NASA lessons learned: moving to a more formal process
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The Marshall Space Flight Center's Propulsion Systems Department has gained significant experience in the last year designing, building, and testing liquid engine components using additive manufacturing. The department has developed valve, duct, turbo-machinery, and combustion device components using this technology. Many valuable lessons were learned during this process. These lessons will be the focus of this presentation. We will present criteria for selecting part candidates for additive manufacturing. Some part characteristics are 'tailor made' for this process. Selecting the right parts for the process is the first step to maximizing productivity gains. We will also present specific lessons we learned about feature geometry that can and cannot be produced using additive manufacturing machines. Most liquid engine components were made using a two-step process. The base part was made using additive manufacturing and then traditional machining processes were used to produce the final part. The presentation will describe design accommodations needed to make the base part and lessons we learned about which features could be built directly and which require the final machine process. Tolerance capabilities, surface finish, and material thickness allowances will also be covered. Additive Manufacturing can produce internal passages that cannot be made using traditional approaches. It can also eliminate a significant amount of manpower by reducing part count and leveraging model-based design and analysis techniques. Information will be shared about performance enhancements and design efficiencies we experienced for certain categories of engine parts.
In order for solar sail propulsion technologies to be considered as a viable option for a wide range of near term practical missions a predictable, stable, reliable, manufactureable, scaleable, and cost effective system must be developed and tested first on earth and then on orbit. The design and development of a Scaleable Square Solar Sail System (S^4) is well underway a t AEC-Able Engineering Co. Inc., and the design and production of the Solar Sails for this system is being carried out by SRS Technologies. In April and May of 2004 a single quadrant 10-meter system was tested at NASA LARC's vacuum chamber and a four quadrant 20-meter system has been designed and built for deployment and testing in the Spring of 2005 at NASA/Glenn Research Center's Plumb Brook Facility. SRS has developed an effective and efficient design for triangular sail quadrants that are supported are three points and provide a flat reflective surface with a high fill factor. This sail design is robust enough for deployments in a one atmosphere, one gravity environment and incorporates several advanced features including adhesiveless seaming of membrane strips, compliant edge borders to allow for film membrane cord strain mismatch without causing wrinkling and low mass (3% of total sail mass) ripstop. This paper will outline the sail design and fabrication process, the lessons learned and the resulting mature production, packaging and deployment processes that have been developed. It will also highlight the scalability of the equipment and processes that were developed to fabricate and package the sails. Based on recent experience, SRS is confidant that flight worthy solar sails in the 40-120-meter size range with areal density in the 4-5g/sq m (sail minus structure) range can be produced with existing technology. Additional film production research will lead to further reductions in film thickness to less than 1 micron enabling production of sails with areal densities as low as 20 g/sq m using the current design resulting in a system areal density of as low as 5.3g/sq m. These areal densities are low enough to allow nearly all of the Solar Sail missions that have been proposed by the scientific community and the fundamental technology required to produce these sails has been demonstrated on the ground test sails that have recently been built. These demonstrations have shown that the technology is mature enough to build sails needed to support critical science missions. Solar Sails will be an enabling technology for NASA's Vision for Space Exploration by allowing communication satellite orbits that can maintain continuous communication with the polar regions of the Moon and Mars and to support solar weather monitoring to provide early warning of solar flares and storms that could threaten the safety of astronauts and other spacecraft.
The obsolescence of materials and processes used in the manufacture of traditional DC brush gear motors has necessitated the development of an upgraded DC brush gear motor (UBGM). The current traditional DC brush gear motor (BGM) design was evaluated using Six-Sigma process to identify potential design and production process improvements. The development effort resulted in a qualified UBGM design which improved manufacturability and reduced production costs. Using Six-Sigma processes and incorporating lessons learned during the development process also improved motor performance for UBGM making it a more viable option for future use as a deployment mechanism in space flight applications.
This presentation discusses the experiences of the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center's (DFRC) Western Aeronautical Test Range (WATR) in dealing with the problems encountered while performing post flight data processing using the WATR's data collection/processing system on Chapter 10 files from different Chapter 10 recorders. The transition to Chapter 10 recorders has brought Vvith it an assortment of issues that must be addressed: the ambiguities of language in the Chapter 10 standard, the unrealistic near-term expectations of the Chapter 10 standard, the incompatibility of data products generated from Chapter 10 recorders, and the unavailability of mature Chapter 10 applications. Some of these issues properly belong to the users of Chapter 10 recorders, some to the manufacturers, and some to the flight test community at large. The goal of this presentation is to share the WATR's lesson learned in processing data products from various Chapter 10 recorder vendors. The WATR could benefit greatly in the open forum Vvith lessons learned discussions with other members of the flight test community.
