Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “human-system interaction”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

Light Water Sustainability Program: Optimizing Information Automation Using a New Method Based on System-Theoretic Process Analysis

This report describes the interim progress for research supporting the design and optimization of information automation systems for nuclear power plants. Much of the domestic nuclear fleet is currently focused on modernizing technologies and processes, including transitioning toward digitalization in the control room and elsewhere throughout the plant, along with a greater use of automation, artificial intelligence, robotics, and other emerging technologies. While there are significant opportunities to apply these technologies toward greater plant safety, efficiency, and overall cost-effectiveness, optimizing their design and avoiding potential safety and performance risks depends on ensuring that human-performance-related organizational and technical design issues are identified and addressed. This report describes modeling tools and techniques, based on sociotechnical system theory, to support these design goals and their application in the current research effort. The report is intended for senior nuclear energy stakeholders, including regulators, corporate management, and senior plant management. We have developed and employed a method to design an optimized information automation ecosystem (IAE) based on the systems-theoretic constructs underlying sociotechnical systems theory in general and the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) approach in particular. We argue that an IAE can be modeled as an interactive information control system whose behavior can be understood in terms of dynamic control and feedback relationships amongst the system’s technical and organizational components. Up to this point, we have employed a Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) technique to examine a performance- and safety-related incident at an industry partner’s plant that involved the unintentional activation of an emergency diesel generator. This analysis provided insight into the behavior of the plant’s current information control structure within the context of a specific, significant event. Our ongoing analysis is focused on identifying near-term process improvements and longer-term design requirements for an optimized IAE system. The latter analyses will employ a second STAMP-derived technique, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). STPA is a useful modeling tool for generating and analyzing actual or potential information control structures. Finally, we have begun modeling plantwide organizational relationships and processes. Organizational system modeling will supplement our CAST and STPA findings and provide a basis for mapping out a plantwide information control architecture. CAST analysis findings indicate an important underlying contributor to the incident under investigation, and a significant risk to information automation system performance, was perceived schedule pressure, which exposed weaknesses in interdepartmental coordination between and within responsible plant organizations and challenged the resilience of established plant processes, until a human caused the initiating event. These findings are discussed in terms of their risk to overall system performance and their implications for information automation system resilience and brittleness. We present two preliminary information automation models. The proactive issue resolution model is a test case of an information automation concept with significant near-term potential for application and subsequent reduction in significant plant events. The IAE model is a more general representation of a broader, plantwide information automation system. From our results, we have generated a set of preliminary system-level requirements and safety constraints. These requirements will be further developed over the remainder of our project in collaboration with nuclear industry subject matter experts and specialists in the technical systems under consideration. Additionally, we will continue to pursue the system analyses initiated in the first part of our effort, with a particular emphasis on STPA as the main tool to identify weak or weakening control structures that affect the resilience of organizations and programs. Our intent is to broaden the scope of the analysis from an individual use case to a related set of use cases (e.g., maintenance tasks, compliance tasks) with similar human-system performance challenges. This will enable more generalized findings to refine the Proactive Issue Resolution and IAE models, as well as their system-level requirements and safety constraints. We will use organizational system modeling analyses to supplement STPA findings and model development. We conclude the report with a set of summary recommendations and an initial draft list of system-level requirements and safety constraints for optimized information automation systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Human Rating Requirements for NASA's Constellation Program

NASA s Constellation Program (CxP) will conduct a series of human space expeditions of increasing scope, starting with missions supporting the International Space Station and expanding to encompass the Moon and Mars. Although human-rating is an integral part of all CxP activities throughout their life cycle, NASA Procedural Requirements document NPR 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements (HRR) for Space Flight Systems, defines the additional processes, procedures, and requirements necessary to produce human-rated space systems that protect the safety of crew members and passengers on these NASA missions. In order to be in compliance with 8705.2B the CxP must show appropriate implementation or progression toward the HRR, or justification for an exception. Compliance includes an explanation of how the CxP intends to meet the HRR, analyses to be performed to determine implementation; and a matrix to trace the HRR to CxP requirements. The HRR requires the CxP to establish a human system integration team (HSIT), consisting of astronauts, mission operations personnel, training personnel, ground processing personnel, human factors personnel, and human engineering experts, with clearly defined authority, responsibility, and accountability to lead the human-system integration. For example, per the HRR the HSIT is involved in the evaluation of crew workload, human-in-the-loop usability evaluations, determining associated criteria, and in assessment of how these activities influenced system design. In essence, the HSIT is invaluable in CxP s ability to meet the three fundamental tenets of human rating: the process of designing, evaluating, and assuring that the total system can safely conduct the required human missions; the incorporation of design features and capabilities that accommodate human interaction with the system to enhance overall safety and mission success; and the incorporation of design features and capabilities to enable safe recovery of the crew from hazardous situations.

