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Solidification of REDC Organics and Airborne Release Fraction Measurements

The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) generates various liquid organic wastes from processing irradiated targets to recover heavy elements. In the past, these organics were discharged to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) liquid low-level waste (LLLW) system, along with the aqueous waste. Because of a reduction in aqueous LLLW from other ORNL generators and an increase in the radionuclide concentration, particularly 238 Pu, in the organic waste stream, the organics can no longer be discharged to the LLLW system. The plan is to solidify the liquid organic waste for disposal as solid debris waste. The documented safety analysis for REDC uses an airborne release fraction of 5 x 10 -4 with a respirable fraction of 0.2 for plutonium and other actinides from packaged solid debris waste during a fire scenario, for an overall airborne release fraction/respirable fraction of 10 -4 . Solidifying the organic liquids, either by using PM-199 Organoclay ® or by grouting, would produce solid waste forms with no free liquid, which should qualify for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The use of Organoclay would be much simpler to implement inside a hot cell. Granular Organoclay can be added to the organic waste solutions until there is a dry layer on top of the liquid and then allowed to cure for a few hours. Grouting the liquids would require using multiple ingredients and mixing steps. Both methods produced waste forms that trapped cerium, as a surrogate for plutonium, inside the waste, with airborne release fractions during fire scenario tests of well below the 10 -4 limit.

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Composite Analysis Solid Waste Release Data Reduction of Activity Flux from Waste Sites to the Vadose Zone for Baseline Assessment

This environmental calculation file (ECF) describes the data reduction methodology for the solid waste release datasets generated by the Composite Analysis Solid Waste Release (CASWR) model (CP-62766, Model Package Report: Composite Analysis Solid Waste Release Model [CASWR Model]) and documents the resulting reduced datasets for the updated Composite Analysis (CA) baseline assessment. This ECF is in support of the updated Hanford Site CA. The purpose of the updated Hanford Site CA is to provide an estimate of the cumulative radiological impacts from active and planned low-level radioactive waste disposals and other potentially interacting radioactive waste disposal sources that will remain following Hanford Site closure. The vadose zone modeling activities associated with the CA includes solid waste forms as contaminant sources. To support the modeling of solid waste transport from the vadose zone to the groundwater at the Hanford Site, the CASWR model was designed to generate deterministic radionuclide release rates for the Hanford Site Central Plateau solid waste disposal sites. The complete CASWR model-generated dataset for the CA Baseline Assessment consists of 2,378,831 sets of time and release rates (1,073,869 sets for the 200 East Area and 1,304,962 sets for the 200 West Area), representing a course of the simulation from year 1953 to year 12,069, 16 radiological contaminants of potential concern (COPCs), and 237 solid waste sources as documented in ECFHANFORD- 19-0112, Solid Waste Release Calculations for the Composite Analysis Baseline Assessment. For several of the STOMP vadose zone models, the number of release rate data pairs required for release at all waste sites would exceed the limitations imposed by the STOMP modelling software package used to simulate contaminant transport through the vadose zone. As a result, a data reduction of the CASWR dataset is required prior to its use as a source input for the CA vadose zone modeling activities.

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Collaboration for the Management of the Bruce Power Major Component Replacement (MCR) Nuclear Waste - 19630

Bruce Power's Major Component Replacement (MCR) Program will generate large volume waste via steam generators (SGs) and intermediate-level nuclear waste, which will require specialized packaging and handling to safely receive and store it at Ontario Power Generation's (OPG) Western Waste Management Facility (WWMF). The refurbishment of a Candu reactor involves, in part, the removal and replacement of all of a reactor core's fuel channel assemblies. Bruce Power and OPG collaborated to develop nuclear waste management solutions to optimize the use of OPG's existing Steam Generator Storage Building (SGSB) and Retube Component Storage Building (RCSB). By designing specialized Retube Waste Containers (RWCs) and optimizing configurations for the waste to be stored in the buildings, we will reduce the interim nuclear waste storage needs at the OPG WWMF, while improving Bruce Power MCR process efficiencies and reducing the overall costs of the MCR Program (Units 3 through 8). (authors)

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Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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Incineration of European non-nuclear radioactive waste in the USA