Engineering design is a challenging activity for any product. Since launch vehicles are highly complex and interconnected and have extreme energy densities, their design represents a challenge of the highest order. The purpose of this document is to delineate and clarify the design process associated with the launch vehicle for space flight transportation. The goal is to define and characterize a baseline for the space transportation design process. This baseline can be used as a basis for improving effectiveness and efficiency of the design process. The baseline characterization is achieved via compartmentalization and technical integration of subsystems, design functions, and discipline functions. First, a global design process overview is provided in order to show responsibility, interactions, and connectivity of overall aspects of the design process. Then design essentials are delineated in order to emphasize necessary features of the design process that are sometimes overlooked. Finally the design process characterization is presented. This is accomplished by considering project technical framework, technical integration, process description (technical integration model, subsystem tree, design/discipline planes, decision gates, and tasks), and the design sequence. Also included in the document are a snapshot relating to process improvements, illustrations of the process, a survey of recommendations from experienced practitioners in aerospace, lessons learned, references, and a bibliography.
One of the major concerns of any maintenance organization is to understand and estimate the cost of maintenance releases of software systems. Planning the next release so as to maximize the increase in functionality and the improvement in quality are vital to successful maintenance management. The objective of this paper is to present the results of a case study in which an incremental approach was used to better understand the effort distribution of releases and build a predictive effort model for software maintenance releases. This study was conducted in the Flight Dynamics Division (FDD) of NASA Goddard Space Flight Center(GSFC). This paper presents three main results: 1) a predictive effort model developed for the FDD's software maintenance release process; 2) measurement-based lessons learned about the maintenance process in the FDD; and 3) a set of lessons learned about the establishment of a measurement-based software maintenance improvement program. In addition, this study provides insights and guidelines for obtaining similar results in other maintenance organizations.
Satellite observations provide information about the Earth that can be critical to building situational awareness and filling in data gaps during disaster response. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Science Division’s Disasters Program aims to advance Earth science data and information to support management decisions that prevent or mitigate the impacts of disasters. In support of this goal, NASA’s Disaster Response Coordination System (DRCS) manages a One-NASA approach to coordinate and mobilize the Agency’s assets and expertise to provide geospatial information during disasters. The purpose of the DRCS is to advance the utility of Earth observation information for supporting disaster response decision support, build skilled and effective response communities through improved coordination, engagement, and learning, and reduce impact to lives and livelihoods by empowering communities to respond to disasters more effectively. The DRCS employs a user-centered, activation framework that begins with direct requests from responders and ends with after-action assessments that feed lessons learned and process improvements. This poster will introduce the DRCS model and approach to expanding the use of Earth observations and geospatial information to support disaster response, share use cases for recent event activations, and highlight initial lessons learned.
Satellite observations can provide critical insights to building situational awareness and filling data gaps during disaster response. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Science Division’s Disasters Program aims to advance Earth science data and information to support management decisions that prevent or mitigate the impacts of disasters. In support of this goal, NASA’s Disasters Response Coordination System (DRCS) employs a “One NASA” approach to coordinate and mobilize the Agency’s assets and expertise to provide geospatial information during disasters. The DRCS advances the utility of Earth observation information for supporting disaster response needs and builds skills in the emergency management and disaster response communities through improved coordination, engagement, and learning. The DRCS aims to support reduction of impact to lives and livelihoods by empowering communities to more effectively respond to disasters. The DRCS is organized across six NASA centers and managed by a project office located at NASA Langley, working in alignment with NASA Headquarters. The DRCS employs a user-centered framework that begins with requests from disaster responders (state, local, federal government and non-profits working at a national scale) and ends with after-action assessments that feed lessons learned and process improvements. This poster introduces the DRCS model and approach to expanding the use of Earth observations and geospatial information to support disaster response, share use cases for recent event activations working with decision-making organizations, and highlight initial lessons learned.
