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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2023

Resilient Electric Grid: Defining, Measuring, and Integrating Resilience into Electricity Sector Policy and Planning

Traditionally, electric grid planning seeks to maintain safe, reliable, efficient, and affordable service for current and future customers. As policies, expectations of the energy system, and the threat landscape evolve, additional objectives for power system planners are emerging, including decarbonization, resilience, and equity. Renewable and clean energy goals, especially in the context of deep decarbonization strategies, are changing the mix of resources on the electric grid and prompting new considerations for grid architecture. The increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events over the last two decades, coupled with cybersecurity concerns, have elevated resilience as a key system need. More recently, there has been greater focus on equity and energy justice in grid planning to ensure that disadvantaged communities are not adversely affected by grid modernization and have equal access to its benefits. In response, new thinking around multi-objective decision planning is exploring improvements in grid planning processes to better integrate approaches to meet decarbonization, resilience, and equity objectives. To provide a foundation for this work, a series of white papers was produced to summarize these emerging objectives.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Equitable Electric Grid: Defining, Measuring, and Integrating Equity into Electricity Sector Policy and Planning

Traditionally, electric grid planning seeks to maintain safe, reliable, efficient, and affordable service for current and future customers. As policies, expectations of the energy system, and the threat landscape evolve, additional objectives for power system planners are emerging, including decarbonization, resilience, and equity. Renewable and clean energy goals, especially in the context of deep decarbonization strategies, are changing the mix of resources on the electric grid and prompting new considerations for grid architecture. The increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events over the last two decades, coupled with cybersecurity concerns, have elevated resilience as a key system need. More recently, there has been greater focus on equity and energy justice in grid planning to ensure that disadvantaged communities are not adversely affected by grid modernization and have equal access to its benefits. In response, new thinking around multi-objective decision planning is exploring improvements in grid planning processes to better integrate approaches to meet decarbonization, resilience, and equity objectives. To provide a foundation for this work, a series of white papers was produced to summarize these emerging objectives.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Modeling Grid Data Flows for Transmission and Distribution Operations: Review, Design, Next Steps

Operational scenarios of the power grids grow multifold to accommodate the diverse needs of both the utilities and end consumers, and the various other stakeholders in-between. To comprehensively model and apply analytics to support objectives and business functions of grid sectors, a reliable approach to characterize and design data flows is crucial. The flows bridge business functions with communications protocols, stakeholders such as the grid actors, and data interfaces comprising different data objects. Additionally, constraints applied to the flow such as cybersecurity, trust, privacy, and ownership among others intersect these entities, requiring the delineation of their interactions under different scenarios. This paper aims to not only highlight relevant research in the space of grid data flows, but also proposes, for the transmission-distribution sector, a novel modeling approach that marries the aforementioned entities: objectives, business functions, data interfaces, communication protocols, data stakeholders, and flow constraints. It elaborates on the design philosophy and the significance of each entity within the model and applies it to an example function of fault location, isolation and service restoration (FLISR). Finally, the next steps to extend the application of this data flow model for other practical operational scenarios are discussed.

