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The NASA Altitude Wind Tunnel program status is presented as of March 21, 1984. Topics covered by viewgraphs include: management flowchart, projected schedules, cost estimates, manpower summary, and modeling/design/construction interfaces.
This paper develops a cost model to do long range planning cost estimates for Deep Space Network (DSN) support of future space missions. The model is a function of eight major mission cost drivers such as uplink frequency upgrade, telemetry upgrade, and antenna gain/noise temperature upgrade. This paper focuses on the costs required to modify and/or enhance the DSN to prepare for supporting future space missions. Two models are derived from actual cost data from three space missions: Voyager (Uranus), Voyager (Neptune), and Magellan. Model A makes it possible to estimate the total cost, and Model B makes it possible to estimate the time profile cost and total cost for DSN support of a similar future space mission. The models were back tested against the total cost and the time profile cost for DSN support of the three projects, and gave cost estimates which range from 17 percent below to 19 percent above actual costs for Model A, and 22.5 percent below to 17.5 percent above for Model B. The total cost Model A was also applied to estimate the total costs for DSN support of two other independent projects: Mariner Jupiter/Saturn (MJS later became Voyager), and Viking. This model gave total cost estimates for DSN support which range from 15 percent to 4 percent above actual total costs for MJS and Viking, respectively.
The impact of diameter in the range of 10 to 15 cm on the cost of wafers sliced from Czochralski ingots was analyzed. Increasing silicon waste and decreasing ingot cost with increasing ingot size were estimated along with projected costs. Results indicate a small but continuous decrease in sheet cost with increasing ingot size in this size range. Sheet costs including silicon are projected to be $50 to $60/sq m (1980 $) depending upon technique used.
Preliminary development cost estimate for Apollo project lunar mobile laboratory /Molab/
A simple model is suggested to do long-range planning cost estimates for Deep Space Network (DSP) support of future space missions. The model estimates total DSN preparation costs and the annual distribution of these costs for long-range budgetary planning. The cost model is based on actual DSN preparation costs from four space missions: Galileo, Voyager (Uranus), Voyager (Neptune), and Magellan. The model was tested against the four projects and gave cost estimates that range from 18 percent above the actual total preparation costs of the projects to 25 percent below. The model was also compared to two other independent projects: Viking and Mariner Jupiter/Saturn (MJS later became Voyager). The model gave cost estimates that range from 2 percent (for Viking) to 10 percent (for MJS) below the actual total preparation costs of these missions.
A model is suggested for making long range planning cost estimates for Deep Space Network (DSN) support of future space missions. The model is a function of major mission cost drivers, such as maintenance and operations, downlink frequency upgrade, uplink frequency upgrade, telemetry upgrade, antenna gain/noise temperature, radiometric accuracy upgrade, radio science upgrade, and very long baseline interferometry. The model is derived from actual cost data from three space missions: Voyager (Uranus), Voyager (Neptune), and Magellan. The model allows one to estimate the total cost and the cost over time of a similar future space mission. The model was back tested against the three projects and gave cost estimates that range from 17 pct. below to 19 pct. above actual mission preparation costs. The model was also compared with two other independent projects: Mariner Jupiter/Saturn (MJS later became Voyager) and Viking. The model gave total preparation cost estimates that range from 15 pct. above to 4 pct. below actual total preparation costs for MJS and Viking, respectively.
Large complex projects cost large sums of money throughout their life cycle for a variety of reasons and causes. For such large programs, the credible estimation of the project cost, a quick assessment of the cost of making changes, and the management of the project budget with effective cost reduction determine the viability of the project. Cost engineering that deals with these issues requires a rigorous method and systematic processes. This paper introduces a logical framework to a&e effective cost engineering. The framework is built upon Axiomatic Design process. The structure in the Axiomatic Design process provides a good foundation to closely tie engineering design and cost information together. The cost framework presented in this paper is a systematic link between the functional domain (FRs), physical domain (DPs), cost domain (CUs), and a task/process-based model. The FR-DP map relates a system s functional requirements to design solutions across all levels and branches of the decomposition hierarchy. DPs are mapped into CUs, which provides a means to estimate the cost of design solutions - DPs - from the cost of the physical entities in the system - CUs. The task/process model describes the iterative process ot-developing each of the CUs, and is used to estimate the cost of CUs. By linking the four domains, this framework provides a superior traceability from requirements to cost information.
