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NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a five-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are 'one deep.' The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting 'brain drain' could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan property for the future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these programs are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to required longer range safety-related actions. NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vigilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to focus on both the short- and long-term aspects of risk management and safety planning. This task continues to be made manageable and productive by the excellent cooperation the Panel receives from both NASA and its contractors. Particular emphasis will continue to be directed to longer term workforce and program planning issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial flights of the X-33 and X-34. Section 2 of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by ASAP activities during 1998. Section 3 contains more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1997 ASAP Annual Report. Appendix C details the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998. During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blomberg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert F Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M. Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and Mr. Robert L. ('Hoot') Gibson joined the Panel as consultants.

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NASA NTRS2018

Thermal Protection Systems Technology Transfer from Apollo and Space Shuttle to the Orion Program

This paper describes how the Orion program is utilizing the Thermal Protection System (TPS) experience from the Apollo and Space Shuttle programs to reduce program risk and improve affordability to meet NASA's future manned exploration missions. The Orion program successfully completed the Exploration Flight Test (EFT-1) mission in 2014 and is currently assembling, integrating, and testing the next spacecraft for the Exploration Mission (EM-1) to meet the flight test objectives of an unmanned orbital mission to the moon and return to earth in 2019. The Orion spacecraft production operations are located in the Neil Armstrong Operations and Checkout (O&C) facility at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) providing an affordable and seamless delivery approach of vehicles directly to the launch site eliminating spacecraft transportation and additional checkout testing. Innovative vehicle design, manufacturing and test operations approaches are maturing and evolving with each Orion vehicle build to support the challenging NASA exploration mission requirements beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) while reducing program cost and schedule impacts. An example of Orion's evolution is the incorporation of an improved heat shield design, assembly and testing approach to meet the higher re-entry velocities for a lunar return for the EM-1 mission. The EFT- 1 heat shield was based on the Apollo heat shield manufacturing processes and was assembled at a supplier location and then transported to KSC for final integration. The EM-1 heat shield is now manufactured, assembled, tested, and installed into the spacecraft at the O&C facility reducing program cost and production schedules. The transition of the Space Shuttle TPS capabilities has enabled Orion to provide a human rated capsule design using proven materials and processes established over years of orbiter re-entry missions. The Orion Crew Module (CM) TPS configuration is derived from the Apollo CM approach utilizing improved materials and processes developed from the Space Shuttle program. The Orion EFT-1 heat shield utilized the Avcoat ablative material from Apollo which was injected into a honeycomb substrate and has been updated for EM-1 incorporating a block configuration bonded to a composite shell structure. This approach utilizes the proven Avcoat material for the heat shield ablator and is utilizing derived bonding and inspection methods and techniques from the Space Shuttle tile experience. The Orion back shell TPS configuration is based on Space Shuttle tile designs using proven tile materials and coatings. The Orion forward bay cover utilizes the high temperature tiles similar to the back shell tiles and low temperature blankets derived from the Space Shuttle program reducing weight impacts. Space Shuttle Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) is installed in the Orion capsule to control the interior temperature environment providing a light weight design. These TPS design approaches have performed successfully on the Orion first flight test on EFT-1 and are incorporated in the configuration for the next flight test for EM-1. Completion of these two flight tests will certify the TPS for the Orion program for human rated exploration missions and has reduced the development cost to the Orion program. In addition to transitioning the Space Shuttle TPS design configurations to Orion, the supporting manufacturing infrastructure, manufacturing processes, and inspection methods are also incorporated into the Orion assembly operations at KSC. This has avoided significant startup schedule and costs impacts of new capabilities and development of support operations necessary to fabricate, install, inspect, and validate the TPS installations for the Orion spacecraft. The Thermal Protection System Facility (TPSF) which supported the Space Shuttle program provides the heat shield Avcoat blocks and the back shell AETB-8 tiles for Orion program. Extending the existing Space Shuttle TPS operations at KSC provides onsite support to the Orion spacecraft assembly operations. A significant benefit to the Orion program is the transition of the Space Shuttle technician work force at KSC. This highly skilled workforce was able to transition to the Orion program and immediately support the TPS installation operations. They brought with them the human rated manufacturing and assembly operations culture that was critical to the Space Shuttle success avoiding the retraining cost and schedule impacts of a new workforce to Orion. The technician skills certification program from the Space Shuttle was found to be compatible with the Lockheed Martin technician certification programs enabling a seamless training process utilizing process similarity avoiding the cost of retraining the work force to Orion standards. The existing workforce is certificated for multiple processes enabling reassignment of technicians to other tasks in the Orion AI&P operations reducing the overall touch labor manpower requirements. Additional benefits of using the Space Shuttle workforce is the incorporation of the lessons learned from Space Shuttle processes to improve the Orion TPS processes. This has resulted in a continuous evolution of TPS processes to improve the producibility and reduce the program cost for the TPS for the Orion program. Transitioning the Apollo and Space Shuttle TPS designs, processes, and technician workforce has been instrumental in enabling Orion to successfully meet the program challenges for NASA's exploration missions of the future.

