Results for “trigger concepts and systems” — Page 3

NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗

NASA NTRS2009

Implementation of an Adaptive Controller System from Concept to Flight Test

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) at the Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) has been conducting flight-test research using an F-15 aircraft (figure 1). This aircraft has been specially modified to interface a neural net (NN) controller as part of a single-string Airborne Research Test System (ARTS) computer with the existing quad-redundant flight control system (FCC) shown in figure 2. The NN commands are passed to FCC channels 2 and 4 and are cross channel data linked (CCDL) to the other computers as shown. Numerous types of fault-detection monitors exist in the FCC when the NN mode is engaged; these monitors would cause an automatic disengagement of the NN in the event of a triggering fault. Unfortunately, these monitors still may not prevent a possible NN hard-over command from coming through to the control laws. Therefore, an additional and unique safety monitor was designed for a single-string source that allows authority at maximum actuator rates but protects the pilot and structural loads against excessive g-limits in the case of a NN hard-over command input. This additional monitor resides in the FCCs and is executed before the control laws are computed. This presentation describes a "floating limiter" (FL) concept that was developed and successfully test-flown for this program (figure 3). The FL computes the rate of change of the NN commands that are input to the FCC from the ARTS. A window is created with upper and lower boundaries, which is constantly "floating" and trying to stay centered as the NN command rates are changing. The limiter works by only allowing the window to move at a much slower rate than those of the NN commands. Anywhere within the window, however, full rates are allowed. If a rate persists in one direction, it will eventually "hit" the boundary and be rate-limited to the floating limiter rate. When this happens, a persistent counter begins and after a limit is reached, a NN disengage command is generated. The tunable metrics for the FL are (1) window size, (2) drift rate, and (3) persistence counter. Ultimate range limits are also included in case the NN command should drift slowly to a limit value that would cause the FL to be defeated. The FL has proven to work as intended. Both high-g transients and excessive structural loads are controlled with NN hard-over commands. This presentation discusses the FL design features and presents test cases. Simulation runs are included to illustrate the dramatic improvement made to the control of NN hard-over effects. A mission control room display from a flight playback is presented to illustrate the neural net fault display representation. The FL is very adaptable to various requirements and is independent of flight condition. It should be considered as a cost-effective safety monitor to control single-string inputs in general.

Larson, Richard R.↗

NASA NTRS2005

The Integrated Safety-Critical Advanced Avionics Communication and Control (ISAACC) System Concept: Infrastructure for ISHM

Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) architectures for spacecraft will include hard real-time, critical subsystems and soft real-time monitoring subsystems. Interaction between these subsystems will be necessary and an architecture supporting multiple criticality levels will be required. Demonstration hardware for the Integrated Safety-Critical Advanced Avionics Communication & Control (ISAACC) system has been developed at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. It is a modular system using a commercially available time-triggered protocol, ?Tp/C, that supports hard real-time distributed control systems independent of the data transmission medium. The protocol is implemented in hardware and provides guaranteed low-latency messaging with inherent fault-tolerance and fault-containment. Interoperability between modules and systems of modules using the TTP/C is guaranteed through definition of messages and the precise message schedule implemented by the master-less Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) communications protocol. "Plug-and-play" capability for sensors and actuators provides automatically configurable modules supporting sensor recalibration and control algorithm re-tuning without software modification. Modular components of controlled physical system(s) critical to control algorithm tuning, such as pumps or valve components in an engine, can be replaced or upgraded as "plug and play" components without modification to the ISAACC module hardware or software. ISAACC modules can communicate with other vehicle subsystems through time-triggered protocols or other communications protocols implemented over Ethernet, MIL-STD- 1553 and RS-485/422. Other communication bus physical layers and protocols can be included as required. In this way, the ISAACC modules can be part of a system-of-systems in a vehicle with multi-tier subsystems of varying criticality. The goal of the ISAACC architecture development is control and monitoring of safety critical systems of a manned spacecraft. These systems include spacecraft navigation and attitude control, propulsion, automated docking, vehicle health management and life support. ISAACC can integrate local critical subsystem health management with subsystems performing long term health monitoring. The ISAACC system and its relationship to ISHM will be presented.

