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At least 55 records · Page 3

Performance evaluation of neutron noise analysis in detecting special nuclear materials

Reliable and rapid inspection techniques play a vital role in preventing illicit trafficking of special nuclear materials. Active interrogation systems using neutrons produced by portable, high-flux deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium neutron generators are being actively developed as a secondary scanning tool for this purpose. In this study, a neutron noise analysis-based approach for detecting unshielded and shielded special nuclear materials by using a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator was evaluated. Here, this approach analyzes the fluctuation of neutron counts. Its performance was quantified with regard to time-to-detection to achieve a minimum probability of detection of 99% and a probability of false alarm of less than 1% considering various amounts of special nuclear materials and different shielding configurations. It was demonstrated that this approach could detect 17 uranium slugs in 5 s given a neutron generator yield of 8.1 × 10 7 n/s. These slugs could be detected within a reasonable time frame (200 s) when they were shielded by 10.16 cm of high-density polyethylene. The results obtained using the neutron noise analysis approach were compared with those obtained using the commonly used differential die-away analysis technique, a sensitive technique for detecting the presence of fissile materials by utilizing the prompt fission neutrons produced when the source neutrons from a neutron generator are completely diminished. For example, the time to detect 2 unshielded uranium slugs was 2.1 s when using the differential die-away analysis technique; it increased to 93 s for the neutron noise analysis approach. Although the noise analysis-based approach exhibits an overall performance which is not as good as that of differential die-away, neutron noise provides an alternative method for effective detection of special nuclear materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Simulated Energy Response in a Multiplicity Detector

Neutron multiplicity analysis is used for many applications, including nonproliferation and criticality safety. Multiplicity detectors have advantages over total neutron counting as they provide the ability to assess both multiplication and mass in fissionable material. In addition, multiplicity detectors can generate real-time information, e.g., dose estimation. The ability to evaluate the detector efficiency in each application is of primary importance in producing meaningful analyses. Multiplicity detectors usually house 3 He tubes within a polyethylene moderator. If the tubes are located behind different thickness of polyethylene, they will have different energy responses. This paper assesses 3 He tube efficiency as a function of neutron energy for a specific multiplicity detector.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Scalable Detector Design for a High-Resolution Fast-Neutron Radiography Panel

Development of a scalable flat-panel neutron radiography device is needed to meet the nondestructive testing needs of a growing industrial market. Flood field images from a Cs-137 gamma source and a Cf-252 fission neutron source were generated using a detector composed of a 3-mm-thick sheet of EJ-200, and 3-mm-thick sheet of acrylic light spreader, an 8 $\times$ 8 array of SensL MICROFJ-60035-TSV SiPMs, and an IDEAS ROSSPAD readout module. The readout module can be tiled together with similar systems to create a panel of any size, and is only limited by the number of available Ethernet ports in a switching system. A collimated gamma line image demonstrated a 90% spatial resolution of approximately 0.47 line pairs per centimeter and a 10% spatial resolution of approximately 2.32 line pairs per centimeter. A neutron edge image demonstrated a 90% spatial resolution of approximately 0.70 line pairs per centimeter and a 10% spatial resolution of approximately 3.35 line pairs per centimeter. Both of these images show the ability to generate radiographs with sub-SiPM spatial resolution. Using these readout modules, a large-scale radiographic panel can be developed by tiling ROSSPAD modules together.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Analysis of a Prototype Multi-Detector Fast-Neutron Radiography Panel

A multi-detector fast neutron radiography panel was built using the previous work on scalable neutron radiography using the IDEAS ROSSPAD readout module. A new aluminum housing was built to accommodate a large number of detectors tiled together. Additional changes to startup and processing code were made to operate the detector as one cohesive unit. Spatial resolution of the full panel using Cs-137 gammas was reported to be 0.42 line pairs per centimeter at 90% MTF and 2.09 line pairs per centimeter at 10% MTF. Here, three neutron radiographs generated using a Cf-252 fission neutron source were used to determine the spatial resolution of the panel for neutrons. The experiments had 90% MTF values of 0.24, 0.3, and 0.27 line pairs per centimeter and 10% MTF values of 1.30, 1.46, and 1.40 line pairs per centimeter. An example neutron radiograph was also used to prove that the radiography panel can perform true neutron radiography.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Effect of likelihood misspecification in Gaussian process-driven autonomous experimentation