Sundararajan, Aditya [ORNL] (ORCID:000000033577854↗
DOE OSTI2025

Utility-Scale Operational Consequences for Solar Grid Services

This report delves into the critical aspects of grid services provided by solar inverter-based resources (IBRs), with an emphasis on the evolving landscape of microgrids, virtual power plants (VPPs), aggregators, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). As the energy sector undergoes a transformative shift towards more decentralized and resilient grid architectures, understanding the multifaceted risks associated with these technologies becomes paramount. The report categorizes these risks into organizational, technical, and procedural domains, providing a thorough risk assessment framework that stakeholders can utilize to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. In addressing the increasing complexity of grid interconnections, the report highlights the importance of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). By embedding engineering controls and cybersecurity measures into the early stages of system design, this approach aims to fortify grid infrastructure against emerging cyber threats. The analysis includes an exploration of best practices and strategies for integrating CIE principles to enhance grid security and resilience. To provide practical insights, the report conducts a detailed consequence analysis of various grid services and cyber mitigations that can be applied through the interconnection process. This analysis evaluates the potential impacts of different failure modes and vulnerabilities, offering a clear understanding of the consequences that could arise from disruptions within the energy grid. The findings are further enriched by a series of case studies that illustrate real-world scenarios and lessons learned from past incidents. Through this comprehensive examination of grid services and their criticality, the report aims to prepare industry professionals with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate the complexities of modern energy systems. By providing a comprehensive approach that includes risk assessment, cybersecurity, and consequence analysis, solar stakeholders can more effectively guarantee the reliability, efficiency, and security of the energy grid.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the US electrifies the transportation sector, cyber attacks targeting vehicle charging could bring consequences to electrical system infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery and must communicate to a range of entities to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and are complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid communication system cybersecurity could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks - or public perception of such - ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Caribbean Energy Sector Cybersecurity Forum: Modernizing and Securing the Grid

This presentation on Modernizing and Securing the Grid brought together regional and NREL cybersecurity expertise for USAID's Caribbean Energy Sector Cybersecurity Forum. The presentation's overall purpose was to provide a deep dive into the changes underway in the electric grid, including the greater integration of renewables and distributed energy resources. The presentation also reviewed best practices for building cybersecurity into modern energy systems, including in the areas of vendor assessment and supply chain cybersecurity.

Caribbean↗
DOE OSTI2022

Addressing Electric Aviation Infrastructure Cybersecurity Implementation

This technical report evaluates key considerations of cybersecurity systems in preparation for the electrification of both legacy and new aviation services. The objectives are to consider the landscape of components and interconnections, review sensitivities and the criticality of data and operations, and aim to understand the applicability of existing best practices or the need for new ones associated with the cybersecurity of electric charging systems for the aviation sector. Given the early stages of electric aviation deployment, developers have the opportunity to plan and integrate cybersecurity strategies into the complete electric aviation system during the initial stages of design and procurement and will benefit from employing a framework for continuous cybersecurity monitoring. This paper presents initial considerations of key cybersecurity strategies and their application to forthcoming electric aviation systems.

airports↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies – GETs and HPCs Session 2: Advanced Power Flow Control and Transmission Topology Optimization

The INL TADA GETs Cohort Session 2, held on November 7, 2025, conducted in collaboration with ScottMadden, focused on two core Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs): Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC) and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO). These technologies are pivotal in enhancing grid flexibility, reliability, and cybersecurity resilience. APFC, particularly through modular FACTS devices like Modular Static Synchronous Series Compensators (M-SSSCs), enables dynamic voltage injection to reroute power flows. The session highlighted the deployment benefits of APFC, such as rapid installation, minimal civil works, and re-deployability. Regulatory drivers like FERC Order 2023 mandate the inclusion of Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs) in interconnection studies. Case studies from Central Hudson, CAISO, and National Grid (UK) demonstrated APFC’s effectiveness in congestion relief and cost savings. The session also addressed cybersecurity concerns, including firmware vulnerabilities, SCADA integration risks, and supply chain dependencies. Participants engaged in interactive exercises to rank cybersecurity and supply chain risks, emphasizing the need for robust digital assurance strategies. TTO involves software-based reconfiguration of transmission networks to optimize power flow without new infrastructure. The session showcased its operational value, with examples from SPP, PJM, and MISO showing significant congestion cost reductions. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities were discussed, particularly in API security and software supply chains, referencing incidents like SolarWinds and attacks on Danish utilities. Digital assurance exercises explored worst-case scenarios, attack paths, and mitigation responsibilities between vendors and utilities. Reliability challenges such as algorithm stability, vendor dependency, and operator trust were also examined. Cross-cutting themes emphasized the importance of digital assurance tools, including Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) and hardware-in-loop testing. Human performance, training, and operational confidence were identified as critical enablers of technology adoption. The session concluded with a preview of Session 3, which will focus on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and risk-based cybersecurity tools. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Physical Resiliency for Wind Power Generation

