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Program analyzes the consequences of a loss-of-flow accident in the primary cooling system of a heterogeneous light-water moderated and cooled nuclear reactor. It produces a temperature matrix 36 x 41 /x,y/ which includes fuel surface temperatures relative to the time the pump power was lost.
Probabilistic safety requirements currently formulated or proposed for space systems, nuclear reactor systems, nuclear weapon systems, and other types of systems that have a low-probability potential for high-consequence accidents depend on showing that the probability of such accidents is below a specified safety threshold or goal. Verification of compliance depends heavily upon synthetic modeling techniques such as PRA. To determine whether or not a system meets its probabilistic requirements, it is necessary to consider whether there are significant risks that are not fully considered in the PRA either because they are not known at the time or because their importance is not fully understood. The ultimate objective is to establish a reasonable margin to account for the difference between known risks and actual risks in attempting to validate compliance with a probabilistic safety threshold or goal. In this paper, we examine data accumulated over the past 60 years from the space program, from nuclear reactor experience, from aircraft systems, and from human reliability experience to formulate guidelines for estimating probabilistic margins to account for risks that are initially unknown or underappreciated. The formulation includes a review of the safety literature to identify the principal causes of such risks.
The space shuttle together with expendable and nonexpendable orbital stages such as the space tug or Centaur can safely dispose of waste material by ejecting it from the solar system. The safety problems associated with all phases of launching and operation (normal, emergency, and accident) of such a system are being examined. It appears that solutions can be found that should make the risks acceptable when compared to the benefits to be obtained from the disposal of the nuclear waste. The techniques proposed to make such a system acceptable need to be carefully verified by further study and experiment.
The results of a study to identify potential hazards arising from nuclear reactor power systems for use on the lunar and Martian surfaces, related safety issues, and resolutions of such issues by system design changes, operating procedures, and other means are presented. All safety aspects of nuclear reactor power systems from prelaunch ground handling to eventual disposal were examined consistent with the level of detail for SP-100 reactor design at the 1988 System Design Review and for launch vehicle and space transport vehicle designs and mission descriptions as defined in the 90-day Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) study. Information from previous aerospace nuclear safety studies was used where appropriate. Safety requirements for the SP-100 space nuclear reactor system were compiled. Mission profiles were defined with emphasis on activities after low earth orbit insertion. Accident scenarios were then qualitatively defined for each mission phase. Safety issues were identified for all mission phases with the aid of simplified event trees. Safety issue resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were compiled. Resolution approaches for those safety issues not covered by the SP-100 program were identified. Additionally, the resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were examined in light of the moon and Mars missions.
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation utilized TAP-A, a COSMIC program originally developed as part of a NASA investigation into the potential of nuclear power for space launch vehicles. It is useful in nuclear power plant design to qualify safety-related equipment at the temperatures it would experience should an accident occur. The program is easy to use, produces accurate results, and is inexpensive to run.
The entry of nuclear reactors into Earth's atmosphere resulting from an accidental or inadvertent abort of a space vehicle powered by nuclear-thermal rockets is investigated. The study is made for a typical piloted Mars mission vehicle incapacitated by an accident or malfunction during the Earth-arrival phase of the Mars-return journey due to simultaneous, multiple failures of its component systems. A single accident/abort scenario resulting in three entry possibilities is considered for a nominal hyperbolic in-bound approach velocity of 8 km/sec. The most severe case involving a direct entry is then analyzed over a broad range of approach velocities extending to 12 km/sec to include sprint-type missions. The results indicate that the severe surface heating, stagnation pressures, and g-loads are greater than 150 kW/sq cm, 300 atm, and 800-g, respectively. The wall heat transfer rate exceeds the value that can be accommodated by a carbon heatshield through radiation equilibrium prior to sublimation at 5500 K. These conditions are beyond our previous experience in crew safety, structural design, and thermal protection.
Human error is a major contributor to accidents and performance losses in complex engineered systems. If one examines these human error caused failures further, a specific cause, the lack of situation awareness, has dominated as a major cause of human errors that instigate latent or catastrophic failures in complex systems. Studies of aviation accidents involving major air carriers revealed that situation awareness was the root cause of around 90% of accidents involving pilot error. Another study explored offshore drilling accidents involving human error and found that 40% of accidents were directly attributed to the loss of situation awareness. Studies of human errors in other domains such as nuclear power, air traffic control, process industry, and advanced driving show that loss of SA was a root cause in a majority of the events. Situation awareness-related failures are not only common but also costly and fatal (e.g., Bhopal Gas Leak, Air France 447 Flight Crash). Thus, the concept of situation awareness has emerged as an important construct in human factors, resulting in numerous models and measurement methods to aid in promoting appropriate levels of situation awareness.
