Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “safety codes and standards”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

Analysis of Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) and Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Cartridge Performance Testing on a Hanford AX Tank Farm Exhauster Slipstream Volume 2: Raw Analytical Data

As the Tank Operations Contractor for U.S. Department of Energy operations at the Hanford site in Washington State, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) is responsible for managing highly radioactive wastes stored in tanks at Hanford. To protect workers at Hanford Tank Farms, WRPS tests air-purifying respirator (APR) and powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) chemical cartridges commonly used at the tank farms. The tests were conducted to determine the period of time the cartridges would provide adequate performance for APRs and PAPRs when workers are exposed to a mixture of Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPC) from any vapors exiting headspaces in the storage tanks. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Standard 29 Code of the Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.134(d)(3)(iii)(b)(2) specifies that for protection against gases and vapors, employers shall implement a schedule for cartridges to ensure that change-outs occur before the end of service life. The change schedule can be based on objective information or data that ensures cartridge change-outs occur before the end of their service life. The primary function of the WRPS Cartridge Test Program is to obtain objective data to determine service lives for the APR and PAPR cartridges used at Hanford Tank Farms. WRPS contracted with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to analyze the test data and offer an independent analysis and any recommendations. This report summarizes data analysis of APR and PAPR cartridge testing on a vapor slipstream from the Hanford AX tank farm exhauster. Volume 1 of this report documents the testing, data analysis, results, conclusions, and recommendations resulting from the cartridge testing on AX exhauster slipstream vapors. Volume 2 provides an introduction to the raw data, including analytical laboratory analysis results that supported the analysis and conclusions documented in Volume 1.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SolarAPP+ ® (Solar Automated Permit Processing Plus) [SWR-19-51]

SolarAPP+ ®: Safe and affordable home solar through permitting automation. NREL has launched a collaborative effort with key code officials, authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs), and the solar industry to develop an instant online solar permitting platform for code compliant residential systems. SolarAPP (Solar Automated Permit Processing) will: -Provide a flexible, web-based PV-permitting tool for residential systems at no-cost to AHJs. -Enable standardization of instant permitting processes. -Evaluate applications for safety and code compliance. -Offer opportunities to incorporate energy storage and expand to other market segments.

Cook, Jeffrey↗

Report on General Hydrogen Safety

Hydrogen is an important resource for many different industries throughout the world, including refining, manufacturing, and as a direct energy source. Hydrogen production, through methods such as steam methane reforming, has been developed over several decades. There is a large global demand for hydrogen from these industries and safe production and distribution are paramount for hydrogen systems. Codes and standards have been developed to reduce the risk associated with hydrogen accidents to the public. These codes and standards are similar to those in other industries in which there is inherent risk to the public, such as gasoline and natural gas production and distribution. Although there will always be a risk to the public in these types of fuels, the codes and standards are developed to reduce the likelihood of an accident occurring and reduce the severity of impact, should one occur. This report reviews the current state of hydrogen in the United States and outlines the codes and standards that ensure safe operation of hydrogen systems. The total hydrogen demand and use in different industries is identified. Additionally, the current landscape of hydrogen production and fueling stations in the United States is outlined. The safety of hydrogen systems is discussed through an overview of the purpose, methods, and content included in codes and standards. As outlined in this safety overview, the risk to the public in operation of hydrogen generation facilities and fueling stations is reduced through implementation of appropriate measures. Codes, such as NFPA 2, ensure that the risk associated with a hydrogen system is no greater than the risk presented by gasoline refueling stations.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Manufactured Home Equipment Sizing and Selection Tool

This tool is for use for manufactured homes built to the HUD Code (thermal provisions of the Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards, Subpart F, Section §3280), including manufactured homes certified as ENERGY STAR® and DOE Efficient New Homes. It provides a simple look-up procedure to assist equipment specifiers, HVAC contractors, home installers, retailers, manufacturers, and electric utility staff. For new manufactured homes, it guides in selection of single speed heat pumps and air conditioners. For existing homes, it determines design conditions and nominal equipment size. The guidelines provide a simple but accurate procedure that reduces oversizing and its associated problems.

Source record↗

Safety Related Concerns with Installation and Use of Switch-Rated Plug/Receptacle Combinations in Lieu of Metal-Enclosed Disconnect Switches

The manufacturers of Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL) listed, switch-rated, plug and receptacle combinations tout their convenience, reliability, efficiency, and compliance with both the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70®, National Electric Code (NEC), and National Fire Protection Association 70E®, The Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, as advantages to using these products in lieu of traditional metal-enclosed disconnect switches. The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness of several unintended consequences that can result when replacement involves high energy cord and plug connected equipment. This paper describes several possible issues in complying with the NFPA 70 Articles 110 and 400 and NFPA 70E Articles 110 and 130 that should be considered when using load rated plug/receptacle combinations. This paper is intended to address high energy circuits typically associated with 480 volt pin and sleeve type connections in applications where incident energy levels may exceed 1.2 calories/centimeter² (cal/cm²).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of Risk Mitigation Guidance for Hydrogen Sensor Placement Indoors and Outdoors

Guidance on Sensor Placement remains one of the top priorities for the safe deployment of hydrogen and fuel cell equipment in the commercial marketplace. Building on the success of Phase 1 work reported at ICHS2019 and published in IJHE, this paper discusses the consecutive steps to further develop and validate such guidance for mechanically ventilated enclosures. The key step included a more in-depth analysis of sensitivity to variation of physical parameters in a small enclosure, and finally, expansion of the developed approach to confined spaces in an outdoor environment.

codes and standards↗

Analysis of Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) and Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Cartridge Performance Testing on Hanford Tanks BY-108 and BY-110 Volume 2: Raw Analytical Data

As the Tank Operations Contractor for U.S. Department of Energy operations at the Hanford site in Washington State, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) is responsible for managing highly radioactive wastes stored in tanks at Hanford. WRPS tests air-purifying respirator (APR) and powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) chemical cartridges commonly used by workers at Hanford Tank Farms to determine the period of time that the cartridges would provide adequate performance for APRs and PAPRs used to protect workers when exposed to a mixture of Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPC) from any vapors exiting headspaces in the storage tanks. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Standard promulgated in Title 29 of the Code of the Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.134(d)(3)(iii)(b)(2) specifies that for protection against gases and vapors, employers shall implement a schedule for cartridges to ensure that change-outs occur before the end of service life. The change schedule can be based on objective information or data that ensures cartridge change-outs occur before the end of their service life. The primary function of the WRPS Cartridge Test Program is to obtain objective data to determine service lives for the APR and PAPR cartridges used at Hanford Tank Farms. WRPS contracted with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to analyze the test data and offer an independent analysis and any recommendations. This report summarizes data analysis of APR and PAPR cartridge testing on BY-110 and BY-108 headspace vapors, respectively. Two different APR cartridges from SCOTT Safety (Monroe, North Carolina) were assessed for the BY-110 headspace vapors, and two different PAPR cartridges—one from MSA Safety Inc. (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) and another from 3M (Maplewood, Minnesota)—were assessed for the BY-108 headspace vapors. Volume 1 of this report documents the testing, data analysis, results, conclusions, and recommendations resulting from the cartridge testing of vapors from the BY-110 and BY-108 headspaces. Volume 2 provides an introduction to the raw data, including analytical laboratory analysis results that supported the analysis and conclusions documented in Volume 1.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Global Trends of ASME "N-Stamp" Certifications for Nuclear Component Vendors

Historically, nuclear component manufacturing vendors, from small businesses through large conglomerates, have felt compelled to obtain an American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Nuclear Certification, known colloquially as an "N-stamp", to assure supply chain quality standards that will be acceptable to regulators and safety concerns. Since the N-stamp quality standard is a U.S.-origin code, combined with the apparent decline in the U.S. nuclear industry alongside the growth of the Asian nuclear industry, there is the question of whether the rest of the world, including new entrants to the nuclear industry, also regard N-stamp as a needed certification. This study addresses this question through analysis of the entire N-stamp database of holders, and former holders, of N-stamp certificates of all types and for all regions worldwide from 1989-2020 (the dates available in the database). From this 30 years of data, we find that actually U.S.-based vendors still consistently obtain the largest number of N-stamps worldwide over all time periods, but also find that the countries participating in the N-stamp certification process has broadly expanded beyond just North America, Japan, S. Korea and Western Europe (the primary N-stamp recipients before the mid-2000's). We produced global heats maps and bar charts to illustrate our findings, as well as further investigation into why the data shows changes over time and region. We note that nuclear entities involved with Soviet-type reactors do not participate in the N-stamp process, but instead pursue the Russian version PNAE, which is substantially similar to the ASME code. We conclude that at least from the N-stamp database, the United States nuclear component manufacturing industry is alive and well, although there have been some consolidations, and that the ASME N-stamp appears to still be a valued certificate worldwide, including in China which now ranks second only to the United States in obtaining N-stamp certificates in recent years. We further note that the vendors of new reactor types, in particular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors (HTGRs) and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), are actively engaged with ASME (and other U.S.-based nuclear standards bodies such as the American Nuclear Society and Nuclear Energy Institute) to coordinate updates to the ASME N-Stamp criteria to ensure applicability of the code for these new designs. Implications of these findings include the following: The global use of the U.S.-origin N-stamp certification supports the view that, despite the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry, the United States remains an esteemed global leader in the area of nuclear safety. As the U.S. Government works to revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry, especially in the area of exports, it may be beneficial to leverage the global standing of the N-stamp certification. The findings indicate that the N-stamp database would be a useful tool for the U.S. Government to use to track the growth of the civil nuclear industry in foreign countries, under certain circumstances. The Excel-format N-stamp database produced as part of this study may be a useful tool for this purpose. N-stamp data may be a useful tool for foreign governments to use to identify nuclear manufacturers within their own country, especially to identify "targets" for outreach on nuclear export control compliance. The U.S. Government could carry this message to foreign partners during bilateral engagements or as part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) discussions on industry outreach.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Analysis of Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) and Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Cartridge Performance Testing on a Hanford AP Tank Farm Exhauster Slipstream: Volume 2 Raw Analytical Data

As the Tank Operations Contractor for U.S. Department of Energy operations at the Hanford site in Washington State, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) is responsible for managing highly radioactive wastes stored in tanks at Hanford. WRPS tests air-purifying respirator (APR) and powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) chemical cartridges commonly used at Hanford Tank Farms to determine the period of time that the cartridges would provide adequate performance for APRs and PAPRs used to protect workers when exposed to a mixture of Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPC) from any vapors exiting headspaces in the storage tanks. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Standard promulgated in Title 29 of the Code of the Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.134(d)(3)(iii)(b)(2) specifies that for protection against gases and vapors, employers shall implement a schedule for cartridges to ensure that change-outs occur before the end of service life. The change schedule can be based on objective information or data that ensures cartridge change-outs occur before the end of their service life.[2-5] The primary function of the WRPS Cartridge Test Program is to obtain objective data to determine service lives for the APR and PAPR cartridges used at Hanford Tank Farms. WRPS contracted with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to analyze the test data and offer an independent analysis and any recommendations. Volume 1 of this report summarizes data analysis of APR and PAPR cartridge testing on vapors from the AP tank farm exhauster. Previous testing of APR cartridges was conducted on the AP exhauster in June 2016. However, an AP exhauster upgrade was completed in September 2016. Two different APR cartridges from SCOTT Safety (Monroe, North Carolina) were assessed for the new AP exhauster source, along with two different PAPR cartridges—one from MSA Safety Inc. (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) and another from 3M (Maplewood, Minnesota). Volume 2 provides an introduction to the raw data, including analytical laboratory analysis results that supported the analysis and conclusions documented in Volume 1.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Fuel Behavior Implications of Reactor Design Choices in Pressurized Water SMRs

Small pressurized water reactors (PWRs) can feature boron free operation, natural circulation mode, reduced height assemblies and/or long refueling cycles. This paper attempts to explore core design optimization for each of these design evolutions. In consequence, five core design layouts are developed incorporating boron free operation with continuous control rods insertion, natural circulation with low burnup/low power density design, natural circulation with high burnup/low power density design, forced circulation with standard core power density design, and forced circulation with high power density design. These cores’ performance is compared to a standard 4-loop PWR. The design process aims to improve the fuel cycle cost under safety constraints through core design optimization using CASMO4E/SIMULATE3 reactor physics codes and FRAPCON4.1 fuel performance assessment tool. Core modeling assumes standard 17x17 PWR fuel assemblies loaded with low enriched uranium (LEU) up to 5wt% or LEU+ (i.e., below 10wt% enrichment) pellets with gadolinium oxide (Gd2O3) as the burnable poison. Satisfactory core and fuel performances are obtained for all the designed cores under steady state and considered overpower transients. For low power density operation, long cycle lengths are achieved reaching a 2.5- and a 5-year cycles and peak rod-average burnup is pushed to 83 MWd/kgU. Other cycle lengths are maintained at 18 months. Boron free operation exhibits the ability to achieve longer cycle lengths at the cost of higher peaking factors leading to high local power and fuel temperatures which prevents sizable power uprates and is deemed uneconomical. Fuel assembly height reduction allows coolant velocity retrofit which enables higher core power density without violating structural integrity of the fuel assembly. As a result, a core power density of 123 kW/l is reached where total cladding hoop strain becomes the limiting parameter.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NREL Hydrogen Sensor Testing Laboratory

Relevance: Detection is recognized as a critical element for hydrogen facility safety design and supports risk mitigation. Detection methodologies will support validation of H2 behavior research. Hydrogen point sensors play a critical role for safety and process monitoring, but other methodologies can be developed. Approach: NREL Sensor Laboratory tests and verifies sensor performance for manufacturers, developers, end-users, regulatory agencies and SDOs/CDOs NREL deployment activity supports regulatory requirement verification, hydrogen behavior models, and method development for use by stakeholders. Accomplishments and Progress: NREL's R&D accomplishments have supported developers, industry, and SDOs by providing sensor performance and deployment expertise not otherwise available. Development of alternative detection strategies for hydrogen applications have been initiated. HyWAM and advanced detection methodologies deployments at H2@Scale Facilities are being implemented. Collaborations: Collaboration with government laboratories, universities, private organizations and regulatory agencies has leveraged the NREL Sensor Laboratory's success in advancing hydrogen safety sensors and process control. Proposed Future Work: NREL will support hydrogen deployment by the proper implementation of hydrogen sensors and advanced detection strategies. NREL will continue to support science-based codes and standards. This effort will be guided by the needs of the hydrogen community.

codes and standards↗

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Initial Efforts Organizing WPNCS SG-8: Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks

The Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) under the guidance of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has over 20 years of experience addressing concerns related to static and transient configurations encountered within the nuclear fuel cycle: fuel fabrication, transportation, reprocessing, storage, and geological disposal. One of the cornerstone activities of the WPNCS is the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP), which was established to identify a comprehensive set of criticality benchmark data, evaluate the data, including quantification of overall uncertainties; compile the data into a standardized format, perform sample calculations utilizing modern nuclear data sets and codes utilized in nuclear criticality safety, and formally document the work into a single source of verified benchmark data. Annually, members of the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) contribute evaluated benchmark data that undergoes comprehensive technical review prior to publication in the ICSBEP Handbook. In the years since the ICSBEP was established, there has been much work to prepare benchmark data to support validation activities in nuclear criticality safety. The 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook contains acceptable benchmark specifications for 5,053 critical, subcritical, or near-critical configurations in 582 benchmark evaluations. Modern benchmark development benefits from decades of experienced international participants, a well-established handbook format, supplementary guides to deal with uncertainty quantification, and a comprehensive review process based upon independent reviews from international experts. The ICSBEP Handbook also contains 838 configurations deemed unacceptable to support criticality safety efforts. They are recorded, with the reasoning for their rejection, to preserve the experimental data, prevent reevaluation of data that are incomplete or contain known errors, and/or to potentially allow future reevaluation of the experiment pending the identification of sufficient data to resolve identified inconsistencies and errors. Users of the ICSBEP Handbook today might notice that the rigor and quality of modern criticality safety benchmarks is much greater than those prepared within the initial decade of the project. Benchmarks with 1s uncertainties in k eff greater than 1% were traditionally rejected unless they were identified as unique experiment types that encompassed materials, fuels, or designs not available from other benchmark experiments. However, benchmarks developed using modern experimental techniques and practices typically have uncertainties on the order of a few tenths of a percent. There have been ongoing efforts to improve the overall quality of previously published benchmark evaluations. Seventy-eight evaluations, containing approximately 600 configurations, have been revised just within the past decade. An additional eleven benchmarks are under revision for updated release in the 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. If some of the historic benchmarks were resubmitted in their current form to the TRG today, they would be rejected due to lack of data, missing components in the uncertainty analysis, or incomplete benchmark model development. The use of historic criticality safety benchmarks that underestimate the total uncertainty, lack properly quantified biases, or provide inadequate benchmark specifications do not sufficiently support modern criticality safety and nuclear data efforts. Although the ICSBEP Handbook is recognized by regulating bodies to support criticality safety, users are required to justify their reasons to ignore historic benchmark data and include additional safety margins within their designs. Discussions were held at the WPNCS 23rd Annual Meeting in September 2019 regarding the aforementioned issues. The resultant decision was to establish Subgroup 8 (SG-8): Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks. The current activities of SG-8 are discussed herein.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Equivalent Safety Evaluation of the 2021 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code to Editions Incorporated by Reference in 49 CFR 192, 193, and 195

Federal safety standards for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and liquid natural gas facilities incorporate rules and requirements for boiler and pressure vessel design and fabrication into 49 CFR Parts 192, 193, and 195 through the IBR process. The equivalent safety evaluations documented in this report demonstrate that boilers and pressure vessels in pipeline facilities that are designed and fabricated in accordance with rules and requirements specified in the 2021 edition do not violate the fundamental safety assumptions stated or implied in the 2007 edition of the ASME BPVC and therefore provide equivalent safety.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Hydrogen Component Leak Rate Quantification for System Risk and Reliability Assessment through QRA and PHM Frameworks: Preprint

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL) Hydrogen Safety Research and Development (HSR&D) program in collaboration with the University of Maryland's Systems Risk and Reliability Analysis Laboratory (SyRRA) are working to improve reliability and reduce risk in hydrogen systems. This approach strives to use quantitative data on component leaks and failures, together with Prognosis and Health Management (PHM), and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to identify at-risk components, reduce component failures and downtime, and predict when components require maintenance. Hydrogen component failures increase facility maintenance cost, facility downtime, and reduce public acceptance of hydrogen technologies, ultimately increasing facility size and cost because of potentially overly conservative requirements. Leaks are a predominant failure mode for hydrogen components. However, uncertainties in the amount of hydrogen emitted from leaking components and the frequency of those failure events limit the understanding of the risks that they present under real-world operational conditions. NREL has deployed a test fixture, the Leak Rate Quantification Apparatus (LRQA), to quantify the mass flow rate of leaking gases from medium and high-pressure components that have failed while in service. Quantitative hydrogen leak rate data from this system could ultimately be used to better inform risk assessment and Regulation Codes and Standards (RCS). Parallel activity explores the use of PHM and QRA techniques to assess and reduce risk, thereby improving safety and reliability of hydrogen systems. The results of QRAs could further provide a systematic and science-based foundation for the design and implementation of RCS, as in the latest versions of the NFPA 2 code for gaseous hydrogen stations. Alternatively, data-driven techniques of PHM could provide new damage diagnosis and health-state prognosis tools. This research will help end users, station owners and operators, and regulatory bodies move towards risk-informed preventative maintenance versus emergency corrective maintenance, reducing cost and improving reliability. Predictive modelling of failures could improve safety and affect RCS requirements such as setback distances at liquid refuelling sites. The combination of leak rate quantification research, PHM, and QRA can lead to better informed models enabling data-based decision to be made for hydrogen system safety improvements.

codes and standards↗

Assessment of Potential Failure Modes and Effects for On-Board Components for Hydrogen-Powered Locomotives

Hydrogen fuel sources offer alternatives to conventional fuels in the rail transportation industry. Hydrogen powered locomotive designs utilizing either a fuel cell or an internal combustion engine can make migration to alternative fuels possible for rail transportation. Codes and standards are still in development for rail application of hydrogen and safety risks must be assessed for hydrogen locomotive applications. This report utilizes a failure mode & effects analysis framework to help qualitatively understand possible risks from a hydrogen locomotive system. Findings illustrate how a combination of three mitigations greatly reduces the risks from a hydrogen locomotive system.

08 HYDROGEN↗

A Review of Regulations, Codes, and Standards for Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Bus Use on Airports

This report reviews regulations, codes, and standards to be considered for FCEB operations on airports governing vehicle safety, hydrogen infrastructure, and airport operations. Overall, the review found the existing regulatory framework largely suitable for FCEB operations on airports, with only minor gaps identified pertaining to heavy-duty vehicle fueling, operation and fire safety on airport aprons, and authorization for emergency power use.

08 HYDROGEN↗