Incineration of dry low level radioactive waste from nuclear stations is a well established process achieving high volume reduction factors to minimise disposal costs and to stabilise residues for disposal. Incineration has also been applied successfully in many European Union member countries to wastes arising from use of radionuclides in medicine, nonnuclear research and industry. However, some nations have preferred to accumulate wastes over many years in decay stores to reduce the radioactive burden at point of processing. After decay and sorting the waste, they then require a safe, industrial scale and affordable processing solution for the large volumes accumulated. This paper reports the regulatory, logistical and technical issues encountered in a programme delivered for Eckert and Ziegler Nuclitec to incinerate safely 100 te of waste collected originally from German research, hospital and industrial centres, applying for the first time a 'burn and return' process model for European waste in the US. The EnergySolutions incinerators at Bear Creek, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA routinely incinerate waste arising from the non-nuclear user community. To address the requirement from Germany, EnergySolutions had to run a dedicated campaign to reduce cross-contamination with non-German radionuclides to the practical minimum. The waste itself had to be sampled in a carefully controlled programme to ensure the exacting standards of Bear Creek's license and US emissions laws were maintained. Innovation was required in packaging of the waste to minimise transportation costs, including sea freight. The incineration was inspected on behalf of the German regulator (the BfS) to ensure suitability for return to Germany and disposal. This first 'burn and return' programme has safely completed the incineration phase in February and the arising ash will be returned to Germany presently. The paper reports the main findings and lessons learned on this first of its kind project. (authors)

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Flexible Packaging and Real Time Assay Techniques to Divert Low Activity Waste LLW from the UK LLWR - 18011

Historically, all Low Level Waste (LLW) produced in the UK was sent to the Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) near Drigg in Cumbria in mild steel IP2 containers. However, this single national asset is filling up very quickly and the UK national LLW policy is to divert waste to alternative sites wherever possible. This paper will describe how through a collaboration between Magnox Ltd, NUVIA Limited, Pactec EPS and Augean Plc has allowed for low activity LLW (<200 MBq/Tonne) to be packaged into IP1 flexible bags, assayed within the flexible packages and then consigned to a suitably designed and licensed landfill site. The Magnox site at Harwell in Oxfordshire is in the process of total decommissioning. A project was initiated to explore the viability of utilising the PACTEC LIFTPAC{sup R} IP1 flexible packages which can contain 1 m{sup 3} of waste and assaying the waste using the NUVIA Limited transportable High Resolution Assay Monitor (HiRAM) before sending the waste for disposal at the Augean Plc East Northants Resource Management Facility (ENRMF) in Cambridgeshire. The project led to a fundamental change in the culture of LLW disposal and the paper will explore the commonly held misconception that flexible packaging can only be used for the transportation and disposal of Very Low Level Waste (VLLW). It will also explore how the NUVIA Limited HiRAM system can assay large quantities of these bags in a short time period to a high level of accuracy such that they were able to consign the waste for disposal to ENRMF. This technique and disposal route is open and available to many other waste producers both within the UK and beyond and has proven cost savings to the waste producer. (authors)

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Reviewing Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Cask Storage Programs to Identify Challenges for an Integrated Waste Management System - 17535