Stewart, Michael↗

NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

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NASA NTRS2010

Structured Transition of Wind Tunnel Operations Skills from Government-to Contractor-Managed

In 2004, NASA awarded the Research, Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering (ROME) contract at NASA Langley Research Center to a team led by Jacobs Technology, Inc. A key component of the contract was the transitioning of the five large wind tunnel facilities from NASA managed and NASA or NASA/contractor workforces to fully contractor operated. The contractor would manage daily operations while NASA would continue to develop long-term strategies, make decisions regarding commitment of funds and commitment of facilities, and provide oversight of the contractor's performance. A major challenge would be the transition of knowledge of facility operations and maintenance from the incumbent civil servant workforce to the contractor workforce. While the contract has since been modified multiple times, resulting in a blended NASA/ROME workforce across the facilities, the processes developed and implemented to capture and document facility knowledge from the incumbent subject matter experts, build training and certification programs, and grow individual skills across subject areas and across facilities, are worthy of documentation. This is the purpose of this paper.

Dunn, Steven C.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Early Career Hire Rapid Training and Development Program: Status Report

The aging of the industrialized workforce, particularly in the aerospace industry, has resulted in a very large generation gap in the workforce. The disproportionate size of Baby Boomers, increasing longevity and declining birth rates has made this phenomenon a reality that no organization can ignore. It is now critical that aerospace organizations prepare themselves for this watershed transformation in the workforce and take the initiative to prepare the incoming workforce with the skills and knowledge necessary to stay at the forefront. Last year the Jet Propulsion Laboratory launched a pioneering training program, known as Phaeton, to provide the knowledge, practice, experience, mentoring opportunities, and project life cycle exposure to our incoming generation of engineers. After 14 months of operation, now is the time to discuss the preliminary results of this new program.

Riley, Betsy N.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Spaceport Command and Control System Software Development

There is an immense challenge in organizing personnel across a large agency such as NASA, or even over a subset of that, like a center's Engineering directorate. Workforce inefficiencies and challenges are bound to grow over time without oversight and management. It is also not always possible to hire new employees to fill workforce gaps, therefore available resources must be utilized more efficiently. The goal of this internship was to develop software that improves organizational efficiency by aiding managers, making employee information viewable and editable in an intuitive manner. This semester I created an application for managers that aids in optimizing allocation of employee resources for a single division with the possibility of scaling upwards. My duties this semester consisted of developing frontend and backend software to complete this task. The application provides user-friendly information displays and documentation of the workforce to allow NASA to track diligently track the status and skills of its workforce. This tool should be able to prove that current employees are being effectively utilized and if new hires are necessary to fulfill skill gaps.

SCCS↗

NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗

NASA NTRS2008

NASA's Elementary and Secondary Education Program: Review and Critique

The federal role in precollege science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education is receiving increasing attention in light of the need to support public understanding of science and to develop a strong scientific and technical workforce in a competitive global economy. Federal science agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), are being looked to as a resource for enhancing precollege STEM education and bringing more young people to scientific and technical careers. For NASA and other federal science agencies, concerns about workforce and public understanding of science also have an immediate local dimension. The agency faces an aerospace workforce skewed toward those close to retirement and job recruitment competition for those with science and engineering degrees. In addition, public support for the agency s missions stems in part from public understanding of the importance of the agency s contributions in science, engineering, and space exploration.

