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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2015

Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance into Systems Engineering Modeling Practices

During the early development of products, flight, or experimental hardware, emphasis is often given to the identification of technical requirements, utilizing such tools as use case and activity diagrams. Designers and project teams focus on understanding physical and performance demands and challenges. It is typically only later, during the evaluation of preliminary designs that a first pass, if performed, is made to determine the process, safety, and mission quality assurance requirements. Evaluation early in the life cycle, though, can yield requirements that force a fundamental change in design. This paper discusses an alternate paradigm for using the concepts of use case or activity diagrams to identify safety hazard and mission quality assurance risks and concerns using the same systems engineering modeling tools being used to identify technical requirements. It contains two examples of how this process might be used in the development of a space flight experiment, and the design of a Human Powered Pizza Delivery Vehicle, along with the potential benefits to decrease development time, and provide stronger budget estimates.

Requirements↗
NASA NTRS2010

Johnson Space Center Health and Medical Technical Authority

1.HMTA responsibilities: a) Assure program/project compliance with Agency health and medical requirements at identified key decision points. b) Certify that programs/projects comply with Agency health and medical requirements prior to spaceflight missions. c) Assure technical excellence. 2. Designation of applicable NASA Centers for HMTA implementation and Chief Medical Officer (CMO) appointment. 3. Center CMO responsible for HMTA implementation for programs and projects at the center. JSC HMTA captured in "JSC HMTA Implementation Plan". 4. Establishes specifics of dissenting opinion process consistent with NASA procedural requirements.

Fogarty, Jennifer A.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Space Station Furnace Facility Management Information System (SSFF-MIS) Development

This report summarizes the chronology, results, and lessons learned from the development of the SSFF-MIS. This system has been nearly two years in development and has yielded some valuable insights into specialized MIS development. General: In December of 1994, the Camber Corporation and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) were contracted to design, develop, and implement a MIS for Marshall Space Flight Center's Space Station Furnace Facility Project. The system was to be accessible from both EBM-Compatible PC and Macintosh platforms. The system was required to contain data manually entered into the MIS as well as data imported from other MSFC sources. Electronic interfaces were established for each data source and retrieval was to be performed at prescribed time intervals. The SOW requirement that predominantly drove the development software selection was the dual-platform (IBM-PC and Macintosh) requirement. The requirement that the system would be maintained by Government personnel influenced the selection of Commercial Off-the-shelf software because of its inherent stability and readily available documentation and support. Microsoft FoxPro Professional 2.6 for Windows and Macintosh was selected as the development tool. This is a software development tool that has been in use for many years. It is stable and powerful. Microsoft has since released the replacement for this product, Microsoft Visual FoxPro, but at the time of this development, it was only available on the Windows platform. The initial contract included included the requirement for capabilities relating to the Work- and Organizational Breakdown Structures, cost (plan and actuals), workforce (plan and actuals), critical path scheduling, trend analysis, procurements and contracts, interface to manufacturing, Safety and Mission Assurance, risk analysis, and technical performance indicators. It also required full documentation of the system and training of users. During the course of the contract, the requirements for Safety and Mission Assurance interface, risk analysis, and technical performance indicators were deleted. Additional capabilities were added as reflected in the Contract Chronology below. Modification 4 added the requirement for Support Contractor manpower data, the ability to manually input data not imported from non-nal sources, a general 'health' indicator screen, and remote usage. Mod 6 included the ability to change the level of planning of Civil Service Manpower at any time and the ability to manually enter Op Codes in the manufacturing data where such codes were not provided by the EMPACS database. Modification 9 included a number of changes to report contents and formats. Modification 11 required the preparation of a detailed System Design Document.