In recent years, several groups have designed Autonomous Experiment (AE) models with the aim of using them as an alternative method for neutron scattering scanning. In an AE, Gaussian processes (GPs) are most frequently used due to their interpretability, their non-parametric nature, their universal approximation, and their closed-form predictive distribution. GPs have two key components, namely, the model for the likelihood of a neutron count knowing the underlying dynamic structure factor and the acquisition function. In this paper, we investigate the impact, on the quality of an AE, of the likelihood and acquisition function choices, in energy scans and (Q, ω) ones, with respect to the signal-over-noise ratio. While we hypothesized that the quality of GP predictions would decrease when the normal to Poisson likelihood approximation breaks down at low count rates, we found that the use of the correct Poisson likelihood does not improve the quality of the data collected, as well as yields very poor results in (Q, ω) scans at low count rates. In fact, the best results are obtained with a combination of normal likelihood, including the observation noise, and the change in variance acquisition function. In addition, we find that the performance, or quality of the predictive distribution, is a misleading measure of efficiency, that is, of the quality of the data collected.

Perryman, David Elliott [Inst. Laue-Langevin (ILL)↗

Demonstration and Concept of Operations for a Zero-Knowledge Protocol Passive Imaging Measurement for Arms Control

Here, we present an imaging system that employs zero-knowledge protocols to protect sensitive geometrical information, along with procedures to increase confidence in the result. The goal of this work is to enable the inclusion of warhead confirmation measurements in future arms control treaties. We present a demonstration of both true positive and true negative measurements that validate models and establish authenticating procedures toward meeting acceptance requirements for use in nuclear facilities. We use a two-dimensional time-encoded fast neutron imaging system with an anti-symmetric mask pattern; the fast neutron count values exceeding minimum or maximum thresholds indicate that two measured items are not identical. Laboratory measurements over twenty trials show that alarm rates for negative confirmation measurements are within uncertainties of model predictions. Positive confirmation measurements indicate that alarm rates are large enough to encourage treaty compliance.

Sweany, Melinda Dominique [Sandia National Laborat↗

Divergence Reduction in Monte Carlo Neutron Transport with On-GPU Asynchronous Scheduling

While Monte Carlo Neutron Transport (MCNT) is near-embarrasingly parallel, the effectively unpredictable lifetime of neutrons can lead to divergence when MCNT is evaluated on GPUs. Divergence is the phenomenon of adjacent threads in a warp executing different control flow paths; on GPUS, it reduces performance because each work group may only execute one path at a time. The process of Thread Data Remapping (TDR) resolves these discrepancies by moving data across hardware such that data in the same warp will be processed through similar paths. A common issue among prior implementations of TDR is the synchronous nature of its remapping and processing cycles, which exhaustively sort data produced by prior processing passes and exhaustively evaluate the sorted data. In another work, we defined a method of remapping data through an asynchronous scheduler which allows for work to be stored in shared memory and deferred arbitrarily until that work is a viable option for low-divergence evaluation. This article surveys a wider set of cases, with the goal of characterizing performance trends across a more comprehensive set of parameters. These parameters include cross sections of scattering/capturing/fission, use of implicit capture, source neutron counts, simulation time spans, and tuned memory allocations. Across these cases, we have recorded minimum and average execution times, as well as a heuristically tuned near-optimal memory allocation size for both synchronous and asynchronous scheduling. Across the collected data, it is shown that the asynchronous method is faster and more memory efficient in the majority of cases, and that it requires less tuning to achieve competitive performance.

