Nuclear Regulatory Commission – Proposed Rule 91 FR 9476 Regulatory Framework for Fusion Machines
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Garcia, J. Patrick [Savannah River National Labora↗
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Ecological connectivity and in-kind mitigation in a regulatory decision framework: A case study with an amphibian habitat specialist
Ecological connectivity is critical to the survival and long-term viability of populations but is often overlooked in regulatory frameworks. We integrated landscape-level processes into a mitigation strategy for impacts to aquatic resources on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in eastern Tennessee. Wetlands on the ORR, which contain significant breeding populations of the imperiled four-toed salamander (Hemidactylium scutatum) and tubercled rein orchid (Platanthera flava var. herbiola), will be impacted by construction of an environmental waste disposal facility under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Here, we used a modified Kepner-Tregoe decision analysis to select general mitigation options that balanced regulatory requirements and interest group perspectives. We emphasized habitat connectivity through models that prioritized an area's importance to natural area connectivity (centrality) and maintenance of population structure for an affected habitat specialist (four-toed salamanders). We also emphasized in-kind mitigation through the preservation and enhancement of ecologically similar resources and the translocation and establishment of a new subpopulation of four-toed salamanders elsewhere on the ORR. We ultimately released over 500 juvenile salamanders that originated from the impacted site into the chosen mitigation wetlands. By doing so under the constraints of a time-sensitive CERCLA remediation effort and exceeding its substantive requirements, this work underscores feasibility. Ecological connectivity and the conservation of species that are not afforded explicit regulatory processes can be effectively and efficiently integrated into environmental decision-making and land use planning.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
The Regulatory Challenges of Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants in Korea - 13101
As of 2012, 23 units of nuclear power plants are in operation, but there is no experience of permanent shutdown and decommissioning of nuclear power plant in Korea. It is realized that, since late 1990's, improvement of the regulatory framework for decommissioning has been emphasized constantly from the point of view of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s safety standards. And it is known that now IAEA prepare the safety requirement on decommissioning of facilities, its title is the Safe Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirement Part 6. According to the result of IAEA's Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Korea in 2011, it was recommended that the regulatory framework for decommissioning should require decommissioning plans for nuclear installations to be constructed and operated and these plans should be updated periodically. In addition, after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in March of 2011, preparedness for early decommissioning caused by an unexpected severe accident became also important issues and concerns. In this respect, it is acknowledged that the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Korea need to be improved. First of all, we identify the current status and relevant issues of regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants compared to the IAEA's safety standards in order to achieve our goal. And then the plan is to be established for improvement of regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Korea. After dealing with it, it is expected that the revised regulatory framework for decommissioning could enhance the safety regime on the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in Korea in light of international standards. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Risk-Informed Initiating Events and Accident Response
Emerging nuclear technologies and advanced reactor developments have brought proposed changes to the regulatory framework which can be leveraged to improve safety implementation and regulatory oversight processes at existing operating nuclear power plants. Specifically, opportunities exist to make plants’ regulatory compliance processes more efficient. This can be done by decreasing reliance on purely deterministic and prescriptive approaches and expansion of the use of risk informed and performance-based approaches to demonstrate reactor safety while achieving economic gains and efficiencies. In this report, we researched possibilities of economic benefits potentially available from the application of concepts associated with a modernized regulatory framework developed for advanced reactors to the existing light water reactors. We used timing factors to demonstrate the complexity of the existing risk assessments and described how these complexities affect regulatory compliance activities at the plants. We also investigated regulatory framework for both existing and new reactors and provided an overview of potential improvements. Lastly, we evaluated various areas of existing plant operations where modernization of compliance activities can offer substantial benefits.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Risk-Informed Approach for Regulatory Approval of Microreactor Transport
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is addressing the challenges associated with safe transport of microreactors including the development and evaluation of regulatory options. PNNL developed a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors in which irradiated nuclear fuel is part microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. A microreactor and its contents will likely not be able to meet all the federal regulatory requirements as a Type B or fissile material transportation package under 10 CFR Part 71 (“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”). However, the regulatory framework developed by PNNL lays out a viable risk-informed licensing options that are safe and feasible. Risk assessment such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to show comparable safety to that provided by a Type B or fissile material package for surface transport. The framework includes guidance on applicable regulations and discusses historical precedence in using risk information for transportation licensing. The framework includes guidance for performing a microreactor transportation PRA, use and development of risk evaluation criteria, and factors such of defense-in-depth and safety margin concepts. Key advantages of using the approach are (1) increasing the likelihood of successfully obtaining regulatory transportation package approval, (2) informing the design on the relative risk significance of microreactor containment and shielding, and (3) informing the need for transportation compensatory measures. This paper focuses on two primary elements of the framework which are development of a transportation PRA for microreactor packages and development of the risk acceptance guidelines to assess the results of the PRA for regulatory decision-making.
