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DOE OSTI2020

Readiness Evaluation for Sustained Operations

Readiness evaluation for sustained operations is a continuous function that progresses from overseeing establishment of five key programmatic elements during design and construction phases to monitoring the output of those elements performing during commissioning and operations. Continuously assessing readiness for sustained operations becomes an important business function for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of River Protection as competition for federal funds increases with increasing waste treatment operations throughout the Office of Environmental Management complex. The five key programmatic elements are as follows: Risk management – Risks and opportunities should prioritize continuous improvement initiatives and be informed by the design and technical authorities and stakeholder monitors. Continuous improvement – All levels of the project organization should exhibit commitment to continuous improvement and learning. Continuity of design and technical authorities – The authorities are responsible for managing knowledge for its effective use in the other elements. Stakeholder monitoring – Active and deliberate monitoring of stakeholder relationships. Sustained operations integrated business planning – Integrated business planning in a federal environment competitive for congressional funding.

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NASA NTRS2019

CRICKET: Cryogenic Reservoir Inventory by Cost-Effective Kinetically Enhanced Technology

NASA PROGRAMMATIC CHALLENGE: Locate hidden water ice in the darkest, coldest places on the moon using dozens of simple, autonomous robots. CONCEPTUAL SOLUTION: Use multiple small, autonomous bots to search for hidden water ice in permanently shadowed regions of the surface of the moon. Bots will locate and tag hidden water ice for follow up missions.Technical Basis for proposed solution: use of emerging and maturing technologies - MEMS, Cubesats, Sensor nets, integrated devices â€“ will minimize cost risk and maximize return. Benefits: Cricket will enable human exploration through in-situ resource utilization: Cricket will demonstrate a distributed constellation to achieve a key NASA goal of novel uses of commercially available technologies. Cricket will reignite public interest in lunar exploration through a sustained human, and robotic, presence on the moon. Technical Approach: The cricket constellation has three members: the "queen"; the "hive" and the "cricket" foragers. The queen transports the hive an its crickets to the moon. The hive lands on the surface and disperses the crickets (there may be more than one species of cricket). The crickets then use the hive as a communications and recharging hub. Each cricket hosts algorithms that allow it to explore its surroundings and monitor its power state - something like a lunar Roomba - and return for recharging. If they are lost due to power or surface condition problems, replacements can carry out the hive tasks. The two most successful types of bio-inspired algorithms (BIAs) are evolutionary algorithms and swarm-based algorithms which are inspired by the natural evolution and collective behavior in animals.The evolution of the idea is summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1. NIAC context: This system integrates key elements from other NIAC efforts; it uses them and extends them into a meaningful whole

Cryogenics↗

NASA NTRS2014

Concepts to Support HRP Integration Using Publications and Modeling

Initial efforts are underway to enhance the Human Research Program (HRP)'s identification and support of potential cross-disciplinary scientific collaborations. To increase the emphasis on integration in HRP's science portfolio management, concepts are being explored through the development of a set of tools. These tools are intended to enable modeling, analysis, and visualization of the state of the human system in the spaceflight environment; HRP's current understanding of that state with an indication of uncertainties; and how that state changes due to HRP programmatic progress and design reference mission definitions. In this talk, we will discuss proof-of-concept work performed using a subset of publications captured in the HRP publications database. The publications were tagged in the database with words representing factors influencing health and performance in spaceflight, as well as with words representing the risks HRP research is reducing. Analysis was performed on the publication tag data to identify relationships between factors and between risks. Network representations were then created as one type of visualization of these relationships. This enables future analyses of the structure of the networks based on results from network theory. Such analyses can provide insights into HRP's current human system knowledge state as informed by the publication data. The network structure analyses can also elucidate potential improvements by identifying network connections to establish or strengthen for maximized information flow. The relationships identified in the publication data were subsequently used as inputs to a model captured in the Systems Modeling Language (SysML), which functions as a repository for relationship information to be gleaned from multiple sources. Example network visualization outputs from a simple SysML model were then also created to compare to the visualizations based on the publication data only. We will also discuss ideas for building upon this proof-of-concept work to further support an integrated approach to human spaceflight risk reduction.

