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NASA NTRS2021

Exploration Medical Capability Medical Scenarios

Medical systems supporting exploration class missions to cislunar space, the lunar surface, and the vicinity of Mars require an evolution in medical capability beyond that available for today’s low Earth orbit centric paradigm. Progress in developing more capable medical systems will be driven by the requirements of prolonged mission duration, increasing distance from Earth, and the realities of orbital mechanics, all necessitating a concomitant need for progressively Earth independent medical decision-making capabilities. These medical systems (which include the crewmembers) are expected to be capable of evaluating, diagnosing, treating and managing a defined list of medical conditions as well as addressing unanticipated medical conditions that may arise. The prioritized medical capabilities and associated resources needed to treat these medical conditions and support anticipated inflight medical events provide robust content that informs system designers and allows for a more complete evaluation of both medical and overall mission risk. Communication of these medical capabilities to system, vehicle, and mission designers can be enhanced using scenarios that characterize the system’s operations. Carefully considered scenarios provide the context needed to explore expected human and system interfaces, roles of ground and inflight crew (including periods of interrupted or delayed communications), identify training needs, assess data needs, etc. Mission-based scenario content varies dependent upon the needs, medical capabilities, conditions and context they are intended to illustrate. This document explicitly seeks to capture and codify those scenarios that have been useful to the Exploration Medical Capability Element of the Human Research Program in defining the enhanced medical systems required for future space exploration. It is expected that this document will continue to evolve through the refinement and characterization of current and future scenarios, respectively, as our knowledge grows, and requirements increasingly focus on Earth independent spaceflight operations.

Derek M Nusbaum↗
NASA NTRS2023

Information and Best Practices Related to NASA Nuclear Flight Safety for Space Flights Involving Space Nuclear Systems

The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate a repeatable and robust process that promotes clear and effective interfaces between activities and stakeholders focused on meeting nuclear flight safety requirements for missions utilizing space nuclear systems (SNS), within the context of NASA’s broader nuclear-related activities and interfaces. NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, requires that the NASA project manager “incorporate nuclear flight safety considerations starting with program or project formulation through the point at which the SNS or other radioactive material no longer has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere.” NASA’s use of SNS inherently involves partnering with other stakeholders to conduct a range of related activities that interface with nuclear flight safety. From a categorical perspective these include: (i) meeting the authorities and licensing requirements for possession and use of nuclear material, as governed by other Federal authorities; (ii) conducting National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities for nuclear-enabled missions; (iii) meeting Federal nuclear launch authorization requirements; (iv) conducting radiological contingency planning activities, including those associated with international commitments; (v) performing risk communication and public outreach activities; and (vi) ensuring decommissioning and disposal strategies reflect National policies and interests. It is the intent of this handbook to promote an effective interface between nuclear flight safety and these interrelated categorical activities. In addition to activities undertaken with partnering agencies, there are individual nuclear-related activities and programs that have a nexus to nuclear flight safety, and these include: (i) applicable NASA Standing Review Boards; (ii) the US Department of Energy nuclear safety activities conducted in partnership with NASA under Memoranda of Understanding; (iii) the Department of Defense’s Range Safety activities; (iv) NASA’s general involvement in interagency and international dialogues regarding nuclear safety; (v) the NASA-administered Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board; (vi) NASA’s program and project governance activities and nuclear-specific Technical Discipline Team activities under the Office of the Chief Engineer; and others. It is the intent of this handbook to promote effective leveraging of these additional interrelated organizational activities, as appropriate.

Donald Helton↗
NASA NTRS2019

Ensuring Flexibility and Security in SDN-Based Spacecraft Communication Networks Through Risk Assessment

Software-defined networking (SDN) has enabled elastic networking and resource distribution in cloud computing. The centralization and separation of the Control Plane also offers a high degree of network configurability and management, which can be used to mitigate and manage threats to the network. Space communication networks have historically been restricted and circuit switching in these networks has been a manual process. This study evaluates the potential role of SDN in space communication networks from a networking security standpoint. The evaluation covers the networking security needs of spacecraft missions and their associated assets. The results from the evaluation lead to a risk assessment that identifies vulnerabilities in an SDN-based communications architecture. Security challenges introduced into the network from integrating SDN are also considered. A risk register summarizes the severity of the attack outcomes, as well as occurrence likelihood. The study identifies Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as a new threat (presently unmitigated by existing security controls) that would be prevalent in an SDN-based space communication environment. A Mininet-based emulation testbed is built to demonstrate the susceptibility of spacecraft flight software to a flooding DoS attack when on an interconnected SDN-managed network. This type of attack would be highly consequential to mission assets, and therefore SDN-based space communications would need to be resilient to such attacks. Future work will need to be performed to fully characterize DoS attack methods that can apply to the space communication scenario, as well as to devise a comprehensive DoS-resilient solution.