Gwaltney, David A.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Virtual Mission Operations of Remote Sensors With Rapid Access To and From Space

This paper describes network-centric operations, where a virtual mission operations center autonomously receives sensor triggers, and schedules space and ground assets using Internet-based technologies and service-oriented architectures. For proof-of-concept purposes, sensor triggers are received from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to determine targets for space-based sensors. The Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) Disaster Monitoring Constellation satellite, the United Kingdom Disaster Monitoring Constellation (UK-DMC), is used as the space-based sensor. The UK-DMC s availability is determined via machine-to-machine communications using SSTL s mission planning system. Access to/from the UK-DMC for tasking and sensor data is via SSTL s and Universal Space Network s (USN) ground assets. The availability and scheduling of USN s assets can also be performed autonomously via machine-to-machine communications. All communication, both on the ground and between ground and space, uses open Internet standards.

Ivancic, William D.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Design and Testing of an Approach to Automated In-Flight Safety Risk Management for sUAS Operations

An onboard risk management automation design is presented based on run-time assurance principles, as well as the concept for In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) as described by the National Academies. The automation is designed to operate independently of the autopilot and perform real-time risk assessment spanning multiple classes of hazards, predict constraint violations, and track autopilot states. In the event of elevated risk conditions or predicted constraint violations, the automation will select from a set of available contingencies and trigger autopilot mode changes if necessary to mitigate risk exposure. The onboard automation also informs the remote operator/pilot of what the independent monitor is observing and any contingency decisions or actions that may arise during flight. Details of an implementation of this design and results of verification and validation activities, as required to meet stringent NASA software and system assurance standards, are also presented. This includes simulation and flight testing using small unmanned aircraft systems.

Ersin Ancel↗

NASA NTRS1982

Theory of beam plasma discharge

The general theory of beam plasma discharge (BPD) is discussed in relation to space and laboratory beam injection situations. An important concept introduced is that even when beam plasma instabilities are excited, there are two regime of BPD with radically different observational properties. They are described here as BPD with either classical or anomalous energy depositions. For high pressures or low altitudes, the classical is expected to dominate. For high altitudes and laboratory experiments, where the axial system size is less than lambda sub en, no BPD will be triggered unless the unstable waves are near the ambient plasma frequency and their amplitudes at saturation are large enough to create suprathermal tails by collapsing.

Papadopoulos, K.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Global Light System for JEM-EUSO

The Global Light System (GLS) is a network of ground-based Xenon flash lamps and steered UV lasers to validate the key functions of the JEM-EUSO instrument. These functions include triggering efficiency, the accuracy of intrinsic luminosity measurements, and the reconstructed pointing direction accuracy. GLS units will generate benchmark optical signatures in the atmosphere with similar characteristics to the optical signals of cosmic ray EASs. The lasers will generate tracks and the flashers will generate point flashes. But unlike air showers, the number, energy, precise time, direction (lasers) can be specified. JEM-EUSO will reconstruct the pointing directions of the lasers and the energy of the lasers and flash lamps to monitor the detector's triggers, and accuracy of energy and direction reconstruction. 12 GLS units will be deployed at selected sites around the globe. The JEM-EUSO footprint will pass over a GLS unit on average once per (near) moonless night under clear conditions for appropriately selected sites. The 12 units will be supplemented by campaign style measurements with an airborne unit that will be flown over the open ocean at selected altitudes under JEM-EUSO. A GLS prototype in an airplane will support a high-altitude balloon flight in 2014 of a proto-type JEM-EUSO telescope. We will describe the concept and system design and report on the status of prototyping and the selection process for candidates sites.

Christl, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2011

Advanced Fusion Reactors for Space Propulsion and Power Systems

In recent years the methodology proposed for conversion of light elements into energy via fusion has made steady progress. Scientific studies and engineering efforts in advanced fusion systems designs have introduced some new concepts with unique aspects including consideration of Aneutronic fuels. The plant parameters for harnessing aneutronic fusion appear more exigent than those required for the conventional fusion fuel cycle. However aneutronic fusion propulsion plants for Space deployment will ultimately offer the possibility of enhanced performance from nuclear gain as compared to existing ionic engines as well as providing a clean solution to Planetary Protection considerations and requirements. Proton triggered 11Boron fuel (p- 11B) will produce abundant ion kinetic energy for In-Space vectored thrust. Thus energetic alpha particles "exhaust" momentum can be used directly to produce high ISP thrust and also offer possibility of power conversion into electricity. p- 11B is an advanced fusion plant fuel with well understood reaction kinematics but will require some new conceptual thinking as to the most effective implementation.

