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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2018

NASA SPLICE Project: Development and Testing of Precision Landing GN&C Technologies

NASA's technology advancement needs for entry, descent and landing call for high-precision, high-rate sensors that can improve navigation accuracy and vehicle control performance. Higher landing accuracy is required for any future human lander missions, and likely, for most robotic missions 1,2. Sensors and algorithms that significantly reduce navigation errors and can image the local terrain will enable landing at locations of high scientific interest that would otherwise pose significant risk to the vehicle. The Safe and Precise Landing-Integrated Capabilities Evolution project, or SPLICE, is developing precision landing and hazard avoidance (PL&HA) technologies for NASA and for potential commercial space flight missions. SPLICE technologies include sensors, algorithms, advanced space flight computing capabilities, and simulation tools used to integrate and study guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) system performance. SPLICE efforts include hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) simulation testing, ground testing, and flight testing, including reuse of hardware from the CoOperative Blending of Autonomous Landing Technologies (COBALT) suborbital flight-test payload3,4. Two of the precise navigation sensors that are being developed and matured within SPLICE are LiDARs. Since 2006, NASA Langley has been developing a Navigation Doppler LiDAR (NDL) for precise velocity measurements, and SPLICE is building an NDL engineering test unit (ETU) that will be brought up to TRL 6 following environmental and high-speed1,2 testing. NASA Goddard is developing a Hazard Detection LiDAR (HD LiDAR) engineering development unit (EDU) for SPLICE that has relevance to future human and robotic lander missions. The HD LiDAR will be flight test and matured to TRL 5.

Restrepo, Carolina I.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Human Research Program Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) Standing Review Panel (SRP)

The Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) Standing Review Panel (SRP) evaluated 22 gaps and 39 tasks in the three risk areas assigned to the SHFE Project. The area where tasks were best designed to close the gaps and the fewest gaps were left out was the Risk of Reduced Safety and Efficiency dire to Inadequate Design of Vehicle, Environment, Tools or Equipment. The areas where there were more issues with gaps and tasks, including poor or inadequate fit of tasks to gaps and missing gaps, were Risk of Errors due to Poor Task Design and Risk of Error due to Inadequate Information. One risk, the Risk of Errors due to Inappropriate Levels of Trust in Automation, should be added. If astronauts trust automation too much in areas where it should not be trusted, but rather tempered with human judgment and decision making, they will incur errors. Conversely, if they do not trust automation when it should be trusted, as in cases where it can sense aspects of the environment such as radiation levels or distances in space, they will also incur errors. This will be a larger risk when astronauts are less able to rely on human mission control experts and are out of touch, far away, and on their own. The SRP also identified 11 new gaps and five new tasks. Although the SRP had an extremely large quantity of reading material prior to and during the meeting, we still did not feel we had an overview of the activities and tasks the astronauts would be performing in exploration missions. Without a detailed task analysis and taxonomy of activities the humans would be engaged in, we felt it was impossible to know whether the gaps and tasks were really sufficient to insure human safety, performance, and comfort in the exploration missions. The SRP had difficulty evaluating many of the gaps and tasks that were not as quantitative as those related to concrete physical danger such as excessive noise and vibration. Often the research tasks for cognitive risks that accompany poor task or information design addressed only part, but not all, of the gaps they were programmed to fill. In fact the tasks outlined will not close the gap but only scratch the surface in many cases. In other cases, the gap was written too broadly, and really should be restated in a more constrained way that can be addressed by a well-organized and complementary set of tasks. In many cases, the research results should be turned into guidelines for design. However, it was not clear whether the researchers or another group would construct and deliver these guidelines.