During fiscal years 2020-2022 NASA’s Human Research Program, Exploration Medical Capability Element has worked to source this evidence for the model. During the process several lessons learned have been identified and drive recommendations for future efforts. The ICL 1.0: Spaceflight Medical Operational expertise should be consulted regarding the addition of future conditions. A clinician experienced with the nuances of spaceflight is recommended to have a minimum of 20 hours per condition to adequately source the evidence. Condition definitions should be carefully crafted to maintain mutual exclusivity. Common side effects from medications, common and consequential incidental findings in laboratory studies, and consequential side effects of diagnostic and procedural capabilities should be considered for inclusion as unique conditions in future iterations of the ICL 1.0. Incidence: Spaceflight incidence, although based on small population sizes, is the gold standard. Terrestrial incidence should be applied cautiously. Probability of minor vs. severe cases of the condition: Data informing severity probability of the medical condition are nearly always terrestrial. Special attention should be paid to this metric as it drives outcomes in the model and terrestrial data often overestimate severity of expected cases in spaceflight. Condition duration: Three clinical phases currently exist in the model. They represent the time necessary for diagnosis, treatment/convalescence/recurrence, and the remaining duration of the mission after maximal recovery, respectively. Further subdivision of acute and convalescent treatment/recurrence is recommended. Probability of need for evacuation: Surrogates for “Return to Definitive Care” were chosen prior to data collection. In most cases these surrogates were “need for hospitalization” or “need for surgery.” For many conditions these may not be realistic drivers of “Return to Definitive Care” and should be re-examined. Probability of Crew Mortality: Terrestrial mortality data is difficult to apply to astronauts who, invariably, have less comorbidities than terrestrial subjects. It must be applied judiciously. The proportion of mission tasks impaired by the condition: “Task Impairment” was assigned to each condition prior to the condition duration data becoming available. Future efforts should assign Task Impairment as the final step in sourcing the evidence.
The authors discuss a trend analysis program that is being conducted on the problem reports written during the processing of Space Shuttle payloads at Kennedy Space Center. The program is aimed at developing lessons learned that can both improve the effectiveness of the current payload processing cycles as well as help to guide the processing strategies for Space Station Freedom. The payload processing reports from STS 26R and STS 41 are used. A two-tier evaluation activity is described, and some typical results from the tier one analyses are presented.
Following the failure of 44P on launch in August 2011, and the subsequent grounding of all Russian Soyuz rocket based launches, the ISS ground teams engaged in an effort to determine how long the ISS could remain crewed, what would be required to safely configure the ISS for decrewing, and what would be required to recrew the ISS upon resumption of Soyuz rocket launches if decrewing became necessary. This White Paper was written to capture the processes and lessons learned from real-time time events and to provide a reference and training document for ISS Program teams in the event decrewing of the ISS is needed. Through coordination meetings and assessments, teams identified six decrewing priorities for ground and crew operations. These priorities were integrated along with preflight priorities through the Increment replanning process. Additionally, the teams reviewed, updated, and implemented changes to the governing documentation for the configuration of the ISS for a contingency decrewing event. Steps were taken to identify critical items for disposal prior to decrewing, as well as identifying the required items to be strategically staged or flown with the astronauts and cosmonauts who would eventually recrew the ISS. After the successful launches and dockings of both 45P and 28S, the decrewing team transitioned to finalizing and publishing the documentation for standardizing the decrewing flight rules. With the continued launching of crews and cargo to the ISS, utilization and science is again a high priority, with the Increment pairs 29 and 30, and 31 and 32 reaching the milestone of at least 35 hours per week average utilization.
Following the failure of 44 Progress (44P) on launch in August 2011, and the subsequent grounding of all Russian Soyuz rocket based launches, the International Space Station (ISS) ground teams engaged in an effort to determine how long the ISS could remain crewed, what would be required to safely configure the ISS for decrewing, and what would be required to recrew the ISS upon resumption of Soyuz rocket launches if decrewing became necessary. This White Paper was written to capture the processes and lessons learned from real-time time events and to provide a reference and training document for ISS Program teams in the event decrewing of the ISS is needed. Through coordination meetings and assessments, teams identified six decrewing priorities for ground and crew operations. These priorities were integrated along with preflight priorities through the Increment re-planning process. Additionally, the teams reviewed, updated, and implemented changes to the governing documentation for the configuration of the ISS for a contingency decrewing event. Steps were taken to identify critical items for disposal prior to decrewing, as well as identifying the required items to be strategically staged or flown with the astronauts and cosmonauts who would eventually recrew the ISS. After the successful launches and dockings of both 45P and 28 Soyuz (28S), the decrewing team transitioned to finalizing and publishing the documentation for standardizing the decrewing flight rules. With the continued launching of crews and cargo to the ISS, utilization and science is again a high priority; both Increment pairs 29 and 30, and Increment 31 and 32 reaching the milestone of at least 35 hours per week average utilization.
