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Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Technology Roadmap

This GNDD Technology Roadmap is intended to provide guidance to potential researchers and help management define research priorities to achieve technology advancements for ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring science being pursued by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team within the Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Four science-based elements were selected to encompass the entire scope of nuclear monitoring research and development (R&D) necessary to facilitate breakthrough scientific results, as well as deliver impactful products. Promising future R&D is delineated including dual use associated with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Important research themes as well as associated metrics are identified along with a progression of accomplishments, represented by a selected bibliography, that are precursors to major improvements to nuclear explosion monitoring.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Unclassified Sources Term and Radionuclide Data for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 2

This report documents the evaluation of the information and data available on the unclassified source term and radionuclide contamination for CAU 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine. The total residual inventory of radionuclides associated with one or more tests is known as the radiologic source term (RST). The RST is comprised of radionuclides in water, glass, or other phases or mineralogic forms. The hydrologic source term (HST) of an underground nuclear test is the portion of the total RST that is released into the groundwater over time following the test. In this report, the HST represents radionuclide release some time after the explosion and does not include the rapidly evolving mechanical, thermal, and chemical processes during the explosion. The CAU 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine has many more detonations and a wider variety of settings to consider compared to other CAUs. For instance, the source term analysis and evaluation performed for CAUs 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa and CAU 98: Frenchman Flat did not consider vadose zone attenuation because many detonations were located near or below the water table. However, the large number of Yucca Flat/Climax Mine tests and the location of many tests above the water table warrant a more robust analysis of the unsaturated zone. The purpose of this report is to develop and document conceptual models of the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine HST for use in implementing source terms for the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine models. This document presents future plans to incorporate the radionuclide attenuation mechanisms due to unsaturated/multiphase flow and transport within the Yucca Flat CAU scale modeling. The important processes that influence radionuclide migration for the unsaturated and saturated tests in alluvial, volcanic, and carbonate settings are identified. Many different flow and transport models developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), including original modeling of multiphase flow and transport by the Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture (SNJV), are integrated to form a general understanding of how the RST relates to the HST. This report is unlike the Frenchman Flat source term analysis because it does not calculate the HST for each test. Instead, this work only identifies the important processes that must be considered when the CAU-transport modeling is performed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Response to External Peer Review Team Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM), in the northeast part of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) requires environmental corrective action activities to assess contamination resulting from underground nuclear testing. These activities are necessary to comply with the UGTA corrective action strategy defined in Appendix VI, Revision No. 4, of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The Phase I Flow and Transport Model Document for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (N-I, 2013a) was developed and subjected to an external peer review as required by the corrective action investigation (CAI) stage of the UGTA strategy. The YF/CM Peer Review Committee (PRC) raised a number of questions and provided recommendations for supplemental analyses (in the External Peer Review Team Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada [N-I, 2015]). The purpose of this document is to provide responses to the PRC recommendations addressing the uncertainties identified by the PRC so that sufficient confidence in the contaminant boundary forecasts is established to advance to the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) stage and initiate model evaluations. The PRC summarized their concerns and recommendations, and presented discussions of each of these uncertainties in their report (N-I, 2015). The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) responses are summarized in Table ES-1.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Review of Global Radioxenon Background Research and Issues

Among the most important problems for the world-wide nuclear explosion monitoring is the interference of naturally occurring and man-made radionuclides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) frequently detects these interferences using sensitive radionuclide measurement equipment. We commonly refer to the presence of radionuclides that are relevant to the CTBT but do not originate from a nuclear explosion as “background”. Backgrounds are highest near the sources but are known to have regional and global effects on the IMS. This review paper summarizes much of the relevant work in the area of background and discusses issues of interest for nuclear explosion detection.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Worldwide measurements of radioxenon background near isotope production facilities, a nuclear power plant and at remote sites: the ‘‘EU/JA-II’’ Project