Wichansky, Anna↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Miserable Risk Estimation: “Managing” Low-Probability, High-Consequence Risks

As with all bold endeavors, NASA missions must identify and manage their risks. While estimating the consequences of these risks is typically straightforward, it can be challenging to estimate their likelihood. This is especially true for low-probability risks, due both to the lack of operational data and the cognitive biases humans bring to risk estimation. In this talk, I will present both a tongue-in-cheek and “Management Science” approach to estimating low-probability, high-consequence risks. I then summon my Human Factors colleagues to provide NASA mission managers with the gentle guidance needed to avoid common errors in risk assessment

Mary K Kaiser↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Manual Crew Override of Vehicle Landings Following G-Transitions

BACKGROUND Manual control during exploration spaceflight consists of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. This crew override capability is critical to enable overall mission success during landing contingencies. However, the introduction of manual override capabilities must be implemented to enable crews to mitigate risks introduced by human error. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. While training and landing aids enable successful landing through disorientation, these adaptive changes may increase cognitive demand that needs to be accounted for in the manual control strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition to develop appropriate countermeasures. METHODS In this study, we will examine operational piloting tasks following International Space Station (ISS) missions in a simulated lunar landing using a six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) motion base. The motion-based simulation will be implemented in our laboratory at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and will be available within hours following the return from commercial crew landings. The primary goals of this study are (1) to understand the impact of spaceflight on crew ability to perform manual crew override tasks, (2) to examine how adaptive changes in vestibular and cognitive function relate to changes in manual crew override proficiency, and (3) compare performance during late “just-in-time” on-board training with early post-flight crew performance. The impact of spaceflight on piloting capability will be assessed from pre- versus post-flight changes in crewmembers assigned to either short duration (< 30 day) or long duration (~6- month) missions to the International Space Station (ISS). Individual differences in post-flight vestibular and cognitive changes include motion sickness reports, measures of tilt motion perception accuracy and precision, and dual-task tracking. During the 6DOF lunar simulation, the crew will manually takeover attitude and rate-of-descent to the nominal or re-designated landing aim point during the approach phase. The outcome measures for the lunar crew override tasks will be the percent time maintaining actual vehicle states, e.g., attitude and rate-of-descent, within recommended guidance during the landing approach, number and maximum deviation outside limits, and root mean square error (RMSE). Given that “just-in-time” (JIT) training is an operational expectation for the Human Landing System (HLS) program, all participants will perform late inflight JIT training for each manual crew override task in which they will participate. Crew proficiency will be captured inflight during JIT training that will be implemented on a laptop with hand controllers to allow the crewmember to practice the landing task procedures like the approach implemented for JIT training with Shuttle landing and ISS telerobotic tasks. COUNTERMEASURE UPDATES The lunar lander simulation has been implemented onto a two-laptop display system where subjects select from alternative landing points, based upon avoiding hazards that the on-board system identifies during the landing. The subject makes inputs using a rotational hand controller (i.e., joystick) and a translational hand controller, which are processed by simulated vehicle dynamics to update the vehicle attitude and rate of descent. Subjects will utilize a combination of flight, situation, and status displays to monitor the state of the simulated vehicle. The simulation exports tilt and translation movements to a 6DOF motion base synced to visual movements and provides representative vestibular cues to the subject while performing the task inside an enclosed cabin featuring a simulated lunar out-the-window view and a heads-down lander cockpit view. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew override capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew override performance will help better characterize the manual control risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. The inclusion of “just-in-time” on-board training will ensure we are characterizing changes in override proficiency with this expected countermeasure in place. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors acknowledge contributions from Draper, HLS Joint Test Panel, Crew HLS Interfaces for Piloting Working Group, and Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) Lab toward the development of the lunar landing simulation. This project is funded by the Human Health Countermeasures Element.

