Radar Interferometry Satellite Mission Concepts for Earth Change and Hazards Observations
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repeat orbit radar interferometry↗
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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Reconnaissance of Apophis (RA): A Mission Concept for Exploring the Potentially Hazardous Asteroid Apophis During Its 2029 Earth Encounter
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Brent W Barbee↗
Recent researches into solid bodies and magnetic fields in the solar system; Proceedings of the Topical Meeting and Symposium, Ottawa, Canada, May 16-June 2, 1982
Topics discussed include the magnetic history of the early solar system, impact processes in solid bodies (e.g., meteoroids and asteroids), and topics related to cometary missions. The section devoted to cometary missions lays particular stress on missions to Comet Halley; attention is given to such aspects of these missions as the investigation of hypervelocity impact on the Giotto Halley mission dust shield, the detection of energetic cometary and solar particles by the EPONA instrument on the Giotto mission, the dust hazard near Comet Halley in regard to the Vega project, and cometary ephemerides for spacecraft flyby missions.
Vette, J. I.↗
The Importance of Primary Martian Surface and Airfall Dust Sample Return for Toxicological Hazard Evaluations for Human Exploration
Manned missions to the Moon highlight a major hazard for future human exploration of the Moon and beyond: surface dust. Not only did the dust cause mechanical and structural integrity issues with the suits, the dust 'storm' generated upon reentrance into the crew cabin caused "lunar hay fever" and "almost blindness" . It was further reported that the allergic response to the dust worsened with each exposure. Due to the prevalence of these high exposures, the Human Research Roadmap developed by NASA identifies the Risk of Adverse Health and Performance Effects of Celestial Dust Exposure as an area of concern. Extended human exploration will further increase the probability of inadvertent and repeated exposures to celestial dusts. Going forward, hazard assessments of celestial dusts will be determined through sample return efforts prior to astronaut deployment.
Harrington, A. D.↗
Dust Hazard Management in the Outer Solar System
Most robotic missions to the outer solar system must grapple with the hazards posed by the dusty rings of the gas giants. Early assessments of these hazards led simply to ring avoidance due to insufficient data and high uncertainties on the dust population present in such rings. Recent approaches, principal among them the Cassini dust hazard management strategy, provide useful results from detailed modeling of spacecraft vulnerabilities and dust hazard regions, which along with the range of mission trajectories are used to to assess the risks posed by each passage through a zone of potential hazard. This paper shows the general approach used to implement the analysis for Cassini, with recommendations for future outer planet missions.
mission hazards↗
Lunar mission safety and rescue: Technical summary
A technical summary is presented of the escape/rescue and the hazards analyses for manned missions and operations in the 1980 time frame. Hazards are interpreted as hazards to man, not to equipment, program schedule, or program objectives. Hazards in 39 individual areas are analyzed, and corrective measures are recommended. Over 200 safety guidelines are proposed, based on significant hazards. Escape and rescue situtations and requirements are identified and analyzed, and escape/survival/rescue concepts are defined to cope with each escape/rescue situation. Areas in which research or technical development efforts could improve mission safety are identified. It is concluded that the primary emphasis should be on survival and escape provisions, with rescue required only where self-help cannot bring the endangered crewmen to a safe haven.
Source record↗
Survey of Spaceflight Safety Systems /Survey period: July 1981 June 1982/
Information from the Survey of Spaceflight Safety Systems considered most applicable to present and future spaceflight activities is summarized. Mission reports for the first three Shuttle Orbiter flights discuss all anomalies which occurred and their resolution, such as the solid rocket booster ignition overpressure spike, and thermal tile damage. Two emergency rescue systems for orbiting space stations are proposed: a dish type rescue capsule and a reusable orbit vehicle. Prebreathing and stage decompression are considered as means of protecting astronauts against decompression effects. The Spacelab Space Sled experiments are described, as is a test program on the assembly of large space structures completed in mid-1981. Finally, collision hazards for space missions are estimated, and operational procedures for minimizing these hazards are discussed.
Brown, N. E.↗
Advancing Lidar Sensors Technologies for Next Generation Landing Missions
Missions to solar systems bodies must meet increasingly ambitious objectives requiring highly reliable "precision landing", and "hazard avoidance" capabilities. Robotic missions to the Moon and Mars demand landing at pre-designated sites of high scientific value near hazardous terrain features, such as escarpments, craters, slopes, and rocks. Missions aimed at paving the path for colonization of the Moon and human landing on Mars need to execute onboard hazard detection and precision maneuvering to ensure safe landing near previously deployed assets. Asteroid missions require precision rendezvous, identification of the landing or sampling site location, and navigation to the highly dynamic object that may be tumbling at a fast rate. To meet these needs, NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) has developed a set of advanced lidar sensors under the Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project. These lidar sensors can provide precision measurement of vehicle relative proximity, velocity, and orientation, and high resolution elevation maps of the surface during the descent to the targeted body. Recent flights onboard Morpheus free-flyer vehicle have demonstrated the viability of ALHAT lidar sensors for future landing missions to solar system bodies.