Mindock, J.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Assessment of Medical Risks and Optimization of their Management using Integrated Medical Model

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project is a software-based technique that will identify and quantify the medical needs and health risks of exploration crew members during space flight and evaluate the effectiveness of potential mitigation strategies. The IMM Project employs an evidence-based approach that will quantify probability and consequences of defined in-flight medical risks, mitigation strategies, and tactics to optimize crew member health. Using stochastic techniques, the IMM will ultimately inform decision makers at both programmatic and institutional levels and will enable objective assessment of crew health and optimization of mission success using data from relevant cohort populations and from the astronaut population. The objectives of the project include: 1) identification and documentation of conditions that may occur during exploration missions (Baseline Medical Conditions List [BMCL), 2) assessment of the likelihood of conditions in the BMCL occurring during exploration missions (incidence rate), 3) determination of the risk associated with these conditions and quantify in terms of end states (Loss of Crew, Loss of Mission, Evacuation), 4) optimization of in-flight hardware mass, volume, power, bandwidth and cost for a given level of risk or uncertainty, and .. validation of the methodologies used.

Fitts, Mary A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicle Development Approach Builds on Lessons from Past and Present Missions

The United States (US) Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January 2004, outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with new space transportation systems for missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that the new human-rated Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) Toward the end of the next decade, a heavy-lift Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) will deliver the Earth Departure Stage (EDS) carrying the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) to low-Earth orbit (LEO), where it will rendezvous with the CEV launched on the CLV and return astronauts to the Moon for the first time in over 30 years. This paper outlines how NASA is building these new space transportation systems on a foundation of legacy technical and management knowledge, using extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize its design and development approach, with the objective of reducing total life cycle costs through operational efficiencies such as hardware commonality. For example, the CLV in-line configuration is composed of a 5-segment Reusable Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB), which is an upgrade of the current Space Shuttle 4- segment RSRB, and a new upper stage powered by the liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen (LOX/LH2) J-2X engine, which is an evolution of the J-2 engine that powered the Apollo Program s Saturn V second and third stages in the 1960s and 1970s. The CaLV configuration consists of a propulsion system composed of two 5-segment RSRBs and a 33- foot core stage that will provide the LOX/LED needed for five commercially available RS-68 main engines. The J-2X also will power the EDS. The Exploration Launch Projects, managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operations planning for these new space transportation systems. Utilizing a foundation of heritage hardware and management lessons learned mitigates both technical and programmatic risk. Project engineers and managers work closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch systems, leveraging a wealth of knowledge from Shuffle operations. In addition, NASA and its industry partners have tapped into valuable Apollo databases and are applying corporate wisdom conveyed firsthand by Apollo-era veterans of America s original Moon missions. Learning from its successes and failures, NASA employs rigorous systems engineering and systems management processes and principles in a disciplined, integrated fashion to further improve the probability of mission success.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Lunar Rover Design Concepts Assessments

Mass is a significant risk to programs and projects as they transition from formulation to implementation, especially in larger human space systems where delivery mass or volume can be a constrained commodity. • Concepts developed without an adequate systems-engineering basis, including design and operations experience, may miss significant functionality and subsequent mass required for integration or operations. • Further uncertainty can be associated with not fully understanding design best practices and standards that drive mass, such as design for minimum risk or fault tolerance.1 • Finally, the appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate mass growth allowance (MGA) to ensure program success. Mass is a key quantity that should be constantly monitored by the systems engineer and the program/project management stakeholder to ensure mission compatibility throughout the project life cycle. In addition, mass is a key programmatic performance metric monitored by the NASA Chief Financial Officer for current and future program cost estimating. NASA Exploration Systems sought an assessment of reasonableness with respect to different potential rover concepts that balances mass needs and human-class cargo lander capabilities. Appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight were used, and are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate MGA to ensure program success. Two independent Lunar rover concepts were evaluated, with a goal to understand concept credibility and the Lunar rover designs potential extensibility for Mars surface operations. A notional generic rover concept is shown in Figure 1.