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) specifies that radioxenon measurements should be performed at 40 or more stations worldwide within the International Monitoring System (IMS). Measuring radioxenon is one of the principle techniques to detect underground nuclear explosions. Specifically, presence and ratios of different radioxenon isotopes allows determining whether a detection event under consideration originated from a nuclear explosion or a civilian source. However, radioxenon monitoring on a global scale is a novel technology and the global civil background must be characterized sufficiently. This paper lays out a study, based on several unique measurement campaigns, of the worldwide concentrations and sources of verification relevant xenon isotopes. It complements the experience already gathered with radioxenon measurements within the CTBT IMS programme and focuses on locations in Belgium, Germany, Kuwait, Thailand and South Africa where very little information was available on ambient xenon levels or interesting sites offered opportunities to learn more about emissions from known sources. The findings corroborate the hypothesis that a few major radioxenon sources contribute in great part to the global radioxenon background. Additionally, the existence of independent sources of 131mXe (the daughter of 131I) has been demonstrated, which has some potential to bias the isotopic signature of signals from nuclear explosions.

Saey, P. R.J.↗

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program

The history of nuclear testing, the treaties associated with the decline and eventual elimination of testing, the inception of Stockpile Stewardship, how the enterprise conducts the program, and its future are explored in this paper. All the events that bring us to present time play in to how the nuclear enterprise will map out the future of our weapons stockpile.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

NIF Operations Management Plan, August 2011

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL) National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a key component of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program, whose purpose is to maintain the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our nation’s nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear testing. The NIF is crucial to the Stockpile Stewardship Program because it is the only facility that can create the conditions of extreme temperature and pressure—conditions that exist only in stars or in exploding nuclear weapons—that are relevant to understanding how our modern nuclear weapons operate. As such, the NIF’s primary mission is to attain fusion ignition in the laboratory. Fusion ignition not only supports Stockpile Stewardship needs, but also provides the basis for future decisions about fusion’s potential as a long-term energy source. Additionally, NIF provides scientists with access to high-energy-density regimes that can yield new insight and understanding in the areas of astrophysics, hydrodynamics, material properties, plasma physics, and radiative properties. The use of the NIF to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the advancement of basic high-energy-density science understanding is planned and managed through program-level execution plans and NIF directorate-level management teams. An example of a plan is the National Ignition Campaign Execution Plan. The NIF Operations Management Plan provides an overview of the NIF Operations organization and describes how the NIF is supported by the LLNL infrastructure and how it is safely and responsibly managed and operated. Detailed information on NIF management of the organization is found in a series of supporting plans, policies, and procedures. A list of related acronyms can be found in Appendix A of this document. The purpose of this document is to provide a roadmap of how the NIF Operations organization functions. It provides a guide to understanding the requirements, document flow down, organizational vision and mission, performance metrics, and interrelationship of the NIF Operations organization with other directorate and laboratory organizations. This document also provides a listing of roles and responsibilities, core processes, procedures, authority matrices, change control boards, and other information necessary for successfully functioning in the NIF Operations organization. This document, the NIF Shot Operations Plan, and the NIF Maintenance Plan together represent the primary documents satisfying our Conduct of Operations compliance requirement.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Fast and Thermal Neutron Spectrum Dosimetry Measurements in the Advanced Test Reactor large-B and small-I Positions Following the Sixth Core Internals Change-out [Slides]

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) has a wide variety of irradiation positions that have had experiments that were developed by users from around the world. Most experiment irradiations rely on thoroughly benchmarked numerical models. However, some irradiation positions in ATR are not as well- characterized and are complicated by spectral perturbations from control cylinder orientation. The “small I” and “large-B” irradiation positions are located nearby control cylinders and suffer from these flux perturbations from control cylinder orientations that change during an irradiation cycle to maintain the desired core power distribution. Models predicted that these types of position would exhibit both spectral shifts and amplitude changes in neutron flux, but few measurements have been conducted to benchmark these predictions. Recently, requalification testing was performed to confirm the operational readiness of the ATR following the completion of the Core Internals Change-out (CIC). These tests provided a unique opportunity to validate the analytical methods used to simulate the ATR because nearly all components in the reactor were in a clean as-built state, significantly reducing modelling uncertainties. One subset of the testing included characterization of the fast and thermal neutron flux in the “small-I” and “large-B” positions using silver, cobalt, and nickel neutron dosimetry. In contrast to typical irradiation cycles, the control cylinders were held in position during the post-CIC nuclear testing. The specific activity of these dosimeter wires was measured following two low-power tests with different control cylinder positions.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