Baker, Dylan Z.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Towards a systems approach to risk considerations for concurrent design

This paper describes the new process used by the Project Design Center at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the identification, assessment and communication of risk elements throughout the lifecycle of a mission design. This process includes a software tool, 'RAP' that collects and communicates risk information between the various designers and a 'risk expert' who mediates this process. The establishment of this process is an attempt towards the systematic consideration of risk in the design decision making process. Using this process, we are able to better keep track of the risks associated with the design decisions. Furthermore, it helps us develop better risk profiles for the studies under consideration. We aim to refine and expand the current process to enable more thorough risk analysis capabilities in the future.

concurrent design↗
NASA NTRS2007

Mission Risk Reduction Regulatory Change Management

NASA Headquarters Environmental Management Division supports NASA's mission to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research by integrating environmental considerations into programs and projects early-on, thereby proactively reducing NASA's exposure to institutional, programmatic and operational risk. As part of this effort, NASA established the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC) as a resource for detecting, analyzing, and communicating environmental regulatory risks to the NASA stakeholder community. The RRAC PC focuses on detecting emerging environmental regulations and other operational change drivers that may pose risks to NASA programs and facilities, and effectively communicating the potential risks. For example, regulatory change may restrict how and where certain activities or operations may be conducted. Regulatory change can also directly affect the ability to use certain materials by mandating a production phase-out or restricting usage applications of certain materials. Regulatory change can result in significant adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities due to NASA's stringent performance requirements for materials and components related to human-rated space vehicles. Even if a regulation does not directly affect NASA operations, U.S. and international regulations can pose program risks indirectly through requirements levied on manufacturers and vendors of components and materials. For example, manufacturers can change their formulations to comply with new regulatory requirements. Such changes can require time-consuming and costly requalification certification for use in human spaceflight programs. The RRAC PC has implemented a system for proactively managing regulatory change to minimize potential adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities. This presentation highlights the process utilized by the RRACPC to communicate regulatory change and the associated potential risks within NASA, as well as the process for communicating and cooperating with other government agencies and industry partners, both domestic and international, to ensure mission success.

Scroggins, Sharon↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Communication Delays in Cislunar Space: A Lab Study Examining Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA) and Team Risk Concerns

BACKGROUND: Communication delays are an inherent challenge of space missions to the Moon and beyond. Past research studies showed that 50+ second delays adversely affected individual well-being, team cohesion, and overall task performance (Kintz et al., 2016; Larson et al., 2019). However, there is a dearth of research on the effects of shorter delays (on the order of 4-12 seconds one-way) that may present a more immediate challenge during the upcoming Artemis missions. Even these shorter delays could make it difficult or infeasible for ground control to provide real-time support to Artemis astronauts, especially in complex and time-critical tasks such as extra-vehicular activities (EVAs). Results from studies on longer or Mars-like delays cannot be directly applied to Artemis-like delays, due to the large differences in delay magnitude and task types between these mission categories. For example, real-time oversight and guidance from ground control is impossible under Mars-like delays but may be performed under Artemis-like delays, albeit with potentially high workload and communication difficulty. Thus, a better understanding of the effects of Artemis-like communication delays on collaborative task performance is needed. Additionally, there is a need to develop reliable task paradigms that can be used in future studies on communication delays. METHODS: This project will study the effects of Artemis-like communication delays on collaborative task performance in a simulated space-to-ground team task via a lunar Gateway-like interface prototype. Teams of two astronaut-like participants - one serving as “crewmember” and one as “flight controller” - will perform a spaceflight-relevant task under six delay conditions (i.e., 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 seconds). Audio, video, texting, and file transfer will be delayed between the participants to mimic lunar-like communication delays. Measures related to workload, situation awareness, system usability, task performance, team cohesion, well-being, and communication strategies will be collected. These measures will be compared across delay levels, participant roles, and off-nominal and nominal tasks. Participants will be given the choice to use any combination of video and text communication in order to study preferences in interaction modality. RESEARCH AIMS: One aim is to identify a delay level or range of levels at which there may be significant decrements in individual and team-based measures. Identifying such ranges may help design novel workload management or communication countermeasures for future space missions. Also, the spaceflight-relevant research tasks and corresponding communication delay technology developed as part of this effort may be used for future studies on communication delays. Results from this work are also expected to inform study scenarios in the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) Campaign.