Berdich, Debbie↗

Human-rating Automated and Robotic Systems - (How HAL Can Work Safely with Astronauts)

Long duration human space missions, as planned in the Vision for Space Exploration, will not be possible without applying unprecedented levels of automation to support the human endeavors. The automated and robotic systems must carry the load of routine housekeeping for the new generation of explorers, as well as assist their exploration science and engineering work with new precision. Fortunately, the state of automated and robotic systems is sophisticated and sturdy enough to do this work - but the systems themselves have never been human-rated as all other NASA physical systems used in human space flight have. Our intent in this paper is to provide perspective on requirements and architecture for the interfaces and interactions between human beings and the astonishing array of automated systems; and the approach we believe necessary to create human-rated systems and implement them in the space program. We will explain our proposed standard structure for automation and robotic systems, and the process by which we will develop and implement that standard as an addition to NASA s Human Rating requirements. Our work here is based on real experience with both human system and robotic system designs; for surface operations as well as for in-flight monitoring and control; and on the necessities we have discovered for human-systems integration in NASA's Constellation program. We hope this will be an invitation to dialog and to consideration of a new issue facing new generations of explorers and their outfitters.

Baroff, Lynn↗

NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health

This slide presentation reviews the history, and development of NASA-STD-3001, NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, and the related Human Integration Design Handbook. Currently being developed from NASA-STD-3000, this project standard currently in review will be available in two volumes, (i.e., Volume 1 -- VCrew Health and Volume 2 -- Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health) and the handbook will be both available as a pdf file and as a interactive website.

Holubec, Keith↗

Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health and the Human Integration Design Handbook

For decades, Space Life Sciences and NASA as an Agency have considered NASA-STD-3000, Man-Systems Integration Standards, a significant contribution to human spaceflight programs and to human-systems integration in general. The document has been referenced in numerous design standards both within NASA and by organizations throughout the world. With research program and project results being realized, advances in technology and new information in a variety of topic areas now available, the time arrived to update this extensive suite of requirements and design information. During the past several years, a multi-NASA center effort has been underway to write the update to NASA-STD-3000 with standards and design guidance that would be applicable to all future human spaceflight programs. NASA-STD-3001 - Volumes 1 and 2 - and the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) were created. Volume 1, Crew Health, establishes NASA s spaceflight crew health standards for the pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight phases of human spaceflight. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health, focuses on the requirements of human-system integration and how the human crew interacts with other systems, and how the human and the system function together to accomplish the tasks for mission success. The HIDH is a compendium of human spaceflight history and knowledge, and provides useful background information and research findings. And as the HIDH is a stand-alone companion to the Standards, the maintenance of the document has been streamlined. This unique and flexible approach ensures that the content is current and addresses the fundamental advances of human performance and human capabilities and constraints research. Current work focuses on the development of new sections of Volume 2 and collecting updates to the HIDH. The new sections in development expand the scope of the standard and address mission operations and support operations. This effort is again collaboration with representatives from the Johnson Space Center Missions Operations and Space Life Sciences Directorates and the Engineering Directorate from Kennedy Space Center as well as discipline experts from across the Agency.

