SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “programmatic risk integration”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines: Successes and Failures

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

L-PBF↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Successes and Failures of Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRS2009

Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management Program -- IRKM-P

The NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) IRKM-P tightly couples risk management and knowledge management processes and tools to produce an effective "modern" work environment. IRKM-P objectives include: (1) to learn lessons from past and current programs (Apollo, Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station); (2) to generate and share new engineering design, operations, and management best practices through preexisting Continuous Risk Management (CRM) procedures and knowledge-management practices; and (3) to infuse those lessons and best practices into current activities. The conceptual framework of the IRKM-P is based on the assumption that risks highlight potential knowledge gaps that might be mitigated through one or more knowledge management practices or artifacts. These same risks also serve as cues for collection of knowledge particularly, knowledge of technical or programmatic challenges that might recur.

Lengyel, David M.↗

NASA NTRS2008

James Webb Space Telescope - Applying Lessons Learned to I&T

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is part of a new generation of spacecraft acquiring large data volumes from remote regions in space. To support a mission such as the JWST, it is imperative that lessons learned from the development of previous missions such as the Hubble Space Telescope and the Earth Observing System mission set be applied throughout the development and operational lifecycles. One example of a key lesson that should be applied is that core components, such as the command and telemetry system and the project database, should be developed early, used throughout development and testing, and evolved into the operational system. The purpose of applying lessons learned is to reap benefits in programmatic or technical parameters such as risk reduction, end product quality, cost efficiency, and schedule optimization. In the cited example, the early development and use of the operational command and telemetry system as well as the establishment of the intended operational database will allow these components to be used by the developers of various spacecraft components such that development, testing, and operations will all use the same core components. This will reduce risk through the elimination of transitions between development and operational components and improve end product quality by extending the verification of those components through continual use. This paper will discuss key lessons learned that have been or are being applied to the JWST Ground Segment integration and test program.

Johns, Alan↗

NASA NTRS2007

The Ares I-1 Flight Test--Paving the Road for the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle

In accordance with the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration and the nation's desire to again send humans to explore beyond Earth orbit, NASA has been tasked to send human beings to the moon, Mars, and beyond. It has been 30 years since the United States last designed and built a human-rated launch vehicle. NASA is now building the Ares I crew launch vehicle, which will loft the Orion crew exploration vehicle into orbit, and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle, which will launch the Lunar Surface Access Module and Earth departure stage to rendezvous Orion for missions to the moon. NASA has marshaled unique resources from the government and private sectors to perform the technically and programmatically complex work of delivering astronauts to orbit early next decade, followed by heavy cargo late next decade. Our experiences with Saturn and the Shuttle have taught us the value of adhering to sound systems engineering, such as the "test as you fly" principle, while applying aerospace best practices and lessons learned. If we are to fly humans safely aboard a launch vehicle, we must employ a variety of methodologies to reduce the technical, schedule, and cost risks inherent in the complex business of space transportation. During the Saturn development effort, NASA conducted multiple demonstration and verification flight tests to prove technology in its operating environment before relying upon it for human spaceflight. Less testing on the integrated Shuttle system did not reduce cost or schedule. NASA plans a progressive series of demonstration (ascent), verification (orbital), and mission flight tests to supplement ground research and high-altitude subsystem testing with real-world data, factoring the results of each test into the next one. In this way, sophisticated analytical models and tools, many of which were not available during Saturn and Shuttle, will be calibrated and we will gain confidence in their predictions, as we gain hands-on experience in operating the first of two new launch vehicle systems. The Ares I-1 flight test vehicle (FTV) will incorporate a mix of flight and mockup hardware, reflecting a configuration similar in mass, weight, and shape (outer mold line or OML) to the operational vehicle. It will be powered by a four-segment reusable solid rocket booster (RSRB), which is currently in Shuttle inventory, and will be modified to include a fifth, inert segment that makes it approximately the same size and weight as the five segment RSRB, which will be available for the second flight test in 2012. The Ares I-1 vehicle configuration is shown. Each test flight has specific objectives appropriate to the design analysis cycle in progress. The Ares I-1 demonstration test, slated for April 2009, gives NASA its first opportunity to gather critical data about the flight dynamics of the integrated launch vehicle stack, understand how to control its roll during flight, and other characterize the severe stage separation environment that the upper stage will experience during future operational flights. NASA also will begin the process of modifying the launch infrastructure and fine-tuning ground and mission operational scenarios, as NASA transitions from the Shuttle to the Ares/Orion system.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Digital Prototyping Methods to Enable Product Development Analysis Cycle Compression in Aerospace Systems