S Upasani↗
NASA NTRS1989

US computer research networks: Current and future

During the last decade, NASA LeRC's Communication Program has conducted a series of telecommunications forecasting studies to project trends and requirements and to identify critical telecommunications technologies that must be developed to meet future requirements. The Government Networks Division of Contel Federal Systems has assisted NASA in these studies, and the current study builds upon these earlier efforts. The current major thrust of the NASA Communications Program is aimed at developing the high risk, advanced, communications satellite and terminal technologies required to significantly increase the capacity of future communications systems. Also, major new technological, economic, and social-political events and trends are now shaping the communications industry of the future. Therefore, a re-examination of future telecommunications needs and requirements is necessary to enable NASA to make management decisions in its Communications Program and to ensure the proper technologies and systems are addressed. This study, through a series of Task Orders, is helping NASA define the likely communication service needs and requirements of the future and thereby ensuring that the most appropriate technology developments are pursued.

Kratochvil, D.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management at NASA

NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions. This risk management structure of functions has been taught to projects at all NASA Centers and is being successfully implemented on many projects. This presentation will give project managers the information they need to understand if risk management is to be effectively implemented on their projects at a cost they can afford.

Hammer, Theodore F.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Accounting for Point Estimate Uncertainty in Space Systems Reliability and Risk Analysis

Understanding and accounting for uncertainty in risk analysis is a critical step in the management and communication of risk in engineered systems. The component and system-level analysis to determine the probability of a negative outcome and its consequence is often quantified by a point estimate. Many Program and Enterprise decisions involving technical concerns and issues rely on reliability engineering activities to produce quantified risk analysis to inform the decision making process. At NASA, it is common to use a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) to inform the overall risk to Loss of Mission or Loss of Crew that involves integration across all spacecraft subsystem fault trees to produce an overall probability of mission failure. The point estimate is an estimate of this overall probability and is an immediate result of a fault tree model. It is the result of a model where the probability of each event is taken to be equal to its mean. The value provides an approximation of the overall mean without running any uncertainty calculations (e.g., no sampling). Using only the point estimate can lead to a false sense of precision and the point estimate may not match the resulting mean when uncertainty is taken into consideration. This paper will explore five conditions that can cause the PRA model mean to diverge from the point estimate and will provide engineers and managers insight into the importance of understanding uncertainty in the elements of PRA models.

Paul J Collier↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS1995

ACTS on-orbit multibeam antenna pattern measurements

The Advanced Communication Technology (ACTS) is a key to NASA's goal of developing high-risk, advanced communications technology using multiple frequency bands to support the nation's future communication needs. Using the multiple, dynamic hopping spot beams and advanced on board switching and processing systems, ACTS will open a new era in communications satellite technology. One of the key technologies to be validated as part of the ACTS program is the multibeam antenna (MBA) with rapidly reconfigurable hopping and fixed spot beams to serve users equipped with small-aperture terminals within the coverage areas. The MBA test program is designed to evaluate the on-orbit ACTS antenna performance. The main parameters measured are beam shape, beam center location and gain.

Acosta, R.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Advanced Communication Technology Satellite (ACTS) multibeam antenna technology verification experiments

The Advanced Communication Technology Satellite (ACTS) is a key to reaching NASA's goal of developing high-risk, advanced communications technology using multiple frequency bands to support the nation's future communication needs. Using the multiple, dynamic hopping spot beams, and advanced on board switching and processing systems, ACTS will open a new era in communications satellite technology. One of the key technologies to be validated as part of the ACTS program is the multibeam antenna with rapidly reconfigurable hopping and fixed spot beam to serve users equipped with small-aperature terminals within the coverage areas. The proposed antenna technology experiments are designed to evaluate in-orbit ACTS multibeam antenna performance (radiation pattern, gain, cross pol levels, etc.).