Houbec, Keith↗

Evaluation of Early Ground Control Station Configurations for Interacting with a UAS Traffic Management (UTM) System

The purpose of this paper is to report on a human factors evaluation of ground control station design concepts for interacting with an unmanned traffic management system. The data collected for this paper comes from recent field tests for NASA's Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) project, and covers the following topics; workload, situation awareness, as well as flight crew communication, coordination, and procedures. The goal of this evaluation was to determine if the various software implementations for interacting with the UTM system can be described and classified into design concepts to provide guidance for the development of future UTM interfaces. We begin with a brief description of NASA's UTM project, followed by a description of the test range configuration related to a second development phase. We identified (post hoc) two classes in which the ground control stations could be grouped. This grouping was based on level of display integration. The analysis was exploratory and informal. It was conducted to compare ground stations across those two classes and against the aforementioned topics. Herein, we discuss the results.

unmanned traffic management↗

What Machines Need to Learn to Support Human Problem-Solving

In the development of intelligent systems that interact with humans, there is often confusion between how the system functions with respect to the humans it interacts with and how it interfaces with those humans. The former is a much deeper challenge than the latter it requires a system-level understanding of evolving human roles as well as an understanding of what humans need to know (and when) in order to perform their tasks. This talk will focus on some of the challenges in getting this right as well as on the type of research and development that results in successful human-autonomy teaming. Brief Bio: Dr. Alonso Vera is Chief of the Human Systems Integration Division at NASA Ames Research Center. His expertise is in human-computer interaction, information systems, artificial intelligence, and computational human performance modeling. He has led the design, development and deployment of mission software systems across NASA robotic and human space flight missions, including Mars Exploration Rovers, Phoenix Mars Lander, ISS, Constellation, and Exploration Systems. Dr. Vera received a Bachelor of Science with First Class Honors from McGill University in 1985 and a Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1991. He went on to a Post-Doctoral Fellowship in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University from 1990-93.

intelligent systems↗

Deep Space Human-Systems Research Recommendations for Future Human-Automation/Robotic Integration

Appropriate integration between automation and robotics systems and their human operators is essential for future space exploration. The Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element of NASA’s Human Research Program requires a systematic understanding of the critical human-automation/robotic (HAR) integration, or HARI, design challenges for future space exploration. This document reports the results of a systematic assessment of the spaceflight-relevant HARI technologies and research topics addressing critical gaps in spaceflight-relevant HARI knowledge, and prioritizes research required for successful human performance and HAR integration. We reviewed relevant literature across the past ten years and interviewed ten subject matter experts to investigate the current state of HARI technology, challenges facing development, the state of HARI research across a wide range of fields, and opportunities for advancing the state of the art through directed research. This information was used to identify relevant HARI technologies and research topics, as well as factors to assess relative priority of HARI technologies. We worked with NASA stakeholders to weight the factors relevant to assessing HARI specific technologies. A multi-dimensional trade analysis was performed to objectively score HARI research topics and specific technologies to recommended investment priorities for NASA.

human-automation interaction↗

Extreme Problem Solving: The New Challenges of Deep Space Exploration

On the International Space Station today, the crew has the near real-time support of a large group of system experts on the ground when dealing with problems on-board. For exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit, however, intermittent and delayed communication with ground will force small crews to take the lead in responding to vehicle anomalies. Enabling a flight crew of roughly four astronauts to perform the job that has traditionally been done by a ground crew of over 80 experts will require a fundamental rethinking of human-systems integration. Through observations of anomaly resolution processes, interviews with system experts and astronauts, and analyses of problem-solving models, we have identified the capabilities that are not currently available on-board but will be needed to enable safe exploration further away from Earth. These include increased data access, just-in-time training tools and technologies, and troubleshooting decision support. Important questions remain on how these technologies can be designed and implemented for increased crew autonomy. We present this critical challenge for deep space exploration to the human-computer interaction research community to reflect on the areas identified by our needs analysis and contemplate how they might be manifested as solutions.

autonomy↗

Human Capabilities Assessments for Autonomous Missions: A Multi-Team Research Effort to Reduce Risk in the Human-System Integration Architecture for Future Deep-Space Missions

