SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The presentation is part of the actinide sciences lecture series. It covers the difference between chemical and nuclear, what makes it a nuclear weapon, a simplified model of how it works, characteristics and effects, and explosion products, such as different kinds of radiation.
From 1948 to 1954, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission conducted a study of pregnancy outcomes among births to atomic bomb survivors (Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan) who had received radiation doses ranging from 0 Gy to near-lethal levels. Past reports (1956, 1981, and 1990) on the cohort did not identify significant associations of radiation exposure with untoward pregnancy outcomes, such as major congenital malformations, stillbirths, or neonatal deaths, individually or in aggregate. We reexamined the risk of major congenital malformations and perinatal deaths in the children of atomic bomb survivors (n = 71,603) using fully reconstructed data to minimize the potential for bias, using refined estimates of the gonadal dose from Dosimetry System 2002 and refined analytical methods for characterizing dose-response relationships. The analyses showed that parental exposure to radiation was associated with increased risk of major congenital malformations and perinatal death, but the estimates were imprecise for direct radiation effects, and most were not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the uniformly positive estimates for untoward pregnancy outcomes among children of both maternal and paternal survivors are useful for risk assessment purposes, although extending them to populations other than the atomic bomb survivors comes with uncertainty as to generalizability.
The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.
Theft or sabotage of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a global concern. To minimize this threat, establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear security regime is required to protect against criminal or other negligent acts. Use of a formalized insider threat mitigation program is one such security measure. Individuals who have or held authorized access to an organization's critical assets, such as nuclear materials, are considered "insiders." Insider threats, or insider adversaries, are motivated individuals who possess access, authority, and knowledge to conduct a malicious act or facilitate that of an external party. To thwart insider threats (both intentional and unintentional), organizations can formalize an enterprise-wide approach to identify and mitigate the unique risks presented by insiders. This report provides an approach to evaluate an insider threat mitigation program at facilities with nuclear materials. Formal program evaluations serve many purposes and can be designed using several different methods and techniques. This report presents a self-assessment approach to program evaluation whereby an organization can assess its strengths, identify key gaps, and set priorities for ongoing improvement efforts to mitigate insider threats. Results of the self-assessment can provide critical information to contribute to the continuous improvement of an organization’s insider threat mitigation program within eight specific domain areas.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620 in the town of Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (see Figure 1). The purpose of the undertaking is related to the modernization of Mercury for future mission needs. The NNSA/NFO will implement this undertaking in accordance with the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA. Building 23-620 was built in 1968 as office space for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), who worked on the design and engineering of nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, it became a maintenance facility for Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company (REECo), and eventually, it became the Real Estate Services building in 2004. The town of Mercury and the immediate surrounding area have been formally determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register, NRHP) as the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230) under Criteria A and C for its importance in supporting nuclear testing and scientific research from 1951 through 1992. Building 23-620 was identified as a contributing element to the MHD in a 2018 architectural survey of the district (Reno et al.) and recorded on a Nevada Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) form (Reno et al. 2017). Building 23-620 was also identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Mitigation Report: The purpose of this letter report is to submit documentation related to the mitigation of the demolition of Building 23-620 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) in the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230). This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA.
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with its quinquennial review conferences (RevCons), has become the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime over the course of its 50-year history. With more states parties than any other arms control agreement (currently 191), the Treaty provides a legally binding framework for all states parties, constraining proliferation of nuclear weapons and committing the five recognized states who possess nuclear weapons to work toward disarmament. The NPT has enjoyed wide success in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Only one state party has left the agreement and gone on to acquire these weapons, and the overall track record of compliance with IAEA safeguards has been robust. However, for all its effectiveness in the area of nonproliferation, its achievements on the disarmament front have been relatively unimpressive. While the NWS – most notably the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia – have decreased the overall size of their nuclear arsenals significantly since 1970, these arsenals have remained an important feature of NWS security policies. The limited progress towards disarmament has created friction between the NNWS and NWS and has been the source of mounting tension within the NPT regime. The 2020 RevCon, the 50th anniversary of the NPT and 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension, faces a range of contentious challenges, old and new, which call into question the Treaty’s future viability.