Historically, the product development life cycle (spanning from origination of a systems concept to initial delivery or fielding) for large-scale aerospace systems is 10-25 years. Examples of recent programs exhibiting this timeline are the Space Shuttle (13 years), , International Space Station (18 years), NASA Hubble telescope (16 years), USAF F-35 Strike Fighter (22 years), Missile Defense Agency THAAD (21 years), USAF V-22 Osprey (26 years), USAF B-2 Spirt (19 years), US Army RAH-66 Comanche (22 years, cancelled prior to fielding), James Webb Space Telescope (25 years), Space Launch System (10 years). This list illustrates the challenges of developing and fielding a modern integrated multi-disciplinary aerospace system. These development timelines are often preceded by significant research and development programs and followed by multiple increments, blocks, or spirals to reach planned operational capability. In the modern era of aerospace system acquisition, there is significant pressure to reduce system development timelines to meet system objectives and enable competitiveness in the current industry and landscape. Across the aerospace industry, a range of rapid acquisition and prototyping programs are seeking to achieve system development within timelines considerably less than 10 years. Notably, in September of 2019, NASA issued a solicitation for the development and demonstration of a Human Landing System (HLS) to deliver humans to the lunar surface by 2024 (5 years) and for the development and demonstration of a more sustainable HLS by 2026 (7 years). Lengthy product development cycle timelines are a product of multiple factors ranging from programmatic, sociological, technical, and systems engineering issues. New approaches in systems engineering provide new ways to enable these compressed development timelines. These approaches employ expanded application of advanced systems engineering methods and cross-cutting digital tools to accelerate system development, utilizing digital prototyping to connect maturing sub-system or component technologies into system or system-of-systems hardware prototypes. Approaches such as the use of system integrating physics relationships to reduce the number of design analysis cycle iterations and state analysis modeling to reduce necessary software testing (and improving coverage of system execution scenarios) represent steps forward in reducing the engineering time needed to field new systems. In addition to cost, schedule and performance benefits, expanded digital exploration and demonstration reduce risk in live system test and demonstration. This incremental demonstration approach, where digital prototyping and demonstration leads and informs full system test and demonstration, could be more important for space applications because of the increased difficulty of test and demonstration of space systems and architectures. The Advanced Concepts Office (ACO) at Marshall Space Flight Center merges traditional multi-disciplinary concept definition methods with modern, cross-cutting systems engineering concepts to enable iterative design and analysis of space architectures and systems through coordinated, strategic management of human capital, technical processes, and technology. This paper provides an overview of that approach, including recent examples and a strategic path forward to enabling continued reduction of aerospace system product development life cycles.

Michael D Watson↗

NASA NTRS2014

Low-Cost, Class D Testing of Spacecraft Photovoltaic Systems Can Reduce Risk

The end-to-end verification of a spacecraft photovoltaic power generation system requires light! A lowcost, portable, and end-to-end photovoltaic-system test appropriate for NASA's new generation of Class D missions is presented. High risk, low-cost, and quick-turn satellites rarely have the resources to execute the traditional approaches from higher-class (A-C) missions. The Class D approach, as demonstrated on the Lunar Atmospheric and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE), utilizes a portable, metalhalide, theatre lamp for an end-to-end photovoltaic system test. While not as precise and comprehensive as the traditional Large Area Pulsed Solar Simulator (LAPSS) test, the LADEE method leverages minimal resources into an ongoing assessment program that can be applied through numerous stages of the mission. The project takes a true Class D approach in assessing the technical value of a costly, highfidelity performance test versus a simpler approach with less programmatic risk. The resources required are a fraction of that for a LAPSS test, and is easy to repeat due to its portability. Further, the test equipment can be handed down to future projects without building an on-site facility. At the vanguard of Class D missions, the LADEE team frequently wrestled with and challenged the status quo. The philosophy of risk avoidance at all cost, typical to Class A-C missions, simply could not be executed. This innovative and simple testing solution is contextualized to NASA Class D programs and a specific risk encountered during development of the LADEE Electrical Power System (EPS). Selection of the appropriate lamp and safety concerns are discussed, with examples of test results. Combined with the vendor's panellevel data and periodic inspection, the method ensures system integrity from Integration and Test (I&T) through launch. Following launch, mission operations tools are utilized to assess system performance based on a scant amount of available data.