Austin M Bollinger↗
NASA NTRS2005

Interaction Challenges in Human-Robot Space Exploration

In January 2004, NASA established a new, long-term exploration program to fulfill the President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration. The primary goal of this program is to establish a sustained human presence in space, beginning with robotic missions to the Moon in 2008, followed by extended human expeditions to the Moon as early as 2015. In addition, the program places significant emphasis on the development of joint human-robot systems. A key difference from previous exploration efforts is that future space exploration activities must be sustainable over the long-term. Experience with the space station has shown that cost pressures will keep astronaut teams small. Consequently, care must be taken to extend the effectiveness of these astronauts well beyond their individual human capacity. Thus, in order to reduce human workload, costs, and fatigue-driven error and risk, intelligent robots will have to be an integral part of mission design.

Fong, Terrence↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Manual Crew Override of Vehicle Landings Following G-Transitions

BACKGROUND Manual control during exploration spaceflight consists of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. This crew override capability is critical to enable overall mission success during landing contingencies. However, the introduction of manual override capabilities must be implemented to enable crews to mitigate risks introduced by human error. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. While training and landing aids enable successful landing through disorientation, these adaptive changes may increase cognitive demand that needs to be accounted for in the manual control strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition to develop appropriate countermeasures. METHODS The following study seeks to inform the risk associated with altered sensorimotor and vestibular function impacting critical mission tasks. We aim to characterize the effects of short and long-duration weightlessness on manual control following G-transitions using simulated lunar landing on a six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) motion base, a fixed base simulation, and a supervisory control tablet task. The primary goal is to understand the impact of spaceflight on crew ability to perform manual crew override and supervisory control. This aim will be assessed by comparing pre- versus postflight simulation performance in crewmembers assigned to either short duration (< 30 day) or long duration (~6- month) missions to the International Space Station (ISS). We hypothesize there will be postflight increases in the percent time that pilots are outside of the acceptable range for recommended vehicle state parameters and the reaction time for secondary cognitive tasks. Ground-based control subjects, who are demographically matched to the crew considering age (± 5 years) and gender, will undergo the same testing schedule as the crew to examine the effects of flight phase independent of microgravity exposure. The second aim is to examine how adaptive changes in vestibular and cognitive function relate to changes in manual crew override proficiency. Crew performance for a sensorimotor perceptual test battery will evaluate motion perception tracking, roll nulling, and/or vection sensitivity using the 6DOF motion base. We hypothesize that a higher severity of vestibular alterations will be associated with increased percent time outside of guidance limits. Motion sickness severity and sleepiness will also be evaluated. To determine the impact of “just-in-time” training, the third aim seeks to compare performance during on-board lunar landing tasks conducted late in-flight to early postflight. We hypothesize that proficiency on the “just-in-time” laptop trainer late in mission will be positively correlated with early postflight proficiency on the same task. The final aim will establish assessments of performance, training protocols, and the learning progression in a ground-control cohort of first-time users. RESULTS The assessment of the learning progression associated with the piloting task on the motion base system with thirty ground subjects will be reported. Learning curves will be established across four distinct sessions and within session considering trial difficulty. The difficulty of the landing task can be modulated with the landing divert distance and cross or downrange difficulty. Results may include changes in performance across multiple trials of a multi-attribute lunar tablet supervisory control task. Preliminary investigations of eighteen subjects who completed vestibular threshold and motion perception tasks offer expected performance ranges for upcoming preflight crew evaluations. The results yielded an average roll threshold of 0.46 ± 0.30 deg/s and an average roll nulling root mean square error performance of 2.52 ± 0.52 deg/s. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew monitoring capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew performance will help better characterize the manual control risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. Ground testing will evaluate learning progression, refine training protocols, and serve as a control cohort for comparisons to crew performance. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors acknowledge contributions from Draper, the Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) Lab, and the Software, Robotics, and Simulation Division toward the development of the lunar landing simulation platforms. This project is funded by the Human Health Countermeasures Element.

Hannah M. Weiss↗
NASA NTRS2024

Integrated Systems Engineering, Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Minimizing Black Swan Events

This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.

