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DOE OSTI2026

A&L Annual Report: GRM-MAPS

Exploding Bridge Wire (EBW) is an important design for initiating detonators relevant to several LLNL systems. In such designs, a metal bridge wire is in direct contact with a porous secondary high explosive (HE), typically pressed to around 50% of its crystalline density. Initiation is believed to occur through shock waves generated when the bridge wire is made to explode via the rapid passing of a strong current pulse. Permeametry is an important characterization tool for the porous powdered HE (PETN, HMX, etc.) component in such devices. Such powders are well known to coarsen with age, with an accompanying deterioration in performance, which includes increased function time and sensitivity. Among various material characteristics, one that has been shown to correlate the most with such performance parameters is the flow-permeable surface area (FSSA), measured using air-permeametry. Commercially available permeametry apparatuses, such as that from Fisher Scientific or a more modern version from Micromeritics suffer from a few drawbacks, most notably as related to monitoring age-related changes in FSSA. This is because it requires re-compaction of the aged powder into the permeametry tube, which in most cases leads to an unwanted increase in FSSA. To address this and a few other shortcomings, we have been developing a modern version of the permeameter, Gee-Reinstein-Maiti Modern Air-Permeametry System (GRM-MAPS). In this report, we summarize progress made in FY25 toward perfecting and calibrating the instrument, which we aim at deploying within surveillance in FY26.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2026

Evolution of storage monitoring – update in response to commercial and regulatory drivers

Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is in transition from first-of-a kind projects and research-orientated pilots to commercially-motivated applications. Monitoring results from many newly developed and planned large scale commercial projects are limited; however, it is worthwhile to assess their evolution and consider new strategies as part of an effort to assess and document best practices. Commercial monitoring is targeted to activities that comply with regulatory drivers and de-risk investments. Commercial monitoring also supports accounting that storage has occurred and is tied to project financing. It deals with long time frames and large volumes injected into multiple wells and multiple projects in favorable areas. We see developing trends toward reproducible workflows that systematically reduce risks and clarify expectations for oversight and long-term surveillance. Monitoring techniques showing increasing trends include injection zone pressure as a history-matching and compliance tool. To reduce cost and environmental impact of time-lapse seismic data collection, deploying new approaches and tools, such as use of fibre and installed sources are increasingly applied. Concern over the risk of induced seismicity by regulatory bodies and the general public has increased, which has also resulted in increased monitoring. Some techniques used in the early research phases have been sidelined or used only in restricted applications. For example, geochemical analyses in the injection zone as well as the environment are now being deployed less than it was in research-oriented programs, except in the US where it is required by the permitting process. Expectations of frequent area-wide near surface monitoring have also decreased.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Intelligent Monitoring Systems and Advanced Well Integrity and Mitigation

Long-term seismic monitoring of carbon capture and storage projects is needed to verify that the injected gas is safely stored in the subsurface until permanence can be assured. Conventional surface seismic monitoring techniques are usually expensive, require highly invasive surface operations, and need significant time investments on the part of personnel for both the field effort and processing the acquired data. For these reasons, permanent reservoir monitoring technologies are preferred, as they can offer a cost-effective solution for long-term monitoring. As part of the monitoring program of the Archer Daniels Midland’s large-scale injection of CO 2 in Decatur, Illinois, USA, a continuous seismic monitoring array was installed using a combination of surface orbital vibrator (SOV) sources and fiber-optic cables for distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) acquisition with the objective to build a continuous monitoring array. The aim of the presented project was to build a monitoring array and platform that integrates real-time seismic data with conventional data streams and provides continuous data analysis using dynamic computational models to deliver a comprehensive real-time assessment of subsurface conditions. It is in this context that the Intelligent Monitoring Systems and Advanced Well Integrity and Mitigation project was proposed with the objective to develop an integrated architecture that utilizes a permanent seismic monitoring network, combines the real-time geophysical and process data with reservoir flow and geomechanical models to create a comprehensive monitoring, visualization, and control system that delivers critical information for process surveillance and optimization.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item CAN92 (SSR147) from Rocky Flats Analytical Laboratory Operations

A plutonium/uranium oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample CAN92 represents plutonium/uranium oxides stored in 3013 containers. The material originated in the analytical laboratory at Rocky Flats. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/400th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over 5 ½ years. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 117 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 77.5 kPa was largely due to the generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide with minor amounts of hydrogen and nitrous oxide. The internal components of SSR147 were inspected 6.5 years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 1,937 days had an etched appearance and general corrosion. No pitting was observed on the inner bucket that held the sample.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