In future exploration missions beyond low earth-orbit, crew will have to execute complex operations and respond to off-nominal events, without real-time support from Mission Control. It is anticipated that increased reliance on automated systems, including human-centric vehicle and information architecture, will need to be designed to support the crew; increased risk to performance, health, and safety may occur if these are not implemented appropriately. The Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element (HFBP) in the NASA Human Research Program supports research to characterize and mitigate such human health and performance risks, including the Risk of Adverse Outcome Due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). The HSIA risk addresses the integration of onboard capability and the crew roles and responsibilities necessary to enable the crew to respond effectively and efficiently in the increasingly autonomous mission operations environment. In 2017, HFBP released the “Human Capabilities Assessments for Autonomous Missions” (HCAAM) research topic to address HSIA related questions. HCAAM is a major NASA research effort that has assembled a multidisciplinary team from seven institutions to work closely with design and engineering efforts on research towards developing and refining human performance standards, guidelines and automation tools. The scientific focus is on quantitative assessment of human capabilities relevant to future deep-space missions during which earth/spacecraft communication is so delayed and intermittent that the crew must be able to function autonomously. The integrated strategy of the HCAAM project characterizes human capabilities and limitations related to potential performance decrements during long duration exploration mission spaceflight as relevant to both routine and complex task performance; defines system characteristics that reduce the likelihood or impact of potential decrements in human performance capabilities; performs integrated assessment of intelligent system responses within the context of an operational environment with relevant NASA tools, systems, and data structures in order to determine positive or negative interactions and validate recommended approaches; and proposes specific updates to existing standards and guidelines for inclusion in NASA handbooks for the design of future spacecraft intelligent systems that provide crew performance assessment/feedback, and to also serve as decision-support aids for the onboard crew (i.e., NASA-STD-3001, and NASA/SP-Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH)). The scientific research vectors being addressed by the seven HCAAM teams include: - crew task performance (accuracy, efficiency) (crew + automation) - crew performance (accuracy, efficiency) - crew Situation Awareness - procedure design and multi-modal enhancement - concurrent tasking (mixed manual + some level of autonomy) - task handover - crew self-planning and time-lining - task design - trust in automation, real-time calibration - human multi-sensory feedback and guidance - human trust in on-board software-based intelligent assistants - virtual assistants The presentation will highlight plans and progress made in each of these research areas as well as the methods by which surrogate astronaut crews in the NASA JSC HERA spaceflight analog facility will function as human test subjects for all of the HCAAM research projects.

HCAAM VNSCOR↗

Spacesuit and Mobility Performance Changes

The complex interactions between the human body and spacesuit lead to changes inmovement patterns and mobility performancesof the wearer. In general, factors including the geometric properties, such as shape and size, mechanical properties of the suit, and pressurization of the suit are known to be associated with altered movement patterns as compared to an unsuited human.However, their relative contributions have not been explicitly quantified from the mobility performance perspectives. The goal of this study wasthus to assessthe effects fromthe different types of mobility constraintconditions, namely by wearing either a 3D printed hard upper torso (HUT) assembly orfully pressurized spacesuit. The outcome was also compared against the unsuited motions. For this study, an xEMU (exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit) suitwas considered, which is the next generation spacesuit developed by NASA. In each test condition, the subject was asked to move the arm and hand as prescribedfor different task types, and the corresponding body segment locations were recordedusing a 3D motion capture system. The following three tasks were performedand analyzed: 1) Outward one-handed reaches:the subject in a standing pose made sweeping motions with the extended right arm from the extreme end-to-end positions, including side-to-side at different elevations and top-to-bottom at different azimuths. 2) Outward two-handed reaches:similarto the previous task, howeverthe subject kept the hands together during the motions in order to assessthe areas that can be reached by both hands. 3) Inward one-handed reaches:the subject made right-hand reach motions to the surface of the HUT.The hand traces collected from each task were modeled by a template shape parametrically deformed with a radial basis function. This process enabled foran abstraction of the hand traces into a smooth surface envelope representing the maximally reachable area of the test subject, of which the shapes and sizes were compared across the different test conditions. The preliminary analysis has shown that theoverall size of reachenvelopes decreases in a pressurized suit compared to 3D printed mockup HUT and unsuited conditions. The specific shape of the envelopes, which were determined by the reachable and unreachable zones, alsovary with the testconditions, and the differences werepronounced with the inward reaches to the HUT surface. The latter observation ispotentially relatedto the increased demandfor shoulder and elbow flexions.Overcomingthe resistance from the pressurizedsoft goods and mechanical constraints of the shoulder assemblywas seen to be associated with the difference in motion patterns between the suited and unsuited conditions. Overall, the information quantified from this study is expected to provide structured metrics for spacesuit mobility, which can improve design optimization and human-system integration.