Amzajerdian, Farzin↗
Hayabusa2#’s Exploration to Asteroids 2001 CC21 and 1998 KY26 Provides Key Insights Into Planetary Defense
The Hayabusa2 extended mission, nicknamed Hayabusa2# (SHARP: Small Hazardous Asteroid Reconnaissance Probe), started its mission after the Hayabusa2 spacecraft successfully returned in December 2020 to the Earth with Ryugu's samples and released the Sample Return Capsule containing it. Hayabusa2#’s key operations include flying by Near Earth Asteroid (98943) 2001 CC21 and rendezvousing with Near-Earth Asteroid 1998 KY26. The flyby is planned to be in 2026, and the rendezvous will be in 2031. Detailed investigations of these targets enable maturing key knowledge and technologies necessary for planetary defense. This paper reviews the characteristics of these targets and strategies to maximize outcomes from the mission. The spacecraft will fly by 2001 CC21 at a speed of ~5 km/s in 2026. Given constraints on the spacecraft condition, not designed to perform a flyby operation, operational plans require careful assessments to maximize the proximity observations of this asteroid. The ~700 m diameter asteroid's shape is currently unknown, though lightcurve observations suggest the asteroid is elongated. While the spin pole is not constrained well, the spin period is about 5.02 h with uncertainties of 0.01 h [1]. The taxonomic class may be L-type, which implies the presence of Calcium-aluminum-rich inclusions (CAI), one of the primitive materials in the solar system [2], although there are studies suggesting an S-type. Therefore, this must be carefully examined. Photometric and spectroscopic observations will strongly constrain this asteroid’s properties. Our rendezvous target, 1998 KY26, is a ~30 m diameter roundish object spinning at a spin period of 10.7 min, which may represent one of the common groups of Near Earth Asteroids in size and composition that give a higher likelihood of threatening the Earth. Radar and optical observations reconstructed this asteroid's shape with high uncertainties and inferred that its surface composition might be similar to that of carbonaceous asteroids [3]. No spacecraft has ever visited such small bodies. Hayabusa2# visiting 1998 KY26 will be the first mission to document its geophysical properties, offering strong insights into what most frequent invaders look like [4].
Hayabusa2#↗
NASA's Software Safety Standard
NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.
Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
Radiation considerations for interplanetary missions
Galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) poses a serious radiation hazard for long-duration missions. In designing a lunar habitat or Mars transfer vehicle, the worst-case radiation exposure determines shielding thickness and, hence, the weight of spacecraft. Using the spherically symmetric diffusion theory of the solar modulation of GCR, it was possible to use data on the differential energy spectra of hydrogen, helium, oxygen, and iron from 1954 to 1989 to show that the flux at 1 A.U. is determined by the diffusion parameter, K, which is a function of the time in the solar cycle. This analysis also showed that the solar minimum of 1976 to 1977 was the deepest minimum in the last 37 years. Using this theory, we have obtained the GCR spectra for all the nuclei and calculated the depth-dose as a function of aluminum shield thickness. Using the ICRP-26 definition of the quality factor, it is shown that the shielding required to stay below the LEO recommended annual limit of 50 cSv is 17.5 (+8, -3), g/sq cm of aluminum; if the limit is raised to 60 cSv, the required shielding is 9 (5, -1.5) g/sq cm. We also discuss the issues and shielding needs for protection against solar particle events.
Badwar, Gautam D.↗
Modernization of National Laboratory Mission Engineering Challenges (Structural Analysis, Dynamic Loads, Hazardous Environments)
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42 ENGINEERING↗
How to assure safe mission terminations
Space shuttle hazards, safety procedures, and escape systems
Wolf, H.↗
Pinpoint landing concepts for the Mars Rover Sample Return mission
From knowledge of hazards gained following Viking, several approaches are being pursued for making the Mars Rover Sample Return (MRSR) landing safer. With the pinpoint landing capability approach, a single landing site would be certified in advance of initiating the descent orbit, using pictures transmitted to earth from the orbiter. Onboard instruments would guide the lander to follow mapped terrain to the selected site. If navigation proves insufficiently accurate, a small number of scattered sites would be certified, and the lander would select the most accessible one in real time. Some early-site certification and navigation concepts are discussed. Some of the key problems to overcome include how to recognize hazards too small to be transmitted to earth, how to represent terrain features in the flight computer, how to overcome errors in inertial measurements during landing of over 12-hour duration, how to find the selected site in real time, and how to navigate to the selected site once it is found.