SLS↗
NASA NTRS2014

Use of Semi-Autonomous Tools for ISS Commanding and Monitoring

As the International Space Station (ISS) has moved into a utilization phase, operations have shifted to become more ground-based with fewer mission control personnel monitoring and commanding multiple ISS systems. This shift to fewer people monitoring more systems has prompted use of semi-autonomous console tools in the ISS Mission Control Center (MCC) to help flight controllers command and monitor the ISS. These console tools perform routine operational procedures while keeping the human operator "in the loop" to monitor and intervene when off-nominal events arise. Two such tools, the Pre-positioned Load (PPL) Loader and Automatic Operators Recorder Manager (AutoORM), are used by the ISS Communications RF Onboard Networks Utilization Specialist (CRONUS) flight control position. CRONUS is responsible for simultaneously commanding and monitoring the ISS Command & Data Handling (C&DH) and Communications and Tracking (C&T) systems. PPL Loader is used to uplink small pieces of frequently changed software data tables, called PPLs, to ISS computers to support different ISS operations. In order to uplink a PPL, a data load command must be built that contains multiple user-input fields. Next, a multiple step commanding and verification procedure must be performed to enable an onboard computer for software uplink, uplink the PPL, verify the PPL has incorporated correctly, and disable the computer for software uplink. PPL Loader provides different levels of automation in both building and uplinking these commands. In its manual mode, PPL Loader automatically builds the PPL data load commands but allows the flight controller to verify and save the commands for future uplink. In its auto mode, PPL Loader automatically builds the PPL data load commands for flight controller verification, but automatically performs the PPL uplink procedure by sending commands and performing verification checks while notifying CRONUS of procedure step completion. If an off-nominal condition occurs during procedure execution, PPL Loader notifies CRONUS through popup messages, allowing CRONUS to examine the situation and choose an option of how PPL loader should proceed with the procedure. The use of PPL Loader to perform frequent, routine PPL uplinks offloads CRONUS to better monitor two ISS systems. It also reduces procedure performance time and decreases risk of command errors. AutoORM identifies ISS communication outage periods and builds commands to lock, playback, and unlock ISS Operations Recorder files. Operation Recorder files are circular buffer files of continually recorded ISS telemetry data. Sections of these files can be locked from further writing, be played back to capture telemetry data that occurred during an ISS loss of signal (LOS) period, and then be unlocked for future recording use. Downlinked Operation Recorder files are used by mission support teams for data analysis, especially if failures occur during LOS. The commands to lock, playback, and unlock Operations Recorder files are encompassed in three different operational procedures and contain multiple user-input fields. AutoORM provides different levels of automation for building and uplinking the commands to lock, playback, and unlock Operations Recorder files. In its automatic mode, AutoORM automatically detects ISS LOS periods, then generates and uplinks the commands to lock, playback, and unlock Operations Recorder files when MCC regains signal with ISS. AutoORM also features semi-autonomous and manual modes which integrate CRONUS more into the command verification and uplink process. AutoORMs ability to automatically detect ISS LOS periods and build the necessary commands to preserve, playback, and release recorded telemetry data greatly offloads CRONUS to perform more high-level cognitive tasks, such as mission planning and anomaly troubleshooting. Additionally, since Operations Recorder commands contain numerical time input fields which are tedious for a human to manually build, AutoORM's ability to automatically build commands reduces operational command errors. PPL Loader and AutoORM demonstrate principles of semi-autonomous operational tools that will benefit future space mission operations. Both tools employ different levels of automation to perform simple and routine procedures, thereby offloading human operators to perform higher-level cognitive tasks. Because both tools provide procedure execution status and highlight off-nominal indications, the flight controller is able to intervene during procedure execution if needed. Semi-autonomous tools and systems that can perform routine procedures, yet keep human operators informed of execution, will be essential in future long-duration missions where the onboard crew will be solely responsible for spacecraft monitoring and control.