K Han Kim↗

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, and Psychosocial Adaptions within a Team

The Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team (the Team Risk) is primarily performance-focused, with a secondary emphasis on behavioral health outcomes resulting from team performance and interpersonal interactions. Monitoring tools, measures, and countermeasures are aimed at enhancing team processes and team composition configurations to optimize team performance and functioning. Long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) will include major challenges that could affect team performance, including social isolation, physical confinement, a small and diverse crew, communication delays between crew and ground, limited or no crew rotation or evacuation options, limited or no resupply, and a high-consequence environment. Each of these conditions will affect the crew’s coordination, cooperation, psychological well-being, and performance. Although the International Space Station (ISS) remains important for studies that require spaceflight testing and validation, the current conditions on the ISS do not adequately mimic the exploration environment that is required for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) teams research, and thus access to terrestrial or ground-based analogs of LDEM conditions is paramount. The emphasis on analogs for research is reflected in this updated evidence review of the Team Risk, and includes data from studies conducted at isolated, confined, extreme (ICE) environments (e.g., Antarctic stations), and from several mission simulation analogs such as the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) (HERA Experiment Information Package, 2014), also known as isolated, confined, controlled (ICC) environments. These studies have characterized many team factors regarding LDEMs, and the Team Risk has now matured from risk characterization to focusing more on countermeasure development. Because spaceflight evidence for team-level research is lacking, no reliable data is available to quantify the impact of team-level variables on individual and team-level outcomes during spaceflight missions. Until recently, no systematic attempt had been undertaken to measure the performance effects of team cohesion, team composition, team training, or team-related psychosocial adaptation during spaceflight. The Team Risk is a relatively young research area for NASA, with substantial growth only since the 2000s, and with limited access to spaceflight performance data. As a result, spaceflight evidence is lacking to identify specifically what team composition, level of training, amount of cohesion, or quality of psychosocial adaptation is necessary to reduce the risk of performance errors in space. However, astronaut journals and interviews and reports from spaceflight subject matter experts (SMEs) provide testimonies that team performance during spaceflight is important for mission success and to maintain crew health. Team spaceflight data is now being collected as part of the Spaceflight Standard Measures task (Clement, 2021)—a set of core measurements related to many human spaceflight risks that are collected from astronauts before, during, and after long-duration missions. The team-related standard measures focus on team cohesion, team performance, group living, team climate, and team processes. Collection of standard measures data is ongoing and published data is not yet available. Finally, although spaceflight evidence is lacking, evidence gleaned from ground studies and spaceflight analog studies will help close the gaps outlined in the Team Risk. Ground-based studies provide quantitative evidence for team functioning in ICE environments. Academic research on teams has produced dozens of meta-analyses that can be used to understand the general relationships among team inputs (e.g., team member characteristics and skills, job context), team processes, and emergent states (e.g., coordination, communication, cooperation, cohesion, trust, shared cognition), and team outcomes (e.g., effectiveness, errors, adaptation). Teams are complex, incorporating individual characteristics of team members, but also existing at a level that is greater than the sum of its parts. Therefore, the Team Risk must be integrated with other individual-focused NASA Human Research Program (HRP) risks, including Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Sleep, and Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and emerging research indicates more integration may needed between the Team Risk and the physiologically oriented risks. Much of this integration occurs through the Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB). A lack of team functioning may be a stressor in some circumstances, but the team often acts as a countermeasure. For example, support for team leaders and teammates can facilitate individual functioning and encourage psychological and physically healthy behaviors and attitudes. However, more research is needed regarding teams during LDEMs and the remaining gaps in the research are described in the current report.

Lauren Blackwell Landon↗

Resilience Modeling in Complex Engineered Systems with Human-Machine Interactions

In recent times, there has been a growing interest in resilience-based design. Resilience-based design operates on the concept that failures and unexpected events will happen, and when they occur, complex engineered systems should be able to operate within acceptable bounds and recover reasonably. Humans can contribute to the resilience of a system by quickly detecting unforeseen events and taking corrective measures. To this effect, researchers have proposed guidelines and design approaches that can help promote human-system resilience. However, there is no early design stage tool to validate if a system is indeed resilient after applying these guidelines and design methods. In this research, we integrate the Human Error and Functional Failure Reasoning (HEFFR) framework into the fmdtools toolkit to enable designers to model the combined (machine, human, and joint) failures, including their propagation and dynamic effects, during early design stages. This integrated tool also allows designers to model the effects of performance shaping factors, team dynamics, and human-machine interactions in systems of systems. A demonstrative example of a remotely operated rover is explored to demonstrate how this approach can be applied to understand resilience in complex engineered systems with human interactions.

