Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “space safety”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1985

Space nuclear safety from a user's viewpoint

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) launched the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) two Voyager spacecraft to Jupiter in 1977, each using three radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) supplied by the Department of Energy (DOE) for onboard electric power. In 1986 NASA will launch JPL's Galileo spacecraft to Jupiter equipped with two DOE supplied RTGs of an improved design. NASA and JPL are also responsible for obtaining a single RTG of this type from DOE and supplying it to the European Space Agency as part of its participation in the International Solar Polar Mission. As a result of these missions, JPL has been deeply involved in space nuclear safety as a user. This paper will give a brief review of the user contributions by JPL - and NASA in general - to the nuclear safety processes and relate them to the overall nuclear safety program necessary for the launch of an RTG. The two major safety areas requiring user support are the ground operations involving RTGs at the launch site and the failure modes and probabilities associated with launch accidents.

Campbell, R. W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Microbial Food Safety for Space Crops

This presentation will highlight the unique challenges and opportunities of microbial food safety for space grown produce as part of a joint webinar on controlled environment food safety.

Veggie↗
NASA NTRS1991

Space engine safety system

A rocket engine safety system is designed to initiate control procedures which will minimize damage to the engine and vehicle or test stand in the event of an engine failure. This report describes the features and the implementation issues associated with rocket engine safety systems. Specific concerns of safety systems applied to a space-based engine and long duration space missions are discussed. Examples of safety system features and architectures are given from recent safety monitoring investigations conducted for the Space Shuttle Main Engine and for future liquid rocket engines. Also, a general design and implementation process for rocket engine safety systems is presented.

Maul, William A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Formal Approaches to Ensuring the Safety of Space Software

A viewgraph describing formal approaches taken to assure the safety of space software is presented. The topics include: 1) Certifiable Program Generation; 2) Certification Framework; 3) Annotation Generation; 4) Experiments; and 5) Future Work.

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS1972

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Voluem 5: Nuclear system safety guidelines. Part 2: Space shuttle/nuclear payloads safety

The design and operations guidelines and requirements developed in the study of space shuttle nuclear system transportation are presented. Guidelines and requirements are presented for the shuttle, nuclear payloads (reactor, isotope-Brayton and small isotope sources), ground support systems and facilities. Cross indices and references are provided which relate guidelines to each other, and to substantiating data in other volumes. The guidelines are intended for the implementation of nuclear safety related design and operational considerations in future space programs.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1987

Spacecraft Fire Safety

Fire detection, fire standards and testing, fire extinguishment, inerting and atmospheres, fire-related medical science, aircraft fire safety, Space Station safety concerns, microgravity combustion, spacecraft material flammability testing, and metal combustion are among the topics considered.

Margle, Janice M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shaping NASA's Kennedy Space Center Safety for the Future

With the completion of the Space Shuttle Program, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) safety function will be required to evolve beyond the single launch vehicle launch site focus that has held prominence for almost fifty years. This paper will discuss how that evolution is taking place. Specifically, we will discuss the future of safety as it relates to a site that will have multiple, very disparate, functions. These functions will include new business; KSC facilities not under the control of NASA; traditional payload and launch vehicle processing; and, operations conducted by NASA personnel, NASA contractors or a combination of both. A key element in this process is the adaptation of the current KSC set of safety requirements into a multi-faceted set that can address each of the functions above, while maintaining our world class safety environment. One of the biggest challenges that will be addressed is how to protect our personnel and property without dictating how other Non-NASA organizations protect their own employees and property. The past history of KSC Safety will be described and how the lessons learned from previous programs will be applied to the future. The lessons learned from this process will also be discussed as information for other locations that may undergo such a transformation.

Kirkpatrick, Paul↗
NASA NTRS1980

Assessment of the effects of the zero gravity environment on the health and safety of space workers

A review was conducted of currently available information relating to adverse effects to the health and safety that space power system (SPS) space workers may experience. Currently available information on the responses of humans to space flight is somewhat limited and was obtained under conditions which are grossly different from conditions to be experienced by future space workers. The limitations in information and differences in conditions were considered in the assessment of potential health and safety hazards to the SPS space workers. The study did not disclose any adverse effects that would result in long term deviations to the medical physiological health of space workers so long as proper preventive or ameliorating action were taken.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2021

Resilient Space Habitat Design Using Safety Controls

Space habitats will involve a complex and tightly coupled combination of hardware, software, and humans, while operating in challenging environments that pose many risks, both known and unknown. It will not be possible to design habitats that are immune to failure, nor will it be possible to foresee all possible failures. Rather than aiming for designs where ―failure is not an option,‖ habitats must be resilient to disruptions. We propose an approach to resilient design for space habitats based on the concept of safety controls from system safety engineering. We model disruptions using a state-and-trigger approach, where the space habitat is in one of three distinct states at each time instance: nominal, hazardous, or accident. We use safety controls as ways of preventing a system from entering or remaining in a hazardous or accident state. We develop a safety control option space for the habitat, from which designers can select the set of safety controls that best meet resilience, performance, and other system goals. The safety control option space is likely to be large, accordingly, we design a database that links safety controls to the applicable states and triggers. We demonstrate our approach on the early design stage of a Martian space habitat.