FY21 Progress Report: SRNL Analysis of ICCWR LCM and WAMS data for Corrosion and Cracking

The development of algorithms for machine learning and data analysis for the 3013 Surveillance Program is a collaborative effort by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and the University of South Carolina (USC). For corrosion detection, Laser Confocal Microscope (LCM) or Wide Area 3D Measurement System (WAMS) data is extracted from large binary files, with software written to convert the data to physical attributes (e.g., height, color and grayscale values; all as functions of a location in a plane projection). A user-friendly Matlab Graphical User Interface (GUI) that reads data from either LCM or WAMS files was developed to integrate input data with software developed for processing and evaluation. The GUI can selectively download binary data, interrogate data attributes, label data, flag significant features, execute Machine Learning (ML) algorithms, output parameters for trained ML algorithms, report ML model accuracy with respect to labeled data, and generate graphical representations for various analyses. Features can be called out by user-specified thresholds, manual labeling or machine learning algorithms when they have been completed. The ability to rapidly label data is important because of the volume of data required for training machine learning algorithms. The GUI has the flexibility to allow addition of improved ML algorithms, methods for data visualization, and statistical computations. Statistical analyses via the GUI include areas of pits within a defined range of pit depths, correlations between Red-Green-Blue (RGB) or grayscale intensity and relative surface height, covariances between values associated with features, and feature histograms. The development of supervised machine learning algorithms, however, has been hindered by a lack of training data. The machine learning algorithms for crack identification are being refined but require improvements to the true positive rate for crack detection. This shortcoming is an artifact of the limited training data currently available, perhaps more so than the structure of the neural networks. At present, the best results are had from a consensus over an ensemble of randomly generated Deep Neural Network (DNN) or Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) algorithms. Although the consensus accuracy method has yielded optimum true positive and true negative rates in excess of 80%, additional validation testing is necessary. In addition to the suite of LCM data that was initially used, and which represents the majority of the work presented in this report, WAMS image data was also reviewed at a preliminary level. The review included a comparison between image resolution and dynamic range for each method. WAMS (ZON file) image data was found to have a pixel pitch of 3.69μm compared to 1 μm for the LCM (vk4 file) data, which implies a lower resolution for the WAMS images. Conversely, the ratio of dynamic range of the WAMS data to the LCM data was approximately 41:20 for height data, suggesting that information from WAMS should more accurately determine the depth of pits. At present, the significance of the greater dynamic range of the WAMS data relative to the LCM data has not yet been evaluated.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Laser Confocal Microscopy Uncertainty Quantification Study

At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Storage Safety and Engineering (SSE) team completes annual surveillance on a subset of in-use interim nuclear material storage containers in fulfilment of requirements outlined in DOE Manual M 441.1-1. The containers are selected through several methods, such as subject matter expert judgement, random selection, and trending items. Following these selections, the SSE team has the capacity to complete surveillance on 15-20 containers each fiscal year, composed of a combination of SAVY-4000 and Hagan storage containers. Through previous work, the stainless-steel components of the containers have been identified as life limiting components, with an emphasis on the thin-walled bodies. The team is focused on understanding the extent of general and pitting corrosion, due to observations of extensive corrosion from stored contents and bag-out-bag degradation. Quantifying corrosion effects on the thin-walled stainless steel container bodies, and understanding potential impacts to the respective design release rates and design qualification release rates is paramount to the team. To date, destructive examination (DE) has proven to be the most insightful method for developing an understanding on the extent of corrosion on used containers. To standardize this process, the SSE team developed a destructive examination guide for analyzing stainless steel components of the containers. Corroded containers of interest are identified during surveillance activities and set aside for sectioning and characterization. Following sectioning, a major step in the DE workflow is the utilization of laser confocal microscopy for scanning corroded samples of interest and extracting data on pits, such as count, depth, and equivalent diameter. Adhering to the techniques outlined in the DE guide, analysis has been completed on two Hagans and one SAVY-4000 container, with the maximum pit depth recorded as 139.1 ± 22.82 μm on a 17.5 year old Hagan. The findings from the completed destructive examinations will be utilized to support lifetime extension efforts of the SAVY-4000 as the team can better estimate corrosion rates and effects over time based on stored contents and age. Due to the implications of observing extreme pit depths that approach the nominal container body thickness of .0299 inches (0.759 mm) or minimum container thickness of 0.236” (0.6 mm), high confidence in the LCM measurements is desired. Through testing outlined in, it was concluded that the total error ascribed to the 20x objective when conducting large image mapping on the Keyence VK-X3050 laser confocal microscope (LCM) relative to a 50x objective (reference) is 16.4% (± 8.73%). For shallow features on the order of pristine SAVY surface defects (i.e. 5 μm), this uncertainty is appropriate. However, this conservative estimate of total error poses a fundamental concern for pit depths that approach the thickness of the measured samples. That is, with the measurement uncertainty currently employed on all measurements, the LCM would be unable to resolve if a pit with a depth of 515 μm is through wall. Standard step height samples were procured and used in the present study to assess the resolution and repeatability of height measurements. Understanding the resolution and repeatability of height measurements was the first focus of the team as it relates directly to pit depth, which is of primary concern. Calibration gratings were procured to evaluate the resolution and repeatability of measurements in the X and Y axes of the LCM stage. The results of the depth uncertainty study were conducted first and presented in the subsequent sections. The planar uncertainty study is appended to the depth study with conclusions from both summarized at the end of the report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Use Attainability Analysis Aquatic Life Uses for Perennial Reach of Sandia Canyon [Slides]