A317_Fast and Thermal Neutron Spectrum Dosimetry Measurements in the Advanced Test Reactor large-B and small-I Positions Following the Sixth Core Internals Change-out

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) has a wide variety of irradiation positions that have had experiments that were developed by users from around the world. Most experiment irradiations rely on thoroughly benchmarked numerical models. However, some irradiation positions in ATR are not as well- characterized and are complicated by spectral perturbations from control cylinder orientation. The “small I” and “large-B” irradiation positions are located nearby control cylinders and suffer from these flux perturbations from control cylinder orientations that change during an irradiation cycle to maintain the desired core power distribution. Models predicted that these types of position would exhibit both spectral shifts and amplitude changes in neutron flux, but few measurements have been conducted to benchmark these predictions. Recently, requalification testing was performed to confirm the operational readiness of the ATR following the completion of the Core Internals Change-out (CIC). These tests provided a unique opportunity to validate the analytical methods used to simulate the ATR because nearly all components in the reactor were in a clean as-built state, significantly reducing modelling uncertainties. One subset of the testing included characterization of the fast and thermal neutron flux in the “small-I” and “large-B” positions using silver, cobalt, and nickel neutron dosimetry. In contrast to typical irradiation cycles, the control cylinders were held in position during the post-CIC nuclear testing. The specific activity of these dosimeter wires was measured following two low-power tests with different control cylinder positions.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Advancements in nuclear data evaluations in the unresolved resonance region [Slides]

Minimal updates to current capabilities (SAMMY/AMPX) and to the ENDF format are proposed to include threshold reaction for outgoing charged-particle channels in the URR formalism. If average resonance parameters are reported, probability tables for newly defined reactions channels may be needed, implemented, and tested. Nuclear data evaluation of n+ 35 Cl reactions can be considered the best case to apply the proposed updates.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

2019 Hyperion 5313A and 5119A Infrasound Sensor Type Approval Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated two variations of a new model of infrasound sensor, the Hyperion 5313A and 5119A. The purpose of this infrasound sensor evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, response, passband, sensitivity variation due to changes in static pressure and temperature, and sensitivity to vertical acceleration. The Hyperion infrasound sensors are being evaluated for potential use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Handbook: Collecting Groundwater Samples from Monitoring Wells in Frenchman Flat, CAU 98