Safety↗
NASA NTRS1988

A matrix safety frame approach to robot safety for space applications

The planned use of autonomous robots in space applications has generated many new safety problems. This thesis assesses safety of autonomous robot systems through the structure of a proposed three-dimensional matrix safety frame. By identifying the common points of accidents and fatalities involving terrestrial robots, reviewing terrestrial robot safety standards, and modifying and extending these results to space applications, hazards are identified and their associated risks assessed. Three components of the safeguarding dimension of the matrix safety frame, safeguarding through design and operation for intrinsic safety, and incorporation of add-on safety systems are explained through examples for both terrestrial and space robots. A space robot hazard identification checklist, a qualitative tool for robot systems designers, is developed using the structure imparted by the matrix safety frame. The development of an expert system from the contents of the checklist is discussed.

Montgomery, T. D.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Rocketdyne Safety Algorithm: Space Shuttle Main Engine Fault Detection

The Rocketdyne Safety Algorithm (RSA) has been developed to the point of use on the TTBE at MSFC on Task 4 of LeRC contract NAS3-25884. This document contains a description of the work performed, the results of the nominal test of the major anomaly test cases and a table of the resulting cutoff times, a plot of the RSA value vs. time for each anomaly case, a logic flow description of the algorithm, the algorithm code, and a development plan for future efforts.

Norman, Arnold M., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1993

A review of wiring system safety in space power systems

Wiring system failures have resulted from arc propagation in the wiring harnesses of current aerospace vehicles. These failures occur when the insulation becomes conductive upon the initiation of an arc. In some cases, the conductive path of the carbon arc track displays a high enough resistance such that the current is limited, and therefore may be difficult to detect using conventional circuit protection. Often, such wiring failures are not simply the result of insulation failure, but are due to a combination of wiring system factors. Inadequate circuit protection, unforgiving system designs, and careless maintenance procedures can contribute to a wiring system failure. This paper approaches the problem with respect to the overall wiring system, in order to determine what steps can be taken to improve the reliability, maintainability, and safety of space power systems. Power system technologies, system designs, and maintenance procedures which have led to past wiring system failures will be discussed. New technologies, design processes, and management techniques which may lead to improved wiring system safety will be introduced.

Stavnes, Mark W.↗
NASA NTRS2000

NASA Space Transportation: Safety, Cost and Performance Initiatives

This paper presents viewgraphs on NASA's Space Transportation. A space launch initiative is developed to provide a safe, reliable and affordable access to space. The topics include: 1) NASA's Integrated Architectural Approach; and 2) Safe, Reliable, and Affordable... Building a Highway to Space.

Rogacki, John Row↗
NASA NTRS2023

Information and Best Practices Related to NASA Nuclear Flight Safety for Space Flights Involving Space Nuclear Systems

The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate a repeatable and robust process that promotes clear and effective interfaces between activities and stakeholders focused on meeting nuclear flight safety requirements for missions utilizing space nuclear systems (SNS), within the context of NASA’s broader nuclear-related activities and interfaces. NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, requires that the NASA project manager “incorporate nuclear flight safety considerations starting with program or project formulation through the point at which the SNS or other radioactive material no longer has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere.” NASA’s use of SNS inherently involves partnering with other stakeholders to conduct a range of related activities that interface with nuclear flight safety. From a categorical perspective these include: (i) meeting the authorities and licensing requirements for possession and use of nuclear material, as governed by other Federal authorities; (ii) conducting National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities for nuclear-enabled missions; (iii) meeting Federal nuclear launch authorization requirements; (iv) conducting radiological contingency planning activities, including those associated with international commitments; (v) performing risk communication and public outreach activities; and (vi) ensuring decommissioning and disposal strategies reflect National policies and interests. It is the intent of this handbook to promote an effective interface between nuclear flight safety and these interrelated categorical activities. In addition to activities undertaken with partnering agencies, there are individual nuclear-related activities and programs that have a nexus to nuclear flight safety, and these include: (i) applicable NASA Standing Review Boards; (ii) the US Department of Energy nuclear safety activities conducted in partnership with NASA under Memoranda of Understanding; (iii) the Department of Defense’s Range Safety activities; (iv) NASA’s general involvement in interagency and international dialogues regarding nuclear safety; (v) the NASA-administered Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board; (vi) NASA’s program and project governance activities and nuclear-specific Technical Discipline Team activities under the Office of the Chief Engineer; and others. It is the intent of this handbook to promote effective leveraging of these additional interrelated organizational activities, as appropriate.

Donald Helton↗