Brzezinski, Amy S.↗
NASA NTRS2011

ISS Operations Cost Reductions Through Automation of Real-Time Planning Tasks

In 2008 the Johnson Space Center s Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) management team challenged their organization to find ways to reduce the costs of International Space station (ISS) console operations in the Mission Control Center (MCC). Each MOD organization was asked to identify projects that would help them attain a goal of a 30% reduction in operating costs by 2012. The MOD Operations and Planning organization responded to this challenge by launching several software automation projects that would allow them to greatly improve ISS console operations and reduce staffing and operating costs. These projects to date have allowed the MOD Operations organization to remove one full time (7 x 24 x 365) ISS console position in 2010; with the plan of eliminating two full time ISS console support positions by 2012. This will account for an overall 10 EP reduction in staffing for the Operations and Planning organization. These automation projects focused on utilizing software to automate many administrative and often repetitive tasks involved with processing ISS planning and daily operations information. This information was exchanged between the ground flight control teams in Houston and around the globe, as well as with the ISS astronaut crew. These tasks ranged from managing mission plan changes from around the globe, to uploading and downloading information to and from the ISS crew, to even more complex tasks that required multiple decision points to process the data, track approvals and deliver it to the correct recipient across network and security boundaries. The software solutions leveraged several different technologies including customized web applications and implementation of industry standard web services architecture between several planning tools; as well as a engaging a previously research level technology (TRL 2-3) developed by Ames Research Center (ARC) that utilized an intelligent agent based system to manage and automate file traffic flow, archiving f data, and generating console logs. This technology called OCAMS (OCA (Orbital Communication System) Management System), is now considered TRL level 9 and is in daily use in the Mission Control Center in support of ISS operations. These solutions have not only allowed for improved efficiency on console; but since many of the previously manual data transfers are now automated, many of the human error prone steps have been removed, and the quality of the planning products has improved tremendously. This has also allowed our Planning Flight Controllers more time to focus on the abstract areas of the job, (like the complexities of planning a mission for 6 international crew members with a global planning team), instead of being burdened with the administrative tasks that took significant time each console shift to process. The resulting automation solutions have allowed the Operations and Planning organization to realize significant cost savings for the ISS program through 2020 and many of these solutions could be a viable

Hall, Timothy A.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Characterization of How CO2 Level May Impact Crew Performance Related to the HSIA Risk

Safety and mission critical anomalies are inevitable on NASA exploration missions. Delays and interruptions in communication with Earth-experts drives the requirement that crew resolve these anomalies on their own. The Human Factors and Behavioral Performance (HFBP) element of the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) recently stood-up the Human-System Integration Architecture (HSIA) risk. The specific risk statement is: “Given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors.” Reliable, on-board capabilities will need to support the crew - not only to resolve anomalies, but also to promote situation awareness (SA) and to reduce workload. Unfortunately, the present level of technological advancement limits the range of achievable intelligent support (Wu & Vera, 2019). The Human Capabilities Assessment for Autonomous Missions (HCAAM) projects were devised to identify how technology may benefit crew situation awareness and enhance crew trust in the intelligent systems. A suite of time-critical and complex exploration tasks have been identified (Holden et al., 2019) that may advance human-integration Concept of Operations (ConOps) development. This ConOps (a future HFBP directed task) along with standards and guidelines (Holden et al., 2019) may be used as the foundation for human-system requirements for a self-reliant crew. Spaceflight CO2 levels are elevated relative to terrestrial levels. Above 2.5 mmHg there is an increase in the incidence of crew headaches (Law et al., 2014) and Mission Control reports of mood and performance changes in the crew. The concern is that elevated CO2 effects may exacerbate the HSIA risk. Unfortunately, effects of higher concentrations of CO2 on performance decrements are not well established. The main goal of the current report is to identify how elevated CO2 impacts the HSIA risk. The approach taken is to trace the relationship between cognitive and motor abilities required for anomaly response with critical mission tasks and the level of technological advancement to support anomaly resolution to identify how elevated CO2 may impact the HSIA risk. The conclusion is that elevated CO2 could exacerbate the HSIA risk. Several research gaps are identified.