Frenchman Flat basin on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) contains Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, which is comprised of ten underground nuclear test locations. Environmental management of these test locations is part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended) with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the State of Nevada. A Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been approved for CAU 98 (DOE, 2011). The CADD/CAP reports on the Corrective Action Investigation that was conducted for the CAU, which included characterization and modeling. It also presents the recommended corrective actions to address the objective of protecting human health and the environment. The recommended corrective action alternative is “Closure in Place with Modeling, Monitoring, and Institutional Controls.” The role of monitoring is to verify that Contaminants of Concern (COCs) have not exceeded the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) limits (Code of Federal Regulations, 2014) at the regulatory boundary, to ensure that institutional controls are adequate, and to monitor for changed conditions that could affect the closure conditions. The long-term closure monitoring program will be planned and implemented as part of the Closure Report stage after activities specified in the CADD/CAP are complete. Groundwater at the NNSS has been monitored for decades through a variety of programs. Current activities were recently consolidated in an NNSS Integrated Sampling Plan (DOE, 2014). Although monitoring directed by the plan is not intended to meet the FFACO long-term monitoring requirements for a CAU (which will be defined in the Closure Report), the objective to ensure public health protection is similar. It is expected that data collected in accordance with the plan will support the transition to long-term monitoring at each CAU. The sampling plan is designed to ensure that monitoring activities occur in compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (DOE, 2012). The sampling plan should be referenced for Quality Assurance (QA) elements and procedures governing sampling activities. The NNSS Integrated Sampling Plan specifies the groundwater monitoring that will occur in CAU 98 until the long-term monitoring program is approved in the Closure Report. The plan specifies the wells that must be monitored and categorizes them by their sampling objective with the associated analytical requirements and frequency. Possible sample collection methods and required standard operating procedures are also presented. The intent of this handbook is to augment the NNSS Integrated Sampling Plan by providing well-specific details for the sampling professional implementing the Sampling Plan in CAU 98, Frenchman Flat. This handbook includes each CAU 98 well designated for sampling in the NNSS Integrated Sampling Plan. The following information is provided in the individual well sections: 1. The purpose of sampling. 2. A physical description of the well. 3. The chemical characteristics of the formation water. 4. Recommended protocols for purging and sampling. The well-specific information has been gathered from numerous historical and current sources cited in each section, but two particularly valuable resources merit special mention. These are the USGS NNSS website (http://nevada.usgs.gov/doe_nv/ntsarea5.cfm) and the UGTA Field Operations website (https://ugta.nv.doe.gov/sites/Field%20Operations/default.aspx). 2 Land surface elevation and measuring point for water level measurements in Frenchman Flat were a focus during CAU investigations (see Appendix B, Attachment 1 in Navarro-Intera, 2014). Both websites listed above provide information on the accepted datum for each well. A summary is found on the home page for the well on the USGS website. Additional information is available through a link in the “Available Data” section to an “MP diagram” with a photo annotated with the datum information. On the UGTA Field Operations well page, the same information is in the “Wellhead Diagram” link. Well RNM-2s does not have an annotated photo at this time. All of the CAU 98 monitoring wells are located within Area 5 of Frenchman Flat, with the exception of ER-11-2 in Area 11 (Figure 1). The wells are clustered in two areas: the northern area (Figure 2) and the central area (Figure 3). Each well is discussed below in geographic order from north to south as follows: ER-11-2, ER-5-3 shallow piezometer, ER-5-3-2, ER-5-5, RNM-1, RNM-2s, and UE-5n.

(1996↗

Technical Cooperation on Verification and its Role in Trust Building

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will demonstrate how technical cooperation on verification contributed to the softening of tensions and the improvement of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because the scope of this endeavor is too broad to be adequately considered in the length of this work, the primary focus will be on the private and public partnerships on seismic and hydroacoustic test ban treaty verification that were forged between Soviet and American scientists from 1986-1988. In order to orient the analysis within the political-scientific landscape of the time, the discussion begins with a brief description of the arms control landscape in the early 1980s, including both the stances of the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations vis a vis nuclear test ban verification. The section concludes with an analysis of the two primary US-USSR collaborative projects in this key sphere – the test ban verification project conducted by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS) and the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) between the US and Soviet National Laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

2022 MB3a Infrasound Sensor Type Approval Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated an updated version of the MB3a infrasound sensor, designed by CEA and manufactured by SeismoWave. The purpose of this infrasound sensor evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, response, passband, sensitivity variation due to changes in barometric pressure and temperature, and sensitivity to acceleration. The MB3a infrasound sensors are being evaluated for use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Preparatory Commission to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

2022 Chaparral 64S Infrasound Sensor Type Approval Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated a new version of the Chaparral 64S infrasound sensor, designed and manufactured by Chaparral Physics. The purpose of this infrasound sensor evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, response, passband, sensitivity variation due to changes in barometric pressure and temperature, and sensitivity to acceleration. The Chaparral 64S infrasound sensors are being evaluated for use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Preparatory Commission to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Imagery Applications for Advanced Event Analytics (WBS 24.3.1.3.3-IDC FY202 Final Project Report)