Meade, Robert M.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Summary of EOS flight dynamics analysis

From a flight dynamics perspective, the Earth Observing System (EOS) spacecraft present a number of challenges to mission designers. The Flight Dynamics Support Branch of NASA GSFC has examined a number of these challenges, including managing the EOS constellation, disposing of the spacecraft at the end-of-life (EOL), and achieving the appropriate mission orbit given launch vehicle and ascent propulsion constraints. The EOS program consists of a number of spacecraft including EOS-AM, an ascending node spacecraft, EOS-PM, a descending node spacecraft, the EOS Chemistry mission (EOS-CHEM), the EOS Altimetry Laser (EOS-LALT), and the EOS-Altimetry Radar (EOS-RALT). The orbit characteristics of these missions are presented. In order to assure that downlinking data from each spacecraft will be possible without interference between any two spacecraft, a careful examination of the relationships between spacecraft and how to maintain the spacecraft in a configuration which would minimize these communications problems must be made. The FDSB has performed various analyses to determine whether the spacecraft will be in a position to interfere with each other, how the orbit dynamics will change the relative positioning of the spacecraft over their lifetimes, and how maintenance maneuvers could be performed, if needed, to minimize communications problems. Prompted by an activity at NASA HQ to set guidelines for spacecraft regarding their end-of-life dispositions, much analysis has also been performed to determine the spacecraft lifetime of EOS-AM1 under various conditions, and to make suggestions regarding the spacecraft disposal. In performing this analysis, some general trends have been observed in lifetime calculations. The paper will present the EOS-AM1 lifetime results, comment on general reentry conclusions, and discuss how these analyses reflect on the HQ NMI. Placing the EOS spacecraft into their respective mission orbits involves some intricate maneuver planning to assure that all mission orbit requirements are met, given the initial conditions supplied by the launch vehicle at injection. The FDSB has developed an ascent scenario to meet the mission requirements. This paper presents results of the ascent analysis.

Newman, Lauri Kraft↗
NASA NTRS2017

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA): Challenges and New Considerations

Use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and emerging technologies often require space flight missions to accept elevated risk. The Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) flow includes environment definition, hazard evaluation, requirements definition, evaluation of design, and design trades to accommodate and mitigate the risk a project or program takes. Depending on the mission profile and environment, different missions may not necessarily benefit from the same risk reduction efforts or cost reduction attempts. While this poses challenges for the radiation engineer, it also presents opportunities to tailor the RHA flow to minimize risk based on the environment or design criticality while remaining within budget. This presentation will focus on an approach to RHA amidst the present challenges, using the same RHA flow as in the past, with examples from recent radiation test results. The current challenges and the types of risk will be identified. How these risks drive requirements development and realization will be explained with examples of device results and data for single event effects (SEE) and in one case total ionizing dose (TID).

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA); Risk Managemen↗
NASA NTRS2005

Challenges of Developing New Classes of NASA Self-Managing Mission

NASA is proposing increasingly complex missions that will require a high degree of autonomy and autonomicity. These missions pose hereto unforeseen problems and raise issues that have not been well-addressed by the community. Assuring success of such missions will require new software development techniques and tools. This paper discusses some of the challenges that NASA and the rest of the software development community are facing in developing these ever-increasingly complex systems. We give an overview of a proposed NASA mission as well as techniques and tools that are being developed to address autonomic management and the complexity issues inherent in these missions.

Hinchey, M. G.↗
NASA NTRS2001

An Earth Entry Vehicle For Returning Samples From Mars

The driving requirement for design of a Mars Sample return mission is assuring containment of the returned samples. The impact of this requirement on developmental costs, mass allocation, and design approach of the Earth Entry Vehicle is significant. A simple Earth entry vehicle is described which can meet these requirements and safely transport the Mars Sample Return mission's sample through the Earth's atmosphere to a recoverable location on the surface. Detailed analysis and test are combined with probabilistic risk assessment to design this entirely passive concept that circumvents the potential failure modes of a parachute terminal descent system. The design also possesses features that mitigate other risks during the entry, descent, landing and recovery phases. The results of a full-scale drop test are summarized.