Systems Engineering↗

DOE OSTI2016

Transition and Transfer of Remediated Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Sites from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

The US Department of Energy (DOE) expects to receive the transfer of 10 FUSRAP Sites from the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) over the next 10 years; however, the timing of the transfers is highly dependent upon federal funding of the ongoing remedial actions. When remediation for each site is complete and the 2-year operations and maintenance period has concluded, each site will transfer from USACE to DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS&M). US DOE’s Office of Legacy Management (LM) will accept program responsibility for these sites and conduct LTS&M activities required to maintain protectiveness, preserve site-specific knowledge, and retain the cleanup and stewardship records while keeping stakeholders informed. Since the last FUSRAP site transfer occurred in 2007, LM in coordination with USACE intends to establish a transition process to promote the seamless transfer of sites from the time when the first record of decision is signed to the completion of FUSRAP activities. The approach to transfer active FUSRAP sites to completed sites status has been historically outlined in foundational documents such as the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding and supporting letters of agreement between the two agencies. As more complex FUSRAP sites are completed, this transition process will provide a model between the two agencies to communicate future long-term care liabilities. Ultimately, the FUSRAP transition process is structured to acquire and preserve site knowledge and information necessary for protecting the environment and public health. As of 2015, LM has transitioned and accepted programmatic responsibility for over 90 sites. From LM’s perspective, successful transition of any site includes understanding the long-term environmental liabilities. LM uses site transition framework requirements from past transitions to develop site-specific transition plans. Site-specific transition plans are developed by LM in coordination with USACE and executed during the 2-year operations and maintenance period. An integrated project team of subject matter experts is assembled to address the conditions of the transitioning site; acquire a site records collection; evaluate site operations and final site conditions and associated risks; identify and contact stakeholders; and document the basis for site LTS&M requirements. While the majority of the transition activities are completed by LM, close coordination between US DOE LM and USACE throughout this process is essential for an effective and seamless transfer to assure that there is no lapse in site protectiveness.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2016

Transition and Transfer of Remediated FUSRAP Sites from USACE to US DOE for Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance - 16209

The US Department of Energy (DOE) expects to receive the transfer of 10 FUSRAP Sites from the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) over the next 10 years; however, the timing of the transfers is highly dependent upon federal funding of the ongoing remedial actions. When remediation for each site is complete and the 2-year operations and maintenance period has concluded, each site will transfer from USACE to DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). US DOE's Office of Legacy Management (LM) will accept program responsibility for these sites and conduct LTS and M activities required to maintain protectiveness, preserve site-specific knowledge, and retain the cleanup and stewardship records while keeping stakeholders informed. Since the last FUSRAP site transfer occurred in 2007, LM in coordination with USACE intends to establish a transition process to promote the seamless transfer of sites from the time when the first record of decision is signed to the completion of FUSRAP activities. The approach to transfer active FUSRAP sites to completed sites status has been historically outlined in foundational documents such as the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding and supporting letters of agreement between the two agencies. As more complex FUSRAP sites are completed, this transition process will provide a model between the two agencies to communicate future long-term care liabilities. Ultimately, the FUSRAP transition process is structured to acquire and preserve site knowledge and information necessary for protecting the environment and public health. As of 2015, LM has transitioned and accepted programmatic responsibility for over 90 sites. From LM's perspective, successful transition of any site includes understanding the long-term environmental liabilities. LM uses site transition framework requirements from past transitions to develop site-specific transition plans. Site-specific transition plans are developed by LM in coordination with USACE and executed during the 2-year operations and maintenance period. An integrated project team of subject matter experts is assembled to address the conditions of the transitioning site; acquire a site records collection; evaluate site operations and final site conditions and associated risks; identify and contact stakeholders; and document the basis for site LTS and M requirements. While the majority of the transition activities are completed by LM, close coordination between US DOE LM and USACE throughout this process is essential for an effective and seamless transfer to assure that there is no lapse in site protectiveness. (authors)

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NASA NTRS2016

Purpose, Principles, and Challenges of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center

