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This viewgraph presentation gives an overview of NASA's risk analysis communication programs associated with changing environmental policies. The topics include: 1) NASA Program Transition; 2) Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC); and 3) Regulatory Tracking and Communication Process.
NASA's Agency-wide.resource for identifying and managing risks associated with changing environmental regulations Goals of the RRAC PC: 1) Proactively. detect, analyze and communicate environmental regulatory risks to NASA Programs and facilities; 2) Communicate with regulators and participate in the mitigation of such risks; and 3) Provide centralized support on emerging regulations to NASA HQ Environmental Management Division. When significant regulatory changes are identified, timely communication is essential. Communication of changing requirements to the regulatory stakeholders - NASA Programs and Facilities. Communication of potential issues to management and, when appropriate, back to the regulating agency.
NASA recently restructured its Space Communications Program to emphasize the development of high risk communication technology useable in multiple frequency bands and to support a wide range of future communication needs. As part of this restructuring, the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) Project will develop and experimentally verify the technology associated with multiple fixed and scanning beam systems which will enable growth in communication satellite capacities and more effective utilization of the radio frequency spectrum. The ACTS requirements and operations as well as the technology significance for future systems are described.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Division has implemented an innovative approach to Enterprise Risk Management under a unique governance structure and streamlined integration model. ESD's mission is to design and build the capability to extend human existence to deep space. The Enterprise consists of three Programs: Space Launch System (SLS), Orion, and Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO). The SLS is a rocket and launch system that will be capable of powering humans, habitats, and support systems to deep space. Orion will be the first spacecraft in history capable of taking humans to multiple destinations within deep space. GSDO is modernizing Kennedy's spaceport to launch spacecraft built and designed by both NASA and private industry. ESD's approach to Enterprise Risk Management is commensurate with affordability and a streamlined management philosophy. ESD Enterprise Risk Management leverages off of the primary mechanisms for integration within the Enterprise. The Enterprise integration approach emphasizes delegation of authority to manage and execute the majority of cross-program activities and products to the individual Programs, while maintaining the overall responsibility for all cross-program activities at the Division. The intent of the ESD Enterprise Risk Management approach is to improve risk communication, to avoid replication and/or contradictory strategies, and to minimize overhead process burden. This is accomplished by the facilitation and integration of risk information within ESD. The ESD Division risks, Orion risks, SLS risks, and GSDO risks are owned and managed by the applicable Program. When the Programs have shared risks with multiple consequences, they are jointly owned and managed. When a risk is associated with the integrated system that involves more than one Program in condition, consequence, or mitigation plan, it is considered an Exploration Systems Integration (ESI) Risk. An ESI risk may require visibility and risk handling by multiple organizations. The Integrated Risk Working Group (IRWG) is a small team of Risk experts that are responsible for collaborating and communicating best practices. In addition, the forum facilitates proper integration of risks across the Enterprise. The IRWG uses a Continuous Risk Management approach for facilitating the identification, analysis, planning, tracking, and controlling of ESI Risks. The ESD Division, Programs, and Integrated Task Teams identify ESI Risks. The IRWG maintains a set of metrics for understanding Enterprise Risk process and the overall Risk Posture. The team is also actively involved in the modeling of risk for Enterprise Performance Management. With the Enterprise being constrained in Schedule and Budget, and with significant technical complexity, the appropriate use of Risk Management techniques is crucial to the success of the Enterprise. The IRWG achieves this through the modified approach, providing a forum for collaboration on risks that cross boundaries between the separate entities.
Human systems PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment: a) Provides quantitative measures of probability, consequence, and uncertainty; and b) Communicates risk and informs decision-making. Human health risks rated highest in ISS PRA are based on 1997 assessment of clinical events in analog operational settings. Much work remains to analyze remaining human health risks identified in Bioastronautics Roadmap.