Many systems derive their electromagnetic radiation (EMR) environments from Mil-Std-464C or Mil-Std-464D, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems. This standard defines several EMR environments based on the type of system and expected application. Many nuclear weapon (NW) systems reference the ordnance environments as the starting point for their functional EMR requirements, since any item intended to go into Department of Defense (DOD) custody is expected to be certified hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO) safe when exposed to the environments listed in Mil-Std-464 Table 9. This environment is defined as the envelope of all sources any system in DOD custody may ever encounter, however, and may include sources that are not relevant for a particular system. This document is intended to provide additional clarity on the Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D EMR environments, specifically the driving sources for the maximum ordnance levels. This supplementary information may be used to guide tailoring of relevant environments or application to different systems with the additional consideration of any shielding that may reduce the external environments defined in the military standard.
On Sept. 26, Director Thom Mason signed the Laboratory’s annual assessment of four of the weapons systems in our nation’s nuclear stockpile: the B61 family of bombs and the W76, the W78 and the W88 warheads. Addressed to the secretary of energy, the secretary of defense and the chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council, this letter informs the president of the United States of our confidence that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective now and into the future as a result of our dedicated sustainment and modernization efforts.
Additive manufacturing (AM) is a rapidly developing technology that allows industries to automate and simplify the production of highly complicated items. Recently, there are concerns that AM techniques have the potential to be utilized in the fields of nuclear weapons and nuclear enrichment technology. Presently, there are very few international or domestic export controls that apply to AM's role in the nuclear industry, constituting an unmanaged proliferation pathway. Pre-existing export controls focus on general concepts and processes and do not consider specific nuances of various techniques that are categorized as additive manufacturing. To introduce legislation and controls that will be effective in monitoring proliferation pathways, one must investigate and characterize AM techniques and their nuclear applications. This paper categorizes and ranks 33 AM techniques based on their potential impact on the nuclear fuel cycle and the development of nuclear weapons. Through this method of characterization and categorization, export controls would address specific AM nuclear proliferation risks without disrupting the entire industry and fuel cycle. Additionally, legislation employing this method would identify loopholes in export controls using a holistic approach to managing and monitoring proliferation pathways.
Actinides are inherently unstable and undergo nuclear decay processes with a concurrent release of energy. Consequently, they are used for nuclear power generation, nuclear weapons, and nuclear medicine. However, the radioactive decay processes also pose significant technological problems for the safe treatment and storage of spent nuclear materials. Cost-effective extraction of the actinides is the key first step in the remediation of nuclear waste, but the appropriate chemical means have yet to be determined. Our present understanding of the chemistry of actinides is limited, with the role of the 5f electrons posing a set of particularly challenging questions. The work reported here is focused on the use of electronic spectroscopy to probe the bonding of small molecules in the gas phase that contains thorium or uranium. Analyses of these data, carried out within the framework of ligand field theory, reveal clear evidence that the 5f electrons are spectators that retain their atomic metal ion character.
The extent and etiology of health effects in workers who maintain underground storage tanks at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation (Hanford) have been subjects of controversy and concern for several decades. Hanford is a decommissioned nuclear production complex managed by the US Department of Energy in southeast Washington State. This integration-of-evidence review evaluates the relationship between exposure to vapors from mixed chemical and radioactive waste stored in underground storage tanks at Hanford and worker health. Hanford workers’ health information was gathered from technical reports, media reports, and published literature, including the systematic search of seven databases. This review describes the health status and health concerns of Hanford tank farm workers based on the integration of the available health effects data from disparate sources. In interviews with external groups, Hanford workers reported both irritant-type symptoms and diseases that they believe are attributable to tank farm vapors. However, the results of this integration-of-evidence review indicated that no pervasive pattern of occupational disease was identified that can be associated with exposure to tank farm vapors. Inhalation exposure to asbestos and beryllium is associated with lung disease from various types of nuclear industry work but not from work on tank farms. This review concluded that while irritant-type symptoms and isolated cases of occupational disease are plausible under certain conditions, the currently available data do not support a pervasive pattern of occupational disease associated with vapor exposure.
The PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is a prototype atmospheric radioxenon detection system designed at Oregon State University in support of international efforts towards monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon testing activities. This detector aims to address some shortcomings found in currently deployed beta–gamma atmospheric radioxenon detection systems, such as lackluster energy resolution and memory effect, by employing modern detection materials and readout. The system uses a PIPSBox, a silicon-based gas cell, for electron detection, and a pair of ultrabright, D-shaped SrI 2 (Eu) scintillators coupled to silicon photomultipliers for photon detection. A custom eight-channel digital pulse processor equipped with a field programmable gate-array (FPGA) identifies electron–photon coincidences between the volumes in near real-time. Gas samples of the four radioxenon isotopes of interest were independently measured with the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) detection system to determine energy resolution and efficiency. Application of FPGA-based coincidence discrimination in near real-time reduced the ambient background count rate by 95.85 ± 0.04%. Using parameters from the Xenon International gas processing unit and assuming a blank sample and zero memory effect the minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs) for the isotopes were calculated to be 0.12 ± 0.03, 0.27 ± 0.05, 0.15 ± 0.02, and 1.00 ± 0.08 mBq/m 3 air for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe, respectively. These MDC estimates compare well with other radioxenon detection systems employed in the International Monitoring System (IMS) and indicate that the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) sensitivity requirement of ≤ 1 mBq/m 3 for 133 Xe.