microreactor, micro nuclear power plant, MNPP, ris↗
Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations
The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation
22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Licensing Modernization Project for Advanced Reactor Technologies: FY 2018 Project Status Report
The promise of new nuclear technology and the future of commercial power in the United States (U.S.) are linked to the existence of an efficient and safety-focused regulatory review and licensing process. With an appropriate regulatory framework, reactor suppliers and regulators can design, license, build, and export advanced reactor units more effectively and efficiently and thereby help meet the growing need for clean and reliable energy. To help address the challenge of maintaining compatibility between the regulatory environment and new commercial nuclear plant designs, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is supporting an industry-led effort called the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP). This cost-shared initiative, started in 2016 and scheduled to continue through mid-2019, targets amendment to key elements of the U.S. nuclear power reactor regulatory framework to specifically address licensing barriers in advanced-reactor concepts. The project is focused on updating guidance for certain technical licensing requirements that are largely incompatible with non-light-water reactors (non-LWR) and establish a new pathway for design-safety evaluations and license-application development. Upon completion, the project will have created a new pathway, founded on modern probabilistic assessment techniques, that offers developers, suppliers, regulators, and owner/operatorowner-operators greater clarity and assurance in design and licensing decisions. The LMP employs a team of advanced reactor technology and licensing subject matter experts working closely with U.S. regulators, affected industries, and interested members of the public. The project is managed by Southern Company and supported through a cost share arrangement with DOE. Technical contributions are also provided to the project from the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Regulatory Development area, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The LMP identified a suite of high priority issues that provided significant uncertainty within the regulated non-LWR community. It was determined that much of this uncertainty could be retired by issuing updated licensing guidance founded on safety performance demonstrations and modern probabilistic methodologies. The success criteria for the project were established as: • Generate sets of technology inclusive (TI), risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) technical requirements, recommendations, and proposals that could be reviewed, amended, and adopted for use by both NRC staff and industry. The proposals would create an optional-use regulatory framework without imposing additional (i.e., mandatory) requirements. • Support LMP the recommended updates of LMP such that they can be finalized, endorsed by NRC, and used by applicants within 5 years. This also supports the DOE advanced- reactor development and deployment goal of completing licensing reviews for technically mature non-LWR concepts sufficient to allow construction to proceed by the early 2030’s. • Further overall programmatic objectives established by DOE’s Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) initiative by resolving technology-inclusive policy issues that adversely impact regulatory reviews, siting, permitting, and/or licensing of non-LWRs. This would provide significantly more regulatory certainty for advanced reactor developers.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Life-cycle analysis of integrated biorefineries with co-production of biofuels and bio-based chemicals: co-product handling methods and implications: Co-product handling methods and implications of life-cycle analysis of biofuel and bio-chemical co-producing biorefineries
New integrated biorefinery (IBR) concepts are being investigated to co-produce hydrocarbon fuels and high-value bio-based chemicals to improve the economic viability of IBRs, to enhance biomass resource utilization efficiencies, and to maximize potential greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. Unlike fuel-only biorefineries, IBRs may co-produce a significant amount of bio-based chemicals, whose emission implications for specific biorefinery products and the biorefinery as a whole need to be evaluated. We discuss this in principle and apply three sets of co-product handling methods to conduct life-cycle analysis (LCA) of modeled IBRs with co-production of two bioproduct examples - succinic acid and adipic acid - alongside a renewable diesel blendstock fuel product. The LCA results for the specific co-product handling methods that were examined shed light on potential artifacts of product-specific LCA with selected co-product methods. We discuss the advantages and limitations of each method and conclude that (i) a system-level or 'black-box' LCA allocation method is too simplistic to reflect appropriately the GHG burdens of distinctly different processing trains for fuels and chemicals in the IBR context, and (ii) the displacement method is the only co-product handling method that accounts fully for the emission effects of both the fuel product and the non-fuel bio-based co-products in the IBRs within the context of the existing fuel-focused GHG regulatory framework. Alternatively, biorefinery system-level LCA combines benefits of individual products to offer a complete picture. This system-level LCA approach offers a holistic LCA without somewhat arbitrary decisions either on an allocation basis or by the selection of an evaluation metric based on specific products.