power systems↗

NASA NTRS2014

Low-cost, Risk-Reduction Testing of Class D Spacecraft Photovoltaic Systems

The end-to-end verification of a spacecraft photovoltaic power generation system requires light! A low-cost, portable, and end-to-end photovoltaic-system test appropriate for NASAs new generation of Class D missions is presented. High risk, low-cost, and quick-turn satellites rarely have the resources to execute the traditional approaches from higher-class (A-C) missions. The Class D approach, as demonstrated on the Lunar Atmospheric and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE), utilizes a portable, metal-halide, theatre lamp for an end-to-end photovoltaic system test. While not as precise and comprehensive as the traditional Large Area Pulsed Solar Simulator (LAPSS) test, the LADEE method leverages minimal resources into an ongoing assessment program that can be applied through numerous stages of the mission. The project takes a true Class D approach in assessing the technical value of a costly, high-fidelity performance test versus a simpler approach with less programmatic risk. The resources required are a fraction of that for a LAPSS test, and is easy to repeat due to its portability. Further, the test equipment can be handed down to future projects without building an on-site facility.At the vanguard of Class D missions, the LADEE team frequently wrestled with and challenged the status quo. The philosophy of risk avoidance at all cost, typical to Class A-C missions, simply could not be executed. This innovative and simple testing solution is contextualized to NASA Class D programs and a specific risk encountered during development of the LADEE Electrical Power System (EPS). Selection of the appropriate lamp and safety concerns are discussed, with examples of test results. Combined with the vendors panel-level data and periodic inspection, the method ensures system integrity from Integration and Test (IT) through launch. Following launch, mission operations tools are utilized to assess system performance based on a scant amount of available data.

photovoltaic↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA’s Space Launch System: Exploration Mission-1 Hardware Nears Completion

The Space Launch System (SLS) Program completed several significant production milestones in 2018 for the launch vehicle’s first mission (Fig. 1) and is poised for greater accomplishments in 2019. With manufacturing and hardware installation finished, Boeing completed the core stage forward join and shipped the liquid hydrogen tank structural test article to Marshall Space Flight Center for testing. The core stage aft join and LOX tank STA are expected to be completed in 2019 on the way to final stage integration. The four EM-1 engines are poised for stage integration in 2019. The Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter completed outfitting at Marshall and will be shipped to Kennedy Space Center in 2019. All solid rocket motor segments for the EM-1 boosters are cast, inspected and ready for shipment to KSC. The upper stage, the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), and the Orion Stage Adapter (OSA), where 13 6U CubeSats will ride to deep space on EM-1, were completed and delivered to Exploration Ground Systems at KSC in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The Program continues to work toward first launch of the nation’s new super heavy lift deep space capability in fiscal 2020. SLS is designed, engineered and tested to launch the most challenging exploration missions, minimizing risk and providing the greatest opportunity for mission success. This paper will discuss the technical and programmatic successes and challenges of the past year and look ahead to plans for 2019.

Honeycutt, John↗

NASA NTRS2009

Results From the John Glenn Biomedical Engineering Consortium. A Success Story for NASA and Northeast Ohio

The John Glenn Biomedical Engineering Consortium was established by NASA in 2002 to formulate and implement an integrated, interdisciplinary research program to address risks faced by astronauts during long-duration space missions. The consortium is comprised of a preeminent team of Northeast Ohio institutions that include Case Western Reserve University, the Cleveland Clinic, University Hospitals Case Medical Center, The National Center for Space Exploration Research, and the NASA Glenn Research Center. The John Glenn Biomedical Engineering Consortium research is focused on fluid physics and sensor technology that addresses the critical risks to crew health, safety, and performance. Effectively utilizing the unique skills, capabilities and facilities of the consortium members is also of prime importance. Research efforts were initiated with a general call for proposals to the consortium members. The top proposals were selected for funding through a rigorous, peer review process. The review included participation from NASA's Johnson Space Center, which has programmatic responsibility for NASA's Human Research Program. The projects range in scope from delivery of prototype hardware to applied research that enables future development of advanced technology devices. All of the projects selected for funding have been completed and the results are summarized. Because of the success of the consortium, the member institutions have extended the original agreement to continue this highly effective research collaboration through 2011.