Quinn, Helen R.↗

NASA NTRS2008

NASA Aeronautics Research: An Assessment

The U.S. air transportation system is vital to the economic well-being and security of the United States. To support continued U.S. leadership in aviation, Congress and NASA requested that the National Research Council undertake a decadal survey of civil aeronautics research and technology (R&T) priorities that would help NASA fulfill its responsibility to preserve U.S. leadership in aeronautics technology. In 2006, the National Research Council published the Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics. That report presented a set of six strategic objectives for the next decade of aeronautics R&T, and it described 51 high-priority R&T challenges--characterized by five common themes--for both NASA and non-NASA researchers. The National Research Council produced the present report, which assesses NASA's Aeronautics Research Program, in response to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-155). This report focuses on three sets of questions: 1. How well does NASA's research portfolio implement appropriate recommendations and address relevant high-priority research and technology challenges identified in the Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics? If gaps are found, what steps should be taken by the federal government to eliminate them? 2. How well does NASA's aeronautics research portfolio address the aeronautics research requirements of NASA, particularly for robotic and human space exploration? How well does NASA's aeronautics research portfolio address other federal government department/agency non-civil aeronautics research needs? If gaps are found, what steps should be taken by NASA and/or other parts of the federal government to eliminate them? 3. Will the nation have a skilled research workforce and research facilities commensurate with the requirements in (1) and (2) above? What critical improvements in workforce expertise and research facilities, if any, should NASA and the nation make to achieve the goals of NASA's research program? This report continues the good work begun by the Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics, and it expands that work to consider in more depth NASA aeronautics research issues related to the space program, non-civil applications, workforce, and facilities.

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NASA NTRS2008

Sense and Sensibility: The Case for the Nationwide Inclusion of Engineering in the K-12 Curriculum

The competitive status of the United States is inextricably linked to innovation just as innovation is inseparable from science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. To stay competitive in innovation requires that the United States produce a 21st century workforce complete with requisite education, training, skills, and motivation. If we accept a priori that science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education are crucial to competitiveness and innovation and that, in terms of innovation, mathematics, science, and engineering are interdependent, why are mathematics and science uniformly ubiquitous in the K-12 curriculum while engineering is conspicuously absent? We are passionate in our belief that the uniform addition of engineering to the K-12 curriculum will help ensure that the nation has "the right" 21st Century workforce. Furthermore, we believe that a nationwide effort, led by a coalition of engineering academics, practitioners, and societies is required to turn this goal into reality. However, accomplishing this goal necessitates, as we are reminded by the title of Jane Austen's timeless novel, "Sense and Sensibility", a workable solution that seeks the "middle ground" between passion and reason. We begin our paper by making two essential points: Engineers are not scientists. Engineering exists separate from science, has its own specialized knowledge community apart from science, and it is largely responsible for many of the most significant advancements and improvements in the quality of our life. Our workable solution requires that K-12 education, nationwide, accommodate the inclusion of engineering as a stand alone curriculum and we offer three reasons to support our position: (1) workforce development, (2) stimulating interest in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) courses and careers, and (3) creating a technologically literate society. We conclude with some thoughts on how this important goal can be accomplished.

Lindberg, Robert E.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Information Technology Research Services: Powerful Tools to Keep Up with a Rapidly Moving Field

Marty firms offer Information Technology Research reports, analyst calls, conferences, seminars, tools, leadership development, etc. These entities include Gartner, Forrester Research, IDC, The Burton Group, Society for Information Management, 1nfoTech Research, The Corporate Executive Board, and so on. This talk will cover how a number of such services are being used at the Goddard Space Flight Center to improve our IT management practices, workforce skills, approach to innovation, and service delivery. These tools and services are used across the workforce, from the executive leadership to the IT worker. The presentation will cover the types of services each vendor provides and their primary engagement model. The use of these services at other NASA Centers and Headquarters will be included. In addition, I will explain how two of these services are available now to the entire NASA IT workforce through enterprise-wide subscriptions.

