examine the relevant aspects of human performance and resilience management exhibited during these incidents. We describe the common narrative about human error and how ASRS data can be used to change it.

resilience↗

Study on the assessment method of human error probabilities in the digitalized main control room - 170

Recently, nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Republic of Korea have been constructed with the new type of main control room (MCR) which is called as digitalized MCR. In digitalized MCR, as digital technologies are being adopted, the environment of MCR has been considerably changed. The operators may obtain the plant data via digitalized human system interfaces (HSIs), large display panel (LDP), computerized procedure system (CPS), soft controls and other system features. Accordingly, the necessity to consider the new environment of MCR has been raised when performing human reliability analysis (HRA) methods. However, none of HRA methods consider the newly installed MCRs. The goal of this paper is to propose new frameworks to assess the human error probabilities (HEPs) in digitalized MCR. Generally, the HEPs are obtained by summing the probabilities of diagnosis errors and the probabilities of execution errors and those probabilities are modified by performance shaping factors (PSFs). In this paper, two parts are included; (1) Assessing the probabilities of diagnosis errors, and (2) Assessing the probabilities of execution errors. In this paper, the process to develop the frameworks are introduced and we expect that the HEPs affecting the features of digitalized MCR can be calculated by using the proposed frameworks. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

'Systemic Failures' and 'Human Error' in Canadian TSB Aviation Reports Between 1996 and 2002

This paper describes the results of an independent analysis of the primary and contributory causes of aviation accidents in Canada between 1996 and 2003. The purpose of the study was to assess the comparative frequency of a range of causal factors in the reporting of these adverse events. Our results suggest that the majority of these high consequence accidents were attributed to human error. A large number of reports also mentioned wider systemic issues, including the managerial and regulatory context of aviation operations. These issues are more likely to appear as contributory rather than primary causes in this set of accident reports.

Holloway, C. M.↗

Incident reporting: Its role in aviation safety and the acquisition of human error data

The rationale for aviation incident reporting systems is presented and contrasted to some of the shortcomings of accident investigation procedures. The history of the United State's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is outlined and the program's character explained. The planning elements that resulted in the ASRS program's voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive design are discussed. Immunity, from enforcement action and misuse of the volunteered data, is explained and evaluated. Report generation techniques and the ASRS data analysis process are described; in addition, examples of the ASRS program's output and accomplishments are detailed. Finally, the value of incident reporting for the acquisition of safety information, particularly human error data, is explored.

Reynard, W. D.↗

Addressing Human Error in International Space Station Flight Control Teams: Advances in Ground Training for Science Operators

In flight control, as with any human in the loop system, operator error is an inevitable reality. On the International Space Station (ISS) where crew time and physical resources are precious and often irreplaceable, operator errors can result in significant, irreversible consequences. Flight controllers at the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama know this reality well. At the POIC, operator errors can be caused by a variety of factors, from poor hardware or software design to environmental factors such as time pressure or fatigue. The most difficult errors to address, however, are those which result from ineffective teamwork. To address these teamwork errors, trainers at the POIC have drawn best practices from high reliability industries as well as from our sister ISS control center at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas, to develop and implement a new training program focused specifically on teamwork skills. This training program, called Team Skills Training, is inspired by modern and historical training programs developed by NASA and is specifically tailored to the needs of the payload operations flight control team at the POIC. The program consists of training for both certified and trainee flight controllers, and covers team skills topics such as situational awareness, leadership, and communication skills. To maximize effectiveness, the program uses novel instructional techniques which extend beyond the classroom to encourage students to apply what they have learned to their day to day work. Minimizing operator errors in flight control is an endeavor which requires constant vigilance and continuous improvement. At the POIC, Team Skills Training is an important step in this journey.