This paper investigates the effects of a nuclear-disturbed environment on the transmission of electromagnetic (EM) waves through the atmosphere. An atmospheric nuclear detonation can produce heightened free electron densities in the surrounding atmosphere that can disrupt EM waves that propagate through the disturbed region. Radiation transport models simulated the ionization and free electron densities created in the atmosphere from a 1 MT detonation at heights of burst of 5 km, 25 km, and 75 km. Recombination rates for the free electrons in the atmosphere were applied, from previous work in the literature, to determine the nuclear-induced electron densities as a function of time and space after the detonation. A ray-tracing algorithm was applied to determine the refraction and reflection of waves propagating in the different nuclear-disturbed environments. The simulation results show that the free electron plasma created from an atmospheric nuclear detonation depend on the height of burst of the weapon, the weapon yield, and the time after detonation. Detonations at higher altitudes produce higher free electron densities for greater durations and over larger ranges. The larger the free electron densities, the greater the impact on EM wavelengths in regards to refraction, reflection, and absorption in the atmosphere. An analysis of modern infrastructure and the effects of nuclear-disturbed atmospheres on different signal wavelengths and systems is discussed.
High-energy radiography is used to image imploding materials to better understand weapon design and performance. The Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) is a new facility proposal that aims to collect radiographic images of nuclear material. As part of the facility design, we aim to optimize data quality and radiographic performance by investigating different detector designs. We addressed design decisions by simulating different scintillator designs using M CNP6 and calculated the quantum efficiency, Swank factor, and detective quantum efficiency at zero-frequency (DQE(O)). First, we investigated the effects of the x-ray endpoint energy on the detector response. We generated three x-ray spectra with endpoint energies of 20 MeV, 22 MeV, and 24 MeV. The three raw spectra were filtered using the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test facility (DARHT) line-of-sight materials along with 1) flat field filtration using 7 cm tungsten alloy in the bullnose and 2) an FTO with 4 plates. The scatter-to-direct radiation ratio was much larger for FTO with 4 plates (50-60%) compared to the flat field with 7 cm of bullnose material (8%). We used these filtered spectra to calculate the detector response for the original DARHT segmented scintillator design. We found that the endpoint energy and filtration had a negligible effect on the detector response. The quantum efficiency was 0.63, the Swank factor was 0.84, and the DQE(O) was 0.53 for all six spectra.
The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) is in the central Pacific Ocean ~4,500 km west of Hawaii. The Enewetak Atoll, located in the northwest part of the RMI, was the site for 43 nuclear weapon tests between 1948 and 1958. Fallout and deposition from the tests contaminated the island surfaces, lagoon waters and sediment, and nearby ocean waters at the atoll. In the 1970s, a cleanup effort collected radioactive waste and placed it in the Cactus Crater on Runit Island (also called the Runit Dome). In December 2021, Congress directed the U.S. Department of Energy to study the impacts of climate change on the Runit Dome nuclear waste disposal site. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) assembled a multidisciplinary team of climate scientists, ocean modelers, environmental scientists, and health physicists to assess the likely effects of remaining radionuclides at the Enewetak Atoll. PNNL’s approach focused on effects of tropical cyclones that were postulated to mobilize and transport contaminated lagoon sediments and result in human and biota exposure. PNNL’s study estimated (1) the radionuclide source term, (2) the effects of climate change on severe storms, (3) mobilization and transport of radionuclides, and (4) radiation dose to humans and biota. Radionuclides in the lagoon and/or ocean waters of the Enewetak Atoll were characterized by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1972, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in 2015, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 2018. The RMI Nationwide Radiological Study was conducted in the early 1990s for radionuclides remaining in island soils. The 1972 AEC survey remains the most comprehensive source of radionuclide data on lagoon sediments. Climate change modeling at a regional scale in the central Pacific Ocean is limited. PNNL climate scientists simulated severe historical storms postulated to occur both in a recent climate (2015) and in the future (2090) using the Advanced Research Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF-ARW) model, employing a pseudo-global-warming technique. A postulated complete, future failure of the Runit Dome was also considered. PNNL developed a high-resolution regional ocean hydrodynamics