Accurate event locations and replicability of location analyses are essential for assessing the nature of an event, its context, ambient site conditions, and proximity to relevant facilities and infrastructure. Additionally, accurate event locations provide valuable information that reduce uncertainties, improve confidence in event analyses, and inform in-field verification activities. However, event location/relocation and replicability are difficult due to a number of factors, including spatially-sparse network coverage in some areas of the globe and variability in seismic data processing. This team proposed that the incorporation of high-fidelity imagery as a data backbone to the analytical assessment of a suspected underground explosion and/or an advanced seismic event bulletin produced by the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) could reduce uncertainties and improve confidence in analyses. Specifically, temporally-separated images can reduce uncertainty by identifying areas where change has occurred (e.g., building construction or demolition, road or facilities improvements). The primary goal of this project was to develop an automated geospatial processing script for imagery change detection to better reflect needs of the technical community (including the IDC) and to make the use of such a tool accessible in a variety of settings across platforms. Technical experts at Los Alamos National Laboratory successfully built GAIA: the Geospatial Automated Imagery Analysis tool, to fill this need. GAIA combines five tool components to produce orthorectified time separated imagery and imagery change detection maps. Our toolkit (1) reduces error by providing a standardized workflow for image analyses and (2) significantly reduces processing time from between 7 and 24+ hours to approximately 5 minutes. Technical experts at Sandia National Laboratories supported GAIA via beta-testing and by introducing a web-based system approach for increased applicability. To test the function, performance, broad application, and ease-of-use of GAIA, we applied it to four separate test cases. The results of this preliminary investigation show promise in reducing uncertainty in seismic event locations: if satellite imagery can show regions where operations that produce seismic activity likely occurred, then pursuing imagery to locate epicenters of seismic nuclear events could reduce the time needed to find the true epicenter location.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Imagery Applications for Advanced Event Analytics (WBS 24.3.1.3.3-IDC FY2020 Final Project Report)

Accurate event locations and replicability of location analyses are essential for assessing the nature of an event, its context, ambient site conditions, and proximity to relevant facilities and infrastructure. Additionally, accurate event locations provide valuable information that reduce uncertainties, improve confidence in event analyses, and inform in-field verification activities. However, event location/relocation and replicability are difficult due to a number of factors, including spatially-sparse network coverage in some areas of the globe and variability in seismic data processing. This team proposed that the incorporation of high-fidelity imagery as a data backbone to the analytical assessment of a suspected underground explosion and/or an advanced seismic event bulletin produced by the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) could reduce uncertainties and improve confidence in analyses. Specifically, temporally-separated images can reduce uncertainty by identifying areas where change has occurred (e.g., building construction or demolition, road or facilities improvements). The primary goal of this project was to develop an automated geospatial processing script for imagery change detection to better reflect needs of the technical community (including the IDC) and to make the use of such a tool accessible in a variety of settings across platforms. Technical experts at Los Alamos National Laboratory successfully built GAIA: the Geospatial Automated Imagery Analysis tool, to fill this need. GAIA combines five tool components to produce orthorectified time-separated imagery and imagery change detection maps. Our toolkit (1) reduces error by providing a standardized workflow for image analyses and (2) significantly reduces processing time from between 7 and 24+ hours to approximately 5 minutes. Technical experts at Sandia National Laboratories supported GAIA via beta-testing and by introducing a web-based system approach for increased applicability. To test the function, performance, broad application, and ease-of-use of GAIA, we applied it to four separate test cases. The results of this preliminary investigation show promise in reducing uncertainty in seismic event locations: if satellite imagery can show regions where operations that produce seismic activity likely occurred, then pursuing imagery to locate epicenters of seismic nuclear events could reduce the time needed to find the true epicenter location.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Report Series: Evaluation, Finding Of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation For Building 23-109, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-109, the Mercury Fire Station/Maintenance/Housing Office (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15235) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-109 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-109 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-109 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains some aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