Computer Science↗

An Integrated Approach to Precision Neutron Measurements in a Dynamic Environment [Slides]

Any quantity of special nuclear material must be accurately quantified for health, safety, and security concerns. High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counters (HLNCCs) are detectors used for assaying the mass of special nuclear material. HLNCCs record a neutron count rate over some period of time which is compared to a calibration curve to determine the quantity of special nuclear material present within the detector.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Joint LLNL, LANL, SNL, and IRSN High Multiplication Subcritical (Multiplicity) Benchmark Integral Experiment Execution (CED-3b Report)

This report documents the experimental configurations and measurements for IER-518: Joint LLNL, LANL, SNL, and IRSN High Multiplication Subcritical (Multiplicity) Benchmark Experiments. These measurements involved a series of subcritical configurations at the Sandia Critical Experiments (SCX) facility at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The purpose of these measurements was to produce time tagged neutron count data of configurations that exceed a subcritical multiplication of 20, which is the high end of the fundamental physics benchmarks currently available in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project Handbook (ICSBEP). These measurements leverage experimental configurations 1 and detector systems 2 from previously accepted ICSBEP benchmark evaluations, allowing evaluations of these measurements to be performed at greatly reduced cost.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Identify and Assess Technical Challenges in Safeguards Measurements of Spent Advanced Reactor Fuels

Advanced reactor (AR) designs use various nuclear fuel types that can be significantly different than conventional light-water reactor (LWR) fuels, including differences in sizes, compositions, and chemical forms (e.g., oxide, carbide, metal). Nearly all the proposed AR fuels use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which will have higher enrichments (5–20 wt% 235 U) than LWR fuels (currently limited to <5 wt% 235 U). In advance of the wide use of these new fuel types around the world, international safeguards organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA]) are working with some of the AR vendors to formulate safeguards approaches for these AR fuel cycles. As part of the overall safeguards approach, it is important to identify the potential technical challenges in performing safeguards verification measurements of these AR fuels (both fresh and spent fuels) in advance of the widespread adoption of these new fuel types, because new safeguards technologies can take several years to develop, test, and approve for use. This report documents work performed in fiscal year 2024 based on modeling and simulation to assess the performance of the existing safeguards measurement technologies for irradiated or spent AR fuel elements or items. This work is a continuation of the work performed in fiscal year 2023 that focused on fresh AR fuels. Spent AR fuels have a distinct difference from their LWR counterparts: unlike the spent LWR fuels typically stored in a water-filled pool, some spent AR fuels—such as tristructural-isotropic (TRISO)-based fuels—will most likely be stored in air-filled hot cells. Because most safeguards measurements on spent fuel performed to date have been conducted under water, the air-filled hot cell environment could present unique challenges to safeguards measurements. Fork detector (FDET) and Cerenkov viewing device (CVD) systems have been the two primary instruments used by the IAEA for several decades to measure spent LWR fuel assemblies stored in pools for safeguards verification purposes. Because the lower refractive index of air causes Cerenkov light to be of lower intensity in air than in water, existing CVDs are likely unable to perform safeguards verification measurements for spent fuel stored in an air-filled hot cell, as is the case for the TRISO-based spent fuel elements (e.g., pebbles, graphite fuel blocks). Unlike FDET measurements, CVD measurements do not require fuel be moved, so they are a simpler and faster to take than FDET measurements. The inability to perform CVD measurements on the TRISO-based AR fuel types presents a major technical challenge in the effort to use existing technology to perform safeguards measurements on spent AR fuels. This study was mainly conducted through the modeling and simulation of an FDET or an FDET-like system on five spent AR fuel types, including one metallic fuel type and four TRISO-based fuel types in both pebble and graphite block forms in their respective storage configurations and environments. Because the various AR fuel types have significantly different dimensions, FDET systems must be adapted to accommodate them. Partial defect tests were also simulated in this study to assess the FDET’s ability to detect potential fuel diversions. The FDET measures the fuel’s total passive neutron and gamma emissions. The simulated FDET results from spent AR fuel items are compared against results from a typical spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly. High-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma detector measurements were also simulated for the spent AR fuel types and the PWR assembly because the signature photopeaks have been used in LWR safeguards verifications, although HPGe is usually not used to detect diversions because of the fuel’s self-attenuation effects on those photopeaks. The results indicate that these detectors have significant challenges in performing safeguards measurements of the spent AR fuel items, including incompatibilities between AR fuel items and existing FDETs, lower neutron count rates, lower sensitivities to fuel diversions in certain AR fuel items, and significantly higher interference from a neighboring fuel item when the measurement is performed in air. These results suggest that an alternative technology or significant and timely technology development is needed to perform adequate safeguards measurements of some of these AR fuel items.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Characterizing Shielded Special Nuclear Material by Neutron Capture Gamma-Ray Multiplicity Counting