Mitcheltree, R.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Earth Entry Vehicle for Mars Sample Return

The driving requirement for design of a Mars Sample return mission is assuring containment of the returned samples. The impact of this requirement on developmental costs, mass allocation, and design approach of the Earth Entry Vehicle is significant. A simple Earth entry vehicle is described which can meet these requirements and safely transport the Mars Sample Return mission's sample through the Earth's atmosphere to a recoverable location on the surface. Detailed analysis and test are combined with probabilistic risk assessment to design this entirely passive concept that circumvents the potential failure modes of a parachute terminal descent system. The design also possesses features that mitigate other risks during the entry, descent, landing and recovery phases. The results of a full-scale drop test are summarized.

Mitcheltree, R. A.↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Survey of Formal Methods for Intelligent Swarms

Swarms of intelligent autonomous spacecraft, involving complex behaviors and interactions, are being proposed for future space exploration missions. Such missions provide greater flexibility and offer the possibility of gathering more science data than traditional single spacecraft missions. The emergent properties of swarms make these missions powerful, but simultaneously far more difficult to design, and to assure that the proper behaviors will emerge. These missions are also considerably more complex than previous types of missions, and NASA, like other organizations, has little experience in developing or in verifying and validating these types of missions. A significant challenge when verifying and validating swarms of intelligent interacting agents is how to determine that the possible exponential interactions and emergent behaviors are producing the desired results. Assuring correct behavior and interactions of swarms will be critical to mission success. The Autonomous Nano Technology Swarm (ANTS) mission is an example of one of the swarm types of missions NASA is considering. The ANTS mission will use a swarm of picospacecraft that will fly from Earth orbit to the Asteroid Belt. Using an insect colony analogy, ANTS will be composed of specialized workers for asteroid exploration. Exploration would consist of cataloguing the mass, density, morphology, and chemical composition of the asteroids, including any anomalous concentrations of specific minerals. To perform this task, ANTS would carry miniaturized instruments, such as imagers, spectrometers, and detectors. Since ANTS and other similar missions are going to consist of autonomous spacecraft that may be out of contact with the earth for extended periods of time, and have low bandwidths due to weight constraints, it will be difficult to observe improper behavior and to correct any errors after launch. Providing V&V (verification and validation) for this type of mission is new to NASA, and represents the cutting edge in system correctness, and requires higher levels of assurance than other (traditional) missions that use a single or small number of spacecraft that are deterministic in nature and have near continuous communication access. One of the highest possible levels of assurance comes from the application of formal methods. Formal methods are mathematics-based tools and techniques for specifying and verifying (software and hardware) systems. They are particularly useful for specifying complex parallel systems, such as exemplified by the ANTS mission, where the entire system is difficult for a single person to fully understand, a problem that is multiplied with multiple developers. Once written, a formal specification can be used to prove properties of a system (e.g., the underlying system will go from one state to another or not into a specific state) and check for particular types of errors (e.g., race or livelock conditions). A formal specification can also be used as input to a model checker for further validation. This report gives the results of a survey of formal methods techniques for verification and validation of space missions that use swarm technology. Multiple formal methods were evaluated to determine their effectiveness in modeling and assuring the behavior of swarms of spacecraft using the ANTS mission as an example system. This report is the first result of the project to determine formal approaches that are promising for formally specifying swarm-based systems. From this survey, the most promising approaches were selected and are discussed relative to their possible application to the ANTS mission. Future work will include the application of an integrated approach, based on the selected approaches identified in this report, to the formal specification of the ANTS mission.