The three main cost areas of unmanned satellite development are discussed. The areas are identified as: (1) the spacecraft platform (SCP), (2) the payload or experiments, and (3) the postlaunch ground equipment and operations. The SCP normally accounts for over half of the total project cost and accurate estimates of SCP costs are required early in project planning as a basis for determining total project budget requirements. The development of single formula SCP cost estimating relationships (CER) from readily available data by statistical linear regression analysis is described. The advantages of single formula CER are presented.
This handbook provides guidance based on best practices for the planning, preparation, review, reporting, and closeout of Standing Review Board (SRB) activities. Revision C updates the Revision B version of the SRB Handbook published in 2016 to incorporate updates to NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5F, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements. These updates include: - Changing the Dissenting Opinion process to the Formal Dissent process, which retains the current process augmented with an expedited escalation path. - Updates to requirements for establishing an Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC) and for performing Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level (JCL) analyses for tightly coupled programs. - Additional requirements for performing a JCL analysis for single-project programs and projects over $1B Life-Cycle Cost (LCC). - Use of initial capability cost estimates instead of LCC estimates in specific, identified instances for single-project programs and projects that plan continuing operations and production, including integration of capability upgrades, with an unspecified Phase E end point. These single-project programs and projects define an initial capability during Phase A and develop an initial capability cost that establishes the ABC at Key Decision Point (KDP) C. Initial capability is the first operational mission flight (or as defined in the KDP B Review Plan) and is documented in the KDP B Decision Memorandum. Initial capability cost includes operations cost for the initial capability. The Phase E cost estimate for continuing operations and production is established separately as part of the Operational Readiness Review (ORR) and KDP E for the 5 years after initial capability and subsequently updated and documented annually for the next 5-year period. Upgrades during Phase E that meet the Agency criteria for a major project for external reporting are treated as projects for the purposes of establishing their own development ABC outside the Phase E cost estimate. The Phase E cost estimate is updated to include production and operations costs associated with these upgrades. Development, production, and operations costs of other (i.e., non-major) upgrades are included in the Phase E cost estimate. (See NPR 7120.5, Sections 2.4.1.5 and 2.4.1.6 and the NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Handbook (PM Handbook), Section 5.5.4 for additional information.) The scope of the SRB’s assessment with respect to initial capability, Phase E cost estimate, and major upgrades for these single-project programs and projects is defined in the Terms of Reference (ToR).
Accurate cost estimates help managers understand critical cost-risk information, which improves their perception of the impact project changes have on the budget and schedule. This research project examined buffer reserves, a key aspect of cost estimation. The main focus of this project was to utilize historical data to calculate the extent to which NASA programs typically exceed their original buffers.
This slide presentation reviews the process and some of the problems and challenges of developing an In-House Cost Estimate (IHCE). Using as an example the Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS) project, the presentation reviews the phases for developing a Cost estimate within the project to estimate government and contractor project costs to support a budget request.
The projected development and production costs of each of the Lunar Base's systems are described and unit costs are estimated for transporting the systems to the lunar surface and for setting up the system.
In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.
In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for all five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to be the result of technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the systemwide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study s lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.
This paper presents past and current work in dealing with indirect industry and NASA costs when providing cost estimation or analysis for NASA projects and programs. Indirect costs, when defined as those costs in a project removed from the actual hardware or software hands-on labor; makes up most of the costs of today's complex large scale NASA space/industry projects. This appears to be the case across phases from research into development into production and into the operation of the system. Space transportation is the case of interest here. Modeling and cost estimation as a process rather than a product will be emphasized. Analysis as a series of belief systems in play among decision makers and decision factors will also be emphasized to provide context.
This article provides a model for estimating the cost required to do a cost estimate. Overruns may lead to concellation of a project. In 1991, we completed a study on the cost of doing cost estimates for the class of projects normally encountered in the development and implementation of equipment at the network of tracking stations operated by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for NASA.
The programmatics effort included comprehensive analyses in four major areas: (1) work breakdown structure, (2) schedules, (3) costs, and (4) supporting research and technology. These analyses are discussed in detail in the following sections which identify and define the laboratory project development schedule, cost estimates, funding distributions and supporting research and technology requirements. All programmatics analyses are correlated among themselves and with the technical analyses by means of the work breakdown structure which serves as a common framework for program definition. In addition, the programmatic analyses reflect the results of analyses and plans for reliability, safety, test, and maintenance and refurbishment.
This paper presents the approach and results for the Aeronautics Test Program (ATP) FY11 Facility Assessment Project. ATP commissioned assessments in FY07 and FY11 to aid in the understanding of the current condition and reliability of its facilities and their ability to meet current and future (five year horizon) test requirements. The principle output of the assessment was a database of facility unique, prioritized investments projects with budgetary cost estimates. This database was also used to identify trends for the condition of facility systems.