We present a new neutron multiplicity counting analysis and measurement method for neutron-shielded fissile material using neutron-capture gamma rays. Neutrons absorbed in shielding produce characteristic gamma rays that preserve the otherwise lost neutron multiplicity signature. Neutron multiplicity counting provides estimates of fission parameters, such as neutron leakage multiplication, spontaneous fissioner (e.g. Pu-240) mass, and (α,n) ratio. Standard neutron multiplicity counting can incorporate the new neutron-capture gamma-ray multiplicity counting technique to characterize previously degenerate or intractable source configurations by maximizing the multiplicity signature. The new method decouples neutron source-detector interferences, such as reflection and thermalization time in the detector, that could improve measurements of the mean neutron lifetime. We also develop a detector prototype for the multiplicity counting of neutron-capture gamma rays and present detector design considerations, such as detection material and shielding, to optimize the detection of the 2.2 MeV hydrogen capture gamma ray. We simulate the prototype neutron- capture gamma-ray multiplicity counter against the BeRP ball in polyethylene shells to inform future measurements.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Gamma and Neutron Measurement and Modeling of Irradiated TRISO Fuel

Given the unique characteristics of the PBR fuel cycle, both gamma and neutron measurements are expected to play important roles in performing and maintaining nuclear material control and accounting for spent pebbles to safeguard the fuel cycle. Given the lack of irradiated pebbles in the US, a variety of irradiated TRISO fuel samples with wide ranges of burnups and cooling times available at ORNL were used in this work. A large number of gamma and neutron measurements have been performed on these samples to collect data to test the various detectors and to benchmark the computer models to simulate the depletion and decay of the fuel and the measurements themselves. Two neutron detectors, including a custom-made detector and the Very High-Performance Neutron Multiplicity Counting, were used to measure the neutrons emitted by these TRISO samples. Three gamma spectrometry detectors, including an HPGe and the M400 CZT detector, were used to measure gamma-ray emissions from these samples. The M400 was recently adopted by the IAEA for fresh uranium measurements, but it was tested for spent fuel measurements prior to this project. Detailed MCNP models were developed to simulate these neutron and gamma measurements. Some GADRAS models were also developed to cross check the MCNP models for the gamma measurements. It was found challenging to perform neutron measurements in the hot cell due to the high background counts. Close agreements were observed between the simulated and measured neutron count rates in both detectors’ measurements of californium calibration sources. Both the HPGe and M400 detectors were able to measure the 604 and 662 keV peaks from these samples, which are the two most important peaks used to infer fuel burnup. Although the M400 detector did not have nearly good energy resolution and did not detect some of the minor peaks as the HPGe detector, it was found to be capable of handling significantly higher dose rates than HPGe. Given the complexities in the TRISO samples (e.g., different samples sizes) and uncertainties in the alignments between the detector and the TRISO fuel inside the containers, large scatters were found between the peak area rates and the samples’ burnups. However, the 604/662 peak ratios were found to trend well with the samples’ burnups among most samples in both measured and simulated results.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Total Measurement Uncertainty in Neutron Coincidence Multiplicity Analysis

