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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Computational Optimization of 133m Xe Production via Neutron Irradiation in a TRIGA Reactor

Here, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests worldwide. As part of treaty compliance, the concentration of radioactive nuclides in the atmosphere is monitored to detect nuclear weapons tests. Radioactive noble gas fission products, specifically radioxenon, can vent into the atmosphere after a nuclear weapons test, even if the test is well contained underground or underwater. Radioxenon thus serves as a signal for nuclear weapons tests. All atmospheric monitoring systems require samples of radioxenon isotopes for detector calibration, quality control, and certification. Here, we present a novel, improved method for creating samples of 133m Xe via neutron irradiation of 132 Xe in the Washington State University TRIGA reactor. 132 Xe neutron absorption results in either 133 Xe or 133m Xe—thermal neutron absorption results in 133m Xe 12% of the time, while fast neutron absorption (above ~1 MeV) results in 133m Xe ~50% of the time. To optimize the production of 133m Xe via neutron absorption in 132 Xe in the thermal TRIGA reactor, spectral tuning using an irradiation chamber is required to maximize the fraction of fast neutrons being absorbed and minimize the number of thermal neutrons interacting with the 132 Xe. We used MCNP to tally 132 Xe absorptions with the isotopic tally function, flux tallies and neutron attenuation to estimate the number of neutrons reaching the 132 Xe through the irradiation chamber, and the adjoint importance function to improve the source strength estimate. Additionally, we performed a heat transfer analysis for safety considerations. It was determined that the use of a 96% enriched 10 B boron carbide chamber, placed next to the fuel elements in reactor position D8, increases the 133m Xe/ 133 Xe activity ratio from a baseline value of 0.3 to 1.0, a 233% increase. Additionally, it was determined that the alpha heating produced in the boron does not become an unmanageable problem in the Washington State University reactor.

37 - INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL AND ANALYTICAL C↗
DOE OSTI2025

Demonstration and Concept of Operations for a Zero-Knowledge Protocol Passive Imaging Measurement for Arms Control

Here, we present an imaging system that employs zero-knowledge protocols to protect sensitive geometrical information, along with procedures to increase confidence in the result. The goal of this work is to enable the inclusion of warhead confirmation measurements in future arms control treaties. We present a demonstration of both true positive and true negative measurements that validate models and establish authenticating procedures toward meeting acceptance requirements for use in nuclear facilities. We use a two-dimensional time-encoded fast neutron imaging system with an anti-symmetric mask pattern; the fast neutron count values exceeding minimum or maximum thresholds indicate that two measured items are not identical. Laboratory measurements over twenty trials show that alarm rates for negative confirmation measurements are within uncertainties of model predictions. Positive confirmation measurements indicate that alarm rates are large enough to encourage treaty compliance.

Sweany, Melinda Dominique [Sandia National Laborat↗
DOE OSTI2020

NNSA GenScen 2.1 Methodology

Nuclear weapons stockpile planning is a complex process. The Non-Proliferation Treaty,' New START Treaty,2 DOE/NNSA, STRATCOM, Navy, Air Force, and Executive-Branch all have objectives that drive requirements for the types and quantities of nuclear weapons, which in turn drive how nuclear weapons are designed, manufactured, tested, maintained, deployed, transported, stored, retired, and ultimately dismantled. An estimated 200 distinct individuals contribute to the development, completion, and approval of this plan. And once that plan is completed, herein called the N NSA Program of Record (POR), ensuring that the plan is feasible — that the stockpile work can get done — ensures that the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) can deliver the intended nuclear force posture.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Conceptual Design for a Desktop Application to Support Inventory Reconciliation Activities