Chapman, John J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRS2017

Device for Temporal Measurement of Loads in Parachute Suspension Systems

In order to understand the distribution of loads in parachutes, the NASA Low Density Supersonic Decelerators (LDSD) project developed a wireless instrument to measure loads in the parachute suspension lines. The load cells are titanium links that are connected in the primary structural load path of the parachute system. Strain gages measure the elongation of the links and an onboard data acquisition system records the data to ash memory. The load cells have onboard power, and include a radio transceiver that is used to receive timing information. The load cells are designed to be interfaced with cordage, packed in a parachute bag, and deployed with a standard parachute deployment. The devices are triggered passively during the deployment of the parachute. Prototype devices with a mass of 100 grams and a load capability of 16,000 lbs were built as a proof of concept.

Brandeau, Erich J.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Atmospheric Science Experiment for Mars: ATMIS for the Netlander 2005 Mission

ATMIS (Atmospheric and Meteorological Instrumentation System) is a versatile suite of atmospheric instrumentation to be accommodated onboard the Netlander Mission slated for launch in 2005. Four Netlanders are planned to form a geophysical measurement network on the surface of Mars. The atmospheric sciences are among the scientific disciplines benefiting most of the network concept. The goal of the ATMIS instrument is to provide new data on the atmospheric vertical structure, regional and global circulation phenomena, the Martian Planetary Boundary Layer (PBL) and atmosphere-surface interactions, dust storm triggering mechanisms, as well as the climatological cycles of H2O, dust and CO2. To reach the goal of characterization of a number of phenomena exhibiting both spatial and temporal variations, simultaneous observations of multiple variables at spatially displaced sites Deforming a network D are required. The in situ observations made by the ATMIS sensors will be supported by extensive modeling efforts. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Harri, A.-M.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Techniques for Improving Pilot Recovery from System Failures

This project examined the application of intelligent cockpit systems to aid air transport pilots at the tasks of reacting to in-flight system failures and of planning and then following a safe four dimensional trajectory to the runway threshold during emergencies. Two studies were conducted. The first examined pilot performance with a prototype awareness/alerting system in reacting to on-board system failures. In a full-motion, high-fidelity simulator, Army helicopter pilots were asked to fly a mission during which, without warning or briefing, 14 different failures were triggered at random times. Results suggest that the amount of information pilots require from such diagnostic systems is strongly dependent on their training; for failures they are commonly trained to react to with a procedural response, they needed only an indication of which failure to follow, while for 'un-trained' failures, they benefited from more intelligent and informative systems. Pilots were also found to over-rely on the system in conditions were it provided false or mis-leading information. In the second study, a proof-of-concept system was designed suitable for helping pilots replan their flights in emergency situations for quick, safe trajectory generation. This system is described in this report, including: the use of embedded fast-time simulation to predict the trajectory defined by a series of discrete actions; the models of aircraft and pilot dynamics required by the system; and the pilot interface. Then, results of a flight simulator evaluation with airline pilots are detailed. In 6 of 72 simulator runs, pilots were not able to establish a stable flight path on localizer and glideslope, suggesting a need for cockpit aids. However, results also suggest that, to be operationally feasible, such an aid must be capable of suggesting safe trajectories to the pilot; an aid that only verified plans entered by the pilot was found to have significantly detrimental effects on performance and pilot workload. Results also highlight that the trajectories suggested by the aid must capture the context of the emergency; for example, in some emergencies pilots were willing to violate flight envelope limits to reduce time in flight - in other emergencies the opposite was found.