Acosta, Roberto J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Harnessing the Risk-Related Data Supply Chain: An Information Architecture Approach to Enriching Human System Research and Operations Knowledge

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) and Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD), not unlike many NASA organizations today, struggle with the inherent inefficiencies caused by dependencies on heterogeneous data systems and silos of data and information spread across decentralized discipline domains. The capture of operational and research-based data/information (both in-flight and ground-based) in disparate IT systems impedes the extent to which that data/information can be efficiently and securely shared, analyzed, and enriched into knowledge that directly and more rapidly supports HRP's research-focused human system risk mitigation efforts and SLSD s operationally oriented risk management efforts. As a result, an integrated effort is underway to more fully understand and document how specific sets of risk-related data/information are generated and used and in what IT systems that data/information currently resides. By mapping the risk-related data flow from raw data to useable information and knowledge (think of it as the data supply chain), HRP and SLSD are building an information architecture plan to leverage their existing, shared IT infrastructure. In addition, it is important to create a centralized structured tool to represent risks including attributes such as likelihood, consequence, contributing factors, and the evidence supporting the information in all these fields. Representing the risks in this way enables reasoning about the risks, e.g. revisiting a risk assessment when a mitigation strategy is unavailable, updating a risk assessment when new information becomes available, etc. Such a system also provides a concise way to communicate the risks both within the organization as well as with collaborators. Understanding and, hence, harnessing the human system risk-related data supply chain enhances both organizations' abilities to securely collect, integrate, and share data assets that improve human system research and operations.

Buquo, Lynn↗
NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together

Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, NASA has extensively used probabilistic analysis methods to assess, understand, and communicate the risk of space launch vehicles. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), used in the nuclear industry, is one of the probabilistic analysis methods NASA utilizes to assess Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) risk for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability distributions to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: 1) what can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired consequences of interest), 2) how likely is it (probabilities), and 3) what is the severity of the degradation (consequences). Since the Challenger accident, PRA has been used in supporting decisions regarding safety upgrades for launch vehicles. Another area that was given a lot of emphasis at NASA after the Challenger accident is reliability engineering. Reliability engineering has been a critical design function at NASA since the early Apollo days. However, after the Challenger accident, quantitative reliability analysis and reliability predictions were given more scrutiny because of their importance in understanding failure mechanism and quantifying the probability of failure, which are key elements in resolving technical issues, performing design trades, and implementing design improvements. Although PRA and reliability are both probabilistic in nature and, in some cases, use the same tools, they are two different activities. Specifically, reliability engineering is a broad design discipline that deals with loss of function and helps understand failure mechanism and improve component and system design. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment process intended to assess the risk scenarios that could lead to a major/top undesirable system event, and to identify those scenarios that are high-risk drivers. PRA output is critical to support risk informed decisions concerning system design. This paper describes the PRA process and the reliability engineering discipline in detail. It discusses their differences and similarities and how they work together as complementary analyses to support the design and risk assessment processes. Lessons learned, applications, and case studies in both areas are also discussed in the paper to demonstrate and explain these differences and similarities.

Safie, Fayssal↗
NASA NTRS2024

Climate Extremes and Risks: Links Between Climate Science and Decision-Making

The World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) envisions a future where actionable climate information is universally accessible, supporting decision makers in preparing for and responding to climate change. In this perspective, we advocate for enhancing links between climate science and decision-making through a better and more decision-relevant understanding of climate impacts. The proposed framework comprises three pillars: climate science, impact science, and decision-making, focusing on generating seamless climate information from sub-seasonal, seasonal, decadal to century timescales informed by observed climate events and their impacts. The link between climate science and decision-making has strengthened in recent years, partly owing to undeniable impacts arising from disastrous weather extremes. Enhancing decision-relevant understanding involves utilizing lessons from past extreme events and implementing impact-based early warning systems to improve resilience. Integrated risk assessment and management require a comprehensive approach that encompasses good knowledge about possible impacts, hazard identification, monitoring, and communication of risks while acknowledging uncertainties inherent in climate predictions and projections, but not letting the uncertainty lead to decision paralysis. The importance of data accessibility, especially in the Global South, underscores the need for better coordination and resource allocation. Strategic frameworks should aim to enhance impact-related and open-access climate services around the world. Continuous improvements in predictive modeling and observational data are critical, as is ensuring that climate science remains relevant to decision makers locally and globally. Ultimately, fostering stronger collaborations and dedicated investments to process and tailor climate data will enhance societal preparedness, enabling communities to navigate the complexities of a changing climate effectively.

climate extremes↗