This article is about the state of ICON principles Goldman et al. (2021), https://doi.org/10.1029/2021EO153180 in natural hazards and a discussion on the opportunities and challenges of adopting them. Natural hazards pose risks to society, infrastructure, and the environment. Hazard interactions and their cascading phenomena in space and time can further intensify the impacts. Natural hazards’ risks are expected to increase in the future due to environmental, demographic, and socioeconomic changes. It is important to quantify and effectively communicate risks to inform the design and implementation of risk mitigation and adaptation strategies. Multihazard multisector risk management poses several nontrivial challenges, including: (a) integrated risk assessment, (b) Earth system data-model fusion, (c) uncertainty quantification and communication, and (d) crossing traditional disciplinary boundaries. Here, we review these challenges, highlight current research and operational endeavors, and underscore diverse research opportunities. We emphasize the need for integrated approaches, coordinated processes, open science, and networked efforts (ICON) for multihazard multisector risk management.
Communicating risk and reliability information within NASA Goddard’s missions is crucial to continuing the development of new technology and ensuring GSFC missions achieve their science objectives. The Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch (Code 371) within the SMA directorate is one of GSFC’s leaders in communicating this information to missions, and one tool 371 engineers use to provide this information is the Commodity Usage Guides (CUGs). CUGs are helpful in compiling various critical parameters and heritage information for standard payload components, ensuring project personnel inherit the lessons learned from previous experiences. The purpose of this project was to create CUGs for CCDs used within GSFC missions. To formulate a CUG applicable data was aggregated into the CUG template for Charge-Coupled Devices (CCDs)--electro-optical components used to convert photons into digital images and data. CCDs can easily be adapted to a variety of mission requirements making them widely used at GSFC, and therefore suitable for CUGs. Once the CUGs for CCDs are completed the information can be distributed to engineers, scientists and other project members to ensure the lessons learned are passed on to the next mission.
Continuous Risk Management (CM) is a software engineering practice with processes, methods, and tools for managing risk in a project. It provides a controlled environment for practical decision making, in order to assess continually what could go wrong, determine which risk are important to deal with, implement strategies to deal with those risk and assure the measure effectiveness of the implemented strategies. Continuous Risk Management provides many training workshops and courses to teach the staff how to implement risk management to their various experiments and projects. The steps of the CRM process are identification, analysis, planning, tracking, and control. These steps and the various methods and tools that go along with them, identification, and dealing with risk is clear-cut. The office that I worked in was the Risk Management Office (RMO). The RMO at NASA works hard to uphold NASA s mission of exploration and advancement of scientific knowledge and technology by defining and reducing program risk. The RMO is one of the divisions that fall under the Safety and Assurance Directorate (SAAD). I worked under Cynthia Calhoun, Flight Software Systems Engineer. My task was to develop a help screen for the Continuous Risk Management Implementation Tool (RMIT). The Risk Management Implementation Tool will be used by many NASA managers to identify, analyze, track, control, and communicate risks in their programs and projects. The RMIT will provide a means for NASA to continuously assess risks. The goals and purposes for this tool is to provide a simple means to manage risks, be used by program and project managers throughout NASA for managing risk, and to take an aggressive approach to advertise and advocate the use of RMIT at each NASA center.
Abstract Recent developments in risk and crisis communication (RCC) research combine social science theory and data science tools to construct effective risk messages efficiently. However, current systematic literature reviews (SLRs) on RCC primarily focus on computationally assessing message efficacy as opposed to message efficiency. We conduct an SLR to highlight any current computational methods that improve message construction efficacy and efficiency. We found that most RCC research focuses on using theoretical frameworks and computational methods to analyze or classify message elements that improve efficacy. For improving message efficiency, computational and manual methods are only used in message classification. Specifying the computational methods used in message construction is sparse. We recommend that future RCC research apply computational methods toward improving efficacy and efficiency in message construction. By improving message construction efficacy and efficiency, RCC messaging would quickly warn and better inform affected communities impacted by current hazards. Such messaging has the potential to save as many lives as possible.
The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions
NASA's mission is to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. To help enable existing and future programs to pursue this mission, NASA has established the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC) to proactively identify, analyze, and communicate environmental regulatory risks to the NASA community. The RRAC PC is chartered to evaluate the risks posed to NASA Programs and facilities by environmentally related drivers. The RRAC PC focuses on emerging environmental regulations, as well as risks related to operational changes that can trigger existing environmental requirements. Changing regulations have the potential to directly affect program activities. For example, regulatory changes can restrict certain activities or operations by mandating changes in how operations may be done or limiting where or how certain operations can take place. Regulatory changes also can directly affect the ability to use certain materials by mandating a production phase-out or restricting usage applications of certain materials. Such changes can result in NASA undertaking material replacement efforts. Even if a regulation does not directly affect NASA operations, U.S. and international regulations can pose program risks indirectly through requirements levied on manufacturers and vendors of components and materials. For example, manufacturers can change their formulations to comply with new regulatory requirements. Such changes can require time-consuming and costly requalification certification for use in human spaceflight programs. The RRAC PC has implemented several strategies for proactively managing regulatory change to minimize potential adverse impacts to NASA Programs and facilities. This presentation highlights the lessons learned through establishing the RRAC PC, the process by which the RRAC PC monitors and distributes information about emerging regulatory requirements, and the cross-Agency cooperation that is vital to supporting NASA's mission.
NASA's mission is to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. To help enable existing and future programs to pursue this mission, NASA has established the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC) to proactively identify, analyze, and communicate environmental regulatory risks to the NASA community. The RRAC PC is chartered to evaluate the risks posed to NASA Programs and facilities by environmentally related drivers. The RRAC PC focuses on emerging environmental regulations, as well as risks related to operational changes that can trigger existing environmental requirements. Changing regulations have the potential to directly affect program activities. For example, regulatory changes can restrict certain activities or operations by mandating changes in how operations may be done or limiting where or how certain operations can take place. Regulatory changes also can directly affect the ability to use certain materials by mandating a production phase-out or restricting usage aPi'iications of certain materials. Such changes can result in NASA undertaking material replacement efforts. Even if a regulation does not directly affect NASA operations, U.S. and international regulations can pose program risks indirectly through requirements levied on manufacturers and vendors of components and materials. For example, manufacturers can change their formulations to comply with new regulatory requirements. Such changes can require time-consuming and costly requalification certification for use in human spaceflight programs. The RRAC PC has implemented several strategies for proactively managing regulatory change to minimize potential adverse impacts to NASA Programs and facilities. This presentation highlights the lessons learned through establishing the RRAC PC, the process by which the RRAC PC monitors and distributes information about emerging regulatory requirements, and the cross-Agency cooperation that is vital to supporting NASA's mission.
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Cooperative driving automation (CDA) Class C, agreement-seeking cooperation, is an innovative and practical solution that can promote cooperation among general passenger vehicles on the road. However, more comprehensive studies are needed before establishing the standard protocols of agreement-seeking cooperation, such as communication frequency and the duration of cooperation. Here, this article presents an initiative study on the impacts of communication capabilities on agreement-seeking cooperation. Through a large-scale analysis by regulating vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication metrics, this work suggests desirable system parameters that can maximize the benefits of cooperation and ensure reliable operability while avoiding exhaustive communication loads. As the first step, an example agreement-seeking cooperation system is created for a car-following scenario, including decision-making and control algorithms for autonomous vehicles. Then, software-in-the-loop tests explore the performance of the developed system as it encounters various communication risks, such as latency and message packet drops. The system performance metrics are evaluated from various angles, including the time consumed for the agreement-seeking process, cooperation ratio, and the ratio of faulty cooperation. Energy saving from the cooperation is assessed by using simulation software that can run multiple high-fidelity vehicle models simultaneously. Based on the analyses, this article suggests the V2V communication requirements for the reliable operation of CDA agreement-seeking, which can be referred to when developing the standard protocols of agreement-seeking cooperation.