This paper describes desktop software being developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to empower users to reconcile observations about items at nuclear facilities more accurately, reliably, and quickly. Inventory activities at nuclear facilities are often conducted using pen and paper, which can be time-consuming, tedious, and susceptible to reading or transcription errors. The proposed inventory assistant would be a replacement for the paper-based process that could be used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, nuclear facility operators, or treaty verification monitors to conduct an inventory of nuclear and non-nuclear items in a more timely and accurate manner. Garner, McGirl, and Whitaker previously reported their work about a conceptual design for a mobile app to assist users in the field. In general, the inventory assistant would ingest an inventory list, distribute assigned items from the inventory list to one or more mobile devices, enable inventory teams to record their observations in the field, and then enable an inventory lead to integrate and reconcile the observations to produce a final report. The assistant consists of two software components - one for the inventory teams to record observations in the field (In-Field Observations App [IFOA]) and one for the inventory lead to (1) distribute the inventory list to each team, (2) integrate the observations from each team, and (3) reconcile the inventory list with observations (Distribution, Integration, and Reconciliation Application [DIRA]). This paper reviews the inventory assistant workflow and describes the DIRA user experience in more detail. As an example, the authors have chosen to follow the use case of IAEA inspectors conducting item counting and tag checking activities of UF 6 cylinders at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant with a large number of UF 6 cylinders (e.g., thousands). These activities can currently require 30 - 40 person-days of inspection to complete. The authors believe an inventory assistant could allow the IAEA to complete item counting and tag checking using the global identifier or the operator’s barcode in 8 - 10 person-days of inspection. We would expect other users (e.g., facility operators or treaty verification monitors) to also benefit from significant time savings.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Global Nonproliferation Regime: The NPT and Beyond

In the aftermath of WWII, the fear of nuclear war prompted the international community to confront the issue of nuclear proliferation. The global nonproliferation regime that exists today is comprised of a matrix of multilateral treaties, political commitments, and unilateral measures designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It has evolved considerably since the dawn of the nuclear age. This presentation covers the origins of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an introduction to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, a discussion of contemporary challenges and opportunities in the field, and an overview of the broader nonproliferation regime beyond the NPT.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Multi-phenomenology Yield Characterization

This report serves as the first delivery of a four-year applied science effort to transform and advance the error bounds for the yield estimate of an explosion. Each year’s delivery will be in this form, culminating in the submission of this work for peer review to a scientific journal. Importantly, the yearly progress reports can then also be viewed as expanding drafts working towards a formal journal article submission. For the first tranche of funding, we collaborated with Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) scientists to identify unclassified real-world data that demonstrate and validate our advanced error propagation methods. Collaboration includes visits to AFTAC and telecons. For this development, we illustrate the fusion of seismic, acoustic, optical, and surface effect signatures from an explosion. The mathematics and code being adapted to this specific application (Williams et al., 2021) involves physics models of multiple sensor signatures. We have also identified related physics models and have integrated them into code. Current methods of underground explosion yield estimation for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) have served the US treaty monitoring mission well for decades. A research objective of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has always been to provide new technical capabilities for monitoring lower thresholds. The general model and error propagation code to be developed in this project is based on significant advances in error modeling and propagation needed to analyze data at lower detection thresholds. The second tranche of funding for this project began on May 1, 2022, and planned work for the second tranche includes: i) completing the integration of physical model code into the general error model framework; this code accommodates a wide range of linear/nonlinear source models, fixed/ random effects, and frequentist/Bayesian analyses (the purpose of which is not to dictate to users how to analyze data, but instead to allow users the maximum flexibility in their work); ii) illustrative application of code to identified data, and; iii) initial planning with AFTAC researchers on delivery of code to the Common Development Environment at AFTAC, and continued writing of the planned final journal article submission (year two of this progress report), with particular emphasis on descriptions of data identified for this effort.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of Alternative Operations and Renewable Energy Deployment on Columbia River Hydropower