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has responsibility for removing commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear power plant sites and disposing of the SNF in a deep geologic repository. However, the methods used by commercial nuclear power plants for onsite storage of their SNF define the starting conditions for DOE efforts to develop a waste management system that includes packaging, transportation, storage, and disposal of commercial SNF. The NWPA (as amended) also charges the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Board) with evaluating the technical and scientific validity of DOE activities related to the management and disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive wastes (HLW). DOE's efforts related to developing an integrated program for storing, transporting, and disposing of SNF and HLW were the focus of a public meeting held by the Board on August 24, 2016, in Washington, D.C. To prepare for the public meeting, the Board's staff compiled information on the dry cask storage systems in service at nuclear power plant sites in order to identify issues that would need to be addressed by DOE in planning to transport SNF away from the sites. This paper is based on a briefing presented to the Board members by the Board's staff before the public meeting. Post-meeting findings and recommendations of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board are documented in the Board letter to the Department of Energy dated December 8, 2016. A note about terminology: in this paper, the phrase 'dry cask storage system' is generic and applies to a complete system used for dry storage of commercial SNF.Within these storage systems, commercial SNF is sealed inside a container called either a cask or a canister depending upon the specific type of storage system used. This distinction is discussed in more detail in the body of this paper. When referring to the containers holding SNF in particular systems, this paper uses the terms 'casks' or 'canisters,' as appropriate. When discussing the collective group of all containers, this paper uses the phrase 'casks and canisters'. Dry cask storage of SNF is a widespread practice throughout the U.S. commercial nuclear industry. As of August 1, 2016, more than 2300 storage casks and canisters were loaded at U.S. commercial nuclear power plant sites. This number is expected to increase by more than 200 casks and canisters annually, reaching a total of approximately 4500 by 2025. Multiple vendors have developed their own unique designs of dry cask storage and transportation systems. The majority of storage system designs (75 percent) feature SNF loaded in welded stainless steel canisters that are stored in ventilated concrete overpacks that allow for convection cooling. Some older dry cask storage system designs do not include a welded stainless steel canister; instead, SNF is loaded directly into a heavily shielded metal cask to minimize radiation exposure to workers and prevent atmospheric release of radionuclides. These types of systems are sealed by O-rings compressed under a bolted lid. After loading, dry cask storage systems are located on concrete pads at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) at nuclear power plant sites and will remain there until the time when they will be transported to a consolidated interim storage facility or a deep geologic repository. Eventual transportation of canistered SNF will include removing the stainless steel canisters from the concrete overpacks, possibly repackaging the SNF, and loading the canisters into specially designed transportation casks for shipment by truck, rail, or barge. In the case of the non-canistered casks, some are approved for transportation and can be shipped after impact limiters are installed on the casks. SNF will need to be removed from casks not approved for transportation and transferred to transport-approved casks. This paper highlights five issues and challenges presented by the nuclear industry's use of dry cask storage systems that will need to be addressed by DOE in developing an integrated waste management system. One example, among the five, is that several dry-storage casks and canisters have received Nuclear Regulatory Commission certificates of compliance for storage only and do not have certificates of compliance for transportation. This will pose a challenge when the SNF must be moved to a consolidated interim storage facility or a deep geologic repository. Another example is that, when loaded with SNF, the total weight of new, larger transportation cask designs will exceed 142 metric tonnes (156 tons) which, when combined with the weight of the rail-car, will exceed the gross weight limit for unrestricted operation on some rail lines. This will also affect future transportation planning for shipments of SNF. All five issues and challenges are discussed in detail in the body of the paper. (authors)

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Scoping Thermal Response Calculations of RNS Waste During Transport to and Disposal at the WIPP

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was contracted by the United States Department of Energy Environmental Management (DOE-EM), Los Alamos Field Office to perform mechanical and thermal scoping calculations as part of a study seeking to understand the ignitability risk of the Remediated Nitrate Salts (RNS) waste drums during transportation from the Waste Control Specialists (WCS) facility to Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and permanent disposal of the waste at WIPP. The scoping thermal simulations described in this report pertain to thermal calculations performed with a packaging system consisting of one Standard Waste Box (SWB) loaded with drums placed inside a Standard Large Box 2 (SLB2). During transportation, the SLB2 is inside Transuranic Package Transporter Model III (TRUPACT-III), which provides the third layer of the packaging. Once at the WIPP, it is assumed the SLB2 is extracted from the TRUPACT-III and maintained above ground, and then subsequently placed underground for permanent disposal. In these proposed configurations, the space between the SLB2 and the SWB is always filled by a layer of insulation consisting of air-filled glass microbubbles except for the bottom which rests directly on the SLB2. The thermal scoping calculations described in this report specifically address whether the introduction of external heat inputs, combined with the contributions from the internally generated radiolytic decay heat and chemical reactions, lead to an unstable thermal state during the time of its movement and placement in the permanent disposal location. The external heat inputs are of two forms: 1) ambient thermal irradiation (e.g., solar and ambient storage/disposal temperatures) and 2) accident-induced fire. Three scoping calculation scenarios were derived as representative, conservative scenarios: 1A) TRUPACT-III transient transportation, 1B) SLB2 48-hour outdoor storage with solar radiation, and 2) fully-engulfing fire during SLB2 handling or emplacement following a steady-state analysis in a 38 °C environment. All the simulated scenarios are conservative relative to the operational conditions expected for handling the waste package during transportation and placement in the WIPP underground disposal unit. The predictions obtained from simulating the three exposure scenarios revealed that adding the SLB2 and the air-filled glass microbubbles to the transport and storage/disposal configurations provides additional thermal protection of the drums beyond what the SWB provides alone, both during long-term above ground insolation and underground during a fire accident. Under the current transportation/storage/disposal concepts, the degree of protection provided by the packaging concept is sufficient to prevent the waste from being ignitable. The simulation results demonstrate that there is adequate margin to safely transport and place the RNS waste from WCS to the WIPP under the current operational concept.

