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Future space missions are required to deliver significant results with new technology and substantially reduced development cost and schedule.
The NASA Safety Center (NSC) was established in2006 in response to Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendations to strengthen NASA’s safety program. The NSC supports all NASA centers and facilities. The NSC fosters world-class Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) support for NASA programs and projects through professional development activities and the advancement of the following SMA technical disciplines: - Aviation Safety - Operational Safety - Quality Engineering - Reliability and Maintainability - SMA Technical Leadership - Software Assurance - System Safety The NSC’s Technical Excellence Office (TEO) is charged with encouraging technical excellence in NASA’s SMA community primarily through professional development products and services. TEO’s first initiative was the SMA Technical Excellence Program (STEP). STEP is a career-oriented, professional development roadmap for safety professionals, which is designed for the employee to learn specific knowledge and skills to improve performance in their current role.
Per the NASA Human Health, Life Support and Habitation System Technology Area 06 report "crewed missions venturing beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) will require technologies with improved reliability, reduced mass, self-sufficiency, and minimal logistical needs as an emergency or quick-return option will not be feasible." To meet this need, the development team of the second generation Cascade Distillation System (CDS 2.0) opted a development approach that explicitely incorporate consideration of safety, mission assurance, and autonomy. The CDS 2.0 prelimnary design focused on establishing a functional baseline that meets the CDS core capabilities and performance. The critical design phase is now focused on incorporating features through a deliberative process of establishing the systems failure modes and effects, identifying mitigative strategies, and evaluating the merit of the proposed actions through analysis and test. This paper details results of this effort on the CDS 2.0 design.
Per the NASA Human Health, Life Support and Habitation System Technology Area 06 report "crewed missions venturing beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) will require technologies with improved reliability, reduced mass, self-sufficiency, and minimal logistical needs as an emergency or quick-return option will not be feasible".1 To meet this need, the development team of the second generation Cascade Distillation System (CDS 2.0) chose a development approach that explicitly incorporate consideration of safety, mission assurance, and autonomy. The CDS 2.0 preliminary design focused on establishing a functional baseline that meets the CDS core capabilities and performance. The critical design phase is now focused on incorporating features through a deliberative process of establishing the systems failure modes and effects, identifying mitigation strategies, and evaluating the merit of the proposed actions through analysis and test. This paper details results of this effort on the CDS 2.0 design.
As envisioned, Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM) will introduce new vehicles and operations within the national airspace, moving people and cargo safely and efficiently at a much larger scale than today. Driven by transformative technology and revolutionary aircraft, this movement must still manage technical, regulatory, operational, and policy challenges. NASA’s work in support of AAM and UAM includes, but is not limited to tools, technologies, and architectures for distributed sensing of aircraft, data & reasoning services exchange, Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT), contingency management, and vehicle health management. This paper builds upon these concepts and evaluates the use of distributed sensing and infrastructure assistance towards health management and mission assurance of UAM vehicles in specific operational scenarios. Through analysis of these example missions, aided by the data produced by the conceptual distributed sensing and reasoning infrastructure, we define opportunities for state estimation, diagnosis, and key decision points affecting the health state of the vehicle and the airspace volume. As a result, we define a number of measurable health state parameters providing relevant information to drive decision-making in contingency situations or feed automation tools in support of operators and managers.
This NASA Technical Handbook compiles into a single volume safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance and risk management terms defined and used in NASA safety and mission assurance directives and standards. The purpose of this handbook is to support effective communication within NASA and with its contractors. The definitions in this handbook are updated when the definition of the acronym or term is updated in the originating document.
In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.
This viewgraph presentation reviews the issues surrounding the management of knowledge in regards to safety and mission assurance. The JSC workers who were hired in the 1960's are slated to retire in the next two to three years. The experiences and knowledge of these NASA workers must be identified, and disseminated. This paper reviews some of the strategies that the S&MA is developing to capture that valuable institutional knowledge.
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This document summarizes questions and concerns raised during the 1999 IV&V Facility's Annual Review Presentation to the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA). Recommendations are provided for issues and action items identified.
Previously approved under INL/MIS-20-58147 Rev:000
Package Qualification and Verification (PQV) of advanced electronic packaging and interconnect technologies and various other types of qualification hardware for the Mars Exploration Rover/Mars Science Laboratory flight projects has been performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware (Engineering Camera and Platinum Resistance Thermometer, PRT) under extreme cold temperatures has been performed with reference to various project requirements. The flight-like packages, sensors, and subassemblies have been selected for the study to survive three times (3x) the total number of expected temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations and mission phases. Qualification has been performed by subjecting above flight-like qual hardware to the environmental temperature extremes and assessing any structural failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Experiments of flight like hardware qualification test results have been described in this paper.