cognition↗
NASA NTRS2020

Optical Navigation for Autonomous Approach of Small Unknown Bodies

State of the practice in navigation around small celestial bodies heavily relies on ground sup- port and human skill, in particular, for perception-based operations such as optical navigation and mapping. This leads to longer duration and more complex mission operations and sub- sequently higher cost. Furthermore, it imposes limitations for certain missions such as fast fly-bys or multi-agent operations. In this work, we present an autonomous navigation strat- egy suitable for approaching small unexplored bodies. During the approach, we estimate the body’s physical properties as well as the spacecraft’s relative trajectory and associated un- certainties. The autonomous navigation strategy, which is solely based on optical measure- ments, begins as soon as the body becomes resolved in the navigation camera and terminates at the start of proximity operations, when the spacecraft makes its first trajectory correction to stay in the vicinity of the body. Our strategy uses multiple image-processing algorithms: light-curve analysis for estimating the target body’s rotation rate, Shape-from-Silhouette for reconstructing the 3D shape and estimating its rotation pole, and feature tracking tailored to Small-Body images for estimating relative navigation parameters. We used the Mission Analysis, Operations, and Navigation Toolkit Environment (MONTE) developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to evaluate the feasibility of this multi-phase navigation strategy using simulated images of an approach trajectory. We used the Rosetta mission data to generate photorealistic images to characterise the performance of this approach. This work is based on the assumptions that the spacecraft attitude is known, the body is a principal-axis rotator, a-priori estimates of ephemerides and scale are available, and the body is observed from a zero sun phase only during initial approach. Preliminary results show orbit determination performance that is on par with the human navigation from the Rosetta mission; albeit with a 1% bias in spacecraft-target radial distance estimate. The bias error is likely due to the robustness and accuracy of the visual tracking under dynamic lighting conditions and per- spective changes, which decrease accuracy.

Villa, Jacopo↗
NASA NTRS1995

Helicopter Human Factors

Even under optimal conditions, helicopter flight is a most demanding form of human-machine interaction, imposing continuous manual, visual, communications, and mental demands on pilots. It is made even more challenging by small margins for error created by the close proximity of terrain in NOE flight and missions flown at night and in low visibility. Although technology advances have satisfied some current and proposed requirements, hardware solutions alone are not sufficient to ensure acceptable system performance and pilot workload. However, human factors data needed to improve the design and use of helicopters lag behind advances in sensor, display, and control technology. Thus, it is difficult for designers to consider human capabilities and limitations when making design decisions. This results in costly accidents, design mistakes, unrealistic mission requirements, excessive training costs, and challenge human adaptability. NASA, in collaboration with DOD, industry, and academia, has initiated a program of research to develop scientific data bases and design principles to improve the pilot/vehicle interface, optimize training time and cost, and maintain pilot workload and system performance at an acceptable level. Work performed at Ames, and by other research laboratories, will be reviewed to summarize the most critical helicopter human factors problems and the results of research that has been performed to: (1) Quantify/model pilots use of visual cues for vehicle control; (2) Improve pilots' performance with helmet displays of thermal imagery and night vision goggles for situation awareness and vehicle control; (3) Model the processes by which pilots encode maps and compare them to the visual scene to develop perceptually and cognitively compatible electronic map formats; (4) Evaluate the use of spatially localized auditory displays for geographical orientation, target localization, radio frequency separation; (5) Develop and flight test control/display concepts; (6) Quantify, model, predict, and improve pilots, workload-management strategies; and (7) Design computer-game trainers to reduce training time and cost.