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Managing Low-Level Waste at Dounreay - 16269

Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL) is the site licence company responsible for the clean-up and demolition of Britain's former centre of fast reactor research and development. The Dounreay site requires facilities to dispose of up to 175,000 cubic metres of low level waste (LLW) that has been and will continue to be generated during the decommissioning and restoration of the site. In May 2014, construction of two new vaults for the disposal of LLW at Dounreay was completed, including the necessary roads, infrastructures and services, followed by an encapsulation plant in September 2014. The vaults are located immediately to the northeast of the Dounreay licensed site, on NDA-owned land. The facilities are for disposal of the solid LLW generated at Dounreay and the adjacent Vulcan site only. In 2004, following consultation with stakeholders and members of the public, Dounreay issued the 'Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) Report' on the management of Dounreay LLW. This report assessed potential management options for LLW against a range of criteria, including technical, environmental, cost, health and safety issues. The study was conducted in line with best practice and involved consultation with a range of people, including the local community and organisations with an interest in radioactive waste management. The recommendations and conclusions from the study provided the basis for the 'Dounreay Solid LLW Overall Strategy', which was published in March 2005. A fundamental component of this strategy was the development of new below-ground disposal vaults for LLW at Dounreay. Siting the vaults on land at Dounreay avoids any need to transport the LLW away from Dounreay on public roads. Disposal at Dounreay therefore satisfies the proximity principle of managing the waste at source. Disposal at Dounreay is also consistent with UK Government Policy on LLW management, the Scottish Government's Radioactive Waste Management Policy and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's (NDA's) strategy on management of LLW from the UK nuclear industry. A planning application was initially lodged with the Highland Council in June 2006. The period for the determination of this application was extended to allow the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) sufficient time to assess fully the supporting Environmental Safety Case (ESC). The planning application was re-activated in May 2008, and planning permission was granted by Highland Council in April 2009. The planning permission included 26 conditions on DSRL, covering a wide range of environmental issues such as construction noise/dust, traffic, visual impact and also a condition to develop a community fund aimed at socio-economic development of the area around the Dounreay site. After undertaking the necessary detailed design work, construction of the phase one vaults commenced in November 2011 by principal contractor, Graham Construction. Work was undertaken on both vaults simultaneously, excavating around 243,000 m{sup 3} of rock. When excavation was complete, steel reinforcement was placed and concrete poured to construct the floor slabs. This was followed by the construction of the reinforced walls and then the installation of the steel support structure and materials that form the roof. Mechanical and electrical installation then followed, in parallel with the construction of the vault apron, ramps and access roads. A pumping system and control building was also constructed to remove groundwater from around the vaults to allow the vaults to be kept dry while they are being filled with waste. A layer of excavated material, approximately 3 m thick, was placed across the existing ground surface between the vaults and the coast, to ensure the water table lies well below the new ground surface after closure of the vaults, and that any future trace contaminated groundwater flows out to the sea rather than to the soil zone. This layer is referred to in project documents as the 'enhanced geosphere'. After disposals are completed and the vaults are closed, this layer will be joined to the capping over the vaults so that the ensemble merges visually with the surrounding landscape. The original vegetation and soil mix will be returned as far as is practicable. An encapsulation plant has been constructed to fill the LLW containers with grout prior to disposal in the vault, similar to the process used at the national Low-Level Waste Repository facility (LLWR), near Drigg in Cumbria. The plant has the capacity to grout up to four containers per day. The grout fills voids in the container and helps provide chemical conditions in the vault that limit the release of radionuclides in the far future, after the vault has been penetrated by groundwater. On April 24 2015, active commissioning began at the Encapsulation Plant and LLW Vaults. Half-height ISO containers packed with low level waste are currently being filled with grout and disposed of in the LLW Vault. Also packaged Demolition Low Level Waste (DLLW) is being processed and disposed of in the Demolition Low Level Waste Vault. To date over 2500 packages of DLLW and 70 containers LLW have been disposed of. Completion of construction and the start of operating the Phase One vaults and encapsulation plant are fundamental to the successful and efficient decommissioning of the Dounreay site, upon which many millions of pounds of investment and hundreds of jobs rely.