Hunter, Paul↗

NASA NTRS2010

Getting to First Flight: Equipping Space Engineers to Break the Start-Stop-Restart Cycle

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA s) history is built on a foundation of can-do strength, while pointing to the Saturn/Apollo Moon missions in the 1960s and 1970s as its apex a sentiment that often overshadows the potential that lies ahead. The chronicle of America s civil space agenda is scattered with programs that got off to good starts with adequate resources and vocal political support but that never made it past a certain milestone review, General Accountability Office report, or Congressional budget appropriation. Over the decades since the fielding of the Space Shuttle in the early 1980s, a start-stop-restart cycle has intervened due to many forces. Despite this impediment, the workforce has delivered engineering feats such as the International Space Station and numerous Shuttle and science missions, which reflect a trend in the early days of the Exploration Age that called for massive infrastructure and matching capital allocations. In the new millennium, the aerospace industry must respond to transforming economic climates, the public will, national agendas, and international possibilities relative to scientific exploration beyond Earth s orbit. Two pressing issues - workforce transition and mission success - are intertwined. As this paper will address, U.S. aerospace must confront related workforce development and industrial base issues head on to take space exploration to the next level. This paper also will formulate specific strategies to equip space engineers to move beyond the seemingly constant start-stop-restart mentality to plan and execute flight projects that actually fly.

Singer, Christopher E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Breaking the Vicious Start-Stop-Restart Cycle

NASA's history is built on a foundation of can-do strength, while pointing to the Apollo Moon missions in the 1960s and 1970s as its apex a sentiment that often overshadows the potential in store. The chronicle of America s civil space adventure is scattered with programs that got off to good starts with adequate resources and vocal political support but that never made it past a certain milestone review, General Accountability Office report, or Congressional budget appropriation. Over the decades since the fielding of the Space Shuttle in the early 1980s, a start-stop-restart cycle has intervened due to many forces. Despite this impediment, the workforce has delivered feats such as the International Space Station and numerous Shuttle and science missions, which reflect a trend in the early days of the Exploration Age that called for massive infrastructure and matching capital allocations. In the new millennium, the aerospace industry must respond to transforming economic climates, the public will, national agendas, and international possibilities relative to scientific exploration beyond Earth's orbit. Two pressing issues workforce transition and mission success are intertwined. As this briefing will show, U.S. aerospace must confront related workforce development and industrial base issues head on to take space exploration to the next level. This briefing also will formulate specific strategies to equip space engineers to move beyond the seemingly constant start-stop-restart mentality to plan and execute flight projects that actually fly.

Singer, Christopher E.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Strategic Employee Development (SED) Program

As with many other U.S. agencies, succession planning is becoming a critical need for NASA. The primary drivers include (a) NASAs higher-than-average aged workforce with approximately 50 of employees eligible for retirement within 5 years; and (b) employees who need better developmental conversations to increase morale and retention. This problem is particularly concerning for Safety Mission Assurance (SMA) organizations since they traditionally rely on more experienced engineers and specialists to perform their organizations functions.In response to this challenge, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) SMA organization created the Strategic Employee Development (SED) program. The SED programs goal is to provide a proactive method to counter the primary drivers by creating a deeper bench strength and providing a more comprehensive developmental feedback experience for the employee. The SED is a new succession planning framework that enables customization to any organization, and in this case, specifically for an SMA organization. This is accomplished via the identification of key positions, the corresponding critical competencies, and a process to help managers have relevant and meaningful development conversations with the workforce. As a result of the SED, several tools and products were created that allows management to make better strategic workforce decisions. Although there are opportunities for improvement for the SED program, the most important impact has been on the quality of developmental discussions for employees.

Nguyen, Johnny↗

NASA NTRS2017

Strategic Employee Development in The Government Sector

As with many other U.S. agencies, succession planning is becoming a critical need for NASA. The primary drivers include (a) NASA's higher-than-average aged workforce with approximately 50% of employees eligible for retirement within 5 years; and (b) employees who need better developmental conversations to increase morale and retention. This problem is particularly concerning for Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) organizations since they traditionally rely on more experienced engineers and specialists to perform their organizations' functions. In response to this challenge, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) S&MA organization created the Strategic Employee Development (SED) program. The SED program's goal is to provide a proactive method to counter the primary drivers by creating a deeper "bench strength" and providing a more comprehensive developmental feedback experience for the employee. The SED is a new succession planning framework that enables customization to any organization, and in this case, specifically for an S&MA organization. This is accomplished via the identification of key positions, the corresponding critical competencies, and a process to help managers have relevant and meaningful development conversations with the workforce. As a result of the SED, several tools and products were created that allows management to make better strategic workforce decisions. Although there are opportunities for improvement for the SED program, the most important impact has been on the quality of developmental discussions for employees.