Nall, Marsha M.↗

NASA NTRS1995

The role of small missions in planetary and lunar exploration

The Space Studies Board of the National Research Council charged its Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration (COMPLEX) to (1) examine the degree to which small missions, such as those fitting within the constraints of the Discovery program, can achieve priority objectives in the lunar and planetary sciences; (2) determine those characteristics, such as level of risk, flight rate, target mix, university involvement, technology development, management structure and procedures, and so on, that could allow a successful program; (3) assess issues, such as instrument selection, mission operations, data analysis, and data archiving, to ensure the greatest scientific return from a particular mission, given a rapid deployment schedule and a tightly constrained budget; and (4) review past programmatic attempts to establish small planetary science mission lines, including the Planetary Observers and Planetary Explorers, and consider the impact management practices have had on such programs. A series of small missions presents the planetary science community with the opportunity to expand the scope of its activities and to develop the potential and inventiveness of its members in ways not possible within the confines of large, traditional programs. COMPLEX also realized that a program of small planetary missions was, in and of itself, incapable of meeting all of the prime objectives contained in its report 'An Integrated Strategy for the Planetary Sciences: 1995-2010.' Recommendations are provided for the small planetary missions to fulfill their promise.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2006

The TPS Advanced Development Project for CEV

The CEV TPS Advanced Development Project (ADP) is a NASA in-house activity for providing two heatshield preliminary designs (a Lunar direct return as well as a LEO only return) for the CEV, including the TPS, the carrier structure, the interfaces and the attachments. The project s primary objective is the development of a single heatshield preliminary design that meets both Lunar direct return and LEO return requirements. The effort to develop the Lunar direct return capable heatshield is considered a high risk item for the NASA CEV development effort due to the low TRL (approx. 4) of the candidate TPS materials. By initiating the TPS ADP early in the development cycle, the intent is to use materials analysis and testing in combination with manufacturing demonstrations to reduce the programmatic risk of using advanced TPS technologies in the critical path for CEV. Due to the technical and schedule risks associated a Lunar return heatshield, the ADP will pursue a parallel path design approach, whereby a back-up TPS/heatshield design that only meets LEO return requirements is also developed. The TPS materials and carrier structure design concept selections will be based on testing, analysis, design and evaluation of scalability and manufacturing performed under the ADP. At the TPS PDR, the preferred programmatic strategy is to transfer the continued (detailed) design, development, testing and evaluation (DDT&E) of both the Lunar direct and LEO return designs to a government/prime contractor coordinated sub-system design team. The CEV prime contractor would have responsibility for the continued heatshield sub-system development. Continued government participation would include analysis, testing and evaluation as well as decision authority at TPS Final System Decision (FSD) (choosing between the primary and back-up heatshields) occurring between TPS PDR and TPS Critical Design Review (CDR). After TPS FSD the prime CEV contractor will complete the detailed design, certification testing, procurement, and integration of the CEV TPS.

Reuther, James↗

NASA NTRS2005

X-43D Conceptual Design and Feasibility Study

NASA s Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Program, in conjunction with the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), developed an integrated hypersonic technology demonstration roadmap. This roadmap is an integral part of the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI), a multi-year, multi-agency cooperative effort to invest in and develop, among other things, hypersonic technologies. This roadmap contains key ground and flight demonstrations required along the path to developing a reusable hypersonic space access system. One of the key flight demonstrations required for systems that will operate in the high Mach number regime is the X-43D. As currently conceived, the X-43D is a Mach 15 flight test vehicle that incorporates a hydrogen-fueled scramjet engine. The purpose of the X-43D is to gather high Mach number flight environment and engine operability information which is difficult, if not impossible, to gather on the ground. During 2003, the NGLT Future Hypersonic Flight Demonstration Office initiated a feasibility study on the X-43D. The objective of the study was to develop a baseline conceptual design, assess its performance, and identify the key technical issues. The study also produced a baseline program plan, schedule, and cost, along with a list of key programmatic risks.