When launching a nuclear reactor into space for use in a nuclear thermal rocket (NTR), safety to the public is of the outmost importance. Ensuring that the reactor will not go critical in an accident scenario is the biggest risk that must be overcome to protect the public. Use of anti-criticality devices and methods, such as the use of poison materials in the core or loading a select portion of the fuel on orbit, can prevent the reactor from going critical in any accident scenario. However, both methods (unpoisoning / loading fuel into the reactor core on orbit) will likely require the use of In Space Assembly and Manufacturing (ISAM) technology to remove the safeguards and ensure the reactor is fully operational before use. This paper discusses the use of ISAMs to help with the unpackaging of anti-criticality devices on orbit along with ISAMs ability to help verify and preform maintenance and inspection checks of the reactor system before operation and in between engine burns.
The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment: Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.
The Importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful In improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking In response to a problem, This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.
NASA, at the request of the AEC, is conducting a preliminary study to determine the feasibility of disposing of nuclear waste material into space. The study has indicated that the Space Shuttle together with expendable and nonexpendable orbital stages such as the Space Tug or Centaur can safety dispose of waste material by ejecting it from the solar system. The safety problems associated with all phases of launching and operation (normal, emergency and accident) of such a system are being examined. From the preliminary study it appears that solutions can be found that should make the risks acceptable when compared to the benefits to be obtained from the disposal of the nuclear waste.
Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, NASA has extensively used probabilistic analysis methods to assess, understand, and communicate the risk of space launch vehicles. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), used in the nuclear industry, is one of the probabilistic analysis methods NASA utilizes to assess Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) risk for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability distributions to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: 1) what can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired consequences of interest), 2) how likely is it (probabilities), and 3) what is the severity of the degradation (consequences). Since the Challenger accident, PRA has been used in supporting decisions regarding safety upgrades for launch vehicles. Another area that was given a lot of emphasis at NASA after the Challenger accident is reliability engineering. Reliability engineering has been a critical design function at NASA since the early Apollo days. However, after the Challenger accident, quantitative reliability analysis and reliability predictions were given more scrutiny because of their importance in understanding failure mechanism and quantifying the probability of failure, which are key elements in resolving technical issues, performing design trades, and implementing design improvements. Although PRA and reliability are both probabilistic in nature and, in some cases, use the same tools, they are two different activities. Specifically, reliability engineering is a broad design discipline that deals with loss of function and helps understand failure mechanism and improve component and system design. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment process intended to assess the risk scenarios that could lead to a major/top undesirable system event, and to identify those scenarios that are high-risk drivers. PRA output is critical to support risk informed decisions concerning system design. This paper describes the PRA process and the reliability engineering discipline in detail. It discusses their differences and similarities and how they work together as complementary analyses to support the design and risk assessment processes. Lessons learned, applications, and case studies in both areas are also discussed in the paper to demonstrate and explain these differences and similarities.
In the future, nuclear assemblies containing fission products will be transported at high speeds. An example is a reactor supplying power to a large subsonic airplane. In this case an accident can occur resulting in a ground impact at speeds up to 1000 ft/sec. This paper analyzes the containment vessel temperatures after impact and attempts to understand the design variables that affect the post impact survival of the system. The heat transfer analysis includes conduction, radiation, and convection in addition to the core material heats of fusion and vaporization under partial-burial conditions. Also, included is the fact that fission products vaporize and transport radially outward and condense on cooler surfaces, resulting in a moving heat source.
Computerized fault tree analyses are used to obtain both qualitative and quantitative information about the safety and reliability of an electrical control system that shuts the reactor down when certain safety criteria are exceeded, in the design of a nuclear plant protection system, and in an investigation of a backup emergency system for reactor shutdown. The fault tree yields the modes by which the system failure or accident will occur, the most critical failure or accident causing areas, detailed failure probabilities, and the response of safety or reliability to design modifications and maintenance schemes.