Nguyen, Johnny↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Diversity and Inclusion in Spacecraft Science Teams: What Do We Know and What Can We Do About It?

Introduction: Not only does the planetary science community lack diversity [1-3], the subset of the community that participates on spacecraft science team is even less diverse than the community as a whole [1, 4]. Results of 2020 Workforce Survey: Previous studies of the diversity of members of spacecraft science teams made incorrect assumptions about the nature of the data before collecting the data. Those analyses assumed a binary gender and ignored the existence of planetary scientists who are neither men nor women [4-6]. We present here results where demographic data was collected without assumptions; each individual surveyed supplied their own answers to demographic questions. The April 2020 survey of Planetary Scientists, which was conducted by the Statistical Research Center of the American Institute of Physics (AIP) and funded by the American Astronomical Society (AAS)’s Division of Planetary Science (DPS) asked participants their gender with 4 possible responses: Woman, Man, Another identify (please specify if you wish), and Prefer not to answer. 32% of respondents chose Woman, 67% chose Man and 1% chose Another gender identity [1]. The survey also asked demographic questions on race, ethnicity, LGBTQ+ identity, and disability. For a full list of questions, see https://dps.aas.org/sites/dps.aas.org/files/reports/2020/survey2020_questionnaire.pdf. In addition to demographic questions, the 2020 Workforce survey asked how many times respondents had been involved in Mission proposals as a Principal Investigator (PI) and, separately, as a Co-Investigator (CoI) [1]. Answers to questions about mission involvement were correlated with answers to demographic questions and the results show that members of historically underrepresented groups (non-white scientists, women, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and disabled scientists) were less likely to be involved in spacecraft mission proposals than were members of historically overrepresented groups [1]. The figures below show the correlated responses for four different axes of underrepresentation [1]. Note that while the figure on gender shows only Women and Men (due to the small percentage of folks answering “Another gender”), non-binary respondents are included in the LGBTQ+ community figure. Conclusion: Being part of a spacecraft science team is a goal for many planetary scientists. With it comes brand new data, more stable funding, and a sense of awe and exploration. It can lead to a cascade of opportunities from conference and public presentations, to membership in subsequent mission teams, and prestige in the community [4]. As a result, participation in spacecraft teams can be used a measure of success within the field. From the survey results, we see that members of historically excluded groups, even after they have overcome barriers to participating in the field, are still experiencing barriers to success within the field itself. Why?: The diminishing percentage of members of underrepresented groups as a career progresses has been referred to as a “leaky pipeline”. However, this fails to adequately capture the experiences of the members of these underrepresented groups as it implies a passive process. In order to capture the active processes (bias, discrimination, harassment, and other exclusionary behaviors) that contribute to low retention in the workforce, the term “Hostile Obstacle Course” is more useful [7,8]. It is these processes that need to be addressed in order to retain valued members of our community. Moving Forward: In order to broaden participation in planetary science, particularly mission science teams, we need to address conditions that create hostile workplace climates. What can mission teams and other groups do to address these conditions? First, each group/team needs to evaluate their own members to determine what specific barriers exist in their own interactions. One tool to accomplish this would be an anonymous survey designed to understand how team members feel about working within the group. Working with professionals who know how to create and analyze such surveys (often called “climate surveys” when applied to University students, for example) would ensure that the survey meets its goals and does not make assumptions that counter the meaningfulness of the results. Such professionals in EDIA (Equity, Diversity, Inclusion, and Accessibility) and workplace culture can make suggestions for policy changes that would eliminate hostile workplace conditions. Policy changes that are often suggested include instituting professional EDIA training for the team and/or for team leadership, instituting and following a code of conduct [9], including more interactive group activities in group meetings, etc. Training and information on EDIA is available for all members of the planetary science community. The first place to look would be in your University or Institution’s EDIA or human resources offices. Bystander Intervention is often offered as part of other meetings [10]. A newer offering is a Workshop on EDIA for Leaders in Planetary Science led by Julie Rathbun (first author of this abstract) and JA Grier (https://edialps.psi.edu/). This 3-day workshop gives participants the tools they need to enact positive change in their personal and professional spheres. The first workshop was help in November 2022 and another workshop will take place in the late spring 2023 with exact dates to be announced soon.