The following information will be presented during the February 23, 2022 Accord Pueblos Technical Meeting. The purpose of the study is to determine if natural thermal conditions are preventing the attainment of Coldwater Aquatic Life Use in the perennial reach of the upper Sandia Canyon Assessment Unit (Sandia AU). The New Mexico Water Quality Standards allow for a change in the designated use if a Use Attainability Analysis (UAA) demonstrates that the use is not attainable due to one or more of six factors listed in 40 CFR 131.10(g), including naturally occurring pollutant concentrations. The Sandia AU is located in a perennial reach of upper Sandia Canyon between Sigma Canyon and NPDES Outfall 001. The classified Segment 20.6.4.126 NMAC comprises perennial waters within Los Alamos National Laboratory boundaries and includes the Sandia AU. Persistent surface flows originate from NPDES permitted effluent releases. These releases have occurred since the early 1950’s and continue today. The UAA examines several lines of evidence. NMED’s Air-Water Temperature Correlation (AWTC) model is used for identifying appropriate stream classifications and attainable aquatic life use subcategories. The model correlates between July average air temperatures (ATEMP) and maximum weekly average stream temperatures. Air temperatures are obtained from PRISM and LANL Meteorological Towers and used to derive ATEMP. Thermographs were placed in the Sandia AU to obtain measured stream temperatures during summer months when stream temperatures are the highest. Measured data is used with AWTC modeled data to determine if the Sandia AU is meeting its natural air temperature driven thermal condition.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Oil and Natural Gas Development near and beneath Uranium Tailings Cells and Other Remediated Sites - 20358