The Columbia River Treaty Tribes in the Pacific Northwest - the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Yakama - hold treaty-reserved fishing rights for the Columbia River, one of the world's most productive salmon rivers and a critical resource for these tribes. However, the tribes have expressed that current operating regimes of hydropower dams throughout the Columbia River Basin (CRB) do not fully account for tribal fishing rights and have negatively impacted fish populations. Four tribes acting together through the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC)'s 2022 Energy Vision stated that current power system models often do not fully account for the many constraints faced by hydropower facilities in the CRB. As the deployment of variable renewable energy (VRE) like solar and wind continues to increase, power system flexibility will become increasingly important. As a result, there is a growing need to better understand the true capabilities of the hydropower generation fleet while accurately accounting for ecological constraints (Northwest Power and Conservation Council 2022). Understanding hydropower's role in a future grid with a higher share of VRE can inform water resources planning to address ecological needs. The goal of this study is to examine the impacts of alternative hydropower operation rules and weather variability on hydropower generation and grid operations in VRE and transmission infrastructure deployment scenarios. The study evaluates how hydropower scheduling practices can reduce ecological impacts to the region's salmon populations. More specifically, the study examines the impact of today's dam water release rules (called "adjusted base water rules" in this study) and new, ecologically informed water release rules (called "ecosystem water rules" in this study) on two VRE scenarios (current renewable energy levels and higher renewable energy levels) using six weather years for each scenario (2008-2013). CRITFC developed the ecosystem water rules, which capture a portion of the changes they recommend for CRB hydropower operations. These analyses use a water resource planning model (OASIS) and a production cost model (PLEXOS) to simulate CRB reservoir cascade and Western Interconnection power grid operation.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

COnfirmation using Gamma-ray Non-Imaging Zero-knowledge ANti-mask Time-encoding (COGNIZANT) Final Summary Report

In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE FA4: Progress Update 2024

The Priority Research Objectives for Arms Control Technology Innovation, Verification, and Evaluation (PROACTIVE) venture’s overall goal is to address the technical challenges that will “enable the negotiation and implementation of future nuclear arms limitation/reduction treaties with verification at the level of individual warheads by advancing the state of the art in verification and monitoring capabilities.” One of the four focus areas of the venture, Focus Area 4 (FA4), is a system-of-systems effort to establish methodologies for the integration of monitoring and verification (M&V) technologies into verification systems that support treaty objectives.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Connecting Nuclear Security to International Frameworks on Gender and Security

The international community is slowly beginning to recognize the intersections between the law and policy on international security – particularly arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament – and the body of human rights law that addresses gender equality. Notably absent from this discussion is the field of nuclear security. Despite its historical underpinnings as an inherently domestic activity, nuclear security is thoroughly grounded in international treaty law. Yet, nuclear security is often overlooked in the international security context and has not been well situated with international instruments that address gender equality. We argue that gender equality in nuclear security should be understood as an important component of broader efforts to achieve equal opportunities for women in work and critical to ensuring women are included in conflict prevention efforts. Linking nuclear security to broader international efforts to increase gender equality in security and conflict prevention will provide a clearer structure and framework for gender equality initiatives in the nuclear security field. This is critically important given that estimates indicate that women comprise only twenty percent of the nuclear security workforce. Moreover, situating nuclear security in a broader international legal framework will simultaneously help states meet their gender equality commitments emanating from other instruments. This paper will first analyze the relationship between nuclear security and broader international security efforts, in particular arms control treaties and non-proliferation regimes. It will then survey the relevant international and regional frameworks for gender equality, particularly those that have applicability in the security context. This paper will next explore the relationship between nuclear security and these frameworks on gender. We find that some instruments provide support for gender equality initiatives in nuclear security because of their mandate to states to provide structural gender equality, and others are particularly relevant where they call for women's participation in conflict prevention. This paper concludes with recommendations to states that are concerned about the underrepresentation of women in nuclear security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Come Hell or High-Water: Challenges for Adapting Pacific Northwest Water Law

The Pacific Northwest region of the United States has been recognized as a leader in crafting water laws that work to balance human needs and ecological considerations. However, this region is experiencing changing dynamics that test the strength of existing water policies and laws. Such dynamics include increasing populations, new and exempt uses, quantification of tribal treaty rights, species protection, renegotiation of the Columbia River Treaty, and the impacts of a changing climate. Together, these dynamics are stressing the legal framework, which remains vital to ensuring sustainable water supplies now and into the future. Here, the history behind water resources management in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana provides the foundation for the laws in place today. Although all four states share regulatory features, nuances specific to each state have tremendously affected their governance structures and ability to adapt to changing dynamics. Although a challenge to meet these changing dynamics, collaborative efforts offer creative opportunities for meeting current and future needs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Discrete Event Simulation Approach to Nuclear Arms Enterprise Modeling and Analysis