J. A. Rathbun↗

NASA NTRS2022

Metrics for Flight Operations: Application to Europa Clipper Tour Selection

Objective measures are ubiquitous in the formulation, design and implementation of deep space missions. Tour durations, flyby altitudes, propellant budgets, power consumption, and other metrics are essential to developing and managing NASA missions. But beyond the simple metrics of cost and workforce, it has been difficult to identify objective, quantitative measures that assist in evaluating choices made during formulation or implementation phases in terms of their impact on flight operations. As part of the development of the Europa Clipper Mission system, a set of operations metrics have been defined along with the necessary design information and software tooling to calculate them. We have applied these methods and metrics to help assess the impact to the flight team on the six options for the Clipper Tour that are currently being vetted for selection in the fall of 2021. To generate these metrics, the Clipper MOS team first designed the set of essential processes by which flight operations will be conducted, using a standard approach and template to identify (among other aspects) timelines for each process, along with their time constraints (e.g., uplinks for sequence execution). Each of the resulting 50 processes is documented in a common format and concurred by stakeholders. Process timelines were converted into generic schedules and workforce-loaded using COTS scheduling software, based on the inputs of the process authors and domain experts. Custom code was generated to create an operations schedule for a specific portion of Clipper's prime mission, with instances of a given process scheduled based on specific timing rules (e.g., process X starts once per week on Thursdays) or relative to mission events (e.g., sequence generation process begins on a Monday, at least three weeks before each Europa closest approach). Over a 5-month period, and for each of six Clipper candidate tours, the result was a 20,000+ line, workforce-loaded schedule that documents all of the process-driven work effort at the level of individual roles, along with a significant portion of the level-of-effort work. Post-processing code calculated the absolute and relative number of work hours during a nominal 5 day / 40 hour work week, the work effort during 2nd and 3rd shift, as well as 1st shift on weekends. The resultant schedules and shift tables were used to generate objective measures that can be related to both human factors and to operational risk and showed that Clipper tours which utilize 6:1 resonant (21.25 day) orbits instead of 4:1 resonant (14.17 day) orbits during the first dozen or so Europa flybys are advantageous to flight operations. A similar approach can be extended to assist missions in more objective assessments of a number of mission issues and trades, including tour selection and spacecraft design for operability.

Sarrel, Marc↗

NASA NTRS2024

A Collaborative Vision for Deep Space Human Exploration

Artemis will be the first cooperative campaign among nations for crewed planetary exploration. This paradigm shift reflects a collaborative vision for deep space human exploration that embraces the concept that, “If you want to go fast, go alone; If you want to go far, go together.” This paper elaborates on the way the National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA)is striving to make its Moon to Mars effort a collaborative endeavor for long-term human exploration of deep space and for the international space community. The agency is making great strides in unifying its workforce, mission directorates, technical authorities, and centers behind shared goals and processes. Enhanced communication and a reinvigoration of systems engineering ideals have been a hallmark of that effort, guided by the Moon to Mars Architecture, which defines what NASA aims to accomplish and how it will execute those goals. This interdisciplinary approach ensures the Artemis campaign supports NASA’s engineering, science, and technology development goals. As of September 2024, over 43 nations have signed the Artemis Accords, which establish a common set of principles for peaceful cooperation in civil space exploration. Building off these efforts, NASA has been engaging in separate and distinct discussions about partner contributions to Artemis. International partnerships for the Artemis campaign include long-standing partners as well as agencies with which NASA has only more recently begun collaborating. The Gateway Program is an early example of both –benefitting from partnerships with Canada, Japan, and Europe forged though decades of cooperation on the International Space Station, as well as a new partnership with the United Arab Emirates. The agency’s Moon to Mars Objectives and Architecture unify the NASA workforce with common goals and shared systems-engineering processes. The architecture offers pathways for broader participation from industry, academia, and international partners. The agency evolves this collaborative approach through its annual Architecture Concept Review cycle, seeking input from the NASA workforce, and through workshops, from industry, academia, and the international space community to refine NASA’s roadmap for exploration. Exploring together, NASA and its partners are setting humanity on the path to long-term presence at the Moon and our eventual journey to Mars

Objective↗