NASA formed the NASA Engineering and Safety Center in 2003 following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. It is an Agency level, program-independent engineering resource supporting NASA's missions, programs, and projects. It functions to identify, resolve, and communicate engineering issues, risks, and, particularly, alternative technical opinions, to NASA senior management. The goal is to help ensure fully informed, risk-based programmatic and operational decision-making processes. To date, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has conducted or is actively working over 600 technical studies and projects, spread across all NASA Mission Directorates, and for various other U.S. Government and non-governmental agencies and organizations. Since inception, NESC human spaceflight related activities, in particular, have transitioned from Shuttle Return-to-Flight and completion of the International Space Station (ISS) to ISS operations and Orion Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), Space Launch System (SLS), and Commercial Crew Program (CCP) vehicle design, integration, test, and certification. This transition has changed the character of NESC studies. For these development programs, the NESC must operate in a broader, system-level design and certification context as compared to the reactive, time-critical, hardware specific nature of flight operations support.

Gilbert, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA’s Space Launch System: First Mission Hardware Nears Completion

The Space Launch System (SLS) Program (Fig. 1) completed several significant production milestones in 2018 for its first mission and is poised for greater accomplishments in 2019. With manufacturing and hardware installation complete, Boeing completed the core stage forward join and shipped the liquid hydrogen tank structural test article to Marshall Space Flight Center for testing. The core stage aft join and LOX tank STA are expected to be completed in 2019 on the way to final stage integration. The four EM-1 engines are poised for stage integration in 2019. The Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter completed outfitting at Marshall and will be shipped to Kennedy Space Center in 2019. All solid rocket motor segments for the EM-1 boosters are cast, inspected and ready for shipment to KSC. The Program continues to work toward first launch of the nation’s new super heavy lift deep space capability in fiscal 2020. SLS is designed, engineered and tested to launch the most challenging exploration missions, minimizing risk and providing the greatest opportunity for mission success and scientific discovery. This paper will discuss the technical and programmatic successes and challenges of the past year and look ahead to plans for 2019.

Honeycutt, John↗

NASA NTRS2006

Fission Surface Power for the Exploration and Colonization of Mars

The colonization of Mars will require abundant energy. One potential energy source is nuclear fission. Terrestrial fission systems are highly developed and have the demonstrated ability to safely produce tremendous amounts of energy. In space, fission systems not only have the potential to safely generate tremendous amounts of energy, but could also potentially be used on missions where alternatives are not practical. Programmatic risks such as cost and schedule are potential concerns with fission surface power (FSP) systems. To be mission enabling, FSP systems must be affordable and programmatic risk must be kept acceptably low to avoid jeopardizing exploration efforts that may rely on FSP. Initial FSP systems on Mars could be "workhorse" units sized to enable the establishment of a Mars base and the early growth of a colony. These systems could be nearly identical to FSP systems used on the moon. The systems could be designed to be safe, reliable, and have low development and recurring costs. Systems could also be designed to fit on relatively small landers. One potential option for an early Mars FSP system would be a 100 kWt class, NaK cooled system analogous to space reactors developed and flown under the U.S. "SNAP" program or those developed and flown by the former Soviet Union ("BUK" reactor). The systems could use highly developed fuel and materials. Water and Martian soil could be used to provide shielding. A modern, high-efficiency power conversion subsystem could be used to reduce required reactor thermal power. This, in turn, would reduce fuel burnup and radiation damage .effects by reducing "nuclear" fuels and materials development costs. A realistic, non-nuclear heated and fully integrated technology demonstration unit (TDU) could be used to reduce cost and programmatic uncertainties prior to initiating a flight program.