Johnson, Donald B.↗

NASA NTRS2019

In Space Assembled Telescope (ISAT) Study Preliminary Findings

“When is it advantageous to assemble telescopes in space rather than deploying them from launch vehicle fairings”? This question forms the crux of the objectives of a NASA study we have been conducting in collaboration with colleagues from different NASA centers, industry and academia. In this study, we have engaged a broad cross section of experts from the various fields of optics engineering, that is, telescope design and instrument design, structure and thermal engineering, robotics, launch system engineering, orbital mechanics, integration and testing, astrophysics, and NASA programmatics among others. Initial efforts began with a quick review of the current state of art of the component technologies that contribute towards an in-space assembled telescope. Then, leveraging the collective expertise of the diverse group of experts, we formulated a reference telescope design and attempted to develop a baseline approach to modularize the telescope into components amenable for robotic assembly. The group identified different trades associated with modularization and also developed a set of criteria to discern between the different options as revealed by the trades. Based on the modularization of the telescope, we will assess the impact of various launch vehicles, orbits for assembly and operation, robotic systems and operational approaches, and other related variables. From this, a concept to assemble the reference telescope in space from modular components will be developed. Based on this concept, and definition of the modules, we will develop a mission lifecycle plan for an assembled telescope over different phases of preliminary design, detailed design, assembly-test-and-integration, and in space operations. The mission lifecycle plan will be used to evaluate cost and risk implications of in-space assembly toward answering our fundamental question of the advantages, if any, of assembling a telescope in space as compared to self-deployment. In this paper, we summarize the objectives of the study, a review of the status of the underlying component technologies, a description of the methodology, including three different multi-day technical interchange meetings (TIMs), summary of findings from the TIMs and other related activities. In addition, a detailed description of the various factors that impact in-space assembly, their interplay and criteria for discerning among them, a preliminary description of the life cycle plan, including the test and integration plan, and initial observations on cost and risk implications will be included in the paper.

Mukherjee, Rudranarayan↗

NASA NTRS2023

Identifying and Closing Medical Capability Gaps for Human Spaceflight Missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit

BACKGROUND: Features of human space missions beyond low Earth orbit such as increasing distance from Earth, lack of real-time communication, and limited or no evacuation or resupply capability are expected to drive an increase in medical risk and require crews to operate in an increasingly autonomous fashion. A diverse set of stakeholders at NASA are seeking to fund the development of concepts of operations, medical requirements, and medical capabilities for such missions. However, a systematic approach to identification of current medical capability gaps and a strategic framework to gap closure is needed. OVERVIEW: The Exploration Medical Integrated Product Team (XMIPT) has developed a list of nine high-level medical capability gaps and associated activities required for gap closure. The list was derived based on inputs from subject matter experts at NASA including flight surgeons, other clinical providers, as well as operational and research communities regarding medical capabilities required to support human missions to the Moon and the Mars surface. Responses were reviewed and distilled to identify common themes across capabilities. To ensure alignment with established human system risks, the gap list was further refined based on inputs from NASA’s Human System Risk Board. Relevant medical gap closure activities outside of those funded by the XMIPT were identified through solicitation of inputs from Elements of NASA’s Human Research Program (particularly Exploration Medical Capability), the broader medical operations community, and other stakeholders. This medical capability gap list is reviewed and updated regularly as new information becomes available or new stakeholders are identified. DISCUSSION: The medical capability gap list has matured to include a large group of NASA stakeholders and development activities. This has enabled articulation of priorities to funding entities and programmatic stakeholders, while serving as an accessible resource summarizing gap closure activities, relevant programmatic infusion points, and opportunities for collaboration between stakeholders. This presentation will provide an overview of the nine NASA medical capability gaps and their associated gap closure activities.