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The Direct Path To WIPP - 12471

Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM), designated as a small quantity site (SQS) by the National TRU Program (NTP), generated contact-handled (CH) and remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste primarily from the decontamination and clean-out of glove boxes at the Hot Cell Facility (HCF) at Technical Area (TA) V. All of the waste required repackaging, with the CH TRU waste being repackaged from late 2007 through 2011. Three shipments of CH were completed in October 2011, which de-inventoried SNL/NM's legacy TRU waste. In FY11, RH TRU waste was repackaged at the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) located in TAV with the support of the Central Characterization Project (CCP). The waste was originally packaged in SNL/NM fabricated casks, cement or lead-lined 55-gallon drums, or 30-gallon drums. The AHCF is a small hot cell, with access only through a roof port which presented challenges for inserting and removing waste from the hot cell. The CCP provided visual examination operators (VEOs) to observe and document each waste item repackaged, removal of prohibited items, and radiological sampling. Dose-to-Curie measurements were calculated by CCP after a radiological report was prepared using scaling factors determined by the analysis of swipe samples. Finally, headspace gas samples were taken and sent to the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) for analysis. Despite the challenges, the RH waste is on track to be shipped to WIPP in early FY12. The processes used and procedures developed to conduct the repackaging operations, the issues identified and mitigated were challenging but the cooperation between SNL/NM and the Central Characterization Program (CCP) enabled SNL/NM to complete the repackaging and support the characterization and shipment. An inventory list, identification of the campaigns, discussion of the challenges and mitigations, and the final loading of the RH 72-B casks at TA-V for direct shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) will be discussed. Lessons learned from the RH campaigns are: - Some containers that were originally identified as HC-3 have been re-evaluated and became < HC-3 due to the conservative estimates made by the original generators - Operators at the AHCF were not accustomed to the detail required by the VE operators. However, they worked well together and the repackaging was completed ahead of schedule. - The AK was not always accurate as was demonstrated by the solid waste found in the drum during the first visit by EPA. That waste has since been determined to be low-level. - Two drums originally thought to be RH turned out to be CH and arrangement for RTR had to be made quickly. - Six of the original RH repacked drums became low level. - Lessons learned from the CH campaigns were helpful in avoiding many issues. The RH repackaging effort has been a success due to the expertise of the AHCF operators, supervisor, and manager, the conscientious attention to detail of the CCP VE operators, the experience of the CCP DTC and headspace gas sampling staff, and the guidance and support from CCP and CBFO. Sometimes schedules had to be adjusted, processes updated, and issues discussed, but the communication between CCP and SNL/NM was good. SNL/NM hopes to have the legacy RH TRU waste shipped off-site by early 2012. (authors)

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Transportation of Radioactive Waste in Support of Ontario Power Generation's Darlington Nuclear Generating Station Refurbishment Project - 19384