model covering the entire RMI extended economic zone using the Finite Volume Coastal Ocean Model (FVCOM). The FVCOM model was run using global reanalysis data for current climate and WRF-ARW simulation for the future climate. PNNL also developed a radionuclide fate and transport model using the FVCOM Integrated Compartment Model (FVCOM-ICM) to simulate the current and future mobilization and transport of radionuclides sorbed to lagoon sediments and the exchange of radionuclides between the water and sediment. FVCOM-ICM-predicted radionuclide concentrations were then used to estimate radiation dose to humans and biota at all islands of the Enewetak Atoll. Under current climate conditions, annual radiation exposures for the southern islands including Enewetak (Fred) and Medren (Elmer) were below the current U.S. standards. Radiation doses were somewhat elevated starting at Runit Island northward and westward to Enjebi Island (Janet). The islands in the northwest quadrant, particularly Bokoluo (Alice) and Bokombako (Belle), remain relatively contaminated. The islands in the southwestern quadrant have low contamination. The highest contribution to radiation doses comes from consumption of locally grown foods. Two radionuclides, 90Sr and 137Cs, contributed the greatest fraction for most terrestrial foods. In current climate conditions, the storms temporarily increased radionuclide concentrations in the lagoon waters, increasing the radiation dose slightly. In future conditions, doses are expected to be smaller, primarily because of the radioactive decay of the shorter-lived radioisotopes of 90Sr and 137Cs. This could make all islands in the far northwest of the atoll – except Bokombako (Belle) and perhaps Bokoluo (Alice) – suitable for residency. For the f
Photoionization of atomic ions, the process through which atoms in bound states absorb radiation by losing electrons, is a vital part of describing radiative transfer in mission-relevant dynamics. The photoionization of molecules dominates radiative transfer of ultraviolet (UV) and extreme UV (EUV) radiation in colder atmospheres (temperature < 30,000 degrees Kelvin). Consequently, air, which is quite transparent to our eyes (i.e., in the visible frequency regime) is remarkably opaque to radiation in much of the UV and EUV frequency regimes. This opacity makes air and other gas systems quite efficient at absorbing UV and EUV radiation, which heats the gas until ionization makes it transparent. This effect is important in describing a host of relevant phenomena, ranging from charge separation in high-altitude nuclear events and the dynamics of a nuclear fireball to the electrostatic discharges (sparks) that complicate weapons disassembly at Pantex.
A thundering boom and sheet of fire announced a dramatic, once in a lifetime event – the firing of a nuclear projectile from a 280 mm cannon. Travelling seven miles downrange, the projectile detonated 500 feet over the Nevada Test Site’s Frenchman Flat with a force of fifteen kilotons. Although the test was successful, the massive cannon, designed for tactical battlefield use, had a critical flaw. It was too large and cumbersome for mobile combat. The cannon test, codenamed Grable, was part of Operation Upshot-Knothole, the fourth test series conducted in Nevada. Beginning with the Annie test on March 17, 1953, and concluding with the Climax test on June 4th, the Operation consisted of three airdrops, seven tower detonations, and the one artillery shot. As with previous Nevada tests, the demarcation between the weapon development series, Upshot, and the DOD effects tests, Knothole, was blurred. All eleven tests generated data in support of weapon development as well as tactical battlefield applications. During Upshot-Knothole, the University of California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL), conducted its first ever tests, Ruth and Ray. Although neither test was successful, these failures, along with another a year later at Operation Castle, provided the new laboratory with design data leading to future successful tests. The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) participated in a test series with the general goal of preparing for societal recovery from a nuclear attack. Known as Operation Doorstep, the FCDA’s experiments evaluated the effects of a nuclear attack on food supplies, housing and urban structures, and even a copse of trees transplanted from nearby Mt. Charleston. A contingent of the press witnessed test Annie from an outcropping of rocks, subsequently named News Nob. The presence of the news media, along with the FCDA’s participation, marked a fundamental change in the Nevada test program - a change that that now included the general populace, whose survival was, of course, the rationale for testing. The Department of Defense continued and expanded its Desert Rock exercises of troop exercises, helicopter operations, and evaluation of blast damage to military aircraft, tanks, and guns. Annie, Nancy, Badger, Simon, Encore, and Grable involved larger numbers of personnel than the other five shots. Below is an edited and condensed account of Desert Rock activities compiled by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.