During the next three years, wind power generation is expected to add more generation capacity to the national electrical grid than any other energy sector. With new wind turbine designs rated power over 10 MW and wind farms reaching over 1 GW capacities, the consequences of cyber-attacks on wind power generation are becoming increasingly more critical. Moreover, the known vulnerabilities of wind turbine control systems and the potential damaging effects of intrusions, motivate an urgent protection improvement for the wind power generation sector. This program has developed a variety of new adaptive defense technologies that enable wind power generation systems to survive sophisticated cyberattacks by enhancing the control systems capabilities of detection, localization, and accommodation. The introduction of these technologies in the on-shore and the emerging off-shore market will result in a significantly more reliable and secure wind power infrastructure.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems

The Cyber Resilient Energy Delivery Consortium (CREDC) started operations on October 1, 2015. The original period of performance ended September 30, 2020. During this span, CREDC developed projects with significant and measurable sector impact, achieved by involving industry partners (asset owners, equipment vendors, and technology providers) early and often, from helping us to identify critical sector needs, to performing pilot deployment and technology adoption. The central project goal was to create a research and development ecosystem where research results lead directly to development of applications and methodologies which are then validated in realistic contexts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Architecture Design for Remote Operation of Microreactors: Poster

The nuclear sector is pursuing a number of advanced reactor concepts, one of which is the microreactor, an advanced reactor characterized by a power output of less than 20 MWth. These reactors are intended for use in applications where traditional power solutions are economically or logistically impractical. One key feature required for the successful deployment of microreactors is a remote operation capability, which can dramatically cut staffing expenses by eliminating the need for licensed operators to be present at the site of each reactor and instead concentrate in a centrally located operations center. In moving to a remote operations framework for nuclear reactors, the number of potential attack surfaces for a cyber adversary looking to cause harm or disruption increases. Therefore, a robust cybersecurity architecture is required to mitigate these potential vulnerabilities. This paper explores the functional infrastructure, security, and communication requirements to adapt remote operations to nuclear applications. It then presents a reference architecture for remote operations of microreactors that applies best practices in cybersecurity and remote communications in the context of a digital twin remote operation system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of Condition Monitoring Methods and Technologies for Inservice Inspection and Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Components

This report was prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to explore the application of advanced technologies toward meeting the current and future regulatory requirements for maintenance and condition monitoring of structures, systems, and components. The advanced technologies considered in this work are advanced sensors and instrumentation, data analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence (ML/AI), physics-based models, and digital twins (DT). The interest in the application of advanced technologies for condition monitoring in nuclear power plants continues to grow, and current and future licensees are expected to implement advanced technologies as part of their inservice inspection (ISI) and inservice testing (IST) programs. This report delineates the outcomes of an exploratory investigation into the implementation of advanced condition monitoring technologies to address ISI and IST requirements. A thorough review was conducted of the existing regulatory requirements for ISI and IST, along with an analysis of associated industry practices. Additionally, a state-of-the-art assessment was performed on advanced condition monitoring technologies frequently employed in non-nuclear sectors. This research incorporated two nuclear-specific case studies to illustrate the application of these technologies within the current nuclear fleet. The report provides an exhaustive discussion on the technical challenges, considerations, and opportunities associated with the deployment of advanced condition monitoring technologies. The following are key considerations in the application of advanced technologies for the ISI and IST of nuclear power plant components: • Developing adequate verification and validation procedures to confirm the functional and non-functional requirements, • Developing technical capabilities to conduct real-time asset condition monitoring, • Establishing guidance and protocol for modeling and simulation tools to continuously meet regulatory requirements, • Addressing trustworthiness, explainability, and interpretability of ML/AI methods, • Evaluating maintenance activities to maintain an adequate safety margin and avoid undesirable conditions, • Establishing cybersecure condition monitoring programs associated with a computer-based software system, and • Establishing standardized evaluation metrics for advanced condition monitoring programs. Interest in the use of advanced technologies for condition monitoring in ISI and IST programs continues to grow, and the technology is expected to experience rapid and wide industry adoption in the near future. Adoption of advanced technologies for condition monitoring could have novel and unique impacts on regulatory activities associated with ISI and IST programs. The NRC is continuing to explore the regulatory aspects of advanced technologies as part of ISI and IST programs by pursuing additional research in this technical area.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Does practice make perfect? Lessons learned from full-scale power system incident response exercise