09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
Viable Economic Frameworks and Regulatory Barriers for Community Microgrids
Community microgrids – microgrids with more than one piece of customer- and utility-owned distribution equipment contained in the isolation boundary – are an option for providing resilience to meet targeted community and utility needs. Because multiple investors, including customers, are involved there is a lack of clarity around viable ownership models, roles and responsibilities, and compensation mechanisms. Together, these aspects describe an economic framework. To be viable, an economic framework not only needs to provide the possibility of all parties agreeing to the microgrid but also needs to meet regulatory guidelines. This report contains learnings from present-day community microgrid tariffs and programs, regulatory filings, and experiences shared within an interest group to highlight regulatory barriers to community microgrids and identify several viable economic frameworks for community microgrids.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NORM in Building Materials: A Case Study in Releasing and Disposing of Building Debris within the DOE System - 18123
In 2013, the Office of Management and Budget issued Memorandum 2013-02, clarifying its 'Freeze the Footprint' policy. Memorandum 2013-02 requires that all federal agencies maintain or reduce their total square footage, within each subsequent year, from a FY2012 baseline. Memorandum 2013-02 also requires that total square footage remain constant with respect to the type/intended use of a building. At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), this means that new construction cannot occur without demolition of equivalent (both in type and square footage) building(s). Since 2013, decommissioning and demolition of aging, unused facilities at LANL has increased. In 2016, the TA16-280 building complex was scheduled for demolition. TA16-280 is a former high explosives (HE) processing facility that consists of six buildings connected to each other via weatherproof walkways. It was constructed in the 1950's and has been subsequently used for HE shipping, receiving, and storage. Interviews with radiation protection staff suggest that some of the buildings within the complex may have been used to store depleted uranium metal parts in a non-dispersible form. It is LANL policy to conduct decommissioning surveys for radioactive materials when building history cannot confirm that a structure is radiologically non-impacted. LANL follows the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) process to develop its surveys and clear structures from radiological control. After clearance, a structure may be dispositioned as non-regulated waste, at a significant cost savings compared to regulated disposition pathways such as low-level waste. MARSAME measurements conducted in the 16-280 complex were elevated compared to reference measurements of surrogate materials, and a majority of the survey units failed to pass indistinguishable from background (IFB), which is LANL's unregulated clearance criteria. Further measurements conducted both in situ and in the laboratory indicated the presence of naturally-occurring thorium in several building materials including: poured concrete, the glaze atop ceramic blast tiles, and the porcelain enamel on the exterior of blast-proof ceiling lamps. Other than naturally-occurring thorium, there were no elevated radionuclide concentrations detected in building materials. It should be noted that there was no history of thorium use in the 16-280 complex, and the material in question was in all cases fixed to and within the building materials in question. Except in certain specific cases, such material is exempt from regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [3], as amended, and is therefore exempt from regulation under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, and agreement state regulatory frameworks. Despite this regulatory exemption, disposition of material from the 16-280 complex proved to be challenging, principally because local industrial landfills stipulate 'No radioactive material' in their Waste Acceptance Criteria. This disconnect between what is regulated and what is disposable creates a situation where some DOE sites find it easier to disposition property as Low Level Waste in lieu of pursuing a non-regulated disposition pathway. This presentation will explore the specifics of the 16-280 decommissioning project as well as the implications of the release/disposition disconnect for naturally occurring radioactive material and project planning at LANL. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Unique Regulatory Approach for Licensing the Port Hope Remediation Project in Canada - 13315
The Port Hope remediation project is a part of a larger initiative of the Canadian Federal Government the Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) which is based upon a community proposal. The Government of Canada, through Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) is investing $1.28 billion over 10 years to clean up historic low-level radioactive waste in the Port Hope Area and to provide long-term safe management of the low-level radioactive wastes in the Port Hope Area. These wastes arose from the activities of a former Federal Crown Corporation (Eldorado Nuclear) and its private sector predecessors. In Canada, historic waste are defined as low-level radioactive waste that was managed in a manner no longer considered acceptable, but for which the original producer cannot reasonably be held responsible or no longer exists and for which the Federal Government has accepted responsibility. In Canada, under the current regulatory framework, the environmental remediation is not considered as a distinct phase of the nuclear cycle. The regulatory approach for dealing with existing sites contaminated with radioactive residues is defined on the basis of risk and application of existing regulations. A unique regulatory approach was taken by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to address the various licensing issues and to set out the requirements for licensing of the Port Hope Project within the current regulatory framework. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) Licensing and Permitting [Slides]