This presentation describes how the Ares Projects are learning from the successes and failures of previous launch systems in order to maximize safety and reliability while maintaining fiscal responsibility. The Ares Projects are integrating Safety and Mission Assurance into design activities and embracing independent assessments by Quality experts in thorough reviews of designs and processes. Incorporating Lean thinking into the design process, Ares is also streamlining existing processes and future manufacturing flows which will yield savings during production. Understanding the value of early involvement of Quality experts, the Ares Projects are leading launch vehicle development into the 21st century.
Packaging Qualification and Verification (PQV) and life testing of advanced electronic packaging, mechanical assemblies (motors/actuators), and interconnect technologies (flip-chip), platinum temperature thermometer attachment processes, and various other types of hardware for Mars Exploration Rover (MER)/Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), and JUNO flight projects was performed to enhance the mission assurance. The qualification of hardware under extreme cold to hot temperatures was performed with reference to various project requirements. The flight like packages, assemblies, test coupons, and subassemblies were selected for the study to survive three times the total number of expected temperature cycles resulting from all environmental and operational exposures occurring over the life of the flight hardware including all relevant manufacturing, ground operations, and mission phases. Qualification/life testing was performed by subjecting flight-like qualification hardware to the environmental temperature extremes and assessing any structural failures, mechanical failures or degradation in electrical performance due to either overstress or thermal cycle fatigue. Experimental flight qualification test results will be described in this presentation.
ESA is providing the ESM to NASA for the Orion Program in accordance with the Implementing Arrangement (IA) established between the two Agencies in 2012. This IA is a barter agreement, in which ESA provides Service Module vehicles for the first two flights of Orion in exchange for two servicing missions to the ISS. This arrangement has provided opportunities and challenges to both communities. It represents an important opportunity for ESA to build on its experience in the development and operations of ATV and play an active role in the development and flight of a manned space vehicle. This paper will explore some of the unique aspects of this arrangement as it affects Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA).The assessment of ESM compliance with applicable safety requirements is the responsibility of the Joint Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP). The JSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering and SMA organizations co-chair this Panel. Previously, Safety has chaired, with Engineering as a member of the Panel. Inclusion of Engineering as a co-chair has offered greater leverage within the technical community. Second, the JSERP includes a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety (PA/S) organizations. This recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership.Another source of both opportunity and challenge is the differing experience base of ESA and NASA. NASA has decades of experience in manned spaceflight, dating back to the Mercury program and following through Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, Skylab, Shuttle and the International Space Station. The risk posture for manned missions is much more rigorous than for unmanned missions. ESA brings a wealth of knowledge as well, with their flights of Ariane and Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), development and operation of the Columbus module on ISS, and satellite programs. The result is that both parties have developed paradigms related to risk and failure that contribute to ESM discussions.Orion represents humanity's first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) in over fifty years. Much of that experience is captured in program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous spacecraft with attendant safety-related issues.This paper will explore these and other challenges as we approach the flight of the first Orion vehicle.
The reliability analysis of a thermal protection system (TPS) incorporating low density, fibrous ceramic materials must take into account the time-dependency and variability of the system's strength. Fracture mechanics concepts can be used to estimate the allowable strength and expected lifetime, as well as to define a proof test scheme for assuring mission success of TPS. The aim of this study was to evaluate the proof testing scheme used on the TPS of the Space Shuttle with these fracture mechanics concepts. The analysis confirmed that proof testing was necessary for the undensified system and that proof testing should lead to adequate reliability with respect to the design stresses. For the undensified system, fracture mechanics predictions were confirmed by measuring the strength of samples that survived proof testing. It was also found that the time-dependent nature of the system's strength was controlled mainly by the ceramic and that this time-strength dependency is similar to that observed for bulk glasses that have compositions similar to the glass fibers present in the ceramic tiles.
Objectives: 1) Optimize S&MA organization to best facilitate Shuttle transition in 2010, successfully support Ares developmental responsibilities, and minimize the impacts of the gap between last Shuttle flight and start of Ares V Project. 2) Improve leveraging of critical skills and experience between Shuttle and Ares. 3) Split technical and supervisory functions to facilitate technical penetration. 4) Create Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) stand-alone position for successfully implementation of S&MA Technical Authority. 5) Minimize disruption to customers. 6) Provide early involvement of S&MA leadership team and frequent/open communications with S&MA team members and steak-holders.
As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther from Earth, spacecraft designs must optimize mass and volume while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) office develops, implements, and ensures compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability, and quality assurance. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program S&MA integration functions, and provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs.