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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

The Evaluation of Mechanical Properties of LB650 Cavities

The PIP-II project's LB650 cavities could potentially be vulnerable to mechanical deformation because of the geometric shape of the cavity due to reduced beta. The mechanical property of the niobium half-cell was measured following various heat treatments. The 5-cell cavities were tested in a controlled drop test fashion and the real-world road test. The result showed that the 900 $\deg$C heat treatment was compatible with cavity handling and transportation during production. The test provides the bases of the transportation specification and shipping container design guidelines.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Water vapor isotopic composition during TRACER IOP

The TRACER-Iso project took place from June 1 to September 30, 2022 as part of the intensive observation period (IOP) of the Tracking Aerosol Convection Interactions (TRACER) project at the main project site at the La Porte, Texas, municipal airport. The project sought to use measurements of the stable isotopic composition of water vapor to better understand cloud-aerosol interactions in deep convection in a polluted urban setting. Water vapor isotopologue and humidity measurements were determined using a Picarro L2130 Water Vapor Isotope Analyzer. The instrument was deployed in the guest van and consists of three main components: a water vapor isotope analyzer, and a Los Gatos Research Water Vapor Isotope Standard Source (WVISS), and a Los Gatos Research Dry Air Source. Ambient air samples were collected through an inlet located about one meter above roof of the shipping container. Samples were then delivered to the analyzer through teflon tubing by use of an external pump to minimize the transport time between the inlet and analyzer. The inlet tubing was surrounded by a Briskheat heat trace and insulating material to ensure ambient air samples did not fall below the dew point and result in condensation. The analyzer uses cavity ringdown spectroscopy to report isotopic ratios of ambient air samples at a frequency of 1 Hz. The calibration unit of the instrument was used in conjunction with the dry air source to periodically measure the δ values of standard waters. It uses a nebulizer to push small water droplets into a hot chamber that vaporizes the water without fractionation. This vapor was then transported to the analyzer using a built-in compressor and the dry air source, which allows each standard with known δ values to be measured at a wide range of humidity values for post-measurement calibration of ambient air samples. There are multiple sources of uncertainty introduced at different stages during the data collection and processing. These include (1) instrument precision, (2) uncertainty in the secondary standards, (3) humidity-correction uncertainty, and (4) VSMOW-SLAP calibration uncertainty. Uncertainty from each step is propagated in quadrature to calculate a total uncertainty of each isotopologue. Uncertainty was determined to be 2.3‰ for δD and 0.4‰ for δ18O.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modeling and Analysis of the Transport and Disposal of Beryllium Moderator Blocks and Greater than Class C (GTCC) Waste

Radioactive waste in the United states is categorized based on its source, radioactivity, and security risk. The categorization method employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) for low-level radioactive waste is not currently applied to any waste generated by the Department of Energy (DOE) or disposed of in DOE facilities. As a result, there is a large volume of DOE-generated waste with characteristics similar to the NRC’s “Greater than Class C” (GTCC) waste category which presently do not have a path for long-term disposal. Much of this waste cannot undergo the standard commercial disposition process due to it being categorized as Transuranic (TRU) waste under DOE guidelines, due to elevated concentrations of key fission products. Possible solutions to this dilemma are explored in the Environmental Impact Statement for the “Disposal of Greater-Than-Class-C Low Level Radioactive Wave” (EIS-0375). This paper analyzes several EIS possible paths for disposal for this “orphaned” waste. One example that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding that has been extracted from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) throughout its operational lifetime. These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s main chambers and components and serve as neutron moderators. This paper will use this particular waste form to analyze the economic and technological viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the Waste isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which was deemed the most feasible disposition path according to the EIS. The example of this waste form used in this paper that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding extracted from Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s components and serve as neutron moderators, and thus have accumulated high concentration of high-activity transuranic isotopes. This paper analyzed the viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the five primary disposition paths covered in EIS-0375. An array of calculations was carried out to assess the viability of the various disposition paths for the beryllium shipments as well as other waste shipments that fall within the GTCC category. Modeling with MCNP 6.2 was conducted to determine whether the beryllium blocks could be safely stored and transported within a 72-B cask; the standard shipping container for remote-handled, transuranic waste, while also meeting regulatory limits at various disposition paths. A cost analysis of the transportation and long-term disposal paths mentioned in the EIS was also carried out using available data and information from similar waste shipments. Lastly, a geochemical analysis of the various geological repository discussed in the EIS was also carried out using the Geochemists Workbench Release 14. Long-term disposal of the beryllium blocks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) proved to be the most cost-effective long-term disposition option of the ones considered in the EIS. A dose rate calculation at both contact and remote-handling distances indicate that the analyzed beryllium shipments should not exceed the exposure limits at any of the considered locations. Greater-than-class-C waste has been left in a regulatory state of limbo for years, resulting in backlogs of inventory across several research sites in the United States. Due to its high activity and presence of transuranic isotopes, it is imperative to ensure that it remains inaccessible and sequestered both in its short-term interim as well as a long-term geologic time scale. The information and assessments done in the paper could potentially serve as a reference for any future shipments of this waste form at the WIPP facility as well as other disposition paths that may be considered in the future.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Scintillation Hydro-Gel for Isotopic Neutron (SHINE): Eco-Friendly Quantum Dot Neutron Detectors

The development of new neutron detectors to replace helium-3 (3He) detectors is imperative due to a worldwide shortage of 3He following the draw down in nuclear weapons production since the end of the Cold War. The United States Department of Homeland Security would like to deploy monitors for the detection of neutron emissions from shipping containers housing illicit nuclear material; however, this effort has been put on hold until new replacements for 3He detectors can be developed. Scintillation Hydro-Gel for isotopic Neutron Emitters (SHINE) is a unique, first of its kind, 6Li-loaded quantum dot gel scintillator developed at INL. By incorporating 6Li with quantum dots in a gel matrix, SHINE displays the best properties of liquid and solid scintillators without their disadvantages such as continuous filtering to keep liquids free of contaminates, slow throughput of containers, higher base component costs, ‘dead’ voids in solid scintillators, and a high loading of 6Li without compromising on light transparency. Additionally, SHINE is completely eco-friendly, a breakthrough in high-efficiency detection systems. SHINE is a unique combination of 6LiCl, a highly water-soluble compound, and InP/ZnS core/shell quantum dots, which are poured into a gel-form using cross-linking polymers. In this presentation, SHINE has been successfully tested for neutron detection and shows promise as both a replacement for current 3He neutron detectors as well as potential use in handheld, compact neutron detection units and antineutrino detection.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluating and Countering the Insider Threat to the Radioactive Source Supply Chain

The modern supply chain is a global enterprise and little drove this home more than the global COVID-19 pandemic which sent economic shockwaves throughout the world. Many goods became scarce, as products were delayed, in limited supply, or simply not available. The suddenly diminished supply collided with still high demand and led to greatly increased costs. This was particularly true for the radioactive source supply chain. The pandemic introduced extensive delays for construction projects, slowed the transport of radiological materials to facilities, interrupted treatment deliveries, and impaired the mobility of contractors across the industry. All of these concerns not only adversely affected the economy, but also impacted the safety and security of radiological material, potentially raising national security concerns. The vulnerability of the supply chain, a critical element in an increasingly interconnected world, was exposed. One example that challenged the adaptive capacity of the overall supply chain is the Ever Given container ship, which became stuck in the Suez Canal in 2020. This accident immediately shut down shipments that accounted for 12% of global trade, with long-term impacts estimated to be much larger. Developing the ability to anticipate and react in real-time to sudden changes has quickly become a necessity, particularly in industries that deal with the transport of hazardous material. The reaction to these dramatic incidents was to largely focus attention and resources on protecting the supply chain from external threats. However, the threat to the radioactive material supply chain from insiders intimately involved in the process may be even greater and remains a blind spot that requires increased attention. Recent events revealed the blueprint for targeting and disrupting that supply chain, so the potential for a malicious insider—or a manipulated, unwitting insider—to take advantage of this vulnerability is elevated, creating security concerns for radiological industries. This paper examines and analyzes the potential insider threat to the radioactive source supply chain and recommends steps to take to counter this possibility.

Kinney, Justin↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Use of Long-wave Infrared Cameras for Hazardous Waste Remediation - 20457

For over fifty years, infrared cameras have been used in military applications, nondestructive testing, condition monitoring, and predictive maintenance. As infrared cameras continue to become more sophisticated and less expensive, they are providing value in an ever-increasing variety of unique applications, including hazardous waste remediation. This paper describes several instances of how infrared cameras have been used within the US Department of Defense and the US Department of Energy in support of waste remediation projects, including the author's recent use of an infrared camera in support of the Calcine Retrieval Project at the Idaho National Laboratory. Infrared cameras provide images of infrared radiation, or heat energy, which is otherwise invisible to the unaided eye. Infrared radiation is part of the electromagnetic spectrum, which includes visible light. But unlike visible light, infrared has wavelengths longer than the human eye can detect. Infrared is emitted by everything with a temperature above absolute zero (-273 deg. C, or -459 deg. F); the higher the temperature, the greater the infrared thermal radiation, or heat, that is emitted. Even objects that feel cold to us, like ice, emit thermal radiation and can be imaged by infrared cameras. These cameras are typically used to look for abnormally hot or cold spots on a component or target area under normal operating conditions. The method provides a rapid, wide-area, noncontact technique for identifying problems associated with a temperature differential. All infrared cameras can provide qualitative thermal information by displaying relative differences in temperatures within a two-dimensional image. More expensive infrared cameras can also provide quantitative information where an absolute temperature value is assigned to each pixel associated with the displayed two-dimensional image. Proper camera calibration and a solid understanding of heat transfer and thermography techniques are required when using an infrared camera to obtain quantitative information. Case studies outlined in this paper include the rapid, non-intrusive detection of hazardous decontamination solution within one-ton shipping containers at Pine Bluff Arsenal, the non-intrusive identification of residual elemental sodium within the cooling loops of the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory, process monitoring of heat exchanger melt-and-drain efforts during EBR-II decommissioning, and the remote detection of internal steel supports within calcine storage bins prior to bin penetration. For each use of thermography, the author describes a summary of the waste remediation effort, the infrared camera used, the thermal imaging technique employed, and the results obtained. The paper concludes with a discussion on common mistakes to avoid for similar applications of thermography. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Process Improvement For Pu-238 Production at Idaho National Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has supported the production of Pu-238 for future NASA deep space missions since 2017. Over this time, INL has worked to improve the qualification process of Pu-238 production targets as well as improve processes related to the shipping, storage, irradiation, and storage of Pu-238 production targets. Qualification of Pu-238 production targets began with flux measurements and scoping analysis to provide fundamental data to confirm the impacts on the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Fig1. Later, initial production targets were irradiated in ATR’s I-7 position, and then the South Flux Trap (SFT). A modified target design was then implemented which would use the full length of the ATR core and increase Pu-238 production. While working to improve and streamline the qualification of the Pu-238 production targets, INL worked to improve multiple operational aspects of the Pu-238 production process. These changes include updating procedures to streamline operations, supporting modification of shipping containers to contain five rather than one production target, reviewing target receipt procedures and changing work flow to provide flexibility in target receipt, and designing and fabricating support equipment for the storage and internal transfer of production targets

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Process Improvements For Pu-238 Production at Idaho National Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has supported the production of Pu-238 for future NASA deep space missions since 2017. Over this time, INL has worked to improve the qualification process of Pu-238 production targets as well as improve processes related to the shipping, storage, irradiation, and storage of Pu-238 production targets. Qualification of Pu-238 production targets began with flux measurements and scoping analysis to provide fundamental data to confirm the impacts on the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Fig1. Later, initial production targets were irradiated in ATR’s I-7 position, and then the South Flux Trap (SFT). A modified target design was then implemented which would use the full length of the ATR core and increase Pu-238 production. While working to improve and streamline the qualification of the Pu-238 production targets, INL worked to improve multiple operational aspects of the Pu-238 production process. These changes include updating procedures to streamline operations, supporting modification of shipping containers to contain five rather than one production target, reviewing target receipt procedures and changing work flow to provide flexibility in target receipt, and designing and fabricating support equipment for the storage and internal transfer of production targets.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Plutonium-238 Loadout Calorimeter Return To Service

The calorimeter in the transfer area in Building 7920 at the US Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory is used to measure the amount of 238 Pu in the Plutonium Heat Source Oxide. The calorimetry measurement is taken after the oxide is packaged in an ORISC (Oak Ridge Inner Shipping Capsule)/FSO (Fuel Storage Outer) assembly before loading into the Containment Vessel and shipping container. The equipment is used in three specific configurations: zero measurement (nothing in the sample cup), FSO measurement (actual measurement of 238 Pu), and reference calibration measurement (using the reference FSO as a known heat source). System checks were performed in July 2023 in preparation for scheduled material loadout. During these checks, personnel discovered that the reference FSO had experienced an electrical short in the heater cable and was no longer functional. The calorimeter was in the reference calibration measurement configuration at this time. Facility management was notified when the damage was discovered. The data from the Yokogawa recorder were pulled and analyzed for a span of time between September 2022 and July 2023. An unusual spike was found in the sample cup temperature data that started on October 19, 2022, and ended on October 20, 2022. The sample cup reached a temperature of 191.1°C. The maximum allowable temperature for the calorimeter thermopile to reach is 220°C based on the manufacturer statement provided in Appendix B of this report [1]. The calorimeter thermopile and the sample cup thermocouple are physically close to each other; therefore, the data suggest that the calorimeter itself never saw a temperature in excess of 191.1°C. Physical damage present on the cable, tape, and insulation suggests that the temperature reached a higher value in some locations within the sample cup than the data shows. Because of this discrepancy, testing of the calorimeter was required to confirm that the calorimeter is functioning the same as it was before the electrical short. The intent of this report is to assess the functionality of the calorimeter and determine if it is acceptable to use for 238 Pu loadout material measurement. Testing showed that the calorimeter is functionally equivalent to the initial calibration that was performed in the summer of 2021, and thus, the calorimeter was cleared to be used for its intended purposes.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Flanged Tritium Waste Containers: Background and Current Path to Disposal

The MLLW Flanged Tritium Waste Container (FTWC) Project has been operational since 2007 when, during an audit of the FTWC waste stream, it was determined that four FTWC containers contained lead in amounts greater than LDR treatment standards. From June to August of 2007, four FTWC containers were shipped to TA-54 for disposal as LLW from WETF. The contents of the FTWCs were characterized as high activity LLW and were thought to be in compliance with LANL's Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). During the packaging of these FTWC's, 36 intact squib valves (aka actuators), containing detonated squibs were included with the waste stream After being transported to TA-54 Area G, it was determined that the explosive used in some of the squibs was Normal Lead Styphnate (NLS). A recharacterization of the entire contents in the FTWC's was performed with the conclusion that the squib valves exhibited the RCRA toxic characteristic for Lead (D008), thus resulting in the contents of the FTWCs being reclassified as a Mixed LLW.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Controlled Pyrolysis: A Robust Scalable Composite Recycling Technology

The reinforced composites industry is facing significant challenges in handling the scrap composite material from automobile manufacturing, the wind turbine industry, and others. The fibers in the material, whether they be carbon, glass, or other materials have commercial value if they can be recovered successfully. Successfully means the fibers are clean with no sizing or other binders and have adequate strength and physical properties that would allow them to be economically reprocessed into valuable product. The composites recycling project was an industry-collaborative effort to develop a composite recycling technology using controlled pyrolysis. Through the recycling of scrap and end-of-life (EOL) cured composite materials, this pilot study was intended to create a business case by realizing a cost-effective means for recycling EOL and production scrap composite materials, ultimately reducing the volume of composite materials destined for landfill. The project was led by the Institute for Advanced Composites Manufacturing Innovation (IACMI), the American Composites Manufacturers Association (ACMA), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Continental Structural Plastics (CSP) a Teijin Group Company, CHZ Technologies, and A. Schulman with support from Owens Corning, John Deere, General Electric (GE), Ashland LLC, and Plastics Europe (CEFIC). The team studied and tested CHZ Technologies’ controlled pyrolysis system, known as the Thermolyzer TM , which operates on a scalable basis to convert organic polymer materials into a clean synthesis gas and char containing the recoverable carbon and glass fiber reinforcement. The recoverable energy contained in the input polymers creates the synthesis gas that can be used to provide heat to the Thermolyzer TM primary reactor in a sustainable manner. That is, once the Thermolyzer TM is started with a small amount of external natural gas, the synthesis gas that is created from the polymers will continue to operate the burners so long as feedstock is supplied. The reinforcing fiber materials remaining in the solid phase char were separated and cleaned for re-use in other polymer systems based on the retained properties of the fibers. The study created reports (attached in the appendix) on the Mass and Energy Balances, syngas analytics, VOC assessment, yield analysis and other analytics necessary for a Techno-Economic Analysis (TEA) to quantify the economic impact of the recovery and sustainable re-use of the carbon and glass fibers. The process consisted of 4 steps: Selection of 4 samples of cured composite waste materials from project partners interested in materials recycling and recovering the reinforcing fibers for best case re-use. The materials included glass fiber (GF) polyester/vinyl ester automotive SMC from CSP, GF epoxy balsa/PVC foam wind blades from GE, carbon fiber (CF) epoxy wind blade laminated spar caps from GE, and GF/CF epoxy hybrid assembly from John Deere. Processing the waste composite samples into 1-2” shreds. Packaging the shredded composites into bulk sacks on international shipping pallets for shipment to KUG in Forst (Lausitz), Germany. Pyrolysis of the shredded composites under controlled conditions designed for each polymer system. Collecting samples of the gas and char for analysis. Shipping the char containing the CF/GF back to the US for the next steps of testing the fibers and developing protocols for sustainable re-use of the fibers in composite applications.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of an Activation Analysis Methodology to Support the Disposal of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Original Reflector Container

The original beryllium reflector container was installed prior to the first ever High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) cycle and was removed at the end of cycle 382. The original beryllium reflector was part of every HFIR irradiation cycle from September of 1966 to October of 2000. After its service lifetime, the beryllium reflector container has been interim stored at the fuel pool storage, which is located adjacent to the reactor. Due to space limitations in the pool fuel storage, it is necessary to remove the beryllium reflector container and send it to a location that can be stored permanently. Prior to shipping the beryllium reflector container, the radiological activity must be known. The challenge in determining the overall activity as well as the isotopic inventory and volumetric material fractions lays on the fact that some of the original reflector container stainless steel quantities are not known. Therefore, a methodology to determine a conservative activation scenario was developed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fiberboard Properties and Degradation Rates for Storage of 9975 Shipping Package in KAC (2020 Status Report)

Savannah River Site (SRS) stores plutonium materials within model 9975 shipping packages in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The 9975 shipping package consists of a 35 gallon stainless steel drum, Celotex fiberboard insulation, lead shield, and primary and secondary containment vessels. The 9975 shipping package design, performance, and analysis for safe transport of radioactive material are described in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). Celotex fiberboard provides three safety functions: thermal insulation to limit internal temperature during a fire, criticality control, and resistance to package crushing. The fiberboard material must retain its dimensions and density within certain ranges to provide the required impact resistance, criticality control, and fire resistance. The SRS Surveillance Program monitors material performance to establish a basis for service life and ensures the continued integrity of 9975 packages. Fiberboard samples, taken from multiple fiberboard assemblies fabricated from cane and softwood fiberboard, have been conditioning in elevated temperature environments since 2005. The samples are periodically examined to monitor thermal, mechanical, and physical properties, and assess degradation trends. Fiberboard properties of interest that are evaluated to demonstrate acceptable long-term performance include dimensional stability, density, compressive strength, thermal conductivity, and specific heat capacity. Duplicate samples from multiple package sources have been tested to identify the range of variability in fiberboard properties and degradation rates. Baseline and long-term testing of fiberboard material properties have been reported previously; reference 6 summarized experimental results of cane and softwood fiberboard through May 2019 and presented degradation models for the measured properties. This report presents the cumulative data collected through June 2020 and the corresponding updated aging models.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Packaging and Transportation Regulatory Inconsistencies and Challenges - 20485

This paper presents regulatory inconsistencies within and between various regulatory agencies. These inconsistencies relate to the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials typically encountered during decommissioning including mixed wastes that are required to be compliant with more than one regulatory agency during shipment. At least one possible solution is presented for consideration. The following four examples are presented: - Packaging discrepancies for radioactive material meeting the DOT definition of Radioactive LSA-I that also contain lead may be compliant when shipped unpackaged per Department of Transportation (DOT) rules in 173.427 paragraph C. However, since they contain lead, they are required to be shipped in a package per the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Manifest (HWM) instructions. - The difference between the units of measure used in 49 CFR Part 172.101 Appendix A and 40 CFR, Part 355, Appendices A and B. - The requirement for outer packaging for radioactive gauges meeting all other requirements of 49 CFR 173.424 and 173.425. - E-Manifesting EPA system difficult for waste materials containing both radioactive class 7 and PCBs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Designing Flexibility into the Authorized Radioactive Contents of the 9982 Shipping Package

The 9982 radioactive material shipping package, or the 9982, differs from the others by allowing a multitude of radionuclides instead of a single defined set. While allowing flexibility, this requires more justification on why these contents would be worthwhile and why they would not cause various safety hazards when shipped together. The latter was covered through mass limit calculations, and the potential uses for the package are shown through comparison with historical shipments. Here, the mass limits were already calculated[1] and used to show three example shipments are suitable for the 9982 as well. Plutonium stored in 3013 containers[2], training sources shipped in 9977 packages[3], and americium standards shipped in 9978 packages[4] were all analyzed. The mass of each radionuclide and the corresponding mass limit were used to first determine if the listed content could be shipped. If so, the maximum allowed mass of such contents is also calculated in order to see if the 200-gram fissile limit for the 9982 would be violated if additional material was packed. The sum-of-the-fractions method produces contents that do not violate the mass limits or exceed the 200-gram fissile limit. These sets also serve as realistic examples of what may be shipped in the 9982. Well-founded example contents will help the approval of the package by showing its compatibility with previously shipped material. Unfounded hypothetical contents would not show the usefulness of having a wide variety of allowed radionuclides. More contents may be developed in order to incorporate other radionuclides that were not present in these three examples. The light elements will also need to be evaluated due to their exclusion currently preventing some materials from being allowed in the 9982.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Survey Report on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Tracking Tools

Radioactive/nuclear (R/N) materials are integral parts of many business sectors such as medicine, industry, and research. In the United States alone, approximately 3 million packages containing R/N materials are shipped annually via highways, rail, air, and water. These materials are utilized in medical diagnostics and treatments, industrial radiography, and scientific research. The secure and efficient transportation of R/N materials is paramount to public safety and national security. Recent incidents involving the loss of R/N materials during transportation highlight significant security and safety concerns. For instance, in December 2024, a package containing four encapsulated Selenium-75 sources was reported lost in transit from the Czech Republic to Madrid, raising alarms about the security of such shipments. Similarly, a Germanium-68 pin source was reported lost in transit in New Jersey in December 2024, underscoring the risks associated with transporting radioactive materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