This paper describes the concept and preliminary component testing of a gas-cooled, UN-fueled, pin-type reactor which uses He/Xe gas that goes directly into a recuperated Brayton system to produce electricity for nuclear electric propulsion. This Direct-Drive Gas-Cooled Reactor (DDG) is designed to be subcritical under water or wet- sand immersion in case of a launch accident. Because the gas-cooled reactor can directly drive the Brayton turbomachinery, it is possible to configure the system such that there are no external surfaces or pressure boundaries that are refractory metal, even though the gas delivered to the turbine is 1144 K. The He/Xe gas mixture is a good heat transport medium when flowing, and a good insulator when stagnant. Judicious use of stagnant cavities as insulating regions allows transport of the 1144-K gas while keeping all external surfaces below 900 K. At this temperature super-alloys (Hastelloy or Inconel) can be used instead of refractory metals. Super-alloys reduce the technology risk because they are easier to fabricate than refractory metals, we have a much more extensive knowledge base on their characteristics, and, because they have a greater resistance to oxidation, system testing is eased. The system is also relatively simple in its design: no additional coolant pumps, heat exchanger, or freeze-thaw systems are required. Key to success of this concept is a good knowledge of the heat transfer between the fuel pins and the gas, as well as the pressure drop through the system. This paper describes preliminary testing to obtain this key information, as well as experience in demonstrating electrically heated testing of simulated reactor components.
In complex human-machine systems, operations, training, and standardization depend on a elaborate set of procedures which are specified and mandated by the operational management of the organization. The intent is to provide guidance to the pilots, to ensure a logical, efficient, safe, and predictable means of carrying out the mission objectives. In this report the authors examine the issue of procedure use and design from a broad viewpoint. The authors recommend a process which we call 'The Four P's:' philosophy, policies, procedures, and practices. We believe that if an organization commits to this process, it can create a set of procedures that are more internally consistent, less confusing, better respected by the flight crews, and that will lead to greater conformity. The 'Four-P' model, and the guidelines for procedural development in appendix 1, resulted from cockpit observations, extensive interviews with airline management and pilots, interviews and discussion at one major airframe manufacturer, and an examination of accident and incident reports. Although this report is based on airline operations, we believe that the principles may be applicable to other complex, high-risk systems, such as nuclear power production, manufacturing process control, space flight, and military operations.
This paper describes the concept and preliminary component testing of a gas-cooled, UN-fueled, pin-type reactor which uses He/Xe gas that goes directly into a recuperated Brayton system to produce electricity for nuclear electric propulsion. This Direct-Drive Gas-Cooled Reactor (DDG) is designed to be subcritical under water or wet-sand immersion in case of a launch accident. Because the gas-cooled reactor can directly drive the Brayton turbomachinery, it is possible to configure the system such that there are no external surfaces or pressure boundaries that are refractory metal, even though the gas delivered to the turbine is 1144 K. The He/Xe gas mixture is a good heat transport medium when flowing, and a good insulator when stagnant. Judicious use of stagnant cavities as insulating regions allows transport of the 1144-K gas while keeping all external surfaces below 900 K. At this temperature super-alloys (Hastelloy or Inconel) can be used instead of refractory metals. Super-alloys reduce the technology risk because they are easier to fabricate than refractory metals, we have a much more extensive knowledge base on their characteristics, and, because they have a greater resistance to oxidation, system testing is eased. The system is also relatively simple in its design: no additional coolant pumps, heat exchanger, or freeze-thaw systems are required. Key to success of this concept is a good knowledge of the heat transfer between the fuel pins and the gas, as well as the pressure drop through the system. This paper describes preliminary testing to obtain this key information, as well as experience in demonstrating electrical thermal simulation of reactor components and concepts.
A task force was created by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to conduct a 90-day study to support efforts to determine requirements to meet the goals of the Space Exploration Initiative. The task force identified the need for a nuclear reactor to provide the electrical power required as the outpost power demands on the moon and Mars evolve into hundreds of kilowatts. A preliminary hazards analysis has been performed to examine safety aspects of nuclear reactor power systems for representative missions to the moon and Mars. Mission profiles were defined for reference lunar and Martian flights. Potential alternatives to each mission phase were also defined. Accident scenarios were qualitatively defined for the mission phases. The safety issues decay heat removal, reactor control, disposal, criticality, end-of-mission shutdown, radiation exposure, the Martian environment, high speed impact on the surfaces of the moon or Mars, and return flyby trajectories were identified.