Pritchett, Amy R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Common Coordination Procedures across Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) to Integrate xTM Operations into the National Airspace System

New categories of missions and vehicle types, such as drone delivery services, on-demand air taxi, and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) vehicles are being proposed to operate using a novel, highly automated information exchange infrastructure and a community-based, cooperative traffic management concept. Collectively, these new operations are called Extensible Traffic Management (xTM). As these xTM vehicles become more prevalent, their operations will increasingly overlap with existing conventional aircraft and with each other. In order to seamlessly co-exist with current conventional aircraft operations, new coordination procedures, tools and services will be needed to integrate xTM into the future National Airspace System (NAS). In our prior work, we have identified a set of use cases for xTM interactions with air traffic control (ATC), categorized across different xTM operations based on trigger events. Events consisted of ones such as nominal xTM vehicle transition into the ATC environment or an off-nominal emergency landing situation. In this paper, we have extended the prior work to identify commonalities in the coordination procedures across xTM, as well as differences that are specific to the individual xTM operations. The overall results showed that two types of xTM-ATC interactions were prevalent: 1) xTM vehicles transitioning between xTM and ATC operational environments; 2) xTM vehicles being allowed to continue xTM operations in areas that are normally controlled by ATC. The results also suggested that emergency and rare off-nominal events may need specialized procedures for each vehicle type. The overall results suggest that there is a pathway to define a common method of handling and integrating diverse xTM operations in the future NAS, but there need to be procedures for individualized handling of xTM vehicles in infrequent, safety-critical events.

Extensible Traffic Management (xTM)↗

NASA NTRS2014

Micro Cathode Arc Thruster for PhoneSat: Development and Potential Applications

NASA Ames Research Center and the George Washington University are developing an electric propulsion subsystem that will be integrated into the PhoneSat bus. Experimental tests have shown a reliable performance by firing three different thrusters at various frequencies in vacuum conditions. The interface consists of a microcontroller that sends a trigger pulse to the Pulsed Plasma Unit that is responsible for the thruster operation. A Smartphone is utilized as the main user interface for the selection of commands that control the entire system. The propellant, which is the cathode itself, is a solid cylinder made of Titanium. This simplicity in the design avoids miniaturization and manufacturing problems. The characteristics of this thruster allow an array of μCATs to perform attitude control and orbital correction maneuvers that will open the door for the implementation of an extensive collection of new mission concepts and space applications for CubeSats. NASA Ames is currently working on the integration of the system to fit the thrusters and the PPU inside a 1.5U CubeSat together with the PhoneSat bus. This satellite is intended to be deployed from the ISS in 2015 and test the functionality of the thrusters by spinning the satellite around its long axis and measure the rotational speed with the phone gyros. This test flight will raise the TRL of the propulsion system from 5 to 7 and will be a first test for further CubeSats with propulsion systems, a key subsystem for long duration or interplanetary small satellite missions.

CUBESAT↗

NASA NTRS1984

Stochastic does not equal ad hoc

Some classes of influential events in solar system history are class-predictable but not event-predictable. Theories of lunar origin should not ignore class-predictable stochastic events. Impacts and close encounters with large objects during planet formation are class-predictable. These stochastic events, such as large impacts that triggered ejection of Earth-mantle material into a circum-Earth cloud, should not be rejected as ad hoc. A way to deal with such events scientifically is to investigate their consequences; if it can be shown that they might produce the Moon, they become viable concepts in theories of lunar origin.

Hartmann, W. K.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Development of a tool-set for simultaneous, multi-site observations of astronomical objects

A network of ground and space based telescopes can provide continuous observation of astronomical objects. In a 'Target of Opportunity' scenario triggered by the system, any telescope on the network may request supporting observations. We propose to develop a set of data collection and display tools to support these observations. We plan to demonstrate the usefulness of this toolset for simultaneous multi-site observations of astronomical targets. Possible candidates for the proposed demonstration include the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer, International Ultraviolet Explorer, ALEXIS, and sounding rocket experiments. Ground based observations, operated by the University of California, Berkeley; the Jet Propulsion Laboratory; and Fairborn Observatory, Mesa, Arizona will be used to demonstrate the proposed concept. Although the demonstration will involve astronomical investigations, these tools will be applicable to a large number of scientific disciplines. the software tools and systems developed as a result of our work will be made available to the scientific community.

Chakrabarti, Supriya↗