Moriah Thompson↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Having a Come-Apart: Lessons Learned from Additively Manufactured Hardware Failures

NASA has been engaged with additively manufactured (AM) process and component development since the 2000’s. AM offers various technical advantages, such as enhanced hardware design complexity, part consolidation, and processing of novel alloys in addition to programmatic advantages for reduction in processing time and cost. The focus of much of the AM development at NASA has been to mature the various processes, characterize material properties, develop standards, produce demonstrator parts, and integrate AM hardware in liquid rocket engines. These aspects have been demonstrated through process and design iterations using a methodical characterization, test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned. In addition to these fundamental demonstrations of the AM process and hardware development, alloys that provide performance advantages in the high temperature and high-pressure environments have been matured for use in rocket engines. These environments are challenging for any alloy and any design, and the AM process is required to fully meet the intended design requirements. The importance of proper AM process was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality resulted from an AM process issue. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. In part, such concerns motivate the AM certification approach that NASA has recently adopted in NASA-STD-6030 “Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems”. This presentation provides an overview of the previously mentioned failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. The objective of this presentation is to provide awareness to the community working critical and non-critical AM components and the lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗

DOE OSTI2024

Sampling Size Optimization for Bioburden Density Estimation in Planetary Protection

Planetary protection (PP) is a discipline that focuses on minimizing the biological contamination of spacecraft to ensure compliance with international policy. Precise estimation of bioburden - the total number of microbes in or on spacecraft hardware – and the bioburden density are of utmost importance for PP. Such estimation is the way concordance with requirements is demonstrated, and it is critical for quantifying the potential risk of inadvertently contaminating other planetary bodies. Although a suite of molecular techniques have been used to thoroughly characterize and profile the microbiome of various cleanroom environments and spacecraft, the gold standard remains the physical enumeration of microbes via culturing of samples directly taken from spacecraft and associated surfaces. However, due to technical, budgetary, and programmatic constraints, only a manageable portion (around 10%) of the entire spacecraft surface is directly sampled with cotton swabs or wipes. To generate the bioburden current best estimate (CBE) for components not directly verifiable, the accepted approach is to apply a NASA-defined bioburden estimate based on the components’ manufacturing or assembly environment. This approach utilizes a prespecified bioburden density estimation that applies a maximum value across the total surface area of the specified component. For hardware components that underwent similar assembly processes, an implied bioburden is adopted for all components, based on a direct verification of a representative component within the same lot. Once all components have a CBE, the bioburden estimates are generated. In previous publication [ 1], we have shown that statistical risks quantifying the accuracy of the estimates for sampled, prespecified, and implied components can be derived and ranked. For mean squared error (MSE) function, the risks are available analytically and hence a cost function can be obtained to optimize the risks with respect to the sampling area and sampling cost. Since the sampling area and sampling cost are two complimentary variables, their sum will have a well-defined minimum. This paper presents the multivariate optimization of the integrated risk of an empirical Bayes estimator to determine the optimal sampling schedule for a given number of components. It is assumed that given a number of components, N, the bioburden density for each component can either be sampled, implied, or prespecified. The multivariate optimization searches through different options to sample, imply or prespecify the bioburden density for a component, and account for the component’s surface area and cost of sampling. The idea of the optimization is based on the observation that the statistical risk of using an estimator is a monotonically decreasing function of the sampled area. The larger the sampled area, the lower the risk of using the estimator as the estimator becomes more and more accurate as the sampling area increases. On the other hand, the cost of sampling is monotonically increasing as the sampled surface grows. This makes the risk and total cost of sampling complimentary variables which can be counterbalanced to achieve an optimal overall value with respect to the sampled surface. In this paper, the integrated risk has been used to quantify the accuracy of the estimator. This risk has been selected because it depends on neither the true value of the parameter nor on the collected data. The cost of each sample was also available to obtain the total cost of sampling of N components. The paper will present the results based on computer-simulated data as well as the data collected during the InSight mission. The computer-simulated data have N components with randomly generated total areas and each component assigned to one of the three categories according to the method of estimating of bioburden density: sampled, implied, or prespecified. The cost of sampling is also available. The cost of sampling is estimated based on a cost model provided by the planetary protection group at JPL. For this paper, the overall cost was assumed to be a linear function of exposure. The optimization process finds the allocation of the components to the three categories that minimizes the tradeoff between integrated risk and total cost. For the InSight data, a set of components is selected representing all three categories, and optimization is performed to determine if the performed allocation was optimal or if a better allocation could have been obtained. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt not only perform an accurate estimation of bioburden density but also do it in an optimal way.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