Harris, Samantha S.↗

Addressing Human Error in International Space Station Flight Control Teams: Advances in Ground Training for Science Operators

In flight control, as with any human in the loop system, operator error is an inevitable reality. On the International Space Station (ISS) where crew time and physical resources are precious and often irreplaceable, operator errors can result in significant, irreversible consequences. Flight controllers at the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) located at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama know this reality well. At the POIC, operator errors can be caused by a variety of factors, from poor hardware or software design to environmental factors such as time pressure or fatigue. The most difficult errors to address, however, are those which result from ineffective teamwork.Academic research in teamwork has resulted in the identification of many factors which make cross-functional teaming difficult, including leadership, trust building, and communication challenges. These factors, especially when combined with the challenging environmental factors flight control teams must contend with daily, make the goal of minimizing operator errors in payload operations challenging to achieve. To address such teamwork errors, trainers at the POIC have drawn best practices from high reliability industries such as commercial aviation, healthcare, and nuclear power plants, as well as from our sister ISS control center in Houston, Texas, to develop and institute a new training program focused specifically on teamwork skills.This training program, called the Team Skills Curriculum, is based on the concept of Crew Resource Management (CRM) which was developed by NASA in the 1970s for the commercial aviation industry in response to a series of aviation disasters resulting from ineffective teamwork. CRM was later tailored by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) for use in astronaut and flight control training. The result, called Space Flight Resource Management (SFRM) was formally introduced into manned spaceflight training in the late 90s. SFRM has evolved over the years, but the focus has remained on helping operators develop the skills needed to work as part of an effective team. Using these concepts as well as the latest research in cross-functional teaming and data on specific errors occurring at the POIC, trainers in the integrated flight control training branch created a custom training program for both new and certified payload operations specialists.

Harris, Samantha S.↗

What Happened, and Why: Toward an Understanding of Human Error Based on Automated Analyses of Incident Reports

The objective of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling project of NASA's Aviation Safety and Security Program was to develop technologies to enable proactive management of safety risk, which entails identifying the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents. Information about what happened can be extracted from quantitative data sources, but the experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about why an incident happened. In Volume I, the concept of the Scenario was introduced as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what happened based on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. In this Volume II, that study continues into the analyses of the free narratives to gain understanding as to why the incident occurred from the reporter s perspective. While this is just the first experiment, the results of our approach are encouraging and indicate that it will be possible to design an automated analysis process guided by the structure of the Scenario that can achieve the level of consistency and reliability of human analysis of narrative reports.

Ferryman, Thomas A.↗

A Comparison of Human Error Probabilities Collected from HuREX and SHEEP Frameworks

This paper discusses how different are the HEPs collected from HuREX and SHEEP frameworks. This study is a preceding research to infer full-scope HRA data based on the data collected from the SHEEP framework. For the comparison, we used HEPs in the HuREX database published in KAERI-TR-6649 [6]. The HEPs have been collected from actual licensed operators when manipulating MCR simulators of Westinghouse type and Optimized Power Reactor (OPR1000) type in South Korea. For the HEPs based on the SHEEP framework, these have been collected from actual licensed operators and students when using a simplified simulator, i.e., Rancor Microworld.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

How Systems Engineering and Risk Management Defend Against Murphy's Law and Human Error

Systems Engineering and Risk Management processes can work synergistically to defend against the causes of many mission ending failures. Defending against mission ending failures is facilitated by fostering a team that has a healthy respect for Murphy's Law and a team with a of curiosity for how things work, how they can fail, and what they need to know. This curiosity is channeled into making the unknowns known or what is uncertain more certain. Efforts to assure mission success require the expenditure of energy in the following areas: 1. Understanding what defines Mission Success as guided by the customer's needs, objectives and constraints. 2. Understanding how the system is supposed to work and how the system is to be produced, fueled by the curiosity of how the system should work and how it should be produced. 3. Understanding how the system can fail and how the system might not be produced on time and within cost, fueled by the curiosity of how the system might fail and how production might be difficult. 4. Understanding what we need to know and what we need learn for proper completion of the above three items, fueled by the curiosity of what we might not know in order to make the best decisions.

Bay, Michael↗