Truszkowski, Walt↗
NASA NTRS1993

Assured Mission Support Space Architecture (AMSSA) study

The assured mission support space architecture (AMSSA) study was conducted with the overall goal of developing a long-term requirements-driven integrated space architecture to provide responsive and sustained space support to the combatant commands. Although derivation of an architecture was the focus of the study, there are three significant products from the effort. The first is a philosophy that defines the necessary attributes for the development and operation of space systems to ensure an integrated, interoperable architecture that, by design, provides a high degree of combat utility. The second is the architecture itself; based on an interoperable system-of-systems strategy, it reflects a long-range goal for space that will evolve as user requirements adapt to a changing world environment. The third product is the framework of a process that, when fully developed, will provide essential information to key decision makers for space systems acquisition in order to achieve the AMSSA goal. It is a categorical imperative that military space planners develop space systems that will act as true force multipliers. AMSSA provides the philosophy, process, and architecture that, when integrated with the DOD requirements and acquisition procedures, can yield an assured mission support capability from space to the combatant commanders. An important feature of the AMSSA initiative is the participation by every organization that has a role or interest in space systems development and operation. With continued community involvement, the concept of the AMSSA will become a reality. In summary, AMSSA offers a better way to think about space (philosophy) that can lead to the effective utilization of limited resources (process) with an infrastructure designed to meet the future space needs (architecture) of our combat forces.

Hamon, Rob↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Tailoring of NASA-STD-3001 to Lunar Gateway Program Requirements

The Gateway Program must meet NASA's Agency-level human rating requirements, which are intended to accommodate human capabilities and limitations while protecting the safety of the crew, and providing to the maximum extent practical, the capability to safely recover the crew from hazardous situations. Human systems integration represents a key human rating component of Moon to Mars systems to support the execution of Artemis missions, including compliance with mandatory standards for Health and Medical, Safety and Mission Assurance, and Engineering. The human system requirements, together with the human systems integration plan, medical operations requirements, and Gateway sub-system specifications, represent the flow-down of NASA Health and Medical Standards (NASA-STD-3001, Volumes 1 and 2) into the Gateway system. This paper discusses how these documents and other human systems integration activities provide full consideration of human capabilities and limitations as part of the total system design trade space, serving as an example on how the human must be effectively integrated as part of the system in order to achieve mission success. At a bigger scale, the paper con-tributes to the application of systems engineering standards to cutting-edge space exploration initiatives and to the dialogue on how systems engineering can continue to evolve to meet the needs of such ambitious projects.

Systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS2009

Review of the Constellation Level II Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) Requirements Documents during Participation in the Constellation Level II SR&QA Forum

At the request of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) and the Constellation Program (CxP) Safety, Reliability; and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) Requirements Director, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) participated in the Cx SR&QA Requirements forum. The Requirements Forum was held June 24-26; 2008, at GRC's Plum Brook Facility. The forums purpose was to gather all stakeholders into a focused meeting to help complete the process of refining the CxP to refine its Level II SR&QA requirements or defining project-specific requirements tailoring. Element prime contractors had raised specific questions about the wording and intent of many requirements in areas they felt were driving costs without adding commensurate value. NESC was asked to provide an independent and thorough review of requirements that contractors believed were driving Program costs, by active participation in the forum. This document contains information from the forum.

Cameron, Kenneth D.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Environmental Assurance Program for the Phoenix Mars Mission

The Phoenix Mars mission involves delivering a stationary science lander on to the surface of Mars in the polar region within the latitude band 65 deg N to 72 deg N. Its primary objective is to perform in-situ and remote sensing investigations that will characterize the chemistry of the materials at the local surface, subsurface, and atmosphere. The Phoenix spacecraft was launched on August 4, 2007 and will arrive at Mars in May 2008. The lander includes a suite of seven (7) science instruments. This mission is baselined for up to 90 sols (Martian days) of digging, sampling, and analysis. Operating at the Mars polar region creates a challenging environment for the Phoenix landed subsystems and instruments with Mars surface temperature extremes between -120 deg C to 25 deg C and diurnal thermal cycling in excess of 145 deg C. Some engineering and science hardware inside the lander were qualification tested up to 80 deg C to account for self heating. Furthermore, many of the hardware for this mission were inherited from earlier missions: the lander from the Mars Surveyor Program 2001 (MSP'01) and instruments from the MSP'01 and the Mars Polar Lander. Ensuring all the hardware was properly qualified and flight acceptance tested to meet the environments for this mission required defining and implementing an environmental assurance program that included a detailed heritage review coupled with tailored flight acceptance testing. A heritage review process with defined acceptance success criteria was developed and is presented in this paper together with the lessons learned in its implementation. This paper also provides a detailed description of the environmental assurance program of the Phoenix Mars mission. This program includes assembly/subsystem and system level testing in the areas of dynamics, thermal, and electromagnetic compatibility, as well as venting/pressure, dust, radiation, and meteoroid analyses to meet the challenging environment of this mission.