Lukman Irshad↗

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗

Risks of Increased Earth Independence

As human space exploration begins to extend beyond the immediate vicinity of Earth, the ability of expertise on the ground to support operations will progressively decrease. Ground control expertise has been the primary countermeasure preventing loss of life and mission over the past sixty years and it will be gradually stripped away as expeditions reach further into space. The large, flexible and adaptive teams of experts on the ground, provide not only engineering analysis and problem-solving but also greatly increased work capacity. Monitoring of the large and fast moving stream of telemetry data is carried out around the clock by 20-30 flight controllers per shift. Analysis of that data and troubleshooting is carried out by an additional 50-100 engineers per shift. Artificial intelligence capabilities will need to be part of the solution but will not the entire solution. As progress continues to be made on intelligent systems, especially those for use in complex, dynamic environments where humans will remain a part of the activity, there is an ever increasing need to focus on how those systems will interact with the humans. Although capabilities such as natural language processing and facial recognition have become common place, even basic aspects of problem-solving, causal reasoning and generative decision-making remain well-beyond of our current capabilities. Advanced data visualization, procedure execution support, and new training approaches will be needed to close the gap between what is currently provided by experts on the ground and what the crew will need to do in increasingly autonomous ways with greater distance from Earth.

human-systems integration architecture↗

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗

Effects of adaptive automation on operator-system performance - 103

Adaptive automation (AA) is the dynamic, real-time change in the degree of automation in response to situational changes. AA systems are being developed in many industries, including for nuclear power plant applications. AA is a promising means of mitigating human performance issues that often arise in highly automated systems. The purpose of this Nuclear Regulatory Commission study was to characterize important AA design features, define the effects of AA on performance, examine the human factors engineering (HFE) guidance available to design and evaluate AA systems, and identify research and development needs. In general, we found that AA improves task performance and situation awareness (SA) while managing workload. Although the research is limited, AA also supports operator recognition of automation failure and recovery. Research on human-system interfaces has identified principles showing promise for supporting SA, including failure detection, and limiting workload. Research further suggests that AA systems are both more effective, and less disruptive and distracting, when they follow rules of interaction similar to those used by human crewmembers. Our general conclusion about the HFE guidance available to designers and reviewers is that it is limited and has not kept pace with automation technology. We discuss several research and development needs that will help support a better understanding of where and how AA should be used and support the development of more comprehensive guidance for AA safety reviews. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Human factors and modeling methods in the development of control room modernization concepts - 315

Control room modernization is one of the most challenging and complex upgrade projects that a nuclear power plant can undertake. It can even have a bigger impact on operations than, for example, turbine replacement. The challenges of migrating an analog control system to a distributed control system are already well known and a number of nuclear utilities have embarked upon various levels of effort to upgrade some of the systems in the control room. When planning for control room upgrades, plants have to deal with a multitude of engineering and operational impacts. This will inevitably include several human factors considerations, including physical ergonomics of workstations, viewing angles, lighting, seating, new communication requirements, and new concepts of operation. In helping nuclear power utilities to deal with these challenges, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed human factors design and evaluation methods to be used in the development of an end-state control room concept and to manage the various phases of the upgrade life cycle. This included interactive sessions with operators in INL's Human System Simulation Laboratory, and three-dimensional modeling to visualize control board changes. To make the various upgrade phases as concrete and as visible as possible, the end-state concept includes a set of visual representations of the control room before and after various upgrade phases to provide the context and a framework within which to consider the various options in the upgrade. This includes the various control systems, human-system interfaces to be replaced, and possible changes to operator workstations. This paper describes how this framework helps to ensure an integrated and cohesive outcome that is consistent with human factors engineering principles and also provide substantial improvement in operator performance. The paper further describes the application of this integrated approach in the strategic modernization program at a nuclear power plant where legacy systems are upgraded to advanced digital technologies through a systematic process that links human factors principles to the systems engineering process. This approach results in an integrated control room architecture beyond what is possible for individual subsystem upgrades alone. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