Much can be learned from well-written descriptions of the technical and organizational factors that lead to an accident. Subsequent analysis by third parties of investigation reports and associated evidence collected during the investigations can lead to additional insight. Much can also be learned from documented close calls that do not result in loss of life or a spacecraft, such as the Mars Exploration Rover Spirit software anomaly, the SOHO mission interruption, and the NEAR burn anomaly. Seven space shuttle incidents fall into the latter category: Rendezvous Target Failure On STS-41B; Rendezvous Radar Anomaly and Trajectory Dispersion-STS-32 ;Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly-STS-49; Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly-STS-51; Zero Doppler Steering Maneuver Anomaly-STS-59; Excessive Propellant Consumption During Rendezvous-STS-69; Global Positioning System Receiver and Associated Shuttle Flight Software Anomalies-STS-91 Procedural work-arounds or software changes prevented them from threatening mission success. Extensive investigations, which included the independent recreation of the anomalies by multiple Shuttle Program organizations, were the key to determining the cause, accurately assessing risk, and identifying software and software process improvements. Lessons learned from these incidents not only validated long-standing operational best practices, but serve to promote discussion and mentoring among Program personnel and are applicable to future space flight programs.
The qualification of 325 MHz Single Spoke Resonators type 2 (SSR2) jacketed cavities to meet technical requirements represents a significant milestone in the development of the SSR2 cryomodules for the PIP-II Project at Fermilab. This poster reports the procedures and lessons learned in processing and preparing these cavities for horizontal cold testing prior to integration into a cavity string assembly, with a focus on addressing the field emission issues observed during the cold testing. A comprehensive root cause analysis identified critical fabrication, processing, and handling factors impacting field emission onset. New techniques were successfully developed and implemented to achieve field emission-free SSR2 cavities, and efforts were made to correlate radiation levels measured at the test stand with expected levels in the LINAC tunnel. Additionally, the evolution of field emission through assembly steps was thoroughly investigated, leading to a reassessment of design choices and enhancing our understanding of their effects on cavity performance.
The Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) has been operating for more than two decades in the Flight Dynamics Division (FDD) and has adapted to the constant movement of the software development environment. The SEL's Improvement Paradigm shows that process improvement is an iterative process. Understanding, Assessing and Packaging are the three steps that are followed in this cyclical paradigm. As the improvement process cycles back to the first step, after having packaged some experience, the level of understanding will be greater. In the past, products resulting from the packaging step have been large process documents, guidebooks, and training programs. As the technical world moves toward more modularized software, we have made a move toward more modularized software development process documentation, as such the products of the packaging step are becoming smaller and more frequent. In this manner, the QIP takes on a more spiral approach rather than a waterfall. This paper describes the state of the FDD in the area of software development processes, as revealed through the understanding and assessing activities conducted by the COTS study team. The insights presented include: (1) a characterization of a typical FDD Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) intensive software development life-cycle process, (2) lessons learned through the COTS study interviews, and (3) a description of changes in the SEL due to the changing and accelerating nature of software development in the FDD.
The final report contains strip rate data from all of the methods, lessons learned during processing, metallurgical evaluations of the panels, and summaries of corrosion and hydrogen embrittlement studies. Any changes in surface roughness, fatigue and tensile properties, and crack detectability are noted in the report. No process was singled out above the others, as companies should consider equipment and operational costs when complying with the Aerospace NESHAP (National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants) and new OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) regulations.
In the fall of 2004, the Earth Science Mission Operations Project tasked the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSPC) Flight Dynamics Analysis Branch with establishment of a process to protect the high-value Earth Observing System (EOS) missions (Terra, Aqua, and Aura) from close approaches with space debris and other orbiting objects. An agreement between GSFC and the United States Strategic Command was put in place so that close approach predictions would be routinely generated. This paper describes the ESMO conjunction assessment process for the EOS satellites. Process details, including tools and algorithms developed, are discussed. Particular details for a predicted close approach between Terra and a piece of space debris that resulted in the execution of a debris avoidance maneuver are included. This close approach example is described in detail fiom the first screening identification through execution of the mitigation maneuver to illustrate both the process and lessons learned fiom its implementation.