Hart, Sandra G.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Passing the Baton: An Experimental Study of Shift Handover

Shift handovers occur in many safety-critical environments, including aviation maintenance, medicine, air traffic control, and mission control for space shuttle and space station operations. Shift handovers are associated with increased risk of communication failures and human error. In dynamic industries, errors and accidents occur disproportionately after shift handover. Typical shift handovers involve transferring information from an outgoing shift to an incoming shift via written logs, or in some cases, face-to-face briefings. The current study explores the possibility of improving written communication with the support modalities of audio and video recordings, as well as face-to-face briefings. Fifty participants participated in an experimental task which mimicked some of the critical challenges involved in transferring information between shifts in industrial settings. All three support modalities, face-to-face, video, and audio recordings, reduced task errors significantly over written communication alone. The support modality most preferred by participants was face-to-face communication; the least preferred was written communication alone.

Parke, Bonny↗
NASA NTRS2017

Lost in Translation: the Case for Integrated Testing

The building of a spacecraft is complex and often involves multiple suppliers and companies that have their own designs and processes. Standards have been developed across the industries to reduce the chances for critical flight errors at the system level, but the spacecraft is still vulnerable to the introduction of critical errors during integration of these systems. Critical errors can occur at any time during the process and in many cases, human reliability analysis (HRA) identifies human error as a risk driver. Most programs have a test plan in place that is intended to catch these errors, but it is not uncommon for schedule and cost stress to result in less testing than initially planned. Therefore, integrated testing, or "testing as you fly," is essential as a final check on the design and assembly to catch any errors prior to the mission. This presentation will outline the unique benefits of integrated testing by catching critical flight errors that can otherwise go undetected, discuss HRA methods that are used to identify opportunities for human error, lessons learned and challenges over ownership of testing will be discussed.

Young, Aaron↗
NASA NTRS2002

Security in Full-Force

When fully developed for NASA, Vanguard Enforcer(TM) software-which emulates the activities of highly technical security system programmers, auditors, and administrators-was among the first intrusion detection programs to restrict human errors from affecting security, and to ensure the integrity of a computer's operating systems, as well as the protection of mission critical resources. Vanguard Enforcer was delivered in 1991 to Johnson Space Center and has been protecting systems and critical data there ever since. In August of 1999, NASA granted Vanguard exclusive rights to commercialize the Enforcer system for the private sector. In return, Vanguard continues to supply NASA with ongoing research, development, and support of Enforcer. The Vanguard Enforcer 4.2 is one of several surveillance technologies that make up the Vanguard Security Solutions line of products. Using a mainframe environment, Enforcer 4.2 achieves previously unattainable levels of automated security management.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Millimeter-Wave Localizers for Aircraft-to-Aircraft Approach Navigation

Aerial refueling technology for both manned and unmanned aircraft is critical for operations where extended aircraft flight time is required. Existing refueling assets are typically manned aircraft, which couple to a second aircraft through the use of a refueling boom. Alignment and mating of the two aircraft continues to rely on human control with use of high-resolution cameras. With the recent advances in unmanned aircraft, it would be highly advantageous to remove/reduce human control from the refueling process, simplifying the amount of remote mission management and enabling new operational scenarios. Existing aerial refueling uses a camera, making it non-autonomous and prone to human error. Existing commercial localizer technology has proven robust and reliable, but not suited for aircraft-to-aircraft approaches like in aerial refueling scenarios since the resolution is too coarse (approximately one meter). A localizer approach system for aircraft-to-aircraft docking can be constructed using the same modulation with a millimeterwave carrier to provide high resolution. One technology used to remotely align commercial aircraft on approach to a runway are ILS (instrument landing systems). ILS have been in service within the U.S. for almost 50 years. In a commercial ILS, two partially overlapping beams of UHF (109 to 126 MHz) are broadcast from an antenna array so that their overlapping region defines the centerline of the runway. This is called a localizer system and is responsible for horizontal alignment of the approach. One beam is modulated with a 150-Hz tone, while the other with a 90-Hz tone. Through comparison of the modulation depths of both tones, an autopilot system aligns the approaching aircraft with the runway centerline. A similar system called a glide-slope (GS) exists in the 320-to-330MHz band for vertical alignment of the approach. While this technology has been proven reliable for millions of commercial flights annually, its UHF nature limits its ability to operate beyond the 1-to-2-meter precisions associated with commercial runway width. A prototype ILS-type system operates at millimeter-wave frequencies to provide automatic and robust approach control for aerial refueling. The system allows for the coupling process to remain completely autonomous, as a boom operator is no longer required. Operating beyond 100 GHz provides enough resolution and a narrow enough beamwidth that an approach corridor of centimeter scales can be maintained. Two modules were used to accomplish this task. The first module is a localizer/glide-slope module that can be fitted on a refueling aircraft. This module provides the navigation beams for aligning the approaching aircraft. The second module is navigational receiver fitted onto the approaching aircraft to be re fueled that can detect the approach beams. Since unmanned aircraft have a limited payload size and limited electrical power, the receiver portion was implemented in CMOS (complementary metal oxide semiconductor) technology based on a super-regenerative receiver (SRR) architecture. The SRR achieves mW-level power consumption and chip sizes less than l mm2. While super-regenerative techniques have small bandwidths that limit use in communication systems, their advantages of high sensitivity, low complexity, and low power make them ideal in this situation where modulating tones of less than 1 kHz are used.