This presentation provides an overview of the licensing, permitting, and regulatory frameworks governing Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) across multiple international contexts. It outlines foundational permitting considerations - including safety standards, siting requirements, regulatory and environmental obligations, and interconnection processes - alongside typical pathways for installation, approval, and inspection. The presentation summarizes key technical standards such as NFPA 855 and IEEE guidelines, and emphasizes best practices for safe and effective deployment. A series of detailed case studies from South Africa, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic illustrates how different countries structure approval authority, evaluate environmental impacts, and integrate BESS into national grid systems. The deck concludes with insights on emerging challenges, including evolving regulatory frameworks, financial viability, and the need for pricing mechanisms that accurately value storage services.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
The Role of Technical Guidance and Analysis Tools in Remedy Decisions, Implementation, and Closure - 18307
Selection, design, and implementation of environmental remedies are conducted under regulatory frameworks that define the activities, communication, and documentation requirements for the remediation process. However, there are site situations that are not well described in the basic regulatory frameworks, and technical guidance and analysis tools can help facilitate remedy decisions and actions. An example where technical guidance and analysis tools are helpful is in the transition from pump-and-treat (P and T) remediation to monitored natural attenuation (MNA). Standard MNA regulatory guidance does not account for a plume initially controlled by P and T hydraulic conditions rather than natural-gradient conditions. For instance, MNA guidance discusses demonstrating plume stability as a means to evaluate the suitability of MNA. However, plume stability under long-term natural gradient conditions cannot be directly demonstrated while the plume is being contained by a P and T system. Thus, additional guidance is needed to describe other measures that can be used to support transition from P and T to MNA. As an additional example, standard MNA regulatory guidance is not written to provide suitable information for application to vadose-zone contamination; discussion and examples in the regulatory guidance are predominantly for groundwater. Use of contaminant transport assessments is an important component of vadose-zone remedy decisions where technical guidance and analysis tools can facilitate these decisions. For volatile compounds, the assessment may need to also consider flux to the surface and constraints associated with vapor intrusion. Recent technical guidance and associated analysis tools provide sites with approaches to support remedy decisions for the above conditions. In particular, these recent approaches target developing and implementing P and T and soil vapor extraction remediation exit strategies and facilitating assessment and implementation of remedies for coupled vadose-zone/groundwater contamination. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Regulatory Risk Reduction for Advanced Reactor Technologies – FY2016 Status and Work Plan Summary
Millions of public and private sector dollars have been invested over recent decades to realize greater efficiency, reliability, and the inherent and passive safety offered by advanced nuclear reactor technologies. However, a major challenge in experiencing those benefits resides in the existing U.S. regulatory framework. This framework governs all commercial nuclear plant construction, operations, and safety issues and is highly large light water reactor (LWR) technology centric. The framework must be modernized to effectively deal with non-LWR advanced designs if those designs are to become part of the U.S energy supply. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Regulatory Risk Reduction (RRR) initiative, managed by the Regulatory Affairs Department at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is establishing a capability that can systematically retire extraneous licensing risks associated with regulatory framework incompatibilities. This capability proposes to rely heavily on the perspectives of the affected regulated community (i.e., commercial advanced reactor designers/vendors and prospective owner/operators) yet remain tuned to assuring public safety and acceptability by regulators responsible for license issuance. The extent to which broad industry perspectives are being incorporated into the proposed framework makes this initiative unique and of potential benefit to all future domestic non-LWR applicants
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Toward a Safety Risk-Based Classification of Unmanned Aircraft
There is a trend of growing interest and demand for greater access of unmanned aircraft (UA) to the National Airspace System (NAS) as the ongoing development of UA technology has created the potential for significant economic benefits. However, the lack of a comprehensive and efficient UA regulatory framework has constrained the number and kinds of UA operations that can be performed. This report presents initial results of a study aimed at defining a safety-risk-based UA classification as a plausible basis for a regulatory framework for UA operating in the NAS. Much of the study up to this point has been at a conceptual high level. The report includes a survey of contextual topics, analysis of safety risk considerations, and initial recommendations for a risk-based approach to safe UA operations in the NAS. The next phase of the study will develop and leverage deeper clarity and insight into practical engineering and regulatory considerations for ensuring that UA operations have an acceptable level of safety.
Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗
Unmanned Aircraft Hazards and their Implications for Regulation
Use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) has been characterized as the next great step forward in the evolution of civil aviation. Indeed, UASs are in limited civil use in the United States today, and many believe that the time is rapidly approaching when they will move into the commercial marketplace, too. To make this a reality, a number of challenges must be overcome to develop the necessary regulatory framework for assuring safe operation of this special class of aircraft. This paper discusses some of what must be done to establish that framework. In particular, we examine hazards specific to the design, operation, and flight crew of UASs, and discuss implications of these hazards for existing policy and guidance. Understanding unique characteristics of UASs that pose new hazards is essential to developing a cogent argument, and the corresponding regulatory framework, for safely integrating these aircraft into civil airspace.
Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗
The CNSC's Inspector Training and Qualification Program and its Importance to the Nuclear Industry - 19370
Trained, qualified, and designated staff at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) conduct inspections of licensed nuclear sites as a method of compliance verification. This paper will describe the unique and comprehensive qualification process for CNSC inspectors, known as the Inspector Training and Qualification Program (ITQP). The ITQP includes service-line-specific training that is unique to each inspection group within the CNSC, dependent on the facility/industry type. The training requirements specific to staff in the Wastes and Decommissioning Division and its impact on safety at waste management sites across Canada will be discussed. This paper will specifically identify the importance of CNSC inspector training and detail how the unique training program requirements enable the CNSC to better identify and encourage compliance among nuclear waste and decommissioning sites in Canada. CNSC inspectors are designated under section 29 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), and the powers of inspectors are outlined in section 32 of the NSCA. Having trained, qualified, and designated inspectors is paramount for both the CNSC and the nuclear industry. For the CNSC, this ensures that staff in the field are aware of potential hazards and how to mitigate such hazards (if applicable), that staff understand the regulatory framework and how to measure compliance against it, and that staff consistently apply CNSC values across the nuclear industry. For the industry, this ensures that staff present at nuclear facilities are knowledgeable and professional, that inspections are conducted in a consistent manner, and that any compliance actions issued are measurable and defendable against the regulatory framework. The CNSC's ITQP incorporates both theoretical (in-class and online) and practical training, and is broken down into six categories: mandatory training for all new employees; core training; service-line-specific training; on-the-job training; CNSC regulations training; and, recommended additional training. This paper will discuss in detail the specific aspects of each of these categories, the importance of each category including the difference between knowledge and skills acquired in theoretical versus hands-on training, and how CNSC staff in designated inspector positions (inspectors-in-training) progress through the program. The complete list of core training and service-line-specific training for inspectors in the Wastes and Decommissioning Division, including re-qualification requirements, will be explored throughout the paper. It is further important that CNSC designated inspectors undergo continuous learning to ensure that their skills remain up to date, as well as to ensure that inspectors requalify at defined intervals to enable the maintenance of the core knowledge and skills with which the determination of the person's qualification was based. The steps involved in this requalification process, as well as the importance of continuous learning and the maintenance of skills and knowledge will be further discussed. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
A structural description of the evolution of stakeholders and risk communication in the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities: Historical perspective, major stakeholders, and external events
Regulators and policymakers are routinely challenged with explaining complex concepts concerning risk. Part of the challenge is helping external and internal stakeholders to understand the context behind risk-related information and decisions. Here, this paper will describe the historical evolution of the safety and regulatory framework for an important category in the nuclear industry—defense nuclear facilities owned and operated by the US Department of Energy. In parallel with describing this evolution, three major events which occurred external to the complex of defense nuclear facilities will be summarized, and their impact on the maturation of the Department's safety and regulatory framework will be discussed. Finally, integrated with these two threads of discussion will be a chronicle of the changing set of involved organizations and the expanding set of external stakeholders involved in risk decisions—and therefore, the risk communications ecosystem surrounding defense nuclear facilities. It will be noted that this system was once describable as a classic “iron triangle,” but now has progressed to a complex network of federal and state organizations, numerous congressional committees, and expanding sets of external stakeholders. It is hoped that a comprehensive discussion of the context of risk assessment in the defense nuclear facilities complex—addressing historical insights, organizational evolution, and the maturing structure of regulation—will provide enhanced opportunities for building trust and understanding in this complex environment.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