thermal testing↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Shielding Considerations for CubeSat Structures During Solar Maximum

The purpose of this lessons learned is to communicate the utility of shielding in small spacecraft planning for the support of mission assurance and reliability. Numerous SmallSats have been flying in polar low earth orbit for scientific, communications, technology demonstrations, and imaging with academic, commercial, and government interests. Shielding has been part of mission assurance and reliability from the advent of long duration spacecraft missions. The Shields-1 CubeSat has been operating in polar low earth orbit since 16 December 2018 with atomic number (Z)-grade radiation shielding and demonstrates shielding effectiveness. Shields-1 has collected a representative example of solar minimum data in 2019 with 8 Teledyne dosimeters over varying shielding effectiveness. It serves as current experimental data and has been compared with NOVICE Shielding estimates using the AP8 –AE8 trapped radiation model with the Shields-1 CAD and generic CubeSat 3 unit (U) models. Using NOVICE model radiation analysis coding, the shielding effectiveness's, based on a generic CubeSat 3U structure with 4 electronic boards, were estimated for aluminum wall thicknesses ranging from 0.204 cmto4.44 cm (0.550 g/cm2–12.0 g/cm2) thick aluminum. For modeled polar orbiting spacecraft, solar maximum total ionizing dose (TID)increases by nearly a magnitude for thin-walled aluminum 0.550g/cm2-0.686 g/cm2(0.204 cm –0.254 cm) typical CubeSat structures. The shielding effectiveness by NOVICE Sigma estimates, which is a shielding sphere approximation around a detector, showed a linear relationship with wall thickness, which increased over the wall thickness by a ratio of 1.43 determined by linear regression analysis. Using NOVICE Adjoint Monte-Carlo Modeling of solar minimum and solar maximum with the inclusion of a worst-case solar particle event over a one year mission without geomagnetic shielding, the TID for minimum and maximum conditions for a generic 3U with a wall thickness of 0.254 cm is 158 RAD and 1540 RAD, respectively. The modeled total solar maximum TID is over estimated, because at low orbital latitudes a spacecraft will have shielding from Earth's magnetic field. However, TID will still be significant at high latitudes over the poles, where a spacecraft is exposed in a solar particle event. In contrast, to a thin walled generic 3U CubeSat, Shields-1 electronics enclosure has a shielding effectiveness of 21.3 g/cm2from NOVICE Sigma modeling and is expected to show reduced total ionizing dose increases during the present active Solar Cycle 25 period. Because solar particle events during solar maximum increase TID on electronic parts with thin-walled shielding in short periods of time, it is a mission assurance and reliability consideration on the spacecraft’s mission value versus adding shielding for risk reduction of premature spacecraft or instrument payload loss. Since the volumes of many instruments and system electronics have reduced with small spacecraft, shielding material costs and weight penalties have diminished. A small spacecraft project budget and schedule may limit traditional radiation-hardened part use and radiation testing requirements, where shielding can contribute to mission assurance and reliability with reduced costs.

Shields-1↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Shielding Considerations for CubeSat Structures During Solar Maximum