Houts, Mike↗

NASA NTRS2002

Risk Management for the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) is an extremely complex system, both technically and programmatically. The Space Station must support a wide range of payloads and missions. It must be launched in numerous launch packages and be safely assembled and operated in the harsh environment of space. It is being designed and manufactured by many organizations, including the prime contractor, Boeing, the NASA institutions, and international partners and their contractors. Finally, the ISS has multiple customers, (e.g., the Administration, Congress, users, public, international partners, etc.) with contrasting needs and constraints. It is the ISS Risk Management Office strategy to proactively and systematically manages risks to help ensure ISS Program success. ISS program follows integrated risk management process (both quantitative and qualitative) and is integrated into ISS project management. The process and tools are simple and seamless and permeate to the lowest levels (at a level where effective management can be realized) and follows the continuous risk management methodology. The risk process assesses continually what could go wrong (risks), determine which risks need to be managed, implement strategies to deal with those risks, and measure effectiveness of the implemented strategies. The process integrates all facets of risk including cost, schedule and technical aspects. Support analysis risk tools like PRA are used to support programatic decisions and assist in analyzing risks.

Sebastian, J.↗

DOE OSTI2016

Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) Program: Development, Progression and Risk Management - 16476

This Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) Program paper describes the key programmatic elements to enable the startup of treatment and disposal of Hanford tank waste through a phased startup of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Specifically the DFLAW Program consists of the Low- Activity Waste (LAW) vitrification facility, and the direct feed to LAW of treated tank farm supernatant from the Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS). This document identifies the overall strategy, objectives, and processes of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) and all supporting DOE subcontractors, and describes the scope of the program elements. In addition gaps, risks, and opportunities to successful integration for commissioning of all needed systems and facilities to produce immobilized LAW product (ILAW) are described. The scope of the DFLAW Program extends up to the point that LAW Facility hot commissioning is complete and all DFLAW systems are fully operational. The DFLAW Program coordinates, integrates, and monitors all the activities necessary to successfully commission and start up the WTP LAW facility. This involves integrating the readiness of all the plant, personnel and program/procedures that support startup of hot commissioning of tank farms systems, WTP systems, waste treatment and disposal systems, and site utility, infrastructure and services. Multiple Hanford contractors have responsibilities to execute and perform scope under the umbrella of the DFLAW Program. The primary focus of the One System organization, comprised of WTP Project and Tank Operations Contract (TOC) personnel, is to manage the coordination and integration across the interfaces of the work scope described above. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Development of Plug-and-Play Interchangeable Components for Unmanned Aerial System with Mobile Manipulation Capability

The safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research is of vital importance. The sites of U.S. Department of Energy hold 6.5 trillion liters of contaminated groundwater and 40 million cubic meters of soil and debris contaminated with radionuclides, metals, and organics. The deactivation and decommissioning process (D and D) involves conversion of active, excess, and/or abandoned facilities to a final disposition. Because of residual radioactivity and dangerous chemicals, and the physical condition of these facilities, D and D presents unique hazards that must be addressed from safety, environmental, programmatic, and technological standpoints. This problem calls for development of informed D and D strategies including in-situ decommissioning, efficacy of D and D operations, productivity and personnel safety of D and D operation, facilitation of acceptable facility end-states, and independent verification. To identify and address D and D risks and challenges, innovative applications and timely insertion of existing commercially available technologies, processes and robotics or remote hardware are necessary. Aerial robotic unmanned autonomous systems (UAS) enable remote sensing operations. To address the needs of UAS-based sensing and sampling applications, we are developing plug-and-play interchangeable components for integration into the UAS: a neutron/gamma radiation sensor, a gas sensor for detection of vapors in air, and a miniature manipulator. (authors)

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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines: Successes and Failures

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

L-PBF↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Successes and Failures of Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRS2009

Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management Program -- IRKM-P

The NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) IRKM-P tightly couples risk management and knowledge management processes and tools to produce an effective "modern" work environment. IRKM-P objectives include: (1) to learn lessons from past and current programs (Apollo, Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station); (2) to generate and share new engineering design, operations, and management best practices through preexisting Continuous Risk Management (CRM) procedures and knowledge-management practices; and (3) to infuse those lessons and best practices into current activities. The conceptual framework of the IRKM-P is based on the assumption that risks highlight potential knowledge gaps that might be mitigated through one or more knowledge management practices or artifacts. These same risks also serve as cues for collection of knowledge particularly, knowledge of technical or programmatic challenges that might recur.

Lengyel, David M.↗