We overview a discrete event simulation of an arms control enterprise developed to familiarize individuals with the challenges of verification and monitoring at the enterprise level. We will review the design of the simulation applied to a notional country’s nuclear arms enterprise. This simulation models how these nuclear weapons move over their lifetime from deployment, storage, maintenance, and dismantlement. With this output information, we then characterize the “ground truth” of the enterprise. Next, based on these data, we built a sophisticated analysis engine designed to provide treaty monitoring and verification information to support partner country inspectors and their evaluation. This tool was designed to be used as a game, enabling teams to compete on developing the best inspection plan to determine if the host country is complying with the conceptual treaty developed for this effort.

Pulliam, Rachel M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Novel Photonuclear Methods to Produce an Argon-37 Standard

The mission of this research is to explore novel photonuclear-based pathways into the production of 37Ar. Above-background detection levels of 37Ar uniquely indicates the occurrence of an underground nuclear explosion, produced from fission neutrons interacting in the surrounding environment through the 40Ca(n,a)37Ar reaction. The half-life of 35 days allows on-site inspectors (OSI) adequate time following the nuclear event to detect 37Ar and verify compliance or defiance of non-proliferation treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). An 37Ar standard would give OSI the ability to calibrate their detectors and measure detector efficiency allowing for the quantification of detected activity, give OSI authentic samples to test detectors in field exercises, and improve models predicting diffusion pathways of 37Ar through the underground environment.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2022

Characterization of PIPS detectors for measurement of radioxenon

The International Monitoring System arm of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization utilizes sampling of atmospheric radioxenon to scan the world for nuclear testing events. Current designs utilized in the field involve plastic scintillator cells run in coincidence with Sodium Iodide (NaI) or High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors. The use of plastic scintillators as electron detectors exhibit some issues in comparison to other materials. Silicon detectors are analyzed as an alternative to plastic scintillators for beta detection based on their higher energy resolution and lowered memory effect. A radioxenon detection setup was created with the intent of measuring radioxenon samples using coincidence counting between silicon and NaI detectors as well as silicon and HPGe. Finally, the absolute efficiency of both setups is calculated and compared.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Optimizing a detection system for fissile material in nuclear disarmament verification

In arms control treaties, verification plays a crucial role in detecting non-compliance, deterring future violations, and building trust between state parties. Neutron interrogation that induces fission reactions in fissile isotopes and measures the resulting fission neutrons, could be employed for this purpose. This study aims to develop a system which can determine the presence of fissile material while intrinsically protecting information. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the system for discriminating between an enriched uranium block from a depleted uranium (DU) block. The system was built and we report on benchmark measurements with DU and 16% enriched uranium blocks. Furthermore, the Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source, a neutron spectrometer (redBubble Technology Industries (BTI) N-Probe), and superheated droplet detectors were used for these measurements. MCNP simulations provided insights into detector responses to fissile materials with varying isotopic compositions, confirming that the system functioned as designed.

Active neutron interrogation↗
DOE OSTI2024

Measuring very low radiation doses in PTFE for nuclear forensic enrichment reconstruction

Every country that has made nuclear weapons has used uranium enrichment to do so. Despite the centrality of this technology to international security, there is still no reliable physical marker of past enrichment in the open literature that can be used to perform forensic verification of historically produced weapons on gas centrifuges. We show that the extremely low radioactivity from uranium alpha emissions during enrichment leaves detectable and irreversible calorimetric signatures in the common enrichment gasket material PTFE, allowing for historical reconstruction of past enrichment activities at a sensitivity better than one weapon’s quantity of highly enriched uranium. Fast scanning calorimetry also enables the measurement of recrystallization enthalpies of sequentially microtomed slices, confirming the magnitude and the type of radiation exposure while also providing detection of tampering and a method for analyzing field samples useful for treaty verification. Furthermore, this work opens the door for common items to be turned into precise dosimeters to detect the past presence of radioactivity, nuclear materials, and related activities with high confidence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