The purpose of this lessons learned paper is to communicate the utility of shielding in small spacecraft planning for the support of mission assurance and reliability. Numerous SmallSats have been flying in polar low Earth orbit for science, communications, technology demonstrations, and imaging with academic, commercial, and government interests. Shielding has been part of mission assurance and reliability from the advent of long duration spacecraft missions. The Shields-1 CubeSat has been operating in polar low Earth orbit since 16 December 2018 with atomic number (Z)-grade radiation shielding and demonstrates shielding effectiveness. Shields-1 has collected a representative example of solar minimum data in 2019 with eight Teledyne µDosimeters over varying shielding effectivenesses. It serves as current experimental data and has been compared with NOVICE Shielding estimates using the AP8 – AE8 trapped radiation model with the Shields-1 CAD and generic CubeSat three unit (3U) models. Using NOVICE model radiation analysis coding, the shielding effectivenesses, based on a generic CubeSat 3U structure with four electronic boards, were estimated for aluminum wall thicknesses ranging from 0.204 cm to 4.44 cm (0.550 g/cm 2 to 12.0 g/cm 2 ). For modeled polar orbiting spacecraft, solar maximum total ionizing dose (TID) increases by nearly a magnitude for thin-walled aluminum 0.550-g/cm 2 - 0.686-g/cm 2 (0.204-cm – 0.254-cm) typical CubeSat structures. The shielding effectiveness estimated by NOVICE Sigma, which is a shielding sphere approximation around a detector, showed a linear relationship with wall thickness, which increased over the wall thickness by a ratio of 1.43 determined by linear regression analysis. Using NOVICE Adjoint Monte-Carlo Modeling of solar minimum and solar maximum with the inclusion of a worst-case solar particle event over a one-year mission without geomagnetic shielding, the TID for minimum and maximum conditions for a generic 3U with a wall thickness of 0.254 cm is 158 RAD and 1540 RAD, respectively. The modeled total solar maximum TID is over estimated, because at low orbital latitudes a spacecraft will have shielding from the Earth’s magnetic field. However, TID will still be significant at high latitudes over the poles, where a spacecraft is exposed in a solar particle event. In contrast to a thin-walled generic 3U CubeSat, the Shields-1 electronics enclosure has a shielding effectiveness of 21.3 g/cm 2 from NOVICE Sigma modeling and is expected to show reduced total ionizing dose increases during the present active Solar Cycle 25 period. Because solar particle events during solar maximum increase TID on electronic parts with thin-walled shielding in short periods of time, it is a mission assurance and reliability consideration on the mission value of the spacecraft versus adding shielding for risk reduction of premature spacecraft or instrument payload loss. Since the volumes of many instruments and system electronics have reduced with small spacecraft, shielding material costs and weight penalties have diminished. A small spacecraft project budget and schedule may limit traditional radiation-hardened part use and radiation testing requirements, where shielding can contribute to mission assurance and reliability with reduced costs.

Shields-1↗
NASA NTRS2018

Quality Assurance Surveillance Tool Designed for SLS EM-1 Certificate of Flight Readiness

Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) is an uncrewed mission that is launching on the Space Launch System (SLS) Block 1 vehicle. This is a critical flight test for the agency's human deep space exploration goals. Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) Quality (SA-F2) is responsible for providing Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASPs) for NASA contracts and facilities. A QASP assures products and services are provided to EGS in accordance with the contract requirements. In order to encapsulate the multiple KSC Safety and Mission Assurance surveillance and audit activities that need to be accomplished specifically for EM-1 Certificate of Flight Reediness (CoFR), a QASP tool needed to be implemented. This tool would be able to intuitively track Work Authorization Documents (WADs) under development by Test Operations Support Contract (TOSC), reviewed and accepted WADs, Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIPs), Nonconformances (NCs), Material Review Board (MRB) Status, Corrective Actions, Alterations, Deviations, and Waivers for flight hardware and Ground Support Equipment (GSE). This would help ensure that all SLS EM-1 flight hardware and related GSE surveillances and requirements are being recognized and completed with zero constraints identified for the mission.

Morris, Patrick↗
NASA NTRS1982

New NiCd Battery Standard and Guide

The preparation and contents guides designed to provide specifications and standards for NiCd batteries for space missions are discussed. Requirements were established to assure proper in orbit performance and compliance with handling procedures to minimize degradation. The guides were designed to benefit both industries and the military. The surveys include: reasons given for and against the use of flight batteries in systems tests; use of rechargeable batteries during space vehicle testing; and military standards and specifications.

Milden, M. J.↗