Ontario Power Generation's (OPG) Darlington Nuclear Generating Station (DNGS) is currently executing a major refurbishment of the first of their four Candu reactors. As expected, the volumes of Low and Intermediate Level Waste (LILW) generated from this large-scale project have been significant. As a result, unique solutions were needed for the safe and efficient transportation of radioactive waste from the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station to OPG's Western Waste Management Facility for volume reduction and interim storage. OPG's Nuclear Waste Management Division and the Darlington Refurbishment Project worked together to identify unique radioactive waste transportation solutions. These solutions included staging and temporary storage facilities, new waste containers and specialized transportation packages, additional human resources and enhanced planning and logistics required to transport large volumes of routine and non-routine radioactive waste in a manner that minimized the impact on employee and public safety, project schedule and project costs. From a facilities perspective a shielded 'Marshalling Area' that allowed for loaded transportation packages to be staged was built on the Darlington site and a temporary licensed off-site radioactive waste storage facility close to the DNGS was contracted through a third party vendor. These two facilities allowed for more consistent and efficient schedules that limited radioactive waste shipments during off-hours and avoided peak traffic periods thereby limiting the risk to Refurbishment critical path activities. Special purpose-built transportation packages and waste containers were designed and fabricated to handle unique waste streams such as feeder pipes and other miscellaneous intermediate level waste items associated with reactor dismantling. Twenty-four Type A qualified transportation packages mounted to six flat deck trailers were designed and fabricated to support the shipment of contaminated feeder pipes. An Intermediate Level Waste Utility Container (ILWUC) to be used in conjunction with the Type B qualified Trillium Transportation Package was designed and fabricated to handle unique intermediate level waste streams arising from the reactor dismantling process. Logistics software was used to plan the shipments to ensure waste transportation packages could be loaded, transported, unloaded and returned safely to the project site in a timely manner without impacting project schedules. Several shipping scenarios were simulated and adjusted using the software to ensure that the most efficient use of equipment and resources for the radioactive waste transportation aspects of the project. (authors)

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Evaluation of Technologies to Mitigate the Presence of Gaseous Elemental Mercury in Waste Disposal Containers

A study was conducted to evaluate sorbent technologies that can mitigate the presence of elemental mercury (Hg⁰) in waste containers for mercury-contaminated debris (MCD). Decontamination and demolition (D&D) activities at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) facilities generate MCD requiring offsite disposal. The debris is packaged in appropriate waste containers and may be temporarily stored onsite prior to transport for treatment and/or disposal. During transportation of loads that had no visible liquid Hg at the point of origin, temperature changes can cause Hg⁰ to evaporate, condense, and form droplets on container walls. Furthermore, vibration during transportation could cause beads of Hg to be released from the debris, container walls, and ceiling, resulting in pools of liquid Hg⁰ on the container floor. Waste acceptance criteria (WAC) limitations for commercial disposal facilities, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and ORR mixed low-level waste landfills prohibit the presence of any free liquids in containers identified as a solid waste form. Potential solutions to mitigate the presence of residual liquids that could be formed through vapor condensation include the use of sorbents or similar materials to capture and stabilize volatile Hg⁰ vapors and thus ensure compliance with landfill WAC requirements. This report summarizes data from small-scale laboratory experiments conducted to evaluate sorbent materials for Hg⁰ vapor suppression and sorption of liquid Hg⁰ that could form under relevant transportation and disposal conditions. A series of experiments was conducted to evaluate commercial sorbent materials and their effectiveness for Hg⁰ sorption across a temperature range from 19.4°C to 60°C. The impact of residual moisture on sorption was investigated under relevant conditions, and leaching tests were performed to assess the stability of Hg⁰ captured sorbent materials. The results provide estimates for sorbent quantities needed for a given Hg⁰ mass loading based on experimental results exposing sorbents to gaseous and liquid Hg⁰ at various mass ratios. Overall, sorbents that were most effective for Hg⁰ vapor suppression were brominated activated carbons, mackinawite-based sorbents coated on vermiculite, and sulfur-modified granular activated carbon. Elevated temperatures and moisture conditions did not result in significant increases of Hg⁰ headspace concentrations, and the materials also demonstrated high sorption capacities for the sorption of liquid Hg⁰.