In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.
Beginning in 2019, harmful algal events in Austin, Texas, caused canine deaths in the Lady Bird Lake and Lake Travis reservoirs. These reservoirs are part of the larger Highland Lakes chain, managed by the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) and the City of Austin Department of Watershed Protection (CoA DWP), which fulfill municipal, commercial, and agricultural water demands. Given the recent increase in favorable algal event conditions in central Texas, the LCRA and CoA DWP partnered with NASA DEVELOP to improve algal event early-warning systems through the application of remote sensing and machine learning. An Earth observation-based algal monitoring system will assist the responsible agencies in predicting algal conditions and communicating hazards to the public. The NASA DEVELOP team utilized Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI) and Sentinel-2 Multispectral Instrument (MSI) data to produce products including chlorophyll-a concentrations, cyanobacteria detections, turbidity, and water surface temperature. Chlorophyll-a concentrations were retrieved with a pre-trained machine learning model (mixture density network) and spectral indices, while the other products were derived from spectral indices. In situ field data were used to validate and quantify uncertainties for each product. The validations show strong correlations for chlorophyll-a and water surface temperature. Time series analyses of chlorophyll-a concentrations show peaks in the severe drought years (2015 and 2016). This project's resulting products enable monitoring of environmental proxies relevant to algal event presence in the Highland Lakes chain and will ultimately support water management, decision making, and risk communication.
Society faces increasingly severe flood hazards, intensifying demand for flood early warning systems (FEWS) that deliver accurate and actionable information. However, most existing FEWS remain prediction‐centric, treating decision‐making as a downstream consumer of hazard forecasts while offering limited support for uncertainty interpretation, risk communication, and real‐world response. This Perspective presents a vision and blueprint for a novel inland FEWS‐decision‐making (FEWS‐DM) framework that repositions decision‐making as an equal partner in the forecasting process—not a passive recipient of its outputs. The framework is built on three tightly coupled, co‐evolving thrusts: Physical Science (T1), which advances flood prediction with quantified uncertainty informed by decision relevance; Human Science (T2), which incorporates psychology, behavior, and cultural and institutional context; and Decision Science (T3), which unifies physical predictions and human factors through principled, utility‐based decision support with end‐to‐end uncertainty management. Rather than treating T1 as a solved problem, FEWS‐DM recognizes that forecast development itself must be shaped by decision needs through continuous bidirectional feedback. We identify key scientific, behavioral, and operational challenges limiting such integration and discuss the enabling role of AI, while emphasizing human‐centered design and community feedback as essential for building trust and improving flood risk management.
Abstract This study presents a quantitative validation of 15 Similar Exposure Groups (SEGs) that were derived via control bands inherent to the Risk Level Based Management System currently being used at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. For 93% of the SEGs that were evaluated, statistical analyses of personal exposure monitoring data, through Bayesian Decision Analysis (BDA), demonstrated that the controls implemented from the initial control bands assigned to these SEGs were at least as protective as the controls from the control band outcomes derived from the quantitative data. The BDA also demonstrated that for 40% of the SEGs, the controls from the initial control bands were overly protective, thus allowing controls to be downgraded, which resulted in a significant saving of environmental safety and health (ES&H) resources. Therefore, as a means to both confirm existing controls and to identify candidate SEGs for downgrading controls, efforts to continuously improve the accuracy of Control Banding (CB) strategies through the routine quantitative validation of SEGs are strongly encouraged. Targeted collaborative efforts across institutions and even countries for both the development of CB strategies and the validation of discreetly defined SEGs of commonly performed tasks will not only optimize limited ES&H resources but will also assist in providing a simplified process for essential risk communication at the worker level to the benefit of billions of workers around the world.