DOE LM is responsible for maintaining remedies at more than 50 remediated sites that require active long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). Institutional controls (ICs) were established to limit human and environmental exposures to residual contamination by controlling land use, restricting access to potential hazards, and making the public aware of potential dangers from the residual contamination. ICs for each site were developed based on current and foreseeable conditions; however, these controls should evolve to mitigate potential human health and other environmental risks from unanticipated changes in activities or site conditions. Activities conducted beyond the DOE long-term care boundaries by non-DOE parties may impact the effectiveness of ICs or even the long-term stability of disposal cells and groundwater remedies. Several sites that LM manages or that will transfer to LM for LTS and M are in active oil and gas production basins. The sites are associated with uranium ore milling or nuclear test sites and have been remediated or are in the process of remediation and have no ongoing DOE mission. Particularly since 2005, hydraulic fracturing ('fracking') combined with directional drilling has dramatically increased oil and natural gas (oil/gas) production in the United States, now making it the number one hydrocarbon-producing country. Fracking has allowed production from shale and other rocks of low natural permeability that were historically not considered viable oil/gas resources. Also, because wellbores can now be drilled as many as 5 kilometers or more horizontally, hydrocarbons can be recovered from zones without having access to the surface above them. Drilling activity near Rulison, Colorado, the location of an underground nuclear detonation managed by LM, has raised public concerns that remnant radioactivity in the detonation zone could migrate to producing wells and enter the natural gas distribution system. At sites like the Falls City, Texas, Disposal site, transitioned to LM with a split estate, increased production in the region has resulted in wellbores beneath the long-term care boundary of the site. While the DOE license for Falls City was approved by the NRC in 1997 without the acquisition of the subsurface rights, NRC has raised concerns on whether this activity impacts the integrity of the cell and/or groundwater remedies. In Wyoming, LM is anticipating receiving the license for the Bear Creek site and manages the Spook site, both locations of uranium mill tailings disposal cells. These Wyoming sites are in an active region of major oil and gas development. This change in surrounding land use will require LM to work collaboratively with NRC to address these concerns. At several DOE sites radioactive waste, and often intermixed nonradioactive constituents, is permanently isolated in engineered disposal cells. At other sites, residual contamination can be present in groundwater, blast cavities, and infinite amounts within soil. Areas targeted for oil and gas development at the Texas and Wyoming sites range from depths of 2440 to 3350 meters (8000-11000 feet) below ground surface. When most site remedies were designed, oil and gas development was not considered to be an issue within the site boundary. With the more recent uses of directional drilling, fracking, and associated wastewater injections, the evaluative criteria for incoming sites and ICs for managing long-term protectiveness and regulatory compliance are changing. Although DOE surface ownership was previously thought to be a robust IC to prevent surface and subsurface development, particularly at disposal sites, that may no longer be the case. Whereas the subsurface development at Texas and Wyoming sites is currently occurring at thousands of meters beneath the surface, shallower and direct onsite development would be more of a concern for LM. The energy introduced when a well is hydraulically fractured causes microseismic events (magnitude -2 to 1.0) as the fractures propagate but does not directly cause seismic events (earthquakes) of sufficient magnitude to damage surface structures. Additionally, the extent of the hydraulic fractures is limited to the targeted depths, which are far below the surface. However, earthquakes of sufficient magnitude to damage surface structures have been attributed to the injection of wastewater into disposal wells. States that have experienced these effects have enacted regulations that limit the rate and pressures that wastewater can be injected into disposal wells. Items LM may consider are the need for monitoring the volume of water injected into nearby disposal wells and possibly installing seismic stations at sites most susceptible to damage. While the need to demonstrate that no impact from oil and gas extraction activities on a site groundwater remedy or disposal cells will vary from site to site, LM is assessing risk criteria for this activity. Though LM has not experienced an issue yet at a uranium tailings disposal site, it cannot assume that there will be none, and must address NRC concerns. LM is building on past experiences at other sites and beginning to form new processes with the hope that these concepts can be applied for other future sites. (authors)

04 OIL SHALES AND TAR SANDS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Annual Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2024

This report provides the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the public with information on the level of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants (if any) that are added to the environment as a result of Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory’s (PPPL) operations. This report fulfills the annual public reporting requirements of DOE Order 231.1B. The results of PPPL’s 2024 environmental surveillance and monitoring program are presented and discussed. The report also summarizes environmental initiatives, assessments, and community involvement programs that were undertaken in 2024. PPPL has engaged in fusion energy research since 1951 and at its current locations since 1958. The Laboratory’s mission is to develop the scientific knowledge and advanced engineering to enable fusion to power the US and the world, and to develop the understanding of plasmas from the nano- to the astrophysical scale. PPPL’s primary experiment, the National Spherical Torus Experiment-Upgrade (NSTX-U) is a collaboration among national laboratories, universities, and national and international research institutions and is a major element in the US Fusion Energy Sciences Program. Its design tests the physics principles of spherical torus (ST) plasmas, playing an important role in the development of smaller, more economical fusion reactors. Due to previous operational issues, NSTX-U did not operate in 2024. PPPL is engaged in a project to replace key NSTX-U components and systems to enable the operation of this international magnetic fusion user facility. In 2024, PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program measured tritium in the air at onsite sampling stations. Using highly sensitive air monitors, PPPL is capable of detecting small changes in the ambient levels of tritium. The operation of monitors located on D-site is used to demonstrate compliance with the National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) regulations. Also included in PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program, are water monitoring – ground, surface, and waste waters. PPPL’s radiological monitoring program characterized the background levels of tritium in the environment and those data are presented in this report. Ground water monitoring continued under New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s (NJDEP) Site Remediation Program regulations. PPPL monitored for nonradiological contaminants, mainly volatile organic compounds (components of common degreasing solvents). In 2024, PPPL complied with permit limits for surface water and sanitary wastewater discharges. PPPL was honored with an award for EPEAT-certified electronics purchasing from the Global Electronics Council on July 25, 2024.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