While threats to the energy sector occur daily, few utilities get the opportunity to fully test out their detection and response mechanisms to advanced threats in the real world. With the high demand for reliability, few grid operators would allow execution of simulated cyber-attacks on their live systems. The DOE-funded Liberty Eclipse project offers a unique opportunity for small and large utilities and coops to practice their combined IT/OT responses to a live red team executing attacks against an isolated power system on an island in New York. Both cyber teams and power operations teams must work together to detect and respond to attacks, even restoring the power system against extreme impacts. Lessons learned from these exercises reveal key takeaways for understanding what a real attack against the electric sector will look like, gaps in execution of the best-laid plans when the pressure of a real event is bearing down, and how organizations can better prepare for advanced attacks by optimizing participation in exercises. This presentation will discuss successes and opportunities for improvement both in how utilities can prepare for and respond to events, as well as how full-scale IT/OT exercises can be coordinated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Moving from Information Assurance to Functional Assurance with Engineered Controls

Cyber threats to operational technology demand more than traditional IT defenses—they require full-spectrum mission assurance. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that embeds engineered controls into system design to ensure critical functions remain safe and reliable, even under attack. Unlike conventional cybersecurity tools, engineered controls act directly on physical processes to prevent unacceptable outcomes such as equipment damage or mission failure. This session will outline the CIE framework and share examples of consequence-based design that deliver true resilience, not just fail-safe behaviors. Attendees will learn how to integrate these principles into the engineering lifecycle to support resilient-by-design architectures and inform emerging standards. This talk sets the stage for the panel discussion on advancing CIE across sectors as digital and physical systems converge.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Reliability and Resiliency in South Asia's Power Sector - Pathways for Research, Modeling, and Implementation

Reliability and resilience are the core principles of power system planning and operations around the world. Power systems in South Asia are transforming with increasing penetration of clean energy generation resources, emerging technologies, increasing electricity demand and electrification. At the same time, these power systems are facing challenges posed by extreme weather events and climate change. All these factors would add furthermore importance to the reliability and resilience of future power systems in South Asia. This has motivated us to better understand the country specific challenges and chalk out the pathways for research, modelling and implementation in South Asia. Our research, experience in the region and feedback from key stakeholders indicate following as the key areas where more work is needed to improve reliability and resilience of power systems in the region: Renewable energy Data for power system studies, New Tools and Studies, Resilience Planning, Resource Adequacy, Advanced RE Forecasting, Cybersecurity, Load Forecasting, and Coordinated Planning and Operations.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Energy Sector Position, Navigation, and Time Cybersecurity Profile

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed this positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) profile for the Energy Sector at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy. The Department of Energy is the sector-specific agency for the Energy Sector and is responsible for providing guidance in the form of this PNT Profile, per Executive Order 13905, Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services (Executive Office of the President 2020) issued February 18, 2020. Executive Order 13905 directed the National Institute of Standards & Technology to develop a PNT Profile that is broadly applicable to all sectors and to serve as a foundation for sector-neutral guidance, NISTIR 8323 Foundational PNT Profile: Applying the Cybersecurity Framework for the Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Services. This document builds on NISTIR 8323 to identify and serve as the required Energy Sector specific guidance. For purposes of this PNT Profile, Energy Sector precise time is 0.5 µs (microseconds) to 1 µs accuracy. Currently, the electricity subsector has systems that use this level of precision time, but the oil and natural gas subsector currently does not. While the electricity subsector uses precision timing, it does not use positioning and/or navigation at this level of accuracy. For this reason, this PNT Profile will focus on only precise time for the electricity subsector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