Neutron multiplicity counting is the most commonly used nondestructive assay technique for determining the plutonium mass within containers of scrap PuO 2 or mixed oxide (MOX). In multiplicity analysis, the 240 Pu eff mass, leakage multiplication, and alpha ratio (the ratio of [α, n]-to-spontaneous fission neutron production) are the three primary unknown sample properties. They must be determined simultaneously. To solve for these three unknowns in a multiplicity assay, three measured values are needed: the singles, doubles, and triples neutron count rates. While the analysis is limited to solving for three unknowns, there are many additional factors that impact the observed count rates and contribute to the measurement uncertainty. In this study we investigate the various uncertainty contributors for the multiplicity analysis through a combination of traditional uncertainty propagation techniques supplemented by Monte Carlo simulations to address the dependences not explicitly expressed by the point source model. Uncertainties arising from counting statistics, calibration parameters, calibration method, nuclear data, and various material characteristics (isotopic abundances, chemical form, density, and impurities) are considered. A Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU) estimate is then developed from these uncertainty contributors. This study is confined to multiplicity analysis of items commonly encountered in international safeguards applications. That is, the study focused on Pu oxides and MOX materials for the masses ranging up to 4000 grams total Pu. Multiplicity measurements were simulated using MCNP V6 based on the Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter (PSMC), Epithermal Multiplicity Counter (ENMC), Pyrochemical Multiplicity Counter, and Large Epithermal Multiplicity Counter (LEMC) for this study; however, this report focuses on the parameterization of the uncertainties for the PSMC. The performance differences between the PSMC and the other multiplicity counting systems are relatively small, primarily manifesting in the impact on measurement precision so that the evaluation developed for the PSMC can be applied to the other multiplicity counting systems. Finally an analysis tool, the Multiplicity TMU Estimator, was developed from this study to serve as an aid for evaluation of the total measurement uncertainty of multiplicity assay results obtained from the commonly used INCC acquisition and analysis software.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Multiplicity counting using organic scintillators to distinguish neutron sources: An advanced teaching laboratory

In this advanced instructional laboratory, students explore complex detection systems and nondestructive assay techniques used in the field of nuclear physics. After setting up and calibrating a neutron detection system, students carry out timing and energy deposition analyses of radiation signals. Through the timing of prompt fission neutron signals, multiplicity counting is used to carry out a special nuclear material (SNM) nondestructive assay. Our experimental setup is comprised of eight trans-stilbene organic scintillation detectors in a well-counter configuration, and measurements are taken on a spontaneous fission source as well as two (α,n) sources. By comparing each source's measured multiplicity distribution, the resulting measurements of the (α,n) sources can be distinguished from that of the spontaneous fission source. Such comparisons prevent the spoofing, i.e., intentional imitation, of a fission source by an (α,n) neutron source. This instructional laboratory is designed for nuclear engineering and physics students interested in organic scintillators, neutron sources, and nonproliferation radiation measurement techniques.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Boron coated straw-based neutron multiplicity counter for neutron interrogation of TRISO fueled pebbles

Pebble bed reactors (PBRs) can improve the safety and economics of the nuclear energy production. PBRs rely on TRIstructural-ISOtropic (TRISO) fuel pebbles for enhanced fission product retention. Accurate characterization of individual fuel pebbles would enable the validation of computational models, efficient use of TRISO fuel, and improve fuel accountability. Here, we have developed and tested a new neutron multiplicity counter (NMC) based on 192 boron coated straw (BCS) detectors optimized for 235 U assay in TRISO fuel. The new design yielded a singles and doubles neutron detection efficiency of 4.71% and 0.174%, respectively, and a die-away time of 16.7 μs. The NMC has a low intrinsic gamma-ray detection efficiency of 8.71 x 10 –8 at an exposure rate of 80.3 mR/h. In simulation, a high-efficiency version of the NMC encompassing 396 straws was able to estimate the 235 U in a pebble with a relative uncertainty and error both below 2% in 100 s.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improving Effective Mass Estimations in Pu-Metal Annuli

Determining the effective mass of 240 Pu in a plutonium metal item can be achieved through a number of destructive and non-destructive assay techniques. However, these techniques have one or more shortcomings. These include the need for large quantities of plutonium, long measurement time, or lack of sufficient accuracy. While efforts have been made to mitigate these issues by estimating 240 Pu quantities through neutron coincidence counting techniques, these estimates are subject to systematic bias, and their estimates are not well characterized when other factors of the annulus’ physical form and composition are accounted for. In this work, we expand upon these non-destructive assay techniques via the implementation of random forest machine learning models, which produce correction functions that augment and improve the effective mass estimates derived from classical leakage multiplication, singles, doubles, and triples multiplicity counting equations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Incorporating the latest Neutron NDA analysis techniques into INCC6

International Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC6) is the IAEA’s neutron NDA software. With FY25 SGTech support we implemented self-diagnostic features into INCC6. For FY26 we propose to implement advanced analysis methods that have been splintered into custom software for one-off instruments. Incorporating these capabilities in INCC6 will make them available for any new or existing application on the ubiquitous INCC6 platform, increasing safeguards efficiency and effectiveness.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