2021 Annual Site Environmental Report

This report provides the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the public with information on the level of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants (if any) that are added to the environment as a result of Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory’s (PPPL) operations. The results of PPPL’s 2021 environmental surveillance and monitoring program are presented and discussed. The report also summarizes environmental initiatives, assessments, and community involvement programs that were undertaken in 2021. PPPL’s on-site operations were significantly curtailed in 2021 due to the global coronavirus pandemic. PPPL has engaged in fusion energy research since 1951. The Laboratory’s mission is to develop the scientific knowledge and advanced engineering to enable fusion to power the U.S. and the world, and to developing the understanding of plasmas from the nano- to the astrophysical scale. PPPL’s primary experiment, the National Spherical Torus Experiment-Upgrade (NSTX-U) is a collaboration among national laboratories, universities, and national and international research institutions and is a major element in the US Fusion Energy Sciences Program. Its design tests the physics principles of spherical torus (ST) plasmas, playing an important role in the development of smaller, more economical fusion reactors. Due to previous operational issues, NSTX-U did not operate in 2021. PPPL is engaged in a project to replace key NSTX-U components and systems to enable operation of this international fusion user facility. In 2021, PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program measured tritium in the air at the NSTX-U Stack and at onsite sampling stations. Using highly sensitive air monitors, PPPL is capable of detecting small changes in the ambient levels of tritium. The operation of an in-stack monitor located on D-site is used to demonstrate compliance with the National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) regulations. Also included in PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program, are water monitoring – ground, surface, and waste waters. PPPL’s radiological monitoring program characterized the background levels of tritium in the environment and those data are presented in this report. Ground water monitoring continued under New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s (NJDEP) Site Remediation Program regulations. PPPL monitored for non-radiological contaminants, mainly volatile organic compounds (components of common degreasing solvents). In 2021, PPPL complied with permit limits for surface and sanitary discharges. PPPL was honored with awards for EPEAT-certified electronics purchasing and use of peracetic acid as an alternative water treatment chemical in its non-potable process water systems an NJDEP recycling award.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

2022 Annual Site Environment Report, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

This report provides the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the public with information on the level of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants (if any) that are added to the environment as a result of Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory’s (PPPL) operations. This report fulfills the annual public reporting requirements of DOE Order 231.1B. The results of PPPL’s 2022 environmental surveillance and monitoring program are presented and discussed. The report also summarizes environmental initiatives, assessments, and community involvement programs that were undertaken in 2022. PPPL’s on-site operations started to be restored in 2022, following curtailments in 2020 and 2021 for the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. PPPL has engaged in fusion energy research since 1951 and at its current locations since 1958. The Laboratory’s mission is to develop the scientific knowledge and advanced engineering to enable fusion to power the U.S. and the world, and to develop the understanding of plasmas from the nano- to the astrophysical scale. PPPL’s primary experiment, the National Spherical Torus Experiment-Upgrade (NSTX-U) is a collaboration among national laboratories, universities, and national and international research institutions and is a major element in the US Fusion Energy Sciences Program. Its design tests the physics principles of spherical torus (ST) plasmas, playing an important role in the development of smaller, more economical fusion reactors. Due to previous operational issues, NSTX-U did not operate in 2022. PPPL is engaged in a project to replace key NSTX-U components and systems to enable the operation of this international magnetic fusion user facility. In 2022, PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program measured tritium in the air at onsite sampling stations. Using highly sensitive air monitors, PPPL is capable of detecting small changes in the ambient levels of tritium. The operation of monitors located on D-site is used to demonstrate compliance with the National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) regulations. Also included in PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program, are water monitoring – ground, surface, and waste waters. PPPL’s radiological monitoring program characterized the background levels of tritium in the environment and those data are presented in this report. Ground water monitoring continued under New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s (NJDEP) Site Remediation Program regulations. PPPL monitored for non-radiological contaminants, mainly volatile organic compounds (components of common degreasing solvents). In 2022, PPPL complied with permit limits for surface water and sanitary wastewater discharges. PPPL was honored with an award for EPEAT-certified electronics purchasing from the Global Electronics Council.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item 1000089 (SSR136 and SSR136A) from Rocky Flats Peroxide Precipitation and Calcination Process

A plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample 1000089 represents product-quality plutonium oxides produced in the Rocky Flats peroxide precipitation process currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over almost 13 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 204 kPa and was related to a temperature excursion. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 126 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 86.7 kPa was due to the generation of hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide, methane and carbon monoxide were minor components of the headspace gas. The material exhibited unusual behavior in that the atmosphere reached flammable levels of hydrogen and oxygen within the first 30 days and remained flammable for the duration of the experiment. It has been determined that the sample inside the reactor was a mixture of the AR material, material calcined at 800 °C, and material calcined at 950 °C. The experiment was terminated in 2012 and unloaded in 2016. A new reactor, SSR136A, was loaded with the original sample freshly calcined at 950 °C. The total pressure inside SSR136A remained close to the initial value of 93 kPa. The total pressure is composed of He (steady levels after the reloading) and hydrogen which is 10% of the reactor’s total pressure. Nitrogen and oxygen compose trace amounts of the reactor headspace. The internal components of SSR136 were inspected in 2021, five years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 4,576 days had an etched appearance, and pit-like features were observed in the microscopic analysis. No corrosion was observed on the SSR136A inner bucket that held the freshly calcined sample that was exposed for 1,303 days.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Competing Interests and Creating Value - Balancing Durable and Enforceable Institutional Controls with Beneficial Reuse - 20320

US DOE LM has various real property interests at the 100 sites within its current portfolio, with an anticipated total of 127 sites within the next 5 years. Each site has its own narrative with respect to the real property assets. Since the regulatory time frame for long-term surveillance and maintenance activities at some sites can be in perpetuity, durable and effective instruments and documentation are necessary to support LM's unique mission as a federal land manager and steward. More than half of the sites currently in LM's inventory do not allow unrestricted use, and institutional controls (ICs) are required to limit human and environmental exposures to residual contamination. LM's Asset Management program balances protection of human health and the environment with a goal of optimizing its land portfolio through mitigation of risk, limiting liability, and creating value, whether tangible or intangible, in these types of assets. The IC layering strategy utilizes multiple types, restrictions, and legal authorities to protect human health and the environment. This layering strategy influences the transition of these properties into LM's portfolio to assess potential beneficial reuses. The LM's beneficial reuse program aims to repurpose former contaminated sites to restore the environment, protect the public health, revitalize communities, and spur economic growth. LM strives to create value in a perceived valueless asset and reevaluates and revisits the potential opportunities for these sites as long-term surveillance and maintenance activities are performed and objectives are achieved. Beneficial reuse also promotes protectiveness by ensuring activities are compatible with long-term maintenance and protection of public health and the environment as well as ensuring activities are environmentally sound by retaining good stewardship of natural resources. LM has recently revised both the Institutional Control Program Guidance and its Beneficial Reuse Management Plan to integrate the issues of land use with ICs, creating value in these impaired assets. This paper presents the following topics: (1) a general overview of LM's IC and beneficial reuse programs; (2) the unique aspects of each of these programs as a result of the multiple regulatory requirements and programs that affect LM sites; (3) case studies of LM sites to show examples of how LM created value while complying with the ICs and layering strategies; and (4) the most common challenges to beneficial reuses at LM sites and potential options for value creation in impaired assets. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Low-Flow Marine Hydrokinetic Turbine for Small Autonomous Unmanned Mobile Recharge Stations