Klumpp, Allan R.↗
The Five Hazards of Human Spaceflight and Future Habitat Development at NASA
Habitats to support future missions and five key hazards of long duration spaceflight in connection with the film Solaris.
Tracie Prater↗
Developing Mars-Based Clinical Scenarios for an Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO) – Based Decision Support Service
As crewed missions move beyond Low-Earth Orbit, pre-mission planning cannot fully buy down the medical risks of exploration-class missions. Martian missions, where increased hazards exist, (such as long-duration spaceflight, surface-level EVA operations, and communications delays) will require a paradigm shift in the structure of a medical system. An Earth-Independent Medical Operations-based Medical System (EIMO-MS) will need to optimize four critical domains to help provide medical care: utilization of Pre-Mission Planning, augmentation of Acute and Prolonged Medical Decision Making, automated tracking of Resource Management, and assistance in Task Load Balance. The ideal EIMO-MS will be able to accomplish this goal by having an interactive, adaptable interface that will be able to provide real-time medical services. It must respond based on the level of crewmember training, medical situation, and available medical and non-medical resources. To showcase the capabilities and requirements of such a sophisticated automated MS, a series of clinical scenarios of escalating complexity were developed with clinical and systems engineering input. These scenarios describe in clinical detail what a theoretical future medical system, enhanced with multiple information streams (such as a medical database, an AI-based Decision Support System, real-time monitoring, enhanced in-situ laboratory imaging, etc.) can achieve in conjunction with a trained and experienced crew. Scenarios are comprised of: a context section including objectives and applicable spaceflight environment, a highlighted assumptions section, a clinical narrative section, and a systems engineering activity diagram demonstrating the integrated Medical System (MS). The “swim lanes” of the activity diagram act as the logistical core of each scenario and show how the MS will interact with the crew, ground support, and other in-flight systems. The Design Reference Mission that is used for the scenarios is based on existing reference mission profiles [1] with a projected 30-sol stay on the Martian surface. Scenarios span the spectrum from planned evaluations, minor medical care, urgent care, surgical guidance, critical and expectant management, and behavioral health care. Mission complexity will exponentially increase during deep space and Mars exploration-class missions, and medical support for these missions will likewise need to increase in autonomy and adaptability. The integrated system that will support these missions will need to provide assistance in a variety of anticipated and unforeseen scenarios. These medical scenarios, guided by clinician input, are initial steps in crafting the requirements for an EIMO-based medical system. By working in a systems engineering framework, requirements and capabilities can be extracted and mapped while maintaining a clinical core.
Prashant Parmar↗
Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2: Accident Model Document (AMD)
The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.
Source record↗
Predictive Sea State Estimation for Automated Ride Control and Handling - PSSEARCH
PSSEARCH provides predictive sea state estimation, coupled with closed-loop feedback control for automated ride control. It enables a manned or unmanned watercraft to determine the 3D map and sea state conditions in its vicinity in real time. Adaptive path-planning/ replanning software and a control surface management system will then use this information to choose the best settings and heading relative to the seas for the watercraft. PSSEARCH looks ahead and anticipates potential impact of waves on the boat and is used in a tight control loop to adjust trim tabs, course, and throttle settings. The software uses sensory inputs including IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit), stereo, radar, etc. to determine the sea state and wave conditions (wave height, frequency, wave direction) in the vicinity of a rapidly moving boat. This information can then be used to plot a safe path through the oncoming waves. The main issues in determining a safe path for sea surface navigation are: (1) deriving a 3D map of the surrounding environment, (2) extracting hazards and sea state surface state from the imaging sensors/map, and (3) planning a path and control surface settings that avoid the hazards, accomplish the mission navigation goals, and mitigate crew injuries from excessive heave, pitch, and roll accelerations while taking into account the dynamics of the sea surface state. The first part is solved using a wide baseline stereo system, where 3D structure is determined from two calibrated pairs of visual imagers. Once the 3D map is derived, anything above the sea surface is classified as a potential hazard and a surface analysis gives a static snapshot of the waves. Dynamics of the wave features are obtained from a frequency analysis of motion vectors derived from the orientation of the waves during a sequence of inputs. Fusion of the dynamic wave patterns with the 3D maps and the IMU outputs is used for efficient safe path planning.
Huntsberger, Terrance L.↗