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A Cable Car Transfer System for the Cigeo Access Ramps - An Original Approach - 17035

Andra is currently implementing the detailed engineering phase of the step-wise design of Cigeo (the French HLW and IL-LLW Deep Geological Repository). Various technical issues are at stake, including the definition and development of a key component: a funicular ('cable-car') system dedicated to the transfer (down the access ramp and leading to the underground infrastructures) of the shielding casks housing the waste disposal containers (packages). The present paper starts with a brief description of the Cigeo architecture (i.e. the surface utilities, the service and nuclear ramps, the various shafts and finally the underground facilities). A focus is then made on the 'nuclear ramp' dedicated to the transfer of the waste containers lodged inside the casks (those latter weighing some 100 to 130 metric tons each) and its main geometrical characteristics (slope, length, diameter, structure). Then a discussion follows to detail the rationale having led to the choice of a somehow 'sophisticated' funicular transfer system, at the expense of what could be called 'more conventional' and more straightforward transport solutions (like a transfer system by trucks or by rack and pinion trains). A systematic comparison is finally made between the various solutions, explaining and rating the pros and cons of each concept, via a multi-criteria analysis. This technical choice (and the related justification approach) was submitted to an Experts review at the end of the Preliminary Design phase of Cigeo and comforted by their strong support before the design freeze of this solution was integrated in Cigeo. The following part of the paper is then focused on a description of the main technical components and the mechanical performance of the cable-car system, its current state of design and the set of qualification tests (of key safety components) to be implemented before its effective construction. This article concludes with a timeline of the qualification tests and developments to come. The positive outcomes of this future technical test campaign will also pave the way for the future instruction of the Cigeo licensing file, scheduled as of mid-2018. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Achievements and process improvements in processing transuranic waste at the TRU Waste Processing Center - 15488

Wastren Advantage, Inc., (WAI) is the DOE Prime contractor for the TRU Waste Processing Center (TWPC) located in Oak Ridge, TN. This paper highlights the TWPCs specific achievements and process improvements associated with both Contact (CH) and Remote Handled (RH), Transuranic (TRU) waste receipt processing and repackaging for disposal. The five key improvement areas and achievements include: - The TWPC installed, tested and operated successfully the Drum Venting System (DVS) to vent over-packed CH-TRU waste drums in several configurations including 55-gallon drums over-packed in 79 or 85-gallon drums. - A new Remote Drum Opener (RDO) system was designed, tested and placed in service to vent drums discovered in overpack boxes in the Box Breakdown Area and to vent overpack configurations that could not be handled in the standard DVS (e.g., 110 gallon overpacks and multiple drum configurations). - The Cask Processing Enclosure (CPE) approach to repackaging RH-TRU waste contained in concrete casks was developed and implemented - Hot Cell outage to incorporate planned equipment modifications and improvements to maintain processing rates. - To improve certification and segregation of CH-TRU from drums that meet Low Level Waste criteria for disposal at Nevada the TWPC added additional equipment/facilities for Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) and Real Time Radiography (RTR). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Calculation Package for the Analysis of Performance of Cells 1-6, with Underdrain, of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This calculation package presents the results of an assessment of the performance of the 6 cell design of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF). The calculations show that the new cell 6 design at the EMWMF meets the current WAC requirement. QA/QC steps were taken to verify the input/output data for the risk model and data transfer from modeling output files to tables and calculation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The Belgian R and D feasibility programme on the geological disposal of high-level and long-lived radioactive waste

ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, considers geological disposal in poorly indurated clay as the reference solution for the long-term management of high-level waste (HLW) and intermediate and low level waste, long-lived (ILLW-LL). The disposal concept entails the post-conditioning of the waste in disposal packages and the subsequent disposal of these packages in an underground repository. The R and D feasibility programme on geological disposal aims at demonstrating, at a conceptual level, that the proposed disposal system can be constructed, operated and closed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sodium Components Maintenance Shop (SCMS) Carbonation Vessel – Partial HWMA/RCRA Closure Certification Report

This report documents the Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA)/ Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Partial Closure Certification of the Sodium Components Maintenance Shop (SCMS) Carbonation Vessel. The HWMA/RCRA Closure followed the multi step review and evaluation closure process identified in the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) HWMA/RCRA Partial Permit Closure Plan, October 1, 2015. This closure certification report documents that the SCMS Carbonation Vessel was removed from the SCMS, packaged as hazardous waste and stored for future treatment and disposal, and therefore has met the closure performance standards in accordance with the Department of Energy Idaho National Laboratory Materials and Fuels Complex HWMA/RCRA Partial Permit Closure Plan (EPA No. ID4890008952, October 1, 2015).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