Tang, Adrian J.↗
NASA NTRS2022

Lunar Rover Localization Using Craters as Landmarks

Onboard localization capabilities for planetary rovers to date have used relative navigation, by integrating combinations of wheel odometry, visual odometry, and inertial measurements during each drive to track position relative to the start of each drive. At the end of each drive, a “ground-in-the-loop” (GITL) interaction is used to get a position update from human operators in a more global reference frame, such as a map frame defined by orbital reconnaissance imaging of a large region around the rover’s current position. For Mars rovers, this typically has involved downlinking imagery from the rover mast cameras and using interactive visualization tools on Earth to register such images to the orbital reconnaissance images. For safety purposes, rover mission operations typically specify “keep out zones”, which human operators recognize as being unsafe in the orbital images. Autonomous rover drives are limited in distance so that accumulated relative navigation error does not risk the possibility of the rover driving into a keep out zone. The allowable autonomous drive distance in this mode of operation depends on the distribution of keep out zones and the accuracy of relative navigation; in practice, drive limits of a few hundred meters between GITL cycles are to be expected. Several rover mission concepts have recently been studied that require much longer drives between GITL cycles, particularly for the Moon. This includes lunar rover mission concepts that involve (1) driving mostly in sunlight at low latitudes, (2) driving in permanently shadowed regions near the south pole, and (3) a mixture of day and night driving in mid-latitudes. These concepts include total traverse distance requirements of up to 1,800 km in 4 Earth years, with individual drives of several kilometers between stops for downlink. These concepts require greater autonomy to minimize GITL cycles to enable such large range; onboard global localization is a key element of such autonomy. Multiple techniques have been studied in the past for onboard rover global localization, including radio navigation aiding from an orbiter, recognizing horizon landmarks that are known in a regional elevation map, and correlating a local elevation map created onboard the rover with a regional elevation map. These techniques all have drawbacks, including requiring an expensive extra mission element (navigation orbiter), unavailability of sufficient regional elevation map data, or limited accuracy in resulting position estimates (e.g. a few hundred meters with horizon landmarks). For the Moon, the ubiquitous craters offer another possibility, which involves mapping craters from orbit, then recognizing crater landmarks with cameras and/or a lidar onboard the rover. This approach is applicable everywhere on the Moon, does not require high resolution stereo imaging from orbit as some other approaches do, and has potential to enable position knowledge with order of 10 m accuracy at all times. This paper will provide more detail on our technical approach to crater-based lunar rover localization and will present initial results on crater detection using 3-D point cloud data from onboard lidar or stereo cameras and using shading cues in monocular onboard imagery.

Ono, M.↗