A prototype low-flow marine current turbine for deployment from a small unmanned mobile floating platform has been developed for autonomously seeking and harnessing tidal/coastal currents. The support platform is an unmanned surface vehicle (USV), in the form of a catamaran with two electric outboard motors and with capabilities for autonomous navigation. The USV utilized is a WAM-V 16 vehicle that has been developed separately with support from the Office of Naval Research (ONR) [1]. The marine current turbine is based on a freestream waterwheel (FSWW), also known as an undershot waterwheel (FSWW), mounted on the stern of the USV. The concept of operation involves the USV autonomously navigating to a designated marine current resource. Upon arrival, the USV anchors itself, aligns with the current, and deploys the FSWW turbine using a custom cable-lift mechanism. The turbine harnesses the local current, and an onboard power-take-off (PTO) device converts the mechanical energy into electricity, which is stored in an onboard battery bank. When energy harvesting is completed, the turbine and the anchor are retrieved and the USV navigates to a selected location. These unmanned at-sea platforms can provide power to other unmanned maritime systems. Specifically, in this project, the power generated onboard can be used to charge aerial drones via a custom flight deck that has been developed for the USV. The recharging capabilities offered by a fleet of such strategically placed recharging stations can significantly benefit aerial drones operating in the maritime domain by eliminating the need to travel back and forth to land or ship based charging stations. The project has resulted in the development of subcomponents, including the FSWW turbine, a novel PTO, an automated anchoring system for the USV, an automated turbine deployment system, and a flight deck with capabilities onboard the USV for landing, direct-contact charging and takeoff of aerial drones. The design and development of these subsystems have culminated in the overall prototype marine hydrokinetic platform (MHK Platform, Fig. 1). Comprehensive lab and field testing have been conducted to validate the functionality and performance of the platform and its components. The project demonstrates the potential for autonomous, unmanned systems to harness renewable energy from marine currents, and provide sustainable power solutions for maritime applications such as coastal surveillance and environmental monitoring; shoreline mapping; search and rescue; oceanographic research; inspection and maintenance of offshore energy installations like wind turbines and oil rigs; oil spill response; maritime disaster response; and aerial surveys, as well as facilitation of data transfer drones and shore stations.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗
DOE OSTI2020

Life-Cycle Baseline Customization for the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program - 20304

One of the responsibilities of the federal government is to estimate sound and defensible life-cycle baseline costs for use in federal budget estimates and to meet federal financial reporting requirements. To accomplish this, the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have partnered together to ensure that the liabilities documented in each Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) site's life-cycle baseline are specifically tailored. FUSRAP was created in the mid-1970's to clean up radiological contamination resulting from the early development of nuclear weapons. DOE was responsible for FUSRAP until October 1997, when Congress transferred the administration and execution of FUSRAP site cleanups to USACE. By 1997, DOE had completed the cleanup of 25 of the 46 sites that were active within the program and had begun cleanup at 13 additional sites. USACE was assigned responsibility for the cleanup of the 21 remaining FUSRAP sites, and at 8 additional sites that had since been referred for cleanup. The LM mission for the FUSRAP sites is to perform long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). Currently, LM provides long-term stewardship for 34 completed FUSRAP sites. Another 20 sites are under active remediation by USACE. Within the last 5 years, USACE has completed the cleanup at five FUSRAP sites and the LTS and M responsibility has been transferred to LM. By 2029, USACE will compete remediation at eight additional sites and LTS and M for those sites will transfer to LM. Because responsibilities for the FUSRAP sites transfer between USACE and LM upon completion of remedial actions, both agencies maintain life-cycle baselines for different stages of the project and both must have a strong understanding of the needs and requirements for each site. This understanding ensures that the life-cycle baselines form a complete and accurate picture of what is required for the site and for the FUSRAP program. LM focuses on several things when customizing the life-cycle baseline estimates for the FUSRAP sites, including (1) Understanding the unique requirements for each site. By reviewing site-specific documents prepared by USACE, such as Feasibility Studies and Records of Decision, and partnering with USACE to gain additional insight about site conditions and requirements for stewardship, as well as potential risks, LM can better develop the life-cycle baselines. (2) Developing site-specific labor breakdowns. This ensures the required labor mix is baselined for specific activities by comparing the labor mix required to perform activities at (a) other LM-managed FUSRAP sites and (b) non-FUSRAP LM sites and (c) by USACE at active FUSRAP sites. (3) Taking a tiered approach to life-cycle baseline planning. Estimates for sites transferring to LM in the near term (5 years) are more definitive than for sites transferring in the out-year period. Remedial actions at the near-term sites are at or near completion, providing LM a strong understanding of the LTS and M requirements and remaining liabilities. This in turn allows for site-specific customization of the baseline. (4) Using a robust risk management approach to ensure that liabilities specific to each site are identified, evaluated by probability and severity, and documented in relation to the impact to cost or schedule. To ensure the most accuracy within all the baselines, the FUSRAP life-cycle baselines are updated as